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Abstract 
 
Esta Tina Ottman 
History's Wound: Collective Trauma and the Israel/Palestine conflict 
Keywords: Israel, Palestine, collective memory, collective trauma, cultural 
trauma, political trauma 
 
In considering the Israel-Palestine conflict, focus has remained on 
conventional major issues: borders, settlements, Jerusalem, Palestinian 
refugee rights and water. Should there be one binational state, or two states 
for two peoples? Yet this is a conflict that is sustained by factors more 
profound than the dispute over limited resources or competing nationalisms. 
The parties’ narratives, continually rehearsed, speak of a cataclysmic event or 
chain of events, a collective trauma, which has created such deep suffering 
and disruption that the rehearsers remain ‘frozen’ amid the overarching 
context of political violence. 
This study offers a critical analysis of the concept of collective trauma 
together with the role of commemorative practices, including core 
contemporary canonical days of memory, and asks to what extent they may 
hinder progress in the resolution of an intractable conflict, such as the 
Israel/Palestine conflict. Without addressing the powerful traumatic current 
that underpins a chronic conflict, no amount of top-down formal peace-making 
is likely to be sustainable. 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This project would never have come to fruition without the vision, experience 
and untiring support of Professor Jim Whitman; it is to him that I owe my most 
profound thanks for all his years of guidance, patience and encouragement. 
Thanks also to Professor Caroline Hughes, for taking me on at a critical 
juncture, and for her stimulating input; and to Dr. Afshin Shahi, for doing so 
much from afar to see me to the finish line. Gratitudes are also due to 
Professor Marie Thorsten, for her careful reading and constructive advice, and 
to my mentor, Professor Betty Reardon, for setting me on the road to peace 
so long ago. I would also like to express my thanks to Michele Mozley, who 
was of tremendous assistance over the years.  
To colleagues Felicity Greenland, Julia Harper, Sally McLaren, Susan 
Pavloska, Lisa Rogers, peers Lubna Kidwai and Tony Sabella, you too have 
been pillars of strength and founts of advice in this long journey.  
Finally, thanks to my family for their love and forbearance throughout it all, 
especially my partner Koby and my brother Simon and sister-in-law Michal 
Hillman. This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of our late father, 
Harvey (Harold) Ottman. 
  
 
 
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ……………………………………………………….………….………….i 
Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………...…………ii 
Table of Contents ……………………………………………….…………….……iii 
List of Figures……………………………………………..……….………………...v 
List of Tables ………………………………………………………..………………vi 
 
Chapter One: Introduction ……………………………………….………………1 
 
1.1 Historical emergence of trauma …………………………………………..…..9 
1.2 War Trauma …………………………………………………….………..……18 
1.3 Growth of medical models: Empirical evidence for trauma ……………....25 
1.4.Trauma and war: Further psychological manifestations …………....…….31 
1.5 Further psychological battlegrounds ………………………………………..38 
1.6 Quantitative measures ……………………………………….……………….41 
1.7 The APA and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of Mental 
      Disorders………………………………………………………………………..42  
1.8 The DSM, ICD and traumatic stress diagnosis …………………………....50 
1.9 Conclusion …………………………………………………….……………….60 
 
Chapter Two: The concept of experiential collectivities ………….………62 
 
2.1 Introduction ………………………………………………….…………………62 
2.2 Forms of Identity and allegiance as collective experience: Social 
      frameworks of memory ……………………………………..………………..64 
2.3 Conceptual challenges to tropes of collective memory: Individual versus 
      collective memory ………………….... ……………………..…………….… 73 
2.4 Collective memory versus history …………………………………………...77 
2.5.Ethical challenges for history and memory: counter-memories ………….86 
2.6 Methodological challenges for collective memory………………………….90 
2.7 Contemporary challenges for collective memory: Temporal, spatial and 
      cultural dimensions of memorialization ………………………….……….…94 
2.8 Conclusion ………………………………………………………….………….99 
 
Chapter Three: Clarifying the concept of collective trauma…………….100 
 
3.1 Introduction ………………………………………….……….………………100 
3.2 Acknowledging controversies ………………………………………………102 
3.3 The Armenian Genocide (1895-1923) ………………………………….…115 
3.4 Refusing recognition ………………………………………………..…….…119 
3.5 Enduring impact …………………………………………...….……………..127 
3.6 New entrants to trauma ……………………………………….…….………128 
3.7 The Holocaust ………………………………………………….……….……131 
3.8 Avoiding recognition …………………………………….….…………….…133 
3.9 Turning points ……………………………………………….…………….…138 
3.10 The banality of evil …………………………….…………….…….….……140 
3.11 Challenges to collective trauma interpretation: The universal, the 
       unexceptional and the particular ……………………………….…………145 
 
 
iv 
 
3.12 Conclusion …………………………………………………….……………152 
 
Chapter Four: The politics of collective trauma: Israel ….….………..…156 
 
4.1 Methodological approaches to collective memory and trauma: The Israel- 
      Palestine conflict …………………..………………………..………….……156 
4.2 Israel – a history of collective traumas ……………………..….………….162 
4.3 Immigration as trauma ……………………………………….….……….…163 
4.4 Holocaust survivors’ trauma ………………………………….………….…164 
4.5 Trauma as historical narrative and constant condition – days of 
      remembrance in Israel ………………………………………………………172 
4.6 Educating towards remembrance ………………………………….………179 
4.7 The IDF and the Shoah …………………………………..…………………183 
4.8 Yom HaShoah and some further political uses of collective trauma .….189 
4.9 Conclusion …………………………………………………….……..………200 
 
Chapter Five: Palestine and the politics of collective trauma ………….204 
 
5.1 Palestine: Empirical evidence of historical trauma …….………..….……204 
5.2 A human geography of trauma ……………….……………………………207 
5.3 The naming of suffering ………………………………….…………………213 
5.4 The correspondence with cultural trauma …………..……………….……215 
5.5 Palestine – trauma as historical narrative and lived condition: The 
      construction of memorial days …………….…………………………….…228 
5.6 Encroaching upon memory: Collective trauma and the politics of  
      return ……………………………………………………….…………………241 
5.7 The Great March of Return: Acute trauma politics ………………………245 
5.8 Concluding remarks …………………………………………………………259 
 
Chapter Six: Reconsidering collective trauma:  Israel and the 
                      Palestinians ……………………………………..………………263 
 
6.1 Introduction: Factoring in collective trauma ………………...….…………263 
6.2 Pressing for peace …………………………………………….….…………265 
6.3 The implications of the Arab Peace Initiative ……………..….……….….266 
6.4 Conclusion: Toward peacebuilding mechanisms and the politics of 
      recognition ………………………………………………..….………….……278 
6.4.1 The therapeutic framework………………………………………….…….279 
6.4.2 Transforming remembrance ……………………………………….……..288 
 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion ………………………..…………………………295 
 
References ………………………………………………………….……………303 
Notes …………………………………………………..…….……………………431 
 
  
 
 
v 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Fig. 1 A clinical taxonomy of psychological traumas, Type 1, 
         after Kira (2001)…………………………………….……………….……..103 
Fig. 2 A clinical taxonomy of psychological traumas, Type 2, 
         after Kira (2001).…………………………………………..…………….…104 
Fig. 3 Developmental pathways of collective trauma…………………………106 
Fig. 4 Map of the Armenian Genocide …………………………………………115 
Fig. 5 Red district where [earlier Hamidian] massacres occurred, after Bliss, 
Turkey and the Armenian Genocides (Bliss, 1896, p. vi) ……………………116 
Fig. 6  Armenian population by country (in thousands). (Kentronhayastan). 
          ………………………………………………………………………...........118 
Fig. 7 Memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe, Berlin (Beate Müller, 
         2012, reproduced with her permission) …………………………………143 
Fig. 8 Yad Vashem interior, Jerusalem (Esta Tina Ottman, 2011)….………144 
Fig. 9 Children’s memorial at Yad Vashem, Jerusalem (Esta Tina Ottman,  
          2011) ……………………………………….………………………………144 
Fig. 10. Soldiers, hold your fire! Israeli media campaign by B’Tselem. 
            [Source: B’Tselem, 2018b] ………………………………..……………257 
Fig. 11 ‘Gaza sends messages of peace to Israelis.’ [Source, Gershon Baskin, 
            Facebook, 2018a] ……………………..…………………..……………258 
Fig. 12 Gaza peace doves initiative. [Source, Gershon Baskin, Facebook, 
            2018b] …………………………………………………..….……….……258 
Fig. 13 AlGhad TV: Gaza Peace Doves. [Source, Gershon Baskin, 
            Facebook, 2018c] ……………………………….………………………259 
  
 
 
vi 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: The three levels of memory (after Assman, 1995) ……………….….75 
Table 2: Collective history and memory (after Wertsch, 2002, p. 45) …….....79 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
History’s Wound: To what extent does the concept of collective trauma 
hinder progress in the resolution of the Israel/Palestine conflict? 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The traumatic impact of war and violence on health, specifically on the mental 
health of individuals and groups, has been regularly noted by the World 
Health Organization and other international agencies.1 These repeated 
observations are common sense, but accounting for their lack of impact on 
human behavior is a challenge of the tallest order.  
In such reports, conflict-engendered trauma is typically described in terms of 
its devastating immediate effects, and mental health and psychosocial support 
(MHPSS) interventions are typically geared towards toward the immediate, 
post-conflict-only situation in which ‘there remains an unfortunate divide 
between the discourse of policy makers and non-government organisations 
on one side, and the dominant academic discourse in psychiatry and 
psychology (with a focus on [long-term] psychological trauma) on the other’ 
(Ventevogel, DeMarinis, Pérez-Sales and Silove, 2013, p. 228). The lack of 
cohesion is not only the result of a multitude of agencies and interdisciplinary 
approaches to the question of how to address the humanitarian effect of 
conflict on civilians and societies; there is also a critical lack of consensus on 
the core concept of psychological trauma in itself.  
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Meanwhile, over a longer trajectory, chronic ongoing conflicts have the 
potential to saturate the ethos of societies, spinning out as they widen their 
locus of suffering. In the case studies at the heart of this inquiry, Israel and 
Palestine (Chapters Four through Six) both societies ‘behave as “trauma 
organized” societies, where violence is tolerated as a normal way of life’ 
(Hallaq, 2003). Choosing to study this conflict in this way places this study as 
part of a trend, whereby increasingly, over the last ten years, ‘international 
relations (IR) scholars have become interested in understanding traumatic 
events and the ways in which they are experienced, felt, perceived, 
memorialized and forgotten, as well as how they influence―and are 
influenced by – norms, identities and interests in world politics’ write Resende 
and Budryte (2014, loc. 245). This intellectual trend is one that accepts 
implicitly the Eurocentric notion of trauma as an underpinning for further 
inquiries; yet, as the author has indicated―through the account above of the 
emergence of psychological trauma and subsequent attempts to medicalize 
trauma by through psychiatric assessment―the core concept itself remains 
highly contested and in a state of evolution.  
This chapter sets the scene of our inquiry, with an analysis of the saliency of 
psychological concepts of trauma as a prequel to examining their wider 
sociological dimensions, in particular the systemic operationalization to 
perpetuate inter- and intra-state/non-state actor ‘intractable’2 conflicts. In 
particular, we will seek to synthesize and elucidate divergent 
conceptualizations of this inchoative paradigm, charting its phenomenological 
adoption by the emergent field of psychiatry through to social and political 
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psychology, in order to contribute an original integrated approach towards 
peacebuilding. 
The ‘archaeology’ of trauma (from the Greek τραῦμα = in the sense of ‘a 
wound’, in this case to the mind or memory) is one that has undergone 
significant paradigm shifts and accreditations in the relatively recent 
history of the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry as a whole; to add 
further complexity, this ‘free-floating signifier’ has expanded laterally in its 
invocation by historians, political scientists, sociologists, social and 
political psychologists, anthropologists, criminologists and critical and 
literary theorists. In the words of Kirmayer, Lemelson and Barad (2007) 
trauma ‘can be seen at once as a sociopolitical event, a 
psychophysiological process, a physical and emotional experience, and 
narrative theme in explanations of individual and social suffering’ 
(location 160-165). Not only can it be viewed from multiple perspectives, 
but it may also require all of their services, as Danieli (2009) notes: 
Massive trauma causes such diverse and complex destruction that 
only a multidimensional, multidisciplinary integrative framework is 
adequate to describe it ... An individual’s identity involves a complex 
interplay of multiple spheres or systems. … Each dimension may be in 
the domain of one or more disciplines, which overlap and interact, 
such as biology, psychology, sociology, economics, law, anthropology, 
religious studies and philosophy … These systems coexist to create a 
continuous conception of life from past through present to the future. 
(Danieli, 2009, p. 351). 
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Yet what we mean when we say ‘trauma’ continues to be an evolving 
concept and the subject of both ontological and epistemological 
controversy. Taking up Foucault’s structuralist, non-teleological concept of 
‘genealogy’ (outlined in the philosopher’s essay ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History’), Ruth Leys gives a gripping account of the ebbs and flows of 
trauma theory in her two seminal works, Trauma: A Genealogy (2000) and 
From Guilt to Shame: Auschwitz and After (2009) as she exposes ‘the 
structural repetitions that have successive theorizations of psychic trauma, 
the tendency for certain theoretical and indeed empirical difficulties and 
tensions to surface again and again at different historical moments or 
cruxes’ (Leys, 2010, p. 657). For Leys, ‘from the central moment of its 
invention in the late nineteenth century the concept of trauma has been 
fundamentally unstable, balancing uneasily—indeed veering 
uncontrollably—between two ideas, theories, or paradigms’ (2000, p. 297) 
that she refers to as ‘mimetic’ and ‘antimimetic’. The ‘mimetic’ Freudian 
model refers to the subject’s amnesiac ‘hypnotic imitation or identification’ 
with the unrecollected trauma stressor, which ‘shatters or disables the 
victim’s cognitive and perceptual capacities so that the experience never 
becomes part of the ordinary memory system’ causing the victim ‘to act it 
[the traumatogenic event] out or in other ways imitate it’ (Leys, 2000, p. 
298). The inability to remember, and the possibility of ‘false memories’3 has 
controversial implications for victims’ ability to testify about their trauma; it 
may also lead to the condition of ‘survivor guilt’, as ‘mimetic theory posits a 
moment of identification with the aggressor, the victim is imagined as 
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incorporating and therefore sharing the feelings of hostility directed toward 
herself’ (Leys, 2000, p. 298).  
 
Antimimetic theory, conversely, places the subject at a remove from the 
traumatogenic event; she becomes ‘a spectator of the traumatic scene, 
which she can therefore see and represent to herself and others’ and 
chimes with our current notion that ‘trauma is a purely external event that 
befalls a fully constituted subject’. Different from mimetic theory’s 
‘assumption of an identification with the aggressor, the antimimetic theory 
depicts violence as purely and simply an assault from without’ (Leys, 2000, 
p. 299). For Leys, the problem with this proposition remains identical, 
inasmuch as the victim’s testimony against trauma may be discredited, 
since the damaged psyche may not be able to recollect accurately or 
recover from the event, despite ‘the advantage of portraying the victim of 
trauma as in no way mimetically complicitous with the violence directed 
against her’ (Leys, 2000, p. 299). A further issue, according to Leys, is that 
the antimimetic hypothesis ‘also lends itself to various positivist or 
scientistic understandings of trauma’ (2000, p. 299) discernable since 
‘survivor guilt’, formerly listed as one of the optional criteria for Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in the American Psychiatric 
Association’s (APA)’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
DSM-III, was omitted in the 1987 revision, DSM-III-R. As we shall see later 
in the discussion of trauma assessment (in section 2 below) diagnosticians 
abandoned the psychoanalytic approach and ‘reverted instead to the 
descriptive-nosological approach of an earlier, Kraepelinian4 psychiatry’ 
(Leys, 2009, p. 183 ). In terms of trauma genealogy, asserts Leys, this  
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constitutes a turning point, almost an epistemic break. It occurred just as 
trauma studies began to burgeon in popularity and ‘extended far beyond 
the boundaries of American psychiatry, literary-critical theory, queer theory, 
and legal thought’ to take on a radically ‘antimimetic’ approach (Leys, ibid). 
From then on, ‘trauma specialists began with almost missionary zeal to 
substitute shame as the emotion that best defined the traumatic state’. In 
contemporary parlance, shame is ‘viewed today as the affect of 
disempowerment, the chief emotional consequence of social injustice and 
inequality’ (Leys, ibid).While Leys’ stance purports to be that of the impartial 
epistemological genealogist, it seems that the ‘truth’ that she wishes to 
expose is the abandonment of the psychoanalytic understanding of trauma 
in favour of contemporary approaches that she decries as ‘scientistic’ 
‘materialist’ and ‘positivist’. 
 
The ‘split genealogy’ of trauma is evident not only in the psychoanalytic-
psychiatric standoff; social constructionists such as Jeffrey Alexander argue 
that ‘trauma is not something naturally existing; it is something constructed 
by society’ (Alexander, in Alexander, Eyerman, Giesen, Smelser and 
Sztompa, 2004b, p. 2). Fassin and Rechtman (2009) concur, as they offer a 
Foucauldian exploration in The Empire of Trauma of the social and political 
consequences of the ‘naturalization’ of the trauma concept. For Alexander, 
psychoanalytical theories of trauma are merely ‘scholarly discussions’ of 
‘lay trauma theory’ (p. 3) while collective trauma concepts, such as those 
developed by Kai Erikson (1976) and Arthur Neal (2005) represent the 
‘Enlightenment versions’ of ‘lay trauma theory’, whereby trauma is ‘a kind of 
rational response to abrupt change’ (Alexander, in Alexander et al., 2004b,  
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p. 3). Both approaches, argues Alexander, share a ‘naturalistic fallacy’ 
since ‘events are not inherently traumatic. Trauma is a socially mediated 
attribution’ (Alexander, in Alexander et al., 2004b, p. 8). Seemingly, when 
trauma is deconstructed, there nothing either good or bad, but thinking 
makes it so: 
 … while every argument about trauma claims ontological reality, as 
cultural sociologists we are not primarily concerned with the 
accuracy of social actors’ claims, much less with evaluating their 
moral justification. We are concerned only with how and under what 
conditions the claims are made, and with what results. It is neither 
ontology nor morality, but epistemology, with which we are 
concerned. (Alexander, in Alexander et al., 2004b, p. 9) 
 
It is further argued that the entire notion of trauma (including the idea of 
collective trauma) is a ‘‘purely Western” social construct, a culturally 
conditioned historical product’ (Young, 1995) owing its genesis to the 
proponents of psychology, psychiatry and neurology in 19th and early 20th 
century Germany and Austria. Ethnographer Rosemary Sayigh, decrying 
the Palestinian Nakba’s exclusion from trauma literature, criticizes the latter 
for its ‘lack of critical self-reflection, undertaken without theorizing … the 
relationship between the West and the non-West … trauma genre scholars 
never theorize the field in terms of global power asymmetry or 
ethnography’s origins as a Western method of studying the non-Western 
world’ (Sayigh, 2013, pp. 53-54). Commenting that although ‘the trauma 
genre began with the Holocaust studies of [Cathy] Caruth and [Shoshana] 
Felman and [Dori] Laub, it is the three volumes edited by Arthur Kleinmann, 
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Veena Das, and others—Social Suffering (1997), Violence and Subjectivity 
(2000) and Remaking a World (2001)—which are generally recognized as 
the foundational references of the trauma genre’ (Sayigh, 2013, p. 53) she 
takes the editors to task for not looking to the causes of war trauma, alleges 
that they see ‘“historical memories of suffering” … as potential causes of 
violence … rather than as results of violence’ and finally that ‘their work 
pays little attention to [ongoing] colonialism as a cause of world suffering’ 
(Sayigh, 2013. p. 54). In particular she objects to Kleinmann and Das’s 
description of ‘“a new political geography” … marking off certain areas as 
“violence prone” [that] disconnects violence in those areas from historic 
centers of international military, political, and economic power. …. The 
neglect of colonialism … is reproduced throughout the trauma genre in the 
form of micro-level and, for the most part, ahistorical case studies’ (Sayigh, 
2013. pp. 54-55). 
 
Yet despite their salient accusations, such dismissals distract from the 
existence of psychic pain, and do not do justice to the complex and 
powerful diversification of trauma theory across disparate fields of 
knowledge and expertise. Without decrying the excavations of trauma 
genealogists and exposés of social constructionists, the researcher 
believes that the baby cannot, so to speak, be cast aside in preference to 
an analysis of the bathwater; ontologically, psychic pain is to be found, in 
almost all times in all societies and also on the individual level; the how and 
why of its transmission to the cultural collectivity is the fruit of 
epistemological construction. It is not the existence of psychic pain that is in 
dispute, but rather its aetiology, its nosology, and its phenomenological 
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presentation, which may differ interculturally; how or whether it can be 
diagnosed; whether it is recognized by the self and/or others, whether or not 
it may be spoken of, acknowledged or displayed; also the hypotheses or 
theories attached to its amelioration. As Hacking (1999) asserts, ‘We need 
to make room, especially in the case of our most serious 
psychopathologies, for both the constructionist and the biologist … spaces 
in which each can work’ (p. 109). 
 
However, without reference to the clinical antecedents, we cannot speak at 
all of trauma; the psychiatric and psychoanalytic fields gave rise its 
conceptualization and classification. In the following sections, I will therefore 
discuss (1) trauma’s epistemology, and, (2) the growth of medical models of 
trauma. The sociological conception of trauma, a construct that is dependent 
on prior clinical dimensions for intellectual sustenance, will be discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
 
1.1 Historical emergence of trauma 
 
Says He, who more wit than 
the Doctor had, Oppression 
will make a wise man Mad  
 
(James Carkesse, ‘The 
Patients Advice to the 
Doctor’, Lucida Intervalla, 
1679) (1979, p. 39) 
 
Any examination of the notion of societal or individual psychic trauma 
requires us to re-examine the historical emergence of the concept of the 
damaged mind itself, and its uncertain liberation from ‘non-medical’ notions 
of madness, such as demonic possession or supernatural torment, which 
course through Western culture from Oedipus to Shakespeare’s Lear and his 
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Fool. Another manifestation of madness was ‘hysteria’. Notes Micale (2010, 
p. 117): 
From Graeco-Roman times onward, hysteria – the disease of 
the wandering womb – had been associated exclusively with 
adult women … for centuries the nervous disorders – 
hypochondriacal melancholia during the Renaissance, “the 
vapors” of Enlightenment France, or Victorian neurasthenia – 
were believed to be the province of the affluent, educated and 
sophisticated. 
However, comments Roy Porter, on balance: 
… derangement was more commonly viewed as diabolic, 
schemed by Satan and spread by witches and heretics. In his 
Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), the Oxford don Robert Burton 
thus identified the Tempter as the true author of despair and 
suicide … His contemporary, the Anglican clergyman Richard 
Napier, who doubled as a doctor and specialized in healing 
those ‘unquiet of mind’, found that many who consulted him 
were suffering from religious despair …(Porter, 2002, p. 19). 
Michel Foucault5 records how in 15th century Germany, ships of ‘Holy Fools’, 
Narrenschiff: 
… drifted from one town to another with their senseless cargo. 
An itinerant existence was often the lot of the mad. It was 
common practice for towns to banish them from inside the city 
walls, leaving them to run wild in the distant countryside or 
entrusting them to the care of travelling merchants or pilgrims. 
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 … They were often entrusted to the care of the river boatmen. 
(Foucault, 2009, p. 9) 
However, by the mid-17th century, the ‘mad’ were no longer so itinerant, and 
more substantial institutions for confinement were constructed, such as the 
infamous Hospital of Bethlem (‘Bedlam’), which was rebuilt in various 
locations around London and survives to this day as Bethlem Royal Hospital, 
one of the institutions of the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation 
Trust.6 
 
The 18th century ‘age of reason’ led to the ‘secularization’ and 
‘pathologisation’ of the unreasonable, as both Porter and Foucault note; 
homo rationalis in the new classical age drew more strongly on the ancient 
Greeks as the initiators of ‘medicalizing madness’, since ‘medicine thus 
excluded the supernatural by definition’ (Porter, 2002, p. 37). Cartesian 
dualism did not allow for insanity to be the work of the devil; Lockean thought 
rendered mental disturbance ‘essentially delusional, a fault in cognition rather 
than in will or passion’ (Porter, 2002, p. 60). For Foucault, this era also 
marked ‘the great confinement’ of the mad and the poor, although Porter 
contests that asylums have always existed throughout history to some 
degree and there was no ‘spectacular surge in institutionalization – it did not 
become the automatic solution. Different nations and jurisdictions acted 
dissimilarly’ (Porter, 2002, p. 93).  
 
These early asylums, however, did become the birthplace of the new field 
of psychiatry and of the development of diagnoses of mental disturbance, 
or ‘nérvose hystéro-traumatique’ (‘hysteria’, as it came to be known)7  
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through the work of Jean-Martin Charcot (1823-1893), who was professor 
of neurology at the psychiatric hospital of Pitié- Salpêtrière in Paris. Van der 
Kolk, Weisaeth and van der Hart (in van der Kolk, McFarlane and 
Weisaeth, 1996) assert that French researchers Briquet and Tardieu 
connected ‘hysteria’ with childhood trauma (mainly sexual trauma) as early 
as 1859 and 1878 respectively, but the diagnoses proved to be highly 
controversial. Charcot’s work was the more celebrated for making the 
hysteria-trauma connection during his research on patients at the Pitié- 
Salpêtrière. Charcot noted ‘how traumatically induced ‘choc nerveux’ could 
put patients into a mental state similar to that induced by hypnosis’ (van der 
Kolk et al, 1996, p. 49) and indeed, from 1878, became one of the 
celebrated earlier practitioners of hypnosis8, gaining him a certain amount of 
notoriety. Bogousslavsky, Walusinski  and Veyrunes (2009) asserted that 
‘Charcot and his school considered the ability to be hypnotized as a clinical 
feature of hysteria, and they repeatedly used this phenomenon in public 
demonstrations’ (p. 195).  
 
Later, in order to describe many conditions such as multiple scelerosis and 
peroneal muscular atrophy and contribute to the identification of numerous 
other disorders, such as Parkinson’s Disease, Charcot also identified the 
dissociative nature of patients’ episodes, owing to earlier traumatic 
experiences, and rejected the notion that ‘hysterics’ were generally females 
at the mercy of their hormones (a popular notion at the time, which 
Sigmund Freud’s early work only served to underline). For Charcot, 
‘hysteria’ was originally ‘a ‘neurosis with an organic basis … permanent 
clinical features in patients who were also prone to paroxysmal fits 
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(grandes crises d’hysterie)’ but later he shifted to more ‘psychological 
considerations … For him, ‘trauma’ became a critical factor which acted 
both as a triggering factor and as a mental representation after an often 
prolonged latency phase, a concept which was at the origin of the first 
ideas developed on hysteria by Freud and Breuer in the 1890s 
(Bogousslavsky et al, 2009, p. 195).  
 
Indeed, the late Richard Webster (1996) credits Charcot (under whom 
Sigmund Freud originally trained in hypnosis) with the invention of 
psychoanalysis, rather than Freud and Josef Breuer themselves, from whom 
later recidivist hypothesizations of ‘hysteria’ emerged, with the 1895 
publication of Studien über Hysterie (Studies in Hysteria). Translator and 
editor of the English edition of Studies in Hysteria James Strachey noted that 
when Freud returned to Vienna from studying under Charcot to establish his 
own practice, ‘hysteria provided a large proportion of his clientele’ (Breuer 
and Freud, 2000, p. xi). Principally it was the ‘hysterical female’ who 
‘epitomized the shattering effects of trauma on the mind’ (Leys, 2000, p. 4). 
Freud and contemporaries considered the mind ‘… as an apparatus for 
registering the blows to the psyche outside the domain of ordinary 
awareness, and hypnotism was used as a psychotherapeutic method for 
retrieving the forgotten, dissociated, or repressed recollections by bringing 
them into consciousness and language’ (Leys, 2000, p. 4). However, Freud 
was later to disengage from hypnosis as a method of treatment so favoured 
by Charcot. 
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Other than Freud, some of Charcot’s students went on to become equally 
distinguished—such as Polish-French physician Joseph Babinski, Georges 
Gilles de la Tourette (for whom Tourette’s Syndrome is named) William 
James and Pierre Janet. Janet ‘was the first to recognize the connection 
between hysterical divisions of the personality and exposure to traumatic 
stress’ (van der Hart and Dorahy, 2009, p. 19) while Babinski rejected 
Charcot’s research in favour of a return to the original ‘hysteria’ notion with its 
inference of ‘simulation’, a stigma that predominated well into World War I as 
‘war hysteria’ or ‘war neurosis’. Babinski’s methods were as controversial as 
those of Charcot; he required ‘male patients to appear completely naked and 
his female ones to wear only knickers’ in order to ‘examine their limbs quite 
freely and to devise innumerable tests for distinguishing organic from mental 
disorders’ (Shephard, 2002, p. 12). Having made his diagnosis, treatment 
included ‘faradism’ (an early version of electric shock therapy).  
 
Neither Charcot nor Babinski’s methods found much favour over the Channel 
in England where ‘“hysteria has never been cultivated’” (Shephard, 2002, p. 
9). Meanwhile, in 1869, the condition of ‘neurasthenia’ was preferred (popular 
among writers, poets and critics, such as Oscar Wilde, Virginia Woolf, Rupert 
Brooke and Ford Madox Ford). Constructed by American neurologist Charles 
Beard, this new ‘“disease of civilisation’ [was] brought about by “complex 
agencies of modern life”: “steam power, the periodic press, the telegraph, the 
sciences, and the mental activity of women”’ (Shephard, 2002, p. 10). 
Shephard notes, ‘Whether ‘real’ or ‘socially constructed’ by doctors and wider 
society, these mental disorders were felt to be on the increase in the 1900s. 
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 “Nervous breakdown is the disease of our age,” one doctor wrote in 1909’ 
(Shephard, 2002, p. 10).  
 
Contemporary conceptions of trauma also owe a significant debt to the work 
of John Eric Erichsen, a British surgeon who noted the phenomena in railway 
accident victims and published On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous 
System (Erichsen, 1867), believing it to be the result of organic damage to 
the spinal cord (‘railway spine’). As Dell (in Dell and O’Neill, p. 725) notes, 
Jean-Martin Charcot also concurred; engaging in the railway trauma debates 
of the 1880s, he diagnosed railway trauma as ‘functional’ impairment due to 
neurosis. Charcot continued to follow the investigation of railway accidents, 
which later became known as “railway brain”, until the search for its aetiology 
was redirected elsewhere, by Charcot’s disciple Pierre Janet, and Freud (the 
latter being less well-known than Janet at the time, who was then considered 
‘the leading scientist in the study of hysteria’ [(van der Hart and Dorahy, in 
Dell and O’Neill, 2009, p. 6]). Freud was to advance his initial notion of 
‘seduction theory’ in 1889 (linked to sexual trauma in infancy) and later the 
‘fantasy hypothesis’. Fassin and Rechtman (2009, p. 31) note that Freud and 
Janet ‘moved a clear step beyond Charcot in connecting the etiology of 
hysteria with a psychological response to an external trauma’ but ‘did not see 
the anatomical link that Charcot postulated.’ Meanwhile, for Janet, external 
trauma plus psychological precondition ‘resulted in hysteria if the trauma 
occurred in childhood, or in trauma neurosis if it happened in adulthood’. 
Such a trauma neurosis may not be assimilated into consciousness, but 
rather produces an alternate split consciousness or ‘dissociation’, affecting 
memory (‘un altération de l’acte de mémoire’) and making the traumatic 
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event ‘unavailable to conscious recall’ (Robson, 2004, p. 19). This 
theorization of ‘dissociation’ remains current to practitioners of psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis, as Dell (2009, pp. 712-713) affirms. Breuer (in Breuer and 
Freud, 2000) concurs with Janet, maintaining that: 
In normal people all ideas that can become current at all enter 
consciousness as well if they are sufficiently intense. In our 
[hysterical] patients we find a large complex of ideas that are 
admissible to consciousness existing side by side with a 
smaller complex of ideas that are not. Thus in them the field of 
ideational psychical activity does not coincide with potential 
consciousness. The latter is more restricted than the former. 
Their psychical ideational activity is divided into a conscious 
and an unconscious part, and their ideas are divided into some 
that are admissible and some that are inadmissible to 
consciousness. We cannot, therefore, speak of a splitting of 
consciousness, though we can of a splitting of the mind. 
(Breuer and Freud, 2000, p. 225) 
 
However, he disagrees with Janet that the 'splitting of a personality rests on 
an innate psychological weakness ('insuffisance psychologique’) … a 
'maladie par faiblesse' ['disease due to weakness'--for Janet, dissociation 
remained symptomatic of a prior deficit], (Breuer and Freud, 2000, pp. 230-
231). Breuer adds, ‘Freud's observations and analyses show that the splitting 
of the mind can also be caused by “defence”, by the deliberate deflection of 
consciousness from distressing ideas’ (Breuer and Freud, 2000, p. 235). 
Leys (2000) aligns Freudian trauma ‘both with the breaching of the protective 
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shield, or unbinding, and with mimetic identification, or binding’ (Leys, 2000, 
p. 33).  
 
Yet it is actually the German-Jewish psychiatrist and neurologist Hermann 
Oppenheim who must be credited with the first fully-expounded usage of the 
contested signifier of trauma in his work, Die Traumatische Neurosen 
(Oppenheim, 1889). While emphasizing the role of the traumatized psyche, 
Oppenheim suggested ‘a third diagnostic category … (hysterical) paralysis 
resulted from the loss of memory pictures, i.e. ideas of the movement, in the 
brain’ (Holdorff and Dening, 2011, p. 466). Oppenheim clashed on this with 
fellow neurologists convening at the 1890 Berlin Medical Congress. In 
particular, Friedrich Jolly claimed that accident insurance legislation and 
injury pensions were to blame for the newly-minted condition (Holdorff and 
Dening, 2011, p. 467). Hacking (1995) also mentions that Erichsen fought for 
accident victims’ compensation, even if their injuries were not directly 
physical. 
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1.2 War Trauma 
Survivors, by Siegfried Sassoon9 
No doubt they’ll soon get well; the shock and strain 
Have caused their stammering, disconnected talk. 
Of course they’re ‘longing to go out again,’ 
These boys with old, scared faces, learning to walk. 
They’ll soon forget their haunted nights; their cowed 
Subjection to the ghosts of friends who died, 
Their dreams that drip with murder; and they’ll be proud 
Of glorious war that shatter’d all their pride… 
Men who went out to battle, grim and glad, 
Children, with eyes that hate you, broken and mad. 
Craiglockhart, October 1917 
[Sassoon, 2007]. 
 
As certain traumatic milestones recede further from us in living memory, the 
interest in memorializing them has conversely expanded, together with 
analysis of the political discourse surrounding lieux de mémoire and the 
manner of preservation and spaces of memory; in the UK, World War I is a 
particular case in point, despite the fact that ‘“only” around 12 per cent of 
British servicemen died in the war’ (Edkins, 2003, p. 23) although many more 
returned deeply damaged. 
  
 
 
19 
 
World War I, which we now associate indelibly with war neurosis, caused a 
particularly reactionary backtracking on sensitivity to trauma. The Horatian 
sentiment of ‘dulce et decorum est pro patria mori’ ‘sweet and fitting to die for 
your own country’,10 recalled ironically by British war poet Wilfred Owen in his 
own poem, Dulce et Decorum Est, was used across Europe to inspire a 
generation of young men to enlist to the horrors of the trenches. While combat 
injuries were looked on as heroic, ‘combat madness’ or ‘war neurosis’ was 
regarded with suspicion as cowardice and treachery, and traumatized 
deserters were court-martialled. Fassin and Rechtman (2009) cite the 
coercive brutality of French war psychiatrist Dr. Clovis Vincent’s ‘famous 
torpille, electrotherapy’ (p . 45) to treat soldiers in order to return them to the 
battlefield as soon as possible; ‘faradism’ (in this case, applying an electric 
current to the skin of ‘malingerers’) was used in Austria-Hungary, France and 
Britain (p. 48).  
In Britain, the war-traumatized were said to be suffering from ‘shell shock’, 
believed to be consequent from proximity to an exploding shell. Dr. Charles 
Myers was among the first to describe shell shock in February 1915 (Shephard, 
2002, p. 1) when ‘military psychology in the UK is generally regarded as 
having begun … and indeed, the recognition of psychiatric injury in general’ 
(Jones and Wessely, 2005, p. 1); Myers battled to allow for treatment and 
recognition of the soldiers’ condition ‘in specialist hospitals’ but ‘came to 
realize that there were other elements in the equation that were out of his 
control’ (Shephard, 2002, p. 27). Grudgingly, the British Army in France gave 
out the directive: 
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Shell-shock and shell concussion cases should have the letter 
W prefixed to the reports of the casualty, if it was due to the 
enemy; in that case the patient would be entitled to rank as 
‘wounded’ and to wear on his arm a ‘wound stripe’”. If, 
however, the man’s breakdown did not follow a shell 
explosion, it was not thought to be ‘due to the enemy’; and 
was to be labeled ‘Shell-shock, S’ (for sickness) and was not 
entitled to a wound stripe or a pension. (Shephard, 2002, p. 
29) (researcher’s italics) 
 
As the war wore on, the number of shell-shocked grew exponentially; 
Shephard (2002, p. 110) records that ‘By 1918 there were no less than 20 
shell-shock hospitals in Britain, six for officers, fourteen for men, with over 
6,000 beds, and numerous “Homes for Recovery”’. Yet still there was no 
accord on shell shock itself, nor on therapeutic treatment for it, within the 
medical profession. Moreover, Britain’s ‘winning of the war naturally led to a 
wish to close ranks … to move on and leave the past behind. … the fact 
that the Army had won somehow legitimized most of its activities’ 
(Shephard 2002, p. 138). An official inquest into shell shock under Lord 
Southborough eventually killed off the term as an accepted notion; the 
Army simply could not cope with the idea that its raison d’être, the waging 
of war, could result in deep damage to its (male) soldiers and to society 
at large; families and relationships suffered incalculably as loved ones 
returned, silent and alienated, prone to irrational fits of rage and sleep 
disorders. Thus: 
  
 
 
21 
 
 
… henceforth the term disappeared from official medical and 
military vocabularies. This represented a remarkable 
paradox. Just at the time when the cultural significance of 
shell shock was beginning to gain ground … it fell from use 
in psychiatric and medical texts until revived in the 1970s as 
an historical introduction to posttraumatic stress disorder … 
Reflected through the Report was the fundamental 
ambivalence felt by the military to psychiatry, an unease that 
remains to this day. (Jones and Wessely, 2005, p. 54) 
 
Nevertheless, as Jones and Wessely note (2005, p. 54), the 
Southborough Report ‘“marks a new era in military medicine in that it 
points out in modern war the mental and nervous stability of the soldier is 
as important as physical fitness”’ (Anon, 1922a, p. 458, in Jones and 
Wessely, 2005, p. 57). Yet at the same time, the Report ‘left the core 
dilemma unsolved: How to compensate the deserving (courageous men 
traumatized by combat) without rewarding those for whom psychological 
injury merely offered an escape from military duty’ (Jones and Wessely, 
2005, p. 54).  
 
Even though shell shock might have fallen from medical prominence, it 
‘passed into common usage and became a synonym for the suffering of 
soldiers during World War One, note Jones and Wessely (2005, p. 60). 
Familiar to us now from poetry, novels, plays, theatre, films and 
television, ‘Shell shock was hijacked by the literary fraternity …  
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transformed from a diagnosis into a metaphor, moving from the medical 
to the metaphysical’ (Jones and Wessely, 2005, p. 60). 
  
In Germany, Oppenheim, who defended his war-damaged patients against 
charges of ‘malingering’, ‘immorality’ and Willenskrankheit (disease of the 
failed will, also variously referred to as Willenversagung, Willenshemmung, 
Willensperrung, Wille zur Krankheit), also lost much status in the debate. 
Leading German psychiatrist Bonhoeffer and contemporaries maintained 
that such conditions were either due to hereditary weakness or a 
Rentenneurose (compensation neurosis). Germany’s 1926 National Health 
Insurance Act (Reichversicherungs Ordnung or RVO) decreed that the 
long-term war shocked could not receive compensation, since persistence 
pointed to ‘predisposition, constitution, “degenerative inclination”’ (van der 
Kolk, Weisaeth and van der Hart, in van der Kolk et al, 1996, p. 51). 
Schäffner (2001), discussing both German war-damaged and accident 
victims’ claims, notes that popular conception considered that: 
… it was not the accident, but actually the insurance itself that 
caused psychic injuries. The accident, which appears as 
psychic trauma, is a discursive bundle in which issues of 
medicine, jurisprudence, and insurance are intertwined … 
Thus the insurance-technical approach to trauma and 
accidents is part of a nonrepressive exercise of power, 
namely, through stimulation and regulation (Schäffner, 2001. 
p. 82).  
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It is noteworthy that the RVO endured until minor modifications in 1959 and 
again in 1975, but was basically maintained in its restrictive spirit until 1992. 
For the German welfare state, the issue with trauma was that ‘causes and 
symptoms that are so difficult to verify lead to the suspicion that the victims 
are presenting fictive injuries’ (Schäffner, 2001, p. 84). A compassionate 
society may well be generally receptive towards the notion of trauma, but at 
root, particularly because of the possibility of legal compensation, there 
remains a lingering whiff of simulation, an historical throwback from the 
debate of war neurosis, as Schäffner reminds us (2001, p. 84). 
 
Leys asserts that nevertheless, ‘a small and increasingly influential minority 
recognized the psychogenic nature of the war neuroses’ (2000, p. 4), 
seeking solutions in Sigmund Freud’s hypotheses on dissociation and the 
unconscious. Indeed, in Vienna, 1920, Freud himself testified—albeit to 
little effect—on the psychological origins of shell shock in the government 
inquiry on the brutal electrotherapy treatment of war-shocked soldiers by 
the reputable Viennese physician Julius von Wagner-Jauregg, (Scott, 
1990, p. 296). On Freud’s principled objection to Wagner-Jauregg and 
other Austrian military psychiatrists, Danto (2016) comments: 
Freud's interpretation of war neurosis was both psychological 
and sociological. Psychologically, when the human mind is 
pressed to an extreme, it reacts to suffering whether or not 
the sufferer is consciously aware of its source in the present. 
In that sense, the psychological difference between war 
neurosis and malingering is one of motivation: neurotics are 
not conscious of their motivation but malingerers are. 
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 Sociologically, citizens had tired of the endless fighting. “We 
had a people's army,” Freud testified. “Men were forced into 
military service, [and] they were not asked whether they liked 
to go to war; that is why one has to understand that people 
wanted to flee.” Freud also indicted the abuse of power in the 
military hospital. “Some physicians forgot their humanitarian 
duties… [and] allowed their sense of power to make an 
appearance in a brutal fashion” (Danto, 2016, p. 52). 
However, at the time, the ‘theoretical lineage of war neurosis—which 
passed through the great work of Oppenheim, Charcot, Freud and Janet—
in no way accounts for the therapeutic methods established from the very 
beginning of the war to treat traumatized soldiers … the war resulted in a 
detour in the history of traumatic neurosis’ (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009, p. 
44). It stained psychiatry’s name, as many of the early treatments basically 
amounted to forms of torture. Meanwhile in the U.S., ‘Public opinion saw 
psychiatry as an instrument of social control, which wrongly classed all of 
the undesirables that U.S. society did not know how to deal with as insane’ 
(Fassin and Rechtman, 2009, p. 85). Some interpretations, however, 
maintain that at least as far as British physicians were concerned, they: 
… received their first practical introductions to the new 
medical psychology while working in army hospitals … They 
subsequently gained a considerable expertise in handling 
and treating nervous disorder and were responsible for a 
prodigious volume of books and articles on psychotherapy 
and psychopathology during the early 1920s. (Stone, 1985, p. 
243, cited in Jones and Wessely, 2009, p. 55.) 
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This did not offset criticism of Freudian psychoanalysis in the UK; Jones and 
Wessely (2009, p. 56) describe the emerging discipline as somewhat 
‘beleaguered’ in the interwar years, as by and large, interest in trauma waned 
after the Great War. However, the Great War set the stage for the later 
development of the category of combat stress reactions (CSR) such as 
‘gross stress reaction’ in the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA)’s first 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I). In addition, 
the interwar work of Abram Kardiner (discussed in section 3.1 below) paved 
the way for introduction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD 
was introduced as a diagnostic category in DSM-III in 1980, receiving 
accreditation in the wake of the Vietnam War.  
 
1.3 Growth of Medical Models: Empirical evidence for trauma 
 
[And] a dream full of horror has still not ceased to visit me, at 
sometimes frequent, sometimes longer, intervals. … as the dream 
proceeds, slowly and brutally, each time in a different way, everything 
collapses, and disintegrates around me, the scenery, the walls, the 
people, while the anguish becomes more intense and more precise. 
… a well-known voice resounds: a single word, not imperious, but 
brief and subdued. It is the dawn command, of Auschwitz, a foreign 
word, feared and expected: get up, "Wstawàch." (Levi, 1995, p. 207) 
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His father died in the concentration camps. ‘The people who came 
back from the camps were never able to talk about it,’ Marceau later 
said. ‘My name is Mangel. I am Jewish. Perhaps that, unconsciously, 
contributed towards my choice of silence.’ (Schubert, 2012, loc. 12)  
 
As the condition of trauma gradually began to be recognized as a form of 
damage, rather than a spiritual or supernatural aberration, it became 
possible to speak of an empirical ‘turn’ towards its study, more or less 
mirroring the developments of psychiatry and psychology that were enabled 
by the development of the rationalist and materialist movements. In the 
medical models that were to emerge, the ‘subjects’ are patients. 
 
The work of Abram Kardiner (1891-1981) marks the emergence of empirical 
studies of trauma. Kardiner—who had been a student-patient under Freud 
during 1921-1922—treated over a thousand patients at the U.S. Veterans 
Hospital in the Bronx between 1923-1925. He related that patients would 
often experience attacks (symptoms would include palpitations, dizziness, 
vertigo, vomiting, loss of consciousness, seizures, numbness, paralysis and 
war nightmares) some years after their war experiences; certain smells, for 
example, might set off the patient’s attack, and if not tackled, led to the onset 
of phobias or failures of adaptation. When he was able to show patients how 
their episodes could be invoked, Kardiner occasionally managed to bring 
relief; but his observation that the reactions were a ‘typical conditioned 
reflex’ (Kardiner, 1941, p. 43) brought him further away from Freud and 
closer to Pavlovian behavioral psychology. 
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In 1941, just after the outbreak of World War II, Kardiner published The 
Traumatic Neuroses of War (Kardiner, 1941). He highlighted the plethora of 
patients’ previous misdiagnoses of malingering and hysteria, and was the 
first to describe in detail the typical symptoms of the traumatically damaged: 
extreme explosive reactions to touch, temperature, sudden sounds, 
becoming fixated on trauma; having flashbacks and panic attacks; becoming 
angry, withdrawn and declining into depression. Above all, Kardiner 
maintained that: 
… the doctor’s task was to intervene before the “defensive 
reaction” had become consolidated and “a new adaptation was 
established on the ruins of what remains of the inhibited 
personality”. There was “reason for haste in diagnosis and 
treatment. It is a race against time.” (Shephard, 2002, p. 156) 
 
Kardiner’s was ‘by far the most sophisticated interpretation of the war 
neuroses yet,’ asserts Shephard (2002, p. 156), in that he succeeded ‘to 
integrate the physiological side with the psychological … for which he coined 
the term a “physio-neurosis”’. Moreover, Kardiner’s work was ‘rooted in hard 
clinical reality over a long period of time in a way that few previous studies 
had been … His message was grim, almost determinist – that war inevitably 
damaged men’ (Shephard, 2002, p. 156).  
 
Meanwhile, although Kardiner’s theories would pave the way for the 
introduction of the concept of PTSD in the DSM-III, one year into the Second 
World War, interest in trauma remained low, perhaps because of his bleak 
prognosis. This situation continued despite post-war empirical research into 
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 ‘the long-term effects of trauma on survivors of the Holocaust—studies from 
the 1950s onwards that identified the existence of a chronic “concentration-
camp syndrome” or “survivor syndrome”’ (Leys, 2000, p. 5; Eitinger, Krell and 
Rieck, 1985). Danieli (2009) recounts how in the late 1960s, she interviewed 
survivors: 
Astonishingly, all of those interviewed asserted that no-one, 
including mental health professionals, listened to them or 
believed them when they attempted to share their Holocaust 
experiences and their continuing suffering. They, and later their 
children, concluded that people who had not gone through the 
same experiences could not understand and/or did not care. 
With bitterness, many thus opted for silence about the 
Holocaust and its aftermath in their interactions with non-
survivors. The resulting conspiracy of silence between 
Holocaust survivors and society … including mental health, 
justice, and other professionals … has proven detrimental to 
the survivors’ familial and sociocultural reintegration by 
intensifying their already profound sense of isolation, 
loneliness, and mistrust of society. ... The conspiracy of silence 
is the most prevalent and effective mechanism for the 
transmission of trauma on all dimensions (Danieli, 1998, pp. 
351-352).  
 
In her books on trauma, Trauma: A Genealogy (2000) and From Guilt to 
Shame: Auschwitz and After (2009) Ruth Leys discusses the delayed 
discovery of ‘survivor guilt’, partly as a result of interviews with 
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psychiatrists who were sympathetic to victims’ distress and did their best 
to allow survivors to claim compensation through West German 
Wiedergutmachung (‘making good’) reparation laws (from 1953 
onwards).11  
 
Yet studies on the long-term effects Holocaust trauma and survivors’ guilt 
syndrome ‘remained somewhat isolated from the literature on combat 
neuroses, and to some extent also from the literature on civilian trauma’ 
(Leys, 2000, p. 15).12 (‘Survivor guilt’ was later dropped as a sub-category of 
PTSD, in DSM-IV.) Retroactively, notes Leys, ‘the Holocaust now appears 
… to have been the crucial trauma of the [20th] century, but also the one that 
can be fully understood in the light of our knowledge of PTSD’. It also points 
to ‘two distinct paths—initially social, then clinical—taken by the notion of 
trauma, and they prefigure the uses of this notion that would become 
widespread throughout the Western world thirty years later’ (Fassin and 
Rechtman, 2009, p. 72). 
 
It is worth pointing out a recent challenge to the theorists of the ‘conspiracy of 
silence’ regarding empirical evidence of traumatized Holocaust survivors 
(leaving aside the proponents of the political instrumentalisation ‘turn’, such 
as the late Peter Novick [2000] and Norman [Finkelstein, 2000]). Cesarani (in 
Cesarani and Sundquist, 2012) profoundly disagrees with the ‘myth of 
silence’, describing it as a ‘set of beliefs almost immune to contrary data’ 
(Cesarani and Sundquist, 2012, Loc.221). He provides a comprehensive 
overview of interviews, archives, and memoirs in many languages and 
asserts that they were in fact overwhelming in quantity, even 
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if the onset of the Cold War hampered their further flow. ‘Contrary to the 
notion that individual survivors were silent or too traumatized to act, they had 
mounted a frenetic, global effort to transmit information about the Jewish 
catastrophe. If anything, they succeeded too well, too soon,’ maintains 
Cesarani (Cesarani and Sundquist, 2012, Loc. 1021). Cohen (in Cesarani 
and Sundquist, 2012) describes the ‘silence’ of traumatised survivors who 
resettled in the US as the mixture of the results of self-censorship in the face 
of incomprehension; silencing by others because the horrific details made 
squeamish American Jews uncomfortable; and psychiatrists and relief 
workers who: 
... in their rush to get the refugees off relief ... ignored, 
minimized or even mocked the newcomers’ references to the 
war, believing that the newcomers wanted special treatment 
because of their experiences. At time the case workers 
suggested that the refugees were weak and dependent, or that 
they were better off because of their experiences, and urged 
their clients to move ahead as quickly as possible and leave the 
past firmly behind. (Cohen, in Cesarani and Sundquist, 2012, 
Loc. 5668) 
For Hasia Diner, the origins of the myth of silence lay perhaps in 1960s 
radical youth counterculture, which in general turned on the earlier 
generation, determined to ‘speak truth to power’, berating the establishment 
for its ‘accommodationist, conciliatory and assimilationist’ appeasing 
behaviour (Diner, in Cesarani and Sundquist, 2012, Loc. 6003). Thus the 
‘veterans, figurative and literal, of the late 1960s ... want to be able to claim 
that they themselves undid the evils of the pernicious post-war period when 
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the Holocaust constituted a taboo topic, an uninvited guest to the community 
table, a reflection of a widespread, self-imposed collective amnesia’ (Loc. 
6160). Historiographers who ‘produced a flawed history and perpetrated an 
injustice to the past’ receive scathing criticism from Diner (Loc. 6174). 
 
What seems clear from all this debate is that for the emergent medical 
(psychiatric) and psychological models of trauma, there was no lack of 
empirical evidence to be found; what was less clear was how to narrate or 
interpret the evidence—and above all, which discipline could claim 
therapeutic ownership.   
 
1.4  Trauma and war: Further psychological manifestations 
 
The Cry of My Lai / It Makes No Difference 
Ivan Lee 
 
There in a ditch, a small baby cried, any man that would do this  
Is bound to be possessed by the devil himself in disguise,  
They may set him free, but he will still hear that small baby cry  
Hey lieutenant, you're not god, you're just a lieutenant  
And the devil possesses your soul13 
 
The term ‘Battle Shock’ or Combat Stress Reaction—CSR—was coined by 
Mullins and Glass for World War II victims (Mullins and Glass, 1973). Yet it 
was the disastrous U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War (1956-1975), rather 
than the mounting empirical evidence emerging from the World Wars or 
Holocaust survivors, which placed trauma most prominently on the 
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psychological map. With the benefit of a certain amount of historical hindsight, 
Fassin and Rechtman (2009, p. 89) comment on how: 
The brutality of the battles, the mounting casualty numbers, the anxiety 
of soldiers’ families—all these factors, highlighted by intense media 
coverage, made this war more and more a presence in the everyday 
life of the United States. It seemed to be happening under the very 
eyes of the people, on their doorstep, within their own being. Trauma—
which everyone understood, and, at least to some extent, shared—was 
no longer a mark of cowardice or malingering. 
 
Familiar to us from a multitude of films, documentaries and contemporary 
accounts, the war ‘more than any other war in the twentieth century … 
redefined the social role of psychiatry and society’s perception of mental 
health,’ according to Shephard (2002, p. 355). The Vietnam war, with its one-
year tour of intense combat duty, was regarded as unique by many 
Americans. In a chilling, hyperbolic essay entitled ‘Stress Disorders Among 
Vietnam Veterans: The Emotional Content of Combat Continues’ psychiatrist 
Chaim Shatan described the experience as ‘terror so total and the 
dehumanization of Orientals so pervasive … that mass slaughter became 
almost as automatic as it was in Nazi death camps’ (Shatan, 1978, p. 43). 
Referring to Stanley Milgram’s infamous studies in the 1960s and early 1970s 
on obedience, Shatan painted a vivid portrait of solders’ transformation into 
killing machines that enforced ‘a type of sensory dislocation’ (Shatan, 1978, p. 
45) but left them profoundly disturbed and unable to cope thereafter, ‘The 
paranoid hyperalertness and autonomic arousal of the combat stance emerge 
as manifestations of disturbed functioning. While obviously adaptational in the 
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combat zone, they are maladaptive elsewhere’ (Shatan, 1978, p. 46). As 
combatants returned home exhibiting signs of wounded psyches, Horowitz 
and Solomon (1975) predicted delayed stress response to their experiences. 
Thereafter, many studies (too many and too conflictive to report on within the 
confines of this project) ‘were published that identified growing numbers of 
servicemen who blamed their symptoms or social maladjustment on their war 
service’ (Jones and Wessely, 2005, p. 129). Shephard (2002, p. 340) inverts 
the chronology of data collection to underline the latency of emergence of 
symptoms that became PTSD: in 1990, a hugely expensive ($9 million) 
Congress-authorised report attests that ‘no less than 480,000 out of the 3.15 
million Americans (15%) who had served in Vietnam were still, fifteen years 
after the end of the war, suffering from war-related psychological problems’ 
and that ‘between a quarter and a third of all who served in Vietnam, had at 
one time or another had the full-blown [PTSD] disorder’. Yet back in 1967, 
U.S. army psychiatrists had been rather more optimistic about the mental 
health of their servicemen and women.14 Post-World War II and Korea, more 
experienced U.S. military psychiatrists believed that ‘“Psychiatric casualties 
need never again become a major cause of attrition in the United States 
military in a combat zone”’ (Bourne, 1970, p. 487, cited in Jones and Wessely, 
2005, p. 129). 
 
Yet the truth was that military psychiatrists fared no better in coping in this 
particular war, due to a number of factors. For one thing, as Shephard (2002, 
p. 344) notes, Vietnam was a ‘“class war”: the burden of the fighting was 
unfairly borne by ethnic minorities and the poor’ while psychiatrists were, for 
the most part, white, and later on in the war, when knowledge of atrocities 
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such as My Lai came to be more widely known, themselves took part in the 
anti-war rebellion against returning mentally unfit soldiers back to the front line 
as soon as possible. The prescription for troops of tranquilisers such as 
Thorazine became widespread; marijuana use was commonplace, and heroin 
addiction became endemic, in keeping with the counterculture spirit from the 
mid-1960s on; the numbing effect of the drug usage may well have accounted 
for the latent stress symptoms that emerged after the war, which was at first 
termed ‘post-Vietnam syndrome’ (Shephard, 2002, pp. 347-353; Jones and 
Wessely, 2005, p. 130). 
 
In a sense, the cultural climate—in particular the revolution of social values 
that took place across the U.S. and Europe in the 1960s—was ripe for the 
diagnosis and acceptance of this new trauma. Shephard credits the 
consequent post-World War II boom in available psychiatric counselling to 
the ‘new “consciousness of trauma” in Western society’ (Shephard, 2002, p. 
355). The roots of the acceptance of the new category grew very slowly from 
post-World War II empathetic reactions to victims of the Nazi Holocaust, but 
flourished rather more in the ambience of the 1960s and early 1970s with 
their rights-based social revolutions—civil, gay and women’s rights (Ann 
Burgess and Linda Holstrom in 1974 identified ‘rape trauma’ syndrome). 
Specifically influential were the activities of anti-war pressure groups, such 
as the Vietnam Veterans Against War veterans group.  The latter publicized 
the massacre carried out by American soldiers in the village of My Lai in 
1969 and held ‘rap groups’ for members to talk openly about their 
experiences; their activities came to involve anti-war psychiatrists such as 
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Mardi Horowitz, Chaim Shatan and Robert Lifton (author of the controversial 
Home From the War [Lifton, 1973]), as did the more widely-based National 
Veterans Resource Project. Finally, APA psychiatrist Robert Spitzer 
appointed a formal Committee on Reactive Disorders that produced the 
PTSD category for DSM-III (APA, 1980).  
 
Reception of the new category was highly controversial. Scott (1990, p. 308) 
points cynically not only to the production of a new ‘regime of truth’ in the 
widening acceptance of the new diagnostic category of PTSD, but that in 
turn, it was used to ‘create other objective realities; such as 
‘acknowledgements of war’s horrors, populations of treatable clinical cases 
of PTSD, patients entitled to insurance coverage’ so that eventually, ‘each 
new clinical diagnosis of PTSD, each new warrantable medical insurance 
claim, each new narrative about the disorder reaffirms its reality, its 
objectivity, its “just thereness”’. Jones and Wessely (2009), critiquing the 
conflictive epidemiological evidence for post-Vietnam PTSD, note that while 
the ‘powerful and charismatic [anti-war] campaigners believed with 
conviction that the Vietnam War was immoral … Others reacted equally 
vehemently against the perceived politicization of psychiatry’ (p. 135). It 
does not sit well with them that ‘nearly all of the studies on the aetiology, 
nosology and epidemiology of PTSD did not precede its introduction in DSM, 
as one might expect, but followed it’ (Jones and Wessely, 2009, p. 135), a 
case of the tail wagging the dog. 
 
Many trauma victims, not only Vietnam veterans but also rape victims, 
battered women and abused children, were lumped together in the new 
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‘regime of truth’, until a more scientific process reconsidered the categories 
with the publication of the DSM-IV (APA, 1994). U.S. researchers Horowitz 
(1978), Terr (1979, 1983) and Krystal (1978) all contributed to the expansion 
of the understanding of PTSD, including not only war but also reactions to a 
whole range of other traumatic life events: sexual violence in war and 
(negative) ‘peace’; familial abuse patterns; accidents, natural disasters (such 
as tsunami, earthquake, hurricane) and man-made disasters; victims of 
terrorism and genocides; refugees and migrants fleeing political violence, 
who face a complex range of additional psychological stressors in unfamiliar 
new cultures. 
 
Later, multinational military involvement in the Gulf War produced a further 
combat-related trauma variant, ‘Gulf War Syndrome’ (Kilshaw, 2004; 
Iversen, Chalder and Wessely, 2007; Cohn, Dyson and Wessely, 2008), 
while PTSD has more recently been diagnosed in Iraq and Afghanistan war 
military (Marx, Brailey, Proctor, MacDonald, Graefe, Amoroso, Heeren and 
Vasterling, 2009; Schnurr, Lunney, Bovin, and Marx, 2009; Tuerk, 
Grubaugh, Hamner, and Foa, 2009; Thomas, Wilk, Rivière, McGurk, Castro 
and Hoge, 2010, Warner, Appenzeller, Grieger, Belenkiy, Breitbach, Parker, 
Warner and Hoge, 2011; Tuerk, Yoder, Grubaugh, Myrick, Hamner and 
Acierno, 2011). Combat stress trauma research has increased 
exponentially, and with it, the implications for and controversial research into 
PTSD-based compensation claims, as Marx and Holowka (2011, p. 1) 
observe: 
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From 1999 to 2010, the number of Veterans of the United 
States military receiving compensation from the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA) for service-connected PTSD increased 
222% to 386,882. This dramatic and rapid increase in the rate 
of diagnosed service-connected PTSD has intensified 
longstanding concerns that the VA’s disability policies, 
procedures, and treatment programs promote compensation-
seeking and illness behavior, while diminishing engagement in 
treatment because Veterans fear loss of compensation. 
 
In a wide-ranging review of research on compensation issues and PTSD from 
the 1990s on, Marx and Holowka conclude that the evidence is ‘mixed’; 
many studies are currently limited by non-standardized ‘psychometrically 
sound’ instruments and methodology; but it seems that ‘direct evidence 
regarding the prevalence of malingering or exaggeration among Veterans 
who are applying for or who have received service connection for PTSD 
does not exist. Prior estimates have only been based on conjecture, case 
examples or small scale convenience samples’ (Marx and Holowka, 2011, p. 
2). Citing a 2005 study of 2,100 cases by the VA Office of the Inspector 
General, Marx and Holowka note that just ‘13 (2.5% of those not adequately 
verified and 0.6% of the total sample) were considered “potentially 
fraudulent” by investigators’. However, they add a caveat that ‘additional 
research with larger representative samples is needed’ to clarify this thorny 
issue. Above all, ‘future research has enormous potential to shape policy … 
as well as to affect the lives of countless Veterans’. 
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  1.5 Further psychological battlegrounds 
 
Conceptualisations of combat stress disorder emanated not only from U.S. 
military involvement in Vietnam. Independently, empirical evidence for war 
trauma was being collected among a contained and exhaustively-
documented population required to serve in the Israel Defence Forces in the 
first Lebanon War that began in 1982, considered to be ‘Israel’s Vietnam’ (the 
repressed memories of conscripts’ traumatic experiences was rendered 
memorably by Israeli film director Ari Folman, in his nightmarish 2008 
autobiographical documentary/animation, Waltz with Bashir).   
 
A newly-formed military research unit on ‘combat reaction’ hand-collected 
and filed soldiers’ data in a pre-computer age for a longitudinal study in order 
to assess factors in CSR risk, effective treatment and recovery. ‘To the best 
of my knowledge,’ writes lead researcher Zehava Solomon, ‘this was the first 
time in military history that a data base of this sort had been established’ 
(Solomon, 1993, p. 13). Questionnaires based on the new DSM-III diagnostic 
criteria and clinical interviews were conducted with CSR subjects and control 
groups in 1982, 1983 and 1984; among the long-term goals were the IDF’s 
need to know what happens: 
… in Israel’s unique circumstances, which require many men to 
participate in war a number of times. What happens to soldiers 
who are exposed to war more than once? Do they become 
stronger and more resistant to battle stress, or does the 
recurrent expose to combat make the more vulnerable in the 
future? (Solomon, 1993, p. 25) 
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In particular, the objective was to clarify ‘how long and profound are the 
wounds of war’ – i.e., to investigate the respective validities of the ‘stress 
evaporation hypothesis’ or the ‘residual stress hypothesis’ (short or long-term 
damage caused by CSR, and the nature of the post-CSR sequelae, i.e. the 
extent of PTSD).  
 
The clinicians experienced the usual significant challenges in arriving at a 
taxonomy of CSR, since sufferers exhibited ‘a very wide range of symptoms 
and behaviors’ in various unpredictable combinations, including anxiety, 
depression, apathy, lack of responsiveness, phobias. This confirms past 
findings of the ‘labile, polymorphic’ character of CSR. There were ‘a range of 
cognitive disturbances, including lack of concentration, the inability to 
understand or communicate … becoming scattered or forgetful’ in addition to 
a variety of ‘somatic symptoms—ranging from heavy perspiration, vomiting, 
nausea, diarrhea,  and loss of appetite to rapid pulse rate and heart 
palpitations, headaches and dizziness, and tics and tremors’ (Solomon, 
1993, p. 31). Some subjects also showed ‘a loss of functioning in some part 
of the body without any organic impairment … paralysis of the limbs and 
mutism. There were many cases, too, of partial amnesia,’ reports Solomon 
(1993, p. 31). Additionally: 
There were casualties who became listless and passive, who 
withdrew into themselves, sitting off to the side, gazing into 
space, not talking to anyone, not fighting. There were 
casualties who became very restless and irritable … Some 
exhibited strong startle reactions. Some burst into rage out of 
all proportion to the supposed provocation … Others worried 
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unduly about their equipment. Rumor mongering and generally 
looking for every and any excuse to panic were also observed 
…. (Solomon, 1993, p. 31). 
 
The findings—that ‘nearly half of the soldiers who sustained a CSR on the 
battlefield were still suffering from pervasive diagnosable disturbances 3 
years after’ (Solomon, 1993, pp. 57-58) despite intensive therapy—gave the 
researchers pause; even the control group exhibited a degree of PTSD, 
despite having been selected as healthy participants (which says something 
about the masculine ‘Sabra’ ethos of the time, in which Israelis did not easily 
seek therapy). Nor did veterans of multiple wars necessarily exhibit greater 
psychological strength; in many cases, past CSRs were re-activated or 
amplified. The implications remain significant for a ‘small, closely-knit’ and 
highly militarized society such as Israel (in which almost all Jewish citizens 
are obliged to take part in military service and reserve service thereafter). 
‘There are relatively few Israelis who are not associated, with a greater or 
lesser degree of intimacy, with someone who has been in combat,’ notes 
Solomon. ‘Thus, even if only a very small number of soldiers sustain CSRs, 
any aftereffects affect the lives of a relatively large circle of people’ 
(Solomon, 1993, p. 54). Emphasizing the critical societal ‘ripple effect’ of 
CSR, Solomon asserts: 
The distressed combatant is not an isolated individual, but part 
of a larger community of immediate and more distant family 
members; of friends, acquaintances, and colleagues; and of the 
nation in whose army he served and in which he was 
traumatized. The personal consequences of his breakdown 
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inevitably touch the lives of many other people, who are 
affected by his distress and who also have a moral 
responsibility to try to repair whatever damage he may have 
incurred on their behalf. (Solomon, 1993, p. 54). 
It is not recorded what Solomon’s employers made of the researchers’ 
ultimate conclusions that ‘the best way to prevent combat-induced psycho-
pathology is to stop making war’ (Solomon, 1993, p. 256) but clearly, since 
just over 20 years have passed since this particular collection of empirical 
evidence for war trauma, the message remained unheard. 
  
1.6 Quantitative measures 
 
This section will discuss controversial attempts to impose a more quantitative 
approach towards the assessment of psychological trauma, beginning with 
the formal classification of symptomology by the APA in its Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manuals of Mental Disorders and its relationship to the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD, adopted by the World Health Organization 
from 1948 on, and now moving towards its 11th edition).15 In tracing this 
process, the preoccupation with the identification of symptom clusters for 
formulating diagnoses—in the absence of a deeper understanding of 
causality—becomes apparent, as Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz noted back 
in 1999, ‘Because the etiology of most mental disorders is largely unknown, 
psychiatric research remains particularly dependent on the principles and 
process of syndrome identification’ (Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz, 1999, p. 
1677). Fifteen years later, we are much more advanced in the breadth of 
trauma research—an extensive and burgeoning field—but perhaps rather less 
so in depth. It is perhaps a reflection of the fact that our knowledge of 
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neuroscience is still relatively in its infancy in comparison to other branches of 
medicine. 
1.7 The APA and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of Mental 
Disorders 
Originally formed in 1844 in Philadelphia due to the need to collect census 
information on mental illness (APA, 2014), the APA’s ancestor, the 
Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the 
Insane, became the American Medico-Psychological Association in 1892. It 
finally acquired its present name, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
in 1921. With each new manifestation, the demand grew to produce a more 
‘scientific’ taxonomy of mental illnesses; modernity seemed to prove 
especially stressful on the American mind.  
 
The Statistical Manual for the Use of Institutions for the Insane, issued in 
1918, was the first such attempt to publish ‘neat categories of mental illness’ 
that had little to do with Freudian accounts of the psyche (Greenberg, 2013, p. 
30). The Statistical Manual was updated ten times from then until 1942, but 
since its original impetus was the harvesting of epidemiological data about 
institutionalised mental patients, it could not speak to the growing numbers of 
psychiatrists dealing with war-shocked servicemen. Greenberg (p. 31, 2013) 
describes the growing chaos in psychiatric clinics: 
… they began to improvise, stretching diagnostic categories to 
fit their patients, inventing labels when that didn’t work, and 
borrowing disease names from other medical specialities 
wherever they could. The armed forces developed their own 
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nosology, as did the Veterans Administration, and these began 
to compete for primacy with the edition of the Statistical Manual 
that had been issued in 1942. 
Greenberg cites the APA’s George Raines’ complaint that by 1948 ‘at least 
three nomenclatures were in general use, and none of them fell into line with 
the International Statistical Classification’ (Greenberg, p. 31, 2013). 
Meanwhile, in 1949 the WHO had published its sixth edition of the ICD, which 
‘for the first time, included a section for mental disorders. ICD-6 was heavily 
influenced by the Veterans Administration nomenclature and included 10 
categories for psychoses and psychoneuroses and seven categories for 
disorders of character, behavior, and intelligence’ (APA, 2014).  
 
By 1950, Raines and his committee had also produced a radical revision, the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual: Mental Disorders (APA, 1952), geared 
towards psychiatrists in search of diagnoses (and as a by-product, medical 
insurance companies in search of clarity) rather than data collection, now the 
task of the newly-formed National Institute of Mental Health. The new DSM 
contained 106 disorders (‘reactions’16) that were grouped either by 
‘impairment of brain tissue function’ or ‘psychogenic origin or without clearly 
defined physical cause or structural change in the brain’ (Sanders, 2011, p. 
397). Being more Freudian and psychoanalytical in character, the less 
pathological, less empirically-based approach did not suit all members.17  The 
manual was expanded in 1968 to 182 ‘disorders’ with the publication of the 
DSM-II (APA, 1968); ‘reactions’ had fallen from favour ‘because [they] implied 
causality and referred to psychoanalysis (terms like “neuroses” and 
“psychophysiologic disorders” remained, though)’ (Tartakovsky, 2011). 
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Over the years, a cloud has hovered over the APA and its association with the 
pharmaceuticals industry (Cosgrove, Krimsky, Vijayaraghavan and Schneider, 
2006; Healy, 2006; Greenberg, 2013; Kirk, 2013; Whitaker, 2010) and in 
particular, over its inclusion of homosexuality in the DSM as a disorder. Bayer 
(1987, p. 3) recorded disapprovingly how: 
In 1973, after several years of bitter dispute, the Board of 
Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association decided to 
remove homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual … Infuriated by that action, dissident psychiatrists 
charged the leadership of their association with an unseemly 
capitulation to the threats and pressures of Gay Liberation 
Groups, and forced the board to submit its decision to a 
referendum of the full APA membership.  And so America’s 
psychiatrists were called upon to vote upon the question of 
whether homosexuality ought to be considered a mental 
disease. The entire process, from the first confrontations 
organized by gay demonstrators … seemed to violate the most 
basic expectations about how questions of science should be 
resolved. … psychiatric experts [were compelled] to negotiate 
the pathological status of homosexuals with homosexuals 
themselves. 
The compromise drawn up by psychiatrist Robert Spitzer de-listed 
homosexuality but allowed for the curious diagnosis of ‘Ego-Dystonic 
Homosexuality’, which was explained as a condition of ‘people who were gay 
and didn’t want to be … the result, at least in part, of “negative social attitudes 
[that] have been internalized”’ (Greenberg, 2013, p. 35). Although Sanders 
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(2011, p.  395) warns us against ‘Presentism’ and ‘Whiggism’ in applying 
contemporary attitudes towards historical social issues, there is no doubt that 
the dispute did much to discredit psychiatry.18 Meanwhile the DSM’s ‘Freudian 
turn’ was, according to Spitzer, drawing the profession into further turmoil; the 
notion that: 
… same-sex love was the result of damage inflicted in childhood 
by absent fathers and overbearing mothers, and that, in general, 
mental suffering was the result of the eternal war among ego, id, 
and superego … [was leading] psychiatry to near shipwreck. … 
Freud’s  theory of mind was a poor substitute for pathological 
anatomy, and the complexes and resistances and defense 
mechanisms … were far too ungrounded in any kind of empirical 
reality to be useful. Proving the existence of ego, id, and 
superego was like proving the existence of the Holy Trinity. 
(Greenberg, 2013, p. 37)  
Consequently, by 1978, Spitzer, Endicott and Robins produced the more 
‘reliable’ Research Diagnostic Criteria: Rationale and Reliability19 (RDC) 
based on the ‘Feighner criteria’,20 ‘specific diagnostic criteria for 15 mental 
disorders that they [the researchers] had been validated by research’ (Spitzer, 
1989, p. 21). Commented Spitzer: 
These criteria filled a void, since the American Psychiatric 
Association’s official Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (at that time, the second edition, DSM-II) only 
contained general and often vague descriptions of the clinical 
features of the various disorders. In contrast, the Feighner 
criteria explicitly indicated which symptoms needed to be 
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present to make the diagnosis, and, in many cases, which 
symptoms, if present, precluded making the diagnosis. (Spitzer, 
1989, p. 21) 
The RDC were very different from the DSM II, which ‘listed illnesses like 
Depressive Neurosis … a “disorder manifested by an excessive reaction of 
depression due to an internal conflict” (Greenberg, 2013, p. 38).21 Instead, the 
RDC contained disorders such as Major Depressive Disorder ‘defined not in a 
paragraph full of Freudian jargon, but as a list of symptoms’ (Greenberg, 
2013, p. 38).  
 
Expanding the research criteria of the RDC led to the publication of the DSM-
III in 1980 (APA, 1980), which was updated seven years later as the DSM-III-
R (APA, 1987), taking psychiatry back to its neo-Kraepelinian22 roots.) The 
500-page DSM-III used an evaluation of five ‘axes’23 addressing ‘mental 
disorder, personality, medical causes, environmental factors, and general 
functioning in diagnoses’ that was ‘viewed as advantageous’ (Sanders, 2011, 
p. 398) and ‘not only restored both internal and external confidence in 
psychiatry; it was also an international bestseller’ (Greenberg, 2013, p. 41). 
Sanders (2011, p. 398) records that clinicians and researchers alike preferred 
the new manual’s ‘atheoretical stance’ and the ‘more comprehensive and 
systematic, and discrete categories’.  
 
Yet the manual also had its critics. Allan Young (1995, p. 100), commenting 
on the DSM-III’s ‘revolutionary turn in American psychiatry’, noted that 
proponents of the previous psychodynamic approach (of psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis) absolutely ‘rejected the notion that any diagnostic language  
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could be atheoretical’ and criticized its ‘lack of nuance’. Furthermore, writing 
about the DSM-III and its successor, the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), which was 
later updated as the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) Kirk and Kutchins complained 
that the manual’s problem still remained: 
The process of revising DSM is increasingly shrouded in the 
rhetoric of science. But if one looks intensively at what was 
identified as the core scientific problem of diagnosis in the 
1970s, unreliability, one discovers that the scientific data used to 
claim success and great improvement simply do not support the 
claim. In fact, it appears that the reliability problem is much the 
same as it was 30 years ago. Only now, the current developers 
of DSM-IV have de-emphasised the reliability problem and claim 
to be scientifically solving other problems. … There are 
important methodological problems that limit the generalisability 
of most reliability studies. (Kirk and Kutchins, 1994) 
Additionally, the artificial multiaxial system also gave rise to problems of co-
morbidity (increased likelihood that patients would tick psychiatrists’ boxes for 
more than one categorization of mental illness) literally ‘trapping 
diagnosticians in a tautological loop’ (Greenberg, 2013, p. 54). 
With each new version of the DSM the process expanded exponentially. In 
addition to two methods conferences, thirteen work groups reported to the 
DSM-IV taskforce, which in turn liaised with ‘more than 60 organizations and 
associations’ (APA, 1994, p. xxiv), carried out 12 field trials in ‘more than 70 
sites and evaluated more than 6,000 subjects’ (APA, 1994, p. xxviii) in an  
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effort to improve reliability and validity; in addition, with an eye on the 
competition, the DSM-IV Task Force worked with the parties responsible for 
reformulating the ICD-10 (WHO, 1992); according to the APA, the ‘codes and 
terms provided in DSM-IV are fully compatible with both ICD-9-CM and ICD-
10’ (p. xxix).24  
 
The latest manual, DSM-V, was published in 2013 to much fanfare and an 
equal amount of controversy. From its pre-publication days on, Chair of the 
Task Force for DSM-IV Allen Frances and DSM-III Task Force Chair Robert 
Spitzer and others engaged in vigorous criticism of DSM-V in a series of 
colourful articles in the Psychiatric Times (Berkson, 2009; Frances, 2009a, 
2009b, 2009c, 2009d; Spitzer, 2009) accusing the current Task Force of lack 
of transparency, inflation of diagnoses and sloppy methodology; the current 
Task Force and its defenders responded (Schatzberg, Scully, Kupfer and 
Reglar, 2009, Carpenter, 2009). Frances also blogged his concerns in The 
Huffington Post and Psychology Today (Frances, 2013a, 2013b) and in his 
latest book (Frances, 2013c). The new manual’s ‘goal to effect a “paradigm 
shift” in psychiatric diagnosis is absurdly premature,’ Frances asserted, 
continuing, ‘… descriptive psychiatric diagnosis does not now need and 
cannot support a paradigm shift. There can be no dramatic improvements in 
psychiatric diagnosis until we make a fundamental leap in our understanding 
of what causes mental disorders’. 
Despite the APA’s controversial history and the history of the DSM itself,, the 
‘Book of Woe’ (Greenberg, 2013) remains still an international standard as far 
as diagnostic criteria are concerned. For better or worse, it influenced the  
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passage of the U.S. of the Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) in 1996 and the 
subsequently revised Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act 
(MHPAEA) in 2008 that allowed patients suffering from mental illness to claim 
for treatment through their insurers.25 The MHPAEA was, however, rather like 
Obamacare, not quite there. As former senators Pete Domenici (a sponsor of 
the bill) and Gordon Smith note in an Op Ed in The Washington Post, ‘Waiting 
for mental health parity’: 
When any law is passed, the federal government must 
implement and enforce it to make its benefits and provisions a 
reality. … Yet regulatory action has stalled since 2010. The final 
rule that would provide clarity to the millions who have a mental 
illness or substance-use disorder, and to their employers, has 
not been issued. This has created uncertainty and confusion for 
employers over what they must cover and when parity applies.  
For example, many health insurance plans still refuse to cover 
lifesaving treatment for eating disorders. Others create 
discriminatory barriers to care, such as imposing stricter prior-
authorization requirements for mental health and addiction 
treatment than for medical benefits. (Domenici and Smith, 2012) 
Meanwhile, the DSM is constantly playing catchup with the International 
Classification of Diseases.26 Writing in the Introduction to the DSM-III-R, 
Robert Spitzer and Janet Williams commented on the intersection of the DSM 
with the International Classification of Diseases: 
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Also in 1983, the American Psychiatric Association was asked to 
contribute to the development of the mental disorders chapter of 
the tenth revision of the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD-10), which is expected to go into effect around 1992. In 
order for the American Psychiatric Association to provide its best 
recommendations, it was necessary to assemble committees of 
experts to review DSM-III and to make suggestions for updating 
it. 
 
The publication of DSM-III coincided with that of ICD-9; the 
publication of DSM-IV was planned to coincide with that of ICD-
10. Although by 1983 there had been only a few years of 
experience with DSM-III, it was clear that, with the burgeoning 
literature in the field, revisions would be needed long before the 
anticipated publication of DSM-IV in the 1990s. (Spitzer and 
Williams, 1987, p. xvii) 
 
Having given a brief history and contextualization of the somewhat chaotic 
and highly controversial movement towards quantitative assessment27 of 
mental health symptoms in the 20th century, we turn our attention specifically 
to the issue of trauma itself as it was presented in the DSM.  
 
1.8 The DSM, ICD and traumatic stress diagnosis 
 
The diagnosis of Gross Stress Reaction (326.3) in the DSM-I (APA, 1952, p. 
40) marks the first attempt to categorize traumatic stress in the APA’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals, and the impact of encroaching modernity 
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and the two World Wars are in evidence in the particular phrasing of the 
diagnosis. Human beings are normally resilient, according to these criteria, 
and if treated ‘promptly and adequately’ after exposure to extreme stress, they 
will recover. Furthermore, if a patient’s condition ‘progress[es] to one of the 
neurotic reactions’, this, too, is likely to be transient. Nevertheless: 
If the reaction persists, this term is to be regarded as a 
temporary diagnosis to be used only until a more definitive 
diagnosis is established. … In many instances this diagnosis 
applies to previously more or less "normal" persons who have 
experienced intolerable stress. The particular stress involved will 
be specified as (1) combat or (2) civilian catastrophe. (APA, 
1952, p. 40) 
Wilson (1994, p. 682) argued that it was Sigmund Freud’s highly influential 
‘conceptualization of traumatic neurosis [that] was basically rewritten into the 
DSM-I’. Freud’s paradigmatic shift from the controversial ‘Seduction Theory’ 
(which formed the conceptual basis of what would later become known as 
PTSD)28 to ‘an oedipal model replete with “phantasies of a psychical vs. a 
material reality”’ inferred an ‘examination of pre-morbid psychic functioning as 
a determinant of mental disturbances, especially anxiety states and neuroses’ 
(Wilson, 1994, p. 684). This, in turn, produced Freud’s conclusion that 
‘traumatic impacts to the self-structure were acute and transient in nature. 
Thus, if there were prolonged reactions to trauma, they were not caused 
directly by the “material reality” of stressor events but by the pre-morbid traits 
and psychodynamics of the individual’ (Wilson, 1994, p. 684). In other words, 
it was not the stressor itself, but the patient’s predisposition, that produced 
latent post-traumatic stress (a notion that was to strike home with 
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diagnosticians where compensation was at issue). This more ‘regressive’ 
approach towards traumatic illness persisted in the DSM-II, noted Wilson, and 
‘reflect[ed] the paucity of hard-headed thinking and empirical inquiry about the 
human consequences of victimization and traumatization’ (Wilson, 1994, p. 
682). The DSM-II shifted Gross Stress Reaction into category 307, where it 
was re-termed ‘Transient Situational Disturbances’: 
This major category is reserved for more or less transient 
disorders … that occur in individuals without any apparent 
underlying mental disorders and that represent an acute 
reaction to overwhelming environmental stress. … If the patient 
has good adaptive capacity his symptoms usually recede as the 
stress diminishes. If, however, the symptoms persist after the 
stress is removed, the diagnosis of another mental disorder is 
indicated. (APA, 1968, p. 48) 
Five sub-categories of ‘Transient Situational Disturbances’ are described—
‘Adjustment reactions’ of ‘infancy’ ‘childhood’ ‘adolescence’ ‘adult life’ ‘late life’ 
(APA, 1968, pp. 48-49), with a note that these terms ‘differ from Category 307 
of the ICD’ since the latter ‘includes only adolescence, adult life and late life’. 
The ICD’s category 308, ‘Behavioral disorders of children’ ‘contains the 
reactions of infancy and childhood’ (APA, 1968, p. 48).  
 
Indeed, Morton Kramer’s introduction to the DSM-II makes much of the 
inadequacy of the ICD-6 (APA, 1968, pp. xi-xv), which was ‘quite unsatisfying 
for classifying many of the diagnostic terms that were introduced in the first 
edition of this manual … nor did it provide for the transient situational 
personality disorders … The exceptions were … gross stress reaction among  
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the transient disorders’ (p. xi). According to Kramer, a working party 
attempted in 1951 to develop ICD-6 further (and the equally ‘unsuitable’ ICD-7, 
introduced in 1955) so that it could be adapted for American use; meanwhile 
the Viennese-British WHO psychiatrist Erwin Stengel ‘published a study 
revealing general dissatisfaction in all WHO member countries’ (p. xii). The 
International Revision Conference that ensued in July 1965 eventually 
produced ICD-8, providing the basis for DSM-II, but was ‘manifestly, a 
compromise which will fully satisfy psychiatrists neither in the U.S. nor in any 
other country’ states Kramer. Nevertheless, the huge multi-state cooperative 
project, ‘an achievement of the first order in international professional 
collaboration … augurs well for ICD-9’ (APA, 1968, p. xv). 
 
Although from the outset the DSM set out to clarify the differences in nosology 
employed by the U.S. Armed Forces, the Veterans’ Association and other 
bodies, it was not until the publication of the DSM-III that the after-effects of 
trauma—in the shape of PTSD—made its highly controversial entry. Whether 
it was an idea whose time had come, or an overdue acknowledgement of the 
suffering in the wake of ‘etiological events’ such as conflict, rape, abuse, 
disasters or accidents, defining and assessing the new disorder gave rise to a 
burgeoning body of research and argument. ‘This monothetic classification is 
the product or achievement of psychiatric discourse, rather than its discovery,’ 
asserts Allan Young (1995, p. 121). Yet it was necessary, for at that time, 
‘There was no place in the existing diagnostic system for either a chronic 
stress syndrome or a delayed one’ comments McNally (2003, p. 230), 
recalling that ‘psychiatrists [such as Robert Lifton] lobbied for inclusion of 
“post-Vietnam syndrome” in the forthcoming third edition’. In the face of  
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considerable opposition, the psychiatrists maintained that the Vietnam War’s 
unique characteristics ‘such as difficulty telling friend from foe, atrocities, and 
unclear military goals’ would contribute to a lengthy epidemic of stress-related 
mental disorders (McNally, 2003, p. 230). Noted McNally, ‘one prominent 
sociologist, a former member of Vietnam Veterans Against the War, has 
argued that advocates for the PTSD diagnosis inappropriately medicalized 
political dissent when they conceptualized the problems of veterans as a form 
of mental illness’. 
 
Summing up the importance of the PTSD’s official recognition, Wilson (1994, 
p. 690) emphasized that the ‘post-ness’ of ‘the nomenclature’ was critical, and 
its inclusion was equally vital for future research and ‘new questions and 
refinements in understanding the complexity of stress response syndromes’. 
Its authentication would ‘promote clarification in terms of differential diagnosis 
and the understanding co-morbid conditions … [and help ] to avoid 
misdiagnosis and by implication, possible mistreatment’ for sufferers. Above 
all, acknowledging the existence of PTSD ‘helped to validate and legitimate 
the suffering of those victimized by stressful life-events’. Achieving legitimacy 
was the key to ‘disability payments, pensions, compensation for injury or as a 
form of legal defense in criminal litigation’.  
 
Categorised among the anxiety disorders, ‘309.81 Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder, Chronic or Delayed’ uniquely focuses on an extraordinary stressor 
(the so-called ‘Criterion A stressor’) a ‘traumatic event’ that can cause the 
sufferer to relive the event, either through ‘painful, intrusive recollections … 
recurrent dreams or nightmares’ or ‘dissociative like states’ causing numbing  
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and detachment (APA, 1980, p. 236). This focus differs from earlier DSMs 
that sought to emphasize patients’ underlying psychopathology and the 
transient nature of trauma.  
 
Other symptoms listed the DSM-III are ‘hyperalertness, exaggerated startle 
response’; insomnia; ‘impaired memory or difficulty in concentrating or 
completing tasks’; and survivor guilt. The traumatized may avoid anything that 
will invoke the original trauma—cross-listed under phobias in DSM-III-R as 
‘phobic avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma’ (APA, 1987, p. 244) 
—and conversely, certain conditions may also be highly evocative. Further 
‘Associated Features’ are depression, anxiety and ‘increased irritability … 
sporadic and unpredictable explosions of aggressive behavior’ coupled with 
erratic or ‘impulsive’ behavior (p. 237). The DSM-III also acknowledges that 
symptoms may not necessarily show immediately after trauma’s impact; there 
may be a ‘latency period’ of months or years before onset of the ‘chronic or 
delayed subtype’.  
 
Seven years later, as the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) was being updated, much 
debate ensued ‘regarding the possible reclassification of Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder from the Anxiety Disorders to the Dissociative Disorder section in 
DSM-III-R’ since the latter included many PTSD symptoms, namely ‘“a 
disturbance or alteration in the normally integrative functions of identity, 
memory, or consciousness,”’ that prevented remembering or even caused 
amnesia (Kluft, Steinberg and Spitzer, 1988, pp. 44-45). A quasi-chicken-and-
egg dilemma—which disorder was a subset of the other—meant that no 
agreement could be found; besides, research on dissociation was still  
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relatively in its infancy, and the committee members elected to table the 
discussion until DSM-IV.29 Meanwhile, the narrative description for disorder 
309.89 (PTSD) was considerably expanded (APA, 1987, pp. 247-249) with 
added definitions of what might constitute a ‘criterion A stressor’;30 more 
complex clarifications in the diagnostic table meant that the 18 criteria 
extended to two pages (APA, 1987, pp. 250-251). In place of ‘C. Numbing 
phenomena’ and the rather vague ‘D. Miscellaneous symptoms’ were ‘C. 
Attempts to avoid situations that might trigger re-experiences or 
traumatogenic distress, or a generalized numbing of responses’ and ‘D. 
Forms of arousal’. In order to qualify for a diagnosis, the patient was required 
exhibit six symptoms from these, including re-experiencing the trauma; phobic 
avoidance; dissociation and unusual hyper-arousal for the duration of at least 
a month, with no previous underlying pathology.   
 
Accordingly, the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) and its textual revision, the DSM-IV-TR 
(APA, 2000)31 continued to extend the definitions of PTSD. In the DSM-IV, the 
narrative description for ‘309.81 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’ extends to 
four pages, including detailed discussions of diagnostic features; ‘specifiers’ 
distinguishing between ‘acute’, ‘chronic’ or ‘delayed onset’ PTSD; a detailed 
description of ‘associated features and mental disorders’ ‘specific culture and 
age features’ and ‘differential diagnosis’ (the latter differentiates the stressor 
in PTSD as ‘extreme (i.e. life-threatening)’ as opposed to ‘of any severity’ for 
Adjustment Disorder, and reminds the diagnostician that certain characteristic 
symptoms, if they manifest themselves ‘before exposure to the stressor’ do 
not constitute PTSD. There are three equally detailed pages for the diagnostic 
criteria. 
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Meanwhile an additional trauma syndrome, acute stress disorder (ASD), was 
recognized in the DSM-I, and also features in ICD-10. The new syndrome was 
included ‘to describe responses to trauma occurring within the first 30 days of 
the event … since the definition of [acute] PTSD did not allow the diagnosis to 
be made until the symptoms had been present for at least 30 days’, explain 
Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz (1999, p. 1678). (The diagnosis was 
described as ‘chronic PTSD’ if symptoms persisted beyond three months.) 
Essentially, the new syndrome was designed to catch and treat sufferers 
before they proceeded to full-blown PTSD, suggesting a continuum of 
traumatic experience. Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz (1999, p. 1678) found 
this defining of ‘boundaries’ problematic, but acknowledged that it addressed 
the issue of patients who were previously only able to receive a diagnosis of 
‘adjustment disorder’ whatever the severity of the trauma experienced. 
 
Although generally similar to PTSD, the new syndrome differed in that it did 
not require a particular number of symptoms from the ‘avoidance’ and 
‘increased arousal’ clusters. Instead, DSM-IV specified the experiencing of at 
least three out of five dissociative symptoms ‘during or after the traumatic 
event: numbing, detachment, or absence of emotional responsiveness; a 
reduction in awareness of surroundings; derealization; depersonalization; or 
dissociative amnesia’ (Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz,1999, p. 1678). 
Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz (1999) also disputed these particular 
requirements as unsupported by data available at that time (p. 1683). Twenty 
years and many longitudinal studies later, ASD still figures in the manual (in 
DSM-V) as research into the syndrome has expanded (Bryant et al., 2010;  
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Bryant, 2013). Data is conflicted as to whether the diagnosis is an accurate 
predictor of PTSD (Bryant, 2013). 
 
However, the most controversial issue for the DSM-IV was the inclusion of 
secondary trauma, ‘learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, 
or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or other close 
associate’ (APA, 1994, p. 424). For McNally (2003, p. 231) this qualified as a 
kind of ‘conceptual bracket creep’:  
No longer must one be the direct (or even vicarious) recipient of 
trauma; merely being horrified by what has happened to others 
now counts as a PTSD-qualifying event. Such secondhand 
exposure seems qualitatively distinct from being subjected to 
artillery bombardment for days on end while huddled in a muddy 
trench. 
Discussing ‘conceptual bracket creep’ regarding research on Americans’ post-
9/11 trauma, McNally cites the Wakefield and Spitzer (2002) argument that 
‘such surveys medicalize expectable human reactions by failing to 
discriminate between genuine symptoms of disorder and normal distress 
reaction’ (2003, p. 231). Perhaps this, then, marks the difference between 
‘medical’ PTSD and the (still) broader sociological conception? 
 
Whatever the answer to this interesting question, the highly controversial 
‘secondary trauma’ diagnosis remains in the current, yet more extensive and 
extensively-researched32 DSM-V (APA, 2013). PTSD remains a ‘disorder’, 
although ‘certain military leaders’ have requested that the stigmatizing 
nomenclature become ‘posttraumatic stress injury’ in order not to put off  
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soldiers who need assistance, in part because ‘others believe it is the military 
environment that needs to change’.33  
 
In this latest DSM, PTSD is re-categorized from among the ‘Anxiety Disorders’ 
(in previous DSMs) and located in a new cluster, ‘Trauma- and Stressor-
Related Disorders’,34 occupying 19 pages of the cluster—perhaps a sign of 
the post-9/11, post-Atocha and post-Fukushima era. The remarkably similar 
pre-condition, ‘Acute Stress Disorder’ (introduced in DSM-IV), follows PTSD in 
the manual. Although the symptomology does not differ greatly from the DSM-
IV , there is a greater focus is on ‘the behavioral symptoms that accompany 
PTSD’ and the APA proclaims that there are ‘four distinct diagnostic clusters 
instead of three … re-experiencing, avoidance, negative cognitions and mood, 
and arousal’.35 The ‘Criterion A’ stressor is now far more explicit, and includes 
‘sexual violence’, while dropping former language describing the patient’s 
response, such as ‘intense fear, helplessness, or horror’ (APA, 2000, p. 467) 
as this ‘proved to have no utility in predicting the onset of PTSD’36. Criterion C 
in the DSM-IV (avoidance and numbing) is listed now as two separate criteria: 
‘avoidance’ (Criterion C) and ‘negative alterations in cognitions and mood’ 
(Criterion D)37. Moreover, children ‘six years and younger’ are now included 
as possible PTSD sufferers, as are those with ‘PTSD dissociative subtype’ 
symptoms (experiencing detachment from reality). For better or worse, DSM-
V continues to widen the net for trauma in our age of anxiety. 
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1.9 Conclusion 
I have noted at the outset the tremendous impact psychological discourses 
have had latterly on the field of international relations, and the highly 
interdisciplinary trends of analysis that have consequently emerged. In 
keeping with this trend, my goal is also to investigate ‘some of the theoretical 
approaches essential for elucidating and interrogating the multifarious roles 
played by the “memory” of traumatic events … in shaping the contours of 
contemporary global politics’ (Bell, 2010, pp. 1-2). In this chapter, I have 
endeavoured to provide historical context of how the concept of psychological 
trauma evolved, by engaging in a detailed account of trauma’s nascence from 
its medical and psychiatric origins; and to give a sense of the feedback loop 
that was produced when further attempts were made to medicalize trauma 
(particularly war trauma) by through psychiatric assessment. 
The inclusion of PTSD in the APA’s DSM manuals (from DSM-III on), 
described above, symbolizes the viewpoint that war (or another overwhelming 
disaster) is what marks the cut-off point between what we can cope with as 
‘normal’ existential stress, and what some (or many) of us cannot tolerate. For 
those whose resilience is damaged, symptoms present as an ‘abnormal’ 
response. Linear time breaks down as the traumatic event returns cyclically to 
distress the sufferer. Moving forward, restoring linear time―and thereby, 
mental health―then becomes a matter for professional diagnosis and 
treatment, in itself a subject of great controversy. Nevertheless, it would be 
cynical not to acknowledge that:  
The inclusion of PTSD as a formal psychiatric diagnosis has had 
substantial social impact. It has provided psychiatrically 
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distressed patients a means for naming and conceptualizing 
how their lives have been altered by traumatic life events, 
thereby providing reassurance they are not “going crazy”. 
(Mletzko and Dunlop, 2011, p. 152 ) 
 
In contrast, other viewpoints take exception to this notion of a one-size-fits-all 
disorder; it masks the fact that stress reactions are normal (rather than 
dysfunctional) responses to an abnormal situation. After all, there is not even 
a clear consensus on what constitutes mental disorders or whether, 
ontologically, they exist at all (Phillips et al, 2012.) Under such circumstances, 
individual therapy is not necessarily a solution (or only part of the solution) 
since whole societies may be regarded as ‘under trauma’; a political and/or 
social ‘response’ is required in this case (Wessely, 2003). A third approach 
attempts to reconcile the psychological with the political and the social. Such 
positions will be discussed further in the forthcoming chapter. 
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Chapter Two – The concept of experiential collectivities 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 considered the emergence of the conception of psychological 
trauma as damage arising from ‘extraordinary experiences in the personal 
lives of individuals’ (Neal, p. 3), in particular as a result of conflicts and 
political violence. The Great War, World War II and the Vietnam War 
produced widespread diagnostic debate over the validation and treatment of 
symptoms of war-related trauma. Together with controversies over 
compensation and pensions for the war-damaged, the debate spilled over 
from the medical fields of neurology, psychiatry and the nascent field of 
psychology into the political, economic and sociological spheres of the old 
and new worlds.  
 
The medical literatures of trauma are helpful for understanding its 
conceptual evolution, but do not explain the overwhelming extent of the 
theoretical bracket-creep, nor clarify the sociological meaning.1 As is 
indicated in Chapter 1, trauma is embedded in multiple discourses and 
multiple fields to the extent that we could say it is never static—indeed, that 
it is contested in all forms of its modes of expression, in how it is 
experienced, manifested, transmitted and asserted.  
 
Before arriving at a rubric for the sociological concept of collective trauma, it 
is necessary to frame the conversation in terms of epistemological trends for 
experiential ‘collectivities’. Since our focus is largely on the nature of the 
‘wounded’ memory that has been traumatized through catastrophic blows to 
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the ‘body collective’ through abnormal phenomena such as war and political 
violence, it is particularly incumbent to consider ‘wounded memory’ in the 
context of the interdisciplinary collective memory theory field on which the 
concept draws heavily.  
 
I will not be referring below to the more transcendental expressions2 of 
collective memory—what James Wertsch (2002, p. 21) terms ‘the strong 
version of collective memory [that] assumes some sort of collective mind or 
consciousness [which] exists above and beyond the minds of the individuals 
in a collective’. Some of these approaches belong to the realm of the 
phenomenological, or, for example, to Jungian psychology that maintains a 
belief in the non-explicable inherited collective consciousness, ‘a collective, 
universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. … It 
consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which can only become 
conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic 
contents’ (Jung, 1980, p. 43) Other approaches belong to a separate, 
parallel discussion on forms of collective identification (such as ethnies, or 
‘imagined’ constructs such as ‘the nation’), which will be included, where 
relevant, later. However, my purpose below is to give a critical account of 
the lineage of memory studies that gave birth to the field of collective 
trauma. 
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2.2  Forms of identity and allegiance as collective experience: 
Social frameworks of memory 
The collective memory field, ‘a memory boom of unprecedented proportions’ 
as Huyssen (1995, p. 5) and others noted, is considered to have 
mushroomed during the 1980s3, although scholars differ as to whether this is 
a first-, second- or perennial-wave phenomenon (Russell, 2006; Blight, 2009; 
Kastner, Najafi and Connerton, 2011). As Paul Connerton explains, ‘In some 
sense, memory studies is really a phenomenon of the last quarter century. 
One hundred years ago, there would have, of course, been studies of 
memory—by Freud, by Bergson, by Proust—but they would have been 
primarily interested in individual memory. What’s happened in the last quarter 
century has been a turn toward cultural memory. And because of this turn, 
the term memory studies has acquired currency’ (Kastner, Najafi and 
Connerton, 2011).  
The field ascribes its origins largely to the work of Bergson disciple and 
Durkheim contemporary, Maurice Halbwachs, who died in Buchenwald in 
1945; but David W. Blight, who claims ‘at least two major memory 
booms’―the first one taking place ‘during 1890-1920, leading up to and 
transformed by World War I and its staggering losses’―locates Halbwachs in 
the first rather than the second ‘boom’, along with other ‘major intellectuals 
who probed memory in their work … including Henry Bergson, Sigmund 
Freud, Marcel Proust, Virginia Woolf, … and others’ (Blight, 2009. p. 243). 
Chronologically, this is of course an accurate observation, yet as we shall 
see, Halbwachs’ understanding of memory was rather different from the 
‘major intellectuals’ who dealt in individual memory, the province of the  
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newly-emerging fields of stream-of-consciousness literature, psychiatry and 
psychology; it represented a revolution of aspect. Yet for English-speaking 
theorizers of collective memory, Halbwachs is most often associated with the 
1980s ‘boom’ as his work took considerably longer to reach us in translation. 
The unfinished La Mémoire Collective (The Collective Memory) published 
posthumously in 1950 in French, only became available in English in 1980 
(Halbwachs, 1980), when it emerged as a seminal text for Anglo-Saxon 
collective memory theorists. An earlier work published in 1925 in French, Les 
cadres sociaux de la mémoire (The Social Frameworks of Memory) became 
available in English still later, in 1992, through Lewis Coser’s translation 
(Halbwachs, 1992).  
The timing of the publication of these two translations may go some way to 
explaining the emergence of the theoretical boom, but other forces, too, were 
at work. For Andreas Huyssen, the turn towards memory is to be contrasted 
against ‘an age of emerging supranational structures’ when ‘the problem of 
national identity is increasingly discussed in terms of cultural or collective 
memory rather than in terms of the assumed identity of nation and state’ 
(Huyssen, 1995, p. 5). Yet the growth of globalization, global governance and 
of cultural identity politics (actually an expansion of the rights movements of 
the late 1960s and 1970s) also took place in a climate of frenetic national 
memorializing: 
France designated the year 1980 as ‘l’année du patrimoine’ 
(heritage year) and England, independently, celebrated its 
national heritage that very same year. Even Israel, where the 
memory of the Shoah has always played a crucial political role  
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for state and nation, has witnessed a marked intensification of 
its memorial culture, and Germany (then West Germany) 
gritting teeth and dutifully contrite, went through a never-ending 
sequence of Nazi related 40th and 50th anniversaries in the 
1980s that produced a number of fascinating debates about 
German identity as well as the embarrassment of Bitburg and 
the Historikerstreit (historians’ debate). All that time, both the 
United States and Europe kept building museums and 
memorials as if haunted by the fear of some imminent traumatic 
loss. (Huyssen, 1995, p. 5) 
Huyssen’s theory is that ‘the current obsession with memory’ is not merely a 
form of millenarian neurosis, but rather ‘a sign of the crisis of that structure of 
temporality that marked the age of modernity with its celebration of the new 
as utopian, as radically and irreducibly other’ (Huyssen, 1995, p. 6). We are, 
quite simply, alienated by high-tech modernity, made anxious by the future, 
by the apparently speeded-up linear propulsion towards futuristic 
technologies that may lead to unknown outcomes; with this comes the 
anxiety of losing the familiar past, and the fear of memory’s opposite, 
forgetting. Connerton—who found certain aspects of forgetting not only 
malign but also benign4—does not attribute the memory ‘boom’ to ‘any single 
factor’ but rather to a ‘confluence of three powerful forces coming together’: 
The first could be described as the long shadow of World War 
II, which continued to exert its impact even as late as the 
1990s. … Another factor in the emergence of memory studies 
has been what I would call “transitional justice.” And by that I  
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mean to say that in the 1980s and 1990s there were 
transformations in various countries—in Argentina, Chile, El 
Salvador, South Africa, in the states of central eastern 
Europe—that had had a very difficult past, on the whole a 
totalitarian or authoritarian past, and had moved toward a more 
democratic form of government. Precisely because they had 
had a difficult past, they had to take up a position about it, they 
had to examine their memories. They had to think about what 
attitude they should take toward the previous perpetrators and 
victims of injustice. And the final significant factor has been the 
process of decolonization, which had very significant 
repercussions—not only for the previous colonizing powers, in 
particular Britain and France—but also for the previously 
colonized powers, in particular Africa and India, who have 
sought, so to speak, to re-appropriate their own memories, 
whereas for the previous colonizing powers, what has emerged 
is what might be described as a politics of nostalgia. 
(Connerton, in Kastner, Najafi and Connerton, 2011) 
Maier, meanwhile, considers that our ‘surfeit of memory’ is due to the fact 
that ‘at the end of the twentieth century Western societies have come to the 
end of a massive collective project. … the end, or at least the interruption, of 
the capacity to found collective institutions that rest on aspirations for the 
future’ (Maier, 1993, p. 147). Discussing the rise of ethnicity and identity 
claims, he believes that ethnicity has ‘trumped’ all other visions for the future, 
leaving nothing to us except to remember: 
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… as we extend recognition to more and more ethnic fragments 
- Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Moldova, etc., etc. - we are 
confused by their claims. Nations in the modern era were more 
than gene pools; they were layered communities - often 
hierarchical, to be sure, with subject and ruling ethnic groups. 
… they encompassed larger aspirations than ethnicity. …The 
modern nation-state grew out of ethnicity, not toward ethnicity. 
… In the twilight of Enlightenment aspirations to collective 
institutions, we build museums to memory, our memory. (Maier, 
1993, pp. 147-149).  
For this reason, surmises Maier, we (by this presumably he means long-
established nation-states) have become so ‘preoccupied’ with lieux de 
mémoire, ‘landscape and place …sometimes monuments’. In an era of 
globalization and ‘permeable’ frontiers, when ‘concept of spatial coherence … 
has faded as a property of nations’, do these lieux de mémoire act as a form 
of surrogate for ‘self-definition’? Perhaps; but many inter- and intra-group 
claims are still founded on territoriality as spaces of memory. Observe 
Luminet et al (on the political crisis between Walloons and Flemings in 
Belgium, to whom an entire issue of the journal Memory Studies is devoted), 
‘political conflicts surrounding the integrity of nation states systematically 
involve conflict of memories (e.g. Licata et al., 2007; Rosoux, 2004).  … 
these conflicts most often include the ignorance – or the rejection – of the 
other group’s memory’ (Luminet, Licata, Klein, Rousoux, Wolff, van Ypersele 
and Stone, 2012, p. 4). The Israel-Palestine conflict—the case study at the 
heart of this project—is another example out of many; almost all post-colonial 
states also preoccupy themselves with the legacies of such memory conflicts. 
 
 
69 
 
Not only political developments but also epistemological trends play a part in 
explaining the turn to memory. Pennebaker and Banasik (1997) attribute the 
construction of the collective memory field to the theoretical possibilities 
opened up by Kenneth Gergen’s 1973 social deconstructionist movement, 
and his consideration that ‘social psychology was a form of history … history 
itself was an impartial truth with social psychological findings serving as 
archival reminders of the ways people thought and behaved at the time the 
studies were conducted’ (Pennebaker and Banasik, 1997, p. 3).5 Although 
they rightly point out that ‘history itself is highly contextual’ (one might add, 
relational) they concur that ‘social psychological processes help to define 
history … Just as the key to the future is the past, the key to the past is the 
present’ (Pennebaker and Banasik, 1997, p. 3). While psychological research 
into memory concentrates on the individual, ‘history is constructed through 
the shared memories of multiple people’ (Pennebaker and Gonzales, 2009, 
p. 171), a claim strongly influenced by the ideas of Halbwachs and echoed by 
the Vygotskian, James Wertsch (Wertsch, 2002; Wertsch, 2009).  
 
Whatever the factors contributory to the timing of the theoretical boom—
political or epistemic—none of them would have been possible without 
Halbwachs’ particular contribution to the polysemous issue of memory: the 
sociological anchoring of individual memory within the memory of groups, for 
‘it is in society,’ wrote Halbwachs, ‘that people normally acquire their 
memories. It is also in society than people recall, recognize, and localize their 
memories. … It is also in this sense that there exists a collective memory and 
social frameworks for memory’ (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 32). This is not only a 
universal property, but it is also specific to each social group, since ‘the  
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particular nature of the group and its collective experience … shapes its 
collective memory … [and] creates a shared memory and identity’ (Russell, 
2006, p. 796). Consequently, ‘every group has its own collective memory 
and that collective memory differs from the collective memory of other 
groups’ (Russell, 2006, p. 796). Halbwachs allows that individuals will have 
their own ‘take’ on their group’s collective narrative,6 but since individuals 
are raised in that group’s society, their memory will be framed by everything 
they absorb from peers and other elements of that social setting 
(Halbwachs, 1980). Memory—and hence, identity—becomes ‘distributed’ or 
‘multivoiced’ (Wertsch, 1991, 2007) or ‘multidirectional’ (Rothberg, 2009) 
relying not only on individuals in the collective, but on different members of 
the collective retaining or sharing different segments of a narrative, mediated 
by ‘cultural tools’ such as ‘narrative texts’ (Wertsch, 2007, p. 8) maps, history 
textbooks, media or other tools that are available in the sociocultural setting 
of the group (Anderson’s ‘print capitalism’ develops this notion with regard to 
the rise of national groups [1983, p. 52]). A group’s memories are thus rarely 
‘the product of an isolated speaker or cognitive agent’ (Wertsch, 1991, p. 6), 
and while individual memories are thus ‘socially framed’, ‘the groups 
themselves also share publicly articulated images of collective pasts’ (Olick, 
2008, p. 156) i.e. representation in all its various forms. ‘For this reason,’ 
explains Olick, ‘Halbwachs distinguished between “autobiographical memory” 
and “historical memory.” The former concerns the events of one’s own life 
that one remembers because they were experienced directly. The latter 
refers to residues of events by virtue of which groups claim a continuous 
identity through time’ (Olick, 2008, p. 156). 
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The implication, however, is that a group’s collective memory reconstruction 
is mostly a memory of a lived experience,7 as distinct from a historian’s 
scholarly analysis, although the latter account is equally likely to be 
subjectively shaped by moral interpretation and the exigencies of coherent 
narration, as Hayden White and others note in the ongoing debate over 
historiography (Domanska, 1998; Sutermeister, 2005/ 2008; White, 1973, 
1987, 1999). (This point will be discussed in further detail in 2:3 Conceptual 
challenges to tropes of collective memory.)  
The ‘lived experience’ does not necessarily have to be consecutive,8 
according to Kansteiner (2002, p. 190): 
Physical and social proximity to past events and their 
subsequent rationalization and memorialization does not have 
to coincide. There is no natural, direct connection between the 
real and the remembered. On the one hand, collective 
memories might exclude events that played an important role in 
the lives of members of the community (for instance, the 
memory of WWII in Japan). On the other hand, socially and 
geographical[ly] distant events might be adopted for identity 
purposes by groups that had no involvement in their unfolding 
(as in the case of Holocaust memory). 
Such memories are, in any case, ‘mediated phenomena’ and what is of 
interest is the ‘means of representation’ (monuments, architecture and other 
sites of memory, cultural artefacts, other visual, aural or discursive means)  
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that tells us much about how such collective memories evolve (Kansteiner, 
1990, p. 190). 
Certain aspects of collective memory (here scholars do not precisely agree 
on which aspects, or cannot determine which aspects Halbwachs intended) 
are not static phenomena, frozen in time, but they aggregate to a certain 
‘concretion’9 that marks a group’s identity or claim to exceptionality (although 
this too, can be contested: Nous sommes tous Charlie / We are not all 
Charlie). Nevertheless, ‘the creation and maintenance of a collective or 
historical memory is a dynamic and psychological process’, argue 
Pennebaker and Banasik (1997, p. 4). The more historical significance that 
an event has to a community, they argue, the more it will be remembered 
collectively; but such collective remembering will nevertheless still greatly 
depend on the more transient issue of our current circumstances and needs. 
Citing the ‘critical period hypothesis’ (events that take place during the ages 
12-25 are most remembered, according the psychological research of Rubin 
in the 1980s)10 they also surmise that that there is a ‘generational effect’ 
regarding which events are most collectively recollected in recent history 
(such as the Kennedy assassination, the Apollo moon landings, the Vietnam 
War; one might add the collective of memory of 911 events, which are 
gradually beginning to subside in reference, and to be more localized to New 
York City). This concurs with Halbwachs’ notion that when a generational 
group that preserves a memory disbands or passes away, that collective 
memory (or site of memory) will also diminish and fade away. 
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2.3  Conceptual challenges to tropes of collective memory: 
Individual versus collective memory 
One of the key conceptual challenges to collective memory theories has 
been the perennial debate over individual versus collective memory. Klein 
(2000, pp. 130-135) takes issue with what she terms the hypostatization of 
‘the New Structural Memory’. Citing Michael Schudson, (Schudson, 1992), 
she retorts  
… the public has gotten memory wrong, and the “social-
scientific tribe” has gotten it right, says Schudson. Not only is 
memory “essentially social,” it is located in “rules, laws, 
standardized procedures, and records ... books, holidays, 
statues, souvenirs.” Memory may also “characterize groups” by 
revealing a “debt to the past” and expressing “moral 
continuity.”… Memory is not a property of individual minds, but 
a diverse and shifting collection of material artifacts and social 
practices … Memory here becomes “structural,” provided we 
use that word with sufficient flexibility to invoke both the notion 
of “social structure” typical of recent social history and the 
notion of systems of difference common in the high 
structuralism descended from Saussurean linguistics. 
Take away the individual from memory, asserts Klein, and what remains is 
objectivized culture: 
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… The most common strategy for justifying the analogical leap 
from individual memories to Memory social, cultural, collective, 
public, or whatever is to identify memory as a collection of 
practices or material artifacts. This is the new structural 
memory, a memory that threatens to become Memory with a 
capital M.  … The items adduced as memory are potentially 
endless, but certain tropes appear time and again. The most 
obvious are archives and public monuments from statues to 
museums, but another, more picturesque body of objects 
qualifies as well, and any cultural practice or artifact that Hegel 
might have excluded from History seems to qualify as Memory. 
Ideally, the memory will be a dramatically imperfect piece of 
material culture, and such fragments are best if imbued with 
pathos. (Klein, 2000, p. 135) 
A further perspective on the individual versus collective memory debate is 
colourfully encapsulated in Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam’s discussion, ‘Collective 
memory – what is it?’ (Gedi and Elam, 1996, pp. 30-50). In a willful 
misreading of Halbwachs—who did not get to finish or refine his theories—
they characterize collective memory as ‘a fabricated version of that same 
personal memory adjusted to what the individual mind considers, rightly or 
not, as suitable in a social environment’. For Gedi and Elam: 
There is no mystery here; the mechanism of collective memory 
and the mechanism of personal memory are one and the same 
and located in the same individual mind. “Collective memory” is 
but a misleading new term for the old familiar “myth” which can  
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be identified, in its turn, with “collective” and “social” 
stereotypes. Indeed, collective memory is but a myth. (p. 47, 
1996)  
These kinds of pronouncements ignore the interplay of the social and 
personal, and best illustrates the ‘danger in drawing stark distinctions 
between individual and collective processes … [and] ’ can encourage the 
tendency to isolate the work of one discipline from that of another’, notes 
Wertsch (Wertsch, 2002, p. 35) namely, psychology, versus other social 
sciences such as sociology and anthropology.11 ‘The distinction between 
individual and collective memory may not be as ironclad as current 
disciplinary divisions would suggest,’ observes Wertsch (2002, p. 37).12  
 
Jan Assmann (1995; 2008, p. 109) finds a median way between the dualism 
of the individual-social collective memory standoff by characterizing memory 
as a phenomenon composed of three levels (see Table 1, below).13 
 
Level Time Identity Memory 
inner 
(neuromental) 
 
inner, subjective 
time 
Inner self Individual memory 
Social  Social time social self, 
person as carrier 
of social roles 
communicative 
memory 
cultural historical, 
mythical, cultural 
time 
Cultural identity 
 
Cultural memory 
Table 1: The three levels of memory (after Assman, 1995).  
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‘On the inner level,’ explains Assmann, ‘memory is a matter of our neuro-
mental system. This is our personal memory, the only form of memory that 
had been recognized as such until the 1920s’. However, ‘On the social level, 
memory is a matter of communication and social interaction. It was the great 
achievement of the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs to show that our 
memory depends, like consciousness in general, on socialization and 
communication, and that memory can be analyzed as a function of our social 
life (Les cadres sociaux; La mémoire collective)’. It is also memory that 
‘enables us to live in groups and communities, and living in groups and 
communities enables us to build a memory’ (Assmann, 2008, p. 109). 
Because of these social and linguistic features of Halbwachsian memory, 
Assmann prefers to call it ‘communicative memory’ and introduces another 
clarificatory term, ‘cultural memory’:  
 
Halbwachs … was careful to keep his concept of collective 
memory apart from the realm of traditions, transmissions, and 
transferences which we propose to subsume under the term 
“cultural memory.” …we insist on including the cultural sphere, 
which he excluded, in the study of memory. We are, therefore, 
not arguing for replacing his idea of “collective memory” with 
“cultural memory”; rather, we distinguish between both forms as 
two different modi memorandi, ways of remembering. 
(Assmann, 2008, p. 110) 
Assmann’s ‘cultural memory’ is ‘a kind of institution’ available in symbolized 
form – from the temporal (rituals and commemorative days) to the spatial 
(sites of memory); in this he also included objectivized cultural objects,  
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noting, ‘Things do not “have” a memory of their own’ but they act as a 
‘trigger’. ‘They carry memories which we have invested into them … dishes, 
feasts, rites, images, stories and other texts, landscapes, and other “lieux de 
mémoire” … ’ (Assmann, 2008, pp. 110-111). ‘On the social level,’ he adds, 
‘with respect to groups and societies, the role of external symbols becomes 
even more important’: 
… because groups which, of course, do not “have” a memory 
tend to “make” themselves one by means of things meant as 
reminders such as monuments, museums, libraries, archives, 
and other mnemonic institutions. … In order to be able to be 
reembodied in the sequence of generations, cultural memory, 
unlike communicative memory, exists also in disembodied form 
and requires institutions of preservation and reembodiment. 
(Assmann, 2008, pp. 110-111). 
 
2.4  Collective memory versus history 
 
The dialogic relation of collective memory to written history provides a further 
major theoretical challenge to memory scholars (see Table 3, below, for a 
summary of various distinctions). Halbwachs and many other theorists of 
collective memory are clear on the ‘distinct boundaries’ of ‘history and 
memory’ (Blight, 2009, p. 241):  
History and memory have distinct boundaries, and we should 
maintain them as best we can. … History is what trained 
historians do, a reasoned reconstruction of the past rooted in 
research; it tends to be skeptical of human motive and action, 
and therefore more secular than what we commonly call  
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memory. … Memory is often owned, history interpreted. 
[Researcher’s italics] Memory is passed down through 
generations; history is revised generation after generation. 
Memory often coalesces in objects, sites, monuments; history 
seeks to understand contexts in all their complexity. History 
asserts the authority of academic training and rules of evidence; 
memory carries the more immediate authority of community 
membership or family experience. (Blight, 2009, p. 241). 
History functions as abstract ‘semantic memory’, rather like earlier forms of 
prehalbwachsian collective memory, asserts Russell (2006), while 
Halbwachs’ version of collective memory more closely resembles personal 
and subjective ‘episodic memory’, except that it is shared within groups, ‘It 
belongs to particular groups, takes lived experience as its object, is part of 
that group’s identity, and cannot be transferred from one group to another’ 
(Russell, 2006, p. 798). Moreover, while memory is very much about the past, 
it only exists in the present, if it is ‘alive’ and lived by ‘re-presentation’ in the 
community (or by the individual), as Huyssen (1995, p. 3) explains: 
The temporal status of any act of memory is always the present 
and not, as some naïve epistemology might have it, the past 
itself, even though all memory in some ineradicable sense is 
dependent on some past event or experience. It is this tenuous 
fissure between past and present that constitutes memory, 
making it powerfully alive and distinct from the archive or any 
other mere system of storage and retrieval. 
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Rothberg (2009, p. 3) concurs with this, reiterating Richard Terdiman’s 
definition that ‘memory is the past made present … a contemporary 
phenomenon, something that, while concerned with the past, happens in the 
present’. He emphasizes the non-static, active nature of memory; it is ‘a form 
of work, working through, labor, or action’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 3).  
Collective memory History 
“Subjective” “Objective” 
 Single committed 
perspective 
 Distanced from any particular 
perspective 
 Reflects a particular group’s 
social framework  
 Reflects no particular social 
framework 
 Unselfconscious  Critical, reflective stance 
 Impatient with ambiguity and 
motives and the 
interpretation of events 
 Recognizes ambiguity 
 Focus on stable, unchanging 
group essence 
  
 
 Focus on transformation 
Denial of “pastness” about events     Focus on historicity 
 Links the past with the 
present 
 Differentiates the past from the 
present 
 Ahistorical, antihistorical  Views past events as taking 
place ‘then and not now’ 
Commemorative voice Historical voice 
 Museum as a temple  Museum as a forum 
 Unquestionable heroic 
narratives 
 Disagreement, change and 
controversy as part of ongoing 
historical interpretation 
Table 2 Collective history and memory (after Wertsch, 2002, p. 45) 
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What Halbwachs intended by collective memory, writes Peter Novick, author 
of the influential The Holocaust in American Life, ‘is in crucial senses 
ahistorical, even antihistorical’ (Novick, 2000, p. 3): 
To understand something historically is to be aware of its 
complexity, to have sufficient detachment to see it from multiple 
perspectives, to accept the ambiguities, including moral 
ambiguities, of protagonists’ motives and behavior. Collective 
memory simplifies; sees events from a single, committed 
perspective; is impatient with ambiguities of any kind; reduces 
events to mythic archetypes. (Novick, 2000, p. 4) 
Some historians, however, uphold that such dichotomizing is profoundly 
problematic. Winter (2009, p. 254) dislikes the ‘stylized and unpersuasive 
analytical distinction between history on one side as documented narratives 
and memory on the other as free-floating tales that may not be true’. In fact, 
says Winter, ‘Historians think otherwise and work to bring the two closer 
together’ because ‘increasingly, over the twentieth century and beyond, the 
space between history and memory has been reconfigured’ (2009, p. 254). 
There is a middle ground, a ‘varied set of cultural practices that may be 
described as forms of “historical remembrance”’ says Winter, (2009, p. 
254).14  
Nevertheless, the most controversial challenge to the hierarchical domination 
of ‘intellectual and secular’ history over ‘magical’ memory was issued by 
French-Jewish historian Pierre Nora, who asserted that ‘history is perpetually 
suspicious of memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it’ 
(Nora, 1989, p. 9). For Nora, ‘Memory and history, far from being  
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synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition,’ (Nora, 1989, p. 
9). Continuing in elegiac vein, Nora discusses the shortfalls of both memory 
and history, maintaining that: 
Memory is life, borne by living societies found in its name. It 
remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of 
remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive 
deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, 
susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived. 
History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always 
problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. Memory is a 
perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal 
present. …Memory is absolute, while history can only conceive 
the relative. (Nora, 1989, p. 9) 
Mourning the rupture of modernity and the disappearance of ‘the remnants of 
experience still lived in the warmth of tradition … [that] have been displaced 
under the pressure of a fundamentally historical sensibility’ Nora famously 
averred that ‘We speak so much of memory because there is so little of it left’ 
(Nora, 1989, p. 7).15 In similar vein, writing of the current ongoing 
preoccupation with memory, Huyssen (1995) describes it almost as a form of 
collective grief or anxiety; are we losing our memories? Are we losing our 
minds? Are we raging ‘against the dying of the light’? 
The twilight of memory … is not just the result of a somehow 
natural generational forgetting that could be counteracted 
through some form of a more reliable representation. Rather, it 
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is given in the very structures of representation itself, The 
obsessions with memory in contemporary culture must be read 
in terms of this double problematic. Twilight memories are both: 
generational memories on the wane due to the passing of time 
and the continuing speed of technological modernization, and 
memories that reflect the twilight status of memory itself. 
Twilight is that moment of the day that foreshadows the night of 
forgetting, but that seems to slow time itself, an in-between 
state in which the last light of the day may still play out its 
ultimate marvels. It is memory’s privileged time. (Huyssen, 
1995, p. 3) 
The ‘irrevocable break marked by the disappearance of [French] peasant 
culture, that quintessential repository of collective memory’ constituted one 
such living loss for Nora, together with the erosion of ‘societies that had long 
assured the transmission and conservation of collectively remembered 
values’ and minority groups who ‘have possessed reserves of memory but 
little or no historical capital’ (Nora, 1989, p. 7). Under Nora’s aegis the multi-
volume work of essays, Les Lieux de Mémoire16 was published from 1981 
onwards (in English, The Realms of Memory).17 As ‘milieux de mémoire, real 
environments of memory’ no longer exist (Nora, 1989, p. 7), the project 
constituted a unique attempt18 to focus on: 
… specific objects that codify, condense, anchor France’s 
national memory. These can be monuments (the château of 
Versailles or the cathedral of Strasbourg); emblems, 
commemorations, and symbols (the tricolor of the French flag,  
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the Fourteenth of July, the Marseilleise); rituals (the coronation 
of the kings at Reims) … manuals (a textbook used by all 
French children, a dictionary); basic texts (the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man or the Code Civil); or mottos (for example, 
“Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité”). (Nora, 1989, p. 25). 
Kerwin Lee Klein suggests that memory has emerged ‘in an age of 
historiographic crisis precisely because it figures as a therapeutic alternative 
to historical discourse’ (Klein, 2000, p. 145) but not all critics were in favour 
of Nora’s attempt to restore collective memory to historical consciousness 
and the practice of historiography, as Rothberg (2010) notes; accusations of 
the ‘polarization of history and memory’ provided ‘a central irony … a project 
that has helped to stimulate a boom in the study of memory is premised on 
the demise of memory’ (Rothberg, 2010, p. 4). Rothberg prefers ‘a synthesis 
that also gives weight to the individual experience’. ‘Not strictly separable 
from either history or representation,’ suggests Rothberg, ‘memory 
nonetheless captures simultaneously the individual, embodied, and lived side 
and the collective, social, and constructed side of our relations to the past’ 
(Rothberg, 2009, p. 4).  
Others, including Tony Judt, Perry Anderson and Hue-Tam Ho-Tai (2001)19 
took political issue with the design of Nora’s project, which ‘purged’ France of 
‘many of its imperial adventures and minoritarian inflections … phenomena 
that trouble the linear narrative of historical progress and the stark opposition 
between history and memory’ (Rothberg, 2010, p. 4).20 Connerton found ‘a 
very powerful undercurrent of nostalgia’ in Nora’s enterprise; France as a  
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previously colonizing power in the grip of ‘a politics of nostalgia’ (Connerton, 
in Kastner, Najafi and Connerton, 2011). 
In the course of attempting to reconstitute memory and displace national 
history, the wheel had come full circle for memory boomers, as Zwigenberg 
(2014, pp. 4-5) notes: 
While many historians seek to displace the dominance of the 
“nation” in their work, studiers of the history of memory tend to 
cling to the nation with peculiar stubbornness. The familiar 
effort to interpret the past as part of a national culture has led to 
what Sebastian Conrad aptly named “a tunnel vision of the 
past,” which marginalizes entanglement with other national 
memories as well as the influence of the counter-memories of 
minorities and others. 
Wertsch (2002) also concludes that ‘it is often quite difficult to categorize an 
account of the past unequivocally as either memory or history’ citing as his 
example ‘official histories produced by the state and unofficial histories 
produced outside of its purview’ that ‘both include elements of collective 
remembering as well as history’ (p. 20). This is well illustrated in the ongoing 
‘memory politics’ controversies over the content of contested school history 
texts in Japan as well as Palestine and Israel, where ministries of education 
mine history in search of what Wertsch (2002) refers to as a ‘usable past’ to 
shore up allegiance to a collective identity. 
Nora’s huge undertaking was not the only work that is considered to have 
been a landmark in the 1980s ‘memory boom’ that has continued until now;  
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nor was it the only work to have ‘rework[ed] history’s boundaries’ (Klein, 
2000, p. 128).21 Hue-Tam Ho Tai notes: 
The importance of scholarship on the Holocaust in American 
studies of memory has been profound. As Michael Schudson 
observed: “There are two kinds of studies of collective memory-
those that examine the Holocaust, and all the others. Even 
people whose own work lies in that second group find 
Holocaust studies inescapably important, capable of 
illuminating every corner of the general topic with intellectual 
clarity and urgency.” By its very nature, Holocaust scholarship 
focuses on memory that is not linked to national identity or 
imagination. (Hue-Tam Ho Tai, 2001, p. 916). 
Indeed, scholarship on the Holocaust provides the overarching link between 
collective memory and trauma scholarship, as the work of Ruth Leys, 
Dominic LaCapra, Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub, Arthur 
Kleinmann, and Veena Das and many others testify. Widely considered to be 
the critical founding trope of the social construction and formalisation of 
trauma, the relevance of the Holocaust to the case studies at the heart of this 
inquiry is paramount. It has become at once a transcendental symbol of the 
greatest evil and also of its infamous, mundane ‘banality’ (Arendt, 1964), an 
aggregated suffering fused into a collective experiential gasp of horror. 
Tragically since then, and before then, there have been other genocides, but 
this is the one that caught the theoretical imagination. This will be expanded 
on further in Chapter Three. 
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2.5  Ethical challenges for history and memory: counter-memories 
Some scholars are uncomfortable with the polarized memory debates 
coming from the last decades of the 20th century (history versus memory; the 
individual versus the group). Such polarities, they infer, cast a questionable 
light on the grave business of accounting for the past and commemorating it; 
they miss the ethical ‘concern with memory and the obligations—if there are 
any—to remember; or, for that matter, to forget and forgive’ (Margalit, 2000, 
p. ix). 
Susan Crane questions who has the right to represent history and memory, 
to ‘speak for others’? Such questions offer ‘a rich discussion of the 
responsibility for and participation in collective memory, in which historians 
will still play a part,’ she asserts (Crane, 1997, p. 1374). ‘I am trying to 
imagine a new form of historical consciousness,’ explains Crane, which will 
‘avoid the pitfalls that the concept of collective memory suggests to those 
who fear its nationalist, revisionist temptations, as exemplified recently in the 
American controversy over the Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian in 1994-
1995’ (Crane, 1997, p. 1375).  
If history’s challenge is how to effect the inclusive representation of the 
widest range of voices, a new form of historical consciousness might give 
greater weight to the restorative and reconciliatory role of acts of collective 
remembering, memory work and witnessing in restorative justice acts, such 
as the truth commissions of Latin America and South Africa (see, for 
example, the extensive body of work of Brandon Hamber and Richard Wilson  
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on South Africa, such as Hamber and Wilson, 2002; Hamber has also written 
on Northern Ireland and Latin America). These kinds of memory projects:  
… have been called on in transitional justice and historical 
memory interventions as a one of the key mechanisms that can 
help societies and groups come to terms with a past of war or 
mass violence and move societies towards non-violence and 
no repetition. … many such groups have activated plural, 
autonomous, long term, and participatory processes to recover, 
reclaim and/or find evidence of past violations and their impacts, 
while placing those who have been traditionally silenced and 
their knowledge at the center of memory work. 
… Building memory is a political act and a social practice. 
Memory is a field in tension, which can either build and 
strengthen or challenge and transform hierarchies, inequalities 
and social exclusions. It is also a field where political and social 
legitimacies, friendships and enmities are woven … If war 
polarizes memories, a historical memory project that seeks to 
be inclusive of plural voices goes in the opposite direction. But 
to do so requires asking why certain stories are excluded from 
national history, and why that history reinforces social and 
political inequalities and historical injustices. (Historical Memory 
Commission of the Center of Memory of Colombia and the 
University of British Columbia, 2010, pp. 4-11) 
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The proliferation of ‘peoples’ tribunals’ equally engages in memory work and 
witnessing equally. Taking their cue from the International War Crimes 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, a number of Asian 
women’s NGOs convened in Tokyo in December 2000 for the Women's 
International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery to hear 
accounts of women forced to work in comfort stations:22  
In the early 1990s women broke almost five decades of painful 
silence to demand apology and compensation for the atrocities 
they and others suffered under Japanese military sexual 
slavery during the war in the in the 1930s and 1940s in the 
Asia-Pacific region. The victimized survivors, euphemistically 
called “comfort women” came forward to recount how they were 
conscripted and trafficked through force, coercion, and 
deception and confined to “comfort stations” or, more 
accurately, sexual slavery facilities, wherever Japanese troops 
were situated, including on the front lines. (Tokyo Tribunal, 
2001) 
With reference to the case study of Israel-Palestine at the heart of this project, 
the Russell Tribune on Palestine, an ‘International People’s Tribunal’ which 
was ‘created following the international community’s inaction regarding 
Israel’s recognized violations of international law’ 
(http://www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/about-rtop) convened sessions 
in London, Barcelona, Cape Town, New York and Brussels from 2010-2014 
to hear witnesses and to engage in transitional justice memory work, while 
the Israeli NGO Zochrot (http://zochrot.org/) actively researches collective 
 
 
89 
 
memory of the Palestinian Nakba and carries out acts of remembrance in 
order to:  
… challenge the Israeli Jewish public's preconceptions and 
promote awareness, political and cultural change within it to 
create the conditions for the Return of Palestinian Refugees 
and a shared life in this country. To do so, Zochrot will generate 
processes in which Israeli Jews will reflect on and review their 
identity, history, future and the resulting discourse through 
which they conceive of their lives in this country. Our focus on 
the Jewish target audience derives from its practical and moral 
responsibility for Palestinian refugeehood, as well as from its 
privileged power position under the present regime. 
(http://zochrot.org/en/content/17) 
In a similar vein, the World Tribunal on Iraq (WTI),23 an informal global civil 
society ‘reclaimative justice’ project, met from 2003-2005 in various 
European locations, in New York City, in a number of cities in Japan 
including Hiroshima; Jakarta, Mumbai and a culminating session in Istanbul:  
This counterhegemonic tribunal model challenged the dominate 
discourse on the war in Iraq, thereby attempting to influence 
who could write the history of the war, whose voices would be 
heard, what account of the events and processes would prevail, 
and, from this discursive struggle, what understandings of 
justice would contest or support conduct in the global 
community. (Gerson, 2013, p. 88) 
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Allowing for marginalized voices to be heard is one part of the memory work 
equation, yet at present this frequently takes place in settings that have no 
official jurisdiction; how then does such public remembering relate to 
forgetting, and finally, to healing, if this is the sole recourse to justice that is 
available? ‘Since forgetting is not voluntary, neither is forgiveness’, observes 
Avishai Margalit (Margalit, 2002, p. 203). The latter, he says, ‘is a change in 
the mental state of one who was wronged’ (Margalit, ibid.). It is more 
beneficial for the psychological health and social wellbeing of the victim (or 
victims) than the carrying of ‘poisonous’ resentment and ‘vengefulness’ 
toward the offender; it is not a forgetting, but rather, a ‘covering-up model’. 
Since memory cannot (and ought not) to be voluntarily blotted out, ‘What 
ought to be blotted out is the memory of the emotion in the sense of [not] 
reliving it’, writes Margalit (2002, p. 208) describing forgiveness almost in 
terms of working through the effects of PTSD. This, finally, is memory’s 
‘ethical challenge’.  
2.6  Methodological challenges for collective memory 
Many of the methodological challenges for collective identity continue to 
relate to taxonomy and description (what to call collective memory, how to 
define it, whether it is truly collective or not, and how to interpret it). Empirical 
field studies have abounded, but many theoretical and methodological 
concerns rumble on unabated. The interdisciplinarity (or multidisciplinarity) of 
the field of memory studies gives Brown, Gutman, Freeman, Sodaro and 
Coman (2009, p. 188) concern; is it helpful? Does knowledge transfer really 
take place, given the different disciplinary approaches? Can a common 
language be found? They note ‘our respective 
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disciplines [psychiatry, sociology and psychology] are limited in addressing 
this complex nexus of questions due to methodological or theoretical 
constraints’ although this ‘at first glance, has endless potential for interesting 
interactions and collaborations that reveal a larger piece of the puzzle’ 
(Brown et al, 2009, p. 188).  
 
For Jeffrey Olick, the issue is that ‘“Collective memory” in Halbwachs 
indicates at least two distinct, and not obviously complementary, sorts of 
phenomena: socially framed individual memories and collective 
commemorative representations and mnemonic traces’ (Olick, 1999, p. 336) 
and Halbwachs failed to offer ‘an integrated paradigm that identifies the 
unique structures involved in each of these’ (Olick, 1999, ibid). These two 
phenomena, complains Olick, ‘seem to be of radically distinct ontological 
orders and to require different epistemological and methodological strategies’ 
(1999, p. 336). Olick misses ‘precisely this kind of clarity’ in the ‘rather 
indiscriminate (in the true sense of the word) usage of collective memory’ 
(Olick, 1999, p. 336).24 Almost anything seems to be ‘collective memory’, 
comments Olick; historian Alon Confino (1997) agrees.25 Pierre Nora’s 
gargantuan multi-volume project to identify lieux de mémoire in France 
makes us wonder ‘what is not a lieu de mémoire’, says Olick. Apropos of 
which, he adds, ‘The same may be said of collective memory: since social 
action and social production take place with capacities and materials handed 
down from the past, collective memory becomes synonymous with pattern-
maintenance per se’ (Olick, 1999, p. 336).Even if we isolate for examination 
collective memory acts such as commemorations, we encounter the dilemma 
of individual reception versus collectivistic signs: 
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This is because two radically different concepts of culture are 
involved here, one that sees culture as a subjective category of 
meanings contained in people's minds versus one that sees 
culture as patterns of publicly available symbols objectified in 
society. Each of these culture concepts entails different 
methodological strategies and produces different kinds of 
knowledge. (Olick, 1999, p. 336)  
One prospective solution is to include collective memory in ‘the field of 
political culture research [i.e. political psychology] insofar as it is 
concerned with the cultural constitution of political identities and activities’ 
and to follow appropriate analytical methods such as surveys (‘collected 
memory’ leading to the ‘aggregated memory’ of individuals), treating ‘the 
black box of human minds as the source of institutional outcomes’ (Olick, 
1999, p. 336) a method also recommended, among others, by Kansteiner 
(2002, p. 194); such studies ‘open the possibility of dialogue among the 
physical, behavioral, and social sciences’ for ‘an individualist approach to 
memory thus has a great deal of potential for producing insights about 
social memory outcomes’ (Olick,1999, pp. 340-341). Further approaches 
from interpretive social sciences might focus on symbolism and more 
discursive aspects of identity claims. Yet finally, without taking into account 
the ‘collective perspective, we are both unable to provide good 
explanations of mythology, tradition, heritage, and the like either as forms 
or in particular’ (Olick, 1999, p. 341). 
 
Kansteiner himself appears to find that collective memory studies have 
transformed scholars from academics into ‘concerned citizens’  
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(2002, p. 179). We ‘have not yet paid enough attention to the problem of 
reception both in methods and sources’ and need to notice ‘the intellectual 
and cultural traditions that frame all our representations of the past, the 
memory makers who selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions, 
and the memory consumers who use, ignore, or transform such artifacts 
according to their own interests’ (Kansteiner, 2002, pp. 179-180).  
 
In short, Kansteiner finds collective memory tricky, or ‘slippery’. ‘It can take 
hold of historically and socially remote events but it often privileges the 
interests of the contemporary,’ observes Kansteiner (and here we might 
think of current events and discourse in Ukraine) adding, ‘It is as much a 
result of conscious manipulation as unconscious absorption and it is 
always mediated … it can only be observed in roundabout ways, more 
through its effects than its characteristics’ (Kansteiner, 2002, p. 180). 
Attempting to investigate memory may cause ‘an unself-conscious return 
to the central role of human agency in history (now as the maker of 
representations)’ and it may cause confusion, or lead to false conclusions, 
over reception: how to identify someone who ‘actually shares or identifies 
with these representations’ (Kansteiner, 2002, p. 192) and how to assess 
a collective memory’s significance, given its apparent contemporaneity in 
terms of usage. There are, for instance, forgotten collective memories that 
do not stay the course; Kansteiner gives the example of the Korean War, 
which ‘failed’ to stake its claim strongly in American collective memory 
representations (aside from the long-running television series Mash, and 
many consumers did not accurately remember the historical context of that 
show in any case).  
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At the time of writing, what seems apparent is that there is no particular 
agreement on methodology, particularly since memory studies have only 
increased in inter/multi-disciplinarity, and the largest developments in 
memory studies are taking place in German, French and other European 
languages; many of these texts have not yet reached the English-speaking 
market. The field then, is in a state of contestation and evolution, open to 
further developments, a mirror to epistemology itself. Jan Assmann 
perhaps best indicates the essence of the dilemma when he writes, 
‘Whereas knowledge has a universalist perspective, a tendency towards 
generalization and standardization, memory, even cultural memory, is 
local, egocentric, and specific to a group and its values’ (Assmann, 2008, 
p. 113). 
 
2.7 Contemporary challenges for collective memory: Temporal, 
spatial and cultural dimensions of memorialization 
In Section 1, we noted how the expansion of the contemporary collective 
memory field was sparked largely by translations into English of the work of 
Maurice Halbwachs, published some 40 years after his death. Yet Pierre 
Nora’s controversial multi-volume series on French national memory 
(discussed earlier), through the perspective of lieux de mémoire, is far more 
widely known; as Gérôme Truc comments, many theorists in English offer ‘a 
few obligatory quotations … and seem unaware of Halbwachs’ modifications 
to his theses on memory’ (Truc, 2011, p. 147). For Francophones, 
Halbwachs is continually being reevaluated, a ‘“rediscovered sociologist” 
(Jaisson and Baudelot 2007) whose works are constantly republished and 
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subject to stimulating new interpretations’ (Truc, 2012, p. 147). Most notable 
is the republication of Halbwachs’ final work before his death, La 
Topographie légendaire des évangiles en Terre sainte: Étude de mémoire 
collective (The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land: A 
study in collective memory; only its Conclusion is translated in the Lewis 
Coser edition of Halbwachs’ works). Halbwachs made two trips to Palestine 
(in 1927 and 1939) to carry out field work for La Topographie légendaire in 
preparation for the realization of the fullest expression of his own sociology of 
memory, putting into practice a methodology that offered prospects of 
transference and generalizability for other studies of the temporal, cultural 
and spatial dimensions of memorialization. In La Topographie légendaire 
Halbwachs articulated how symbolic representations of space arise from 
social frameworks of memory and the mental images of groups; how 
commemorative sites in the Old City of Jerusalem attributed to the Passion 
became agreed upon and were sacralized through a combination of the 
construction of Christian doctrine and the claims of pilgrimage. In this, he 
was something of a pioneer; it is regrettable that his methodology and 
conclusions cannot be resourced to in order to illuminate present territorial 
contestations in Israel/Palestine. However, the critical work of Eyal Weizman 
(2012), Jeff Halper (2009) and the Foundation for Middle East Peace 
(http://fmep. org) with its former (until 2014) bimonthly Report on Israeli 
Settlements in the Occupied Territories represents ongoing topographical 
contested memory work in the region. 
 
Halbwachs’ notion of a topography of memory has been adapted in different 
forms through memory work in states recovering from political violence in  
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Latin America. Conte (2015) gives an account of the work of the ‘Topography 
of Memory’ section of NGO Memoria Abierta (Open Memory’) that 
‘systematises and produces documentation about sites, buildings 
[‘architectonic memory’] and spaces that were used as spaces of temporary 
detention and clandestine detention centres, as well as spaces of recognition 
and remembrance’ (2014, p. 86). Aguilera (2015) discusses the growing 
number of private and semi-private memory initiatives to those who suffered 
from political violence as a result of ‘Chile’s 9/11’ (General Pinochet’s 1973 
coup) in the form of ‘memorials, memory sites in ex-detention centers, and 
the Museum of Memory and Human Rights’; in both Argentina and Chile, 
these sites that mark what Derek Gregory calls ‘a geography of violence’ are 
deeply contested.  
 
While Halbwachs’ study traced sacralization of space through social 
frameworks, the ways in which ‘the sacred has moved outside the churches 
and into secular space’ is equally a feature of contemporary life, according to 
historian Jay Winter (2009, p. 252). ‘Commemorative sites, alongside 
museums and exhibitions, are now repositories of the sacred; they are the 
churches and cathedrals of modernity’ writes Winter (2009, p. 252). Dates for 
commemoration ceremonies at commemorative sites may also overlap with 
the sacred calendar, as Winter notes; it chimes with the collective ‘conviction 
… that the moment recalled is both significant and informed by a moral 
message’ (p. 253).  
  
 
 
97 
 
Yet these new sacred arenas and practices of memory may also be sources 
or sites of contestation, often by who or what is omitted or included in the 
representation. As Ross (2008) notes: 
Symbolic landscapes communicate inclusion and exclusion, 
hierarchy, and portray dominant and subordinate groups in 
particular ways. The meanings a symbolic landscape conveys 
invites us to ask: Who is present and who is absent in public 
representations? What the qualities of those people and objects 
portrayed in it? Who controls the representations and to what 
extent are they contested? How is hierarchy portrayed and 
what qualities are associated with particular positions within a 
society’s hierarchy? (Ross, 2008, p. 8) 
Such symbolic landscapes become most controversial particularly when they 
appear to ‘sacralize war and the political order that governs it’ (Winter, 2009, 
p. 255, citing Klein, 2000) or when ‘moral doubts persist about a war or public 
policy’ (Winter, 2009, p. 253). Paul Cummins and Tom Piper’s striking 2014 
Remembrance Day poppy art installation ‘Blood Swept Lands and Seas of 
Red’ in London, wherein 888,246 ceramic poppies (symbolizing fallen 
soldiers) filled the moat of the Tower of London, was not without deep 
controversy (Jones, 2014; O’Callaghan, 2014). 26 27 Volunteer poppy planters 
stressed the personal, pacific remembrance qualities of the memorial in 
response to criticism, ‘going to view the poppies does not stop anyone from 
remembering those who lost their lives during this war regardless of where 
they came from. Any life lost to war is one life too many’ (Fishwick, 2014). 
Meanwhile, every time a Japanese prime minister visits Yasukuni Jinja, the 
Tokyo shrine to Japan’s World War II dead that enshrines Class A war 
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criminals, there are vigorous (sometimes violent) protests in neighbouring 
Asian nations that suffered from Japanese imperialism, particularly China 
and South Korea. Ran Zwigenberg’s study (Zwigenberg, 2014) of how the 
Hiroshima Peace Park Memorial and the August 6th commemorative 
practices were established as a ‘bright flash of peace’ gives an account of 
how these sites performed multiple purposes of censorship against war crime, 
propaganda (for both the Allied Forces and the defeated Japanese) in the 
name of world peace, and disaster tourism as recovery from war. ‘Pacifists 
have used sites of memory for precisely the opposite purpose,’ comments 
Winter (2009, p. 255) and the Hiroshima Peace Park site also serves political 
opponents of Prime Minister Abe’s revision of the ‘no-war’ Article 9 in Japan’s 
American-imposed constitution and the Global Article 9 anti-war movement 
(http://www.article-9.org/en/).  
 
Finally, symbolic landscapes are generally represented as timeless, 
particularly in their ‘never again’ injunction when they commemorate 
traumatic loss.28 They challenge time; but ‘one of the few genuinely constant 
attributes to collective memory is that it is likely to undergo change’ (Wertsch, 
2002, p. 46). Likewise sites of memory, as Winter, echoing Halbwachs, 
remarks; they only serve to remind us of their impermanence (and ours), and 
the ‘presentism’ with which we approach them: 
These very sites are as transitory as are the groups of people 
who create and sustain them. … These associations are bound 
to dissolve, to be replaced by other forms, with other needs, 
and other histories. At that point, the characteristic trajectory of  
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sites of memory, bounded by their creation, institutionalization, 
and decomposition, comes to an end. (Winter, 2009, p. 267). 
 
2.8  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to set the scene for collective remembering, 
tracing its lineage and development into a major theoretical field. Empirical 
studies in the sociology of memory press on creatively despite (or because 
of) the lack of resolution to methodological and theoretical challenges, and 
because there is no end to memory or the equally critical question of 
forgetting. Not all memory is traumatic, but the notion of collective trauma, in 
which a painful event is still more historically present, is deeply embedded in 
the landscape of collective remembering and represents a further theoretical 
expansion of the field. Chapter 1 examined the development of the concept 
of psychological trauma, but in Chapter 3, I will investigate how (or whether) 
this psychological phenomenon came to be ‘re-experienced’ sociologically. 
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Chapter Three: Clarifying the concept of collective trauma 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we seek to develop the case for collective trauma further, 
advancing beyond the genesis of the documentation and medicalization of 
psychological trauma, whose effects were exacerbated by the employment of 
increasingly sophisticated war machinery. In order to site these inquiries 
within a wider framework, in Chapter Two we investigated epistemological 
trends for experiential ‘collectivities’, in particular the turn towards memory, or 
the recent memory ‘boom’, with the marked increase in sites of collective 
memory and consciously collective acts of memorialization. The latter sets 
the scene for the methodological basis of our inquiry in Chapter 4, for 
‘examining how commemorative practices shape and are shaped by memory 
of difficult pasts reveals a great deal about why and how cultural trauma is 
continually sustained in national consciousness’ (Hashimoto, 2013, p. 30). 
It follows that if we accept Hallbwachs’ and Wertsch’s stance in Chapter Two, 
namely, that all (or very nearly all) memories can be said to be socially 
mediated and (at least potentially) transmissible by the collectivity, then there 
is also a strong case for examining the phenomenon of collective trauma, 
building on collective memory for its pathways of transmission, wherein ‘all 
“facts” [about trauma] are mediated, emotionally, cognitively, and morally’, 
resulting in an imposed “an interpretative grid”’ (Alexander, 2004, p. 201). 
Such mediated interpretation is critical to the construction of the collective 
trauma, to its sustenance, its amplification and lasting power through 
extensive sharing over generations; this, too, is a natural outgrowth of  
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collective memory theorization. Marianne Hirsch sees this as a highly 
creative connection, terming the phenomenon ‘Postmemory’, wherein: 
… descendants of survivors (of victims as well as of 
perpetrators) of massive traumatic events connect so deeply to 
the previous generation’s remembrances of the past that they 
need to call that connection memory and thus that, in certain 
extreme circumstances, memory can be transmitted to those 
who were not actually there to live an event’ (Hirsch, 2008, pp. 
105-106).  
Postmemory is a ‘received memory [that] is distinct from the recall of 
contemporary witnesses and participants’, a critical term for ‘the many 
qualifying adjectives that try to define both a specifically inter- and trans-
generational act of transfer and the resonant after-effects of trauma’ (Hirsch, 
2008, pp. 105-106). This may sound like a psychological formulation, but it is 
sociological in its relational impact and its imaginative construction, focusing 
on: 
… the relationship that the generation after those who 
witnessed cultural or collective trauma bears to the experiences 
of those who came before, experiences that they “remember” 
only by means of the stories, images, and behaviors among 
which they grew up’. But these experiences were transmitted to 
them so deeply and affectively as to seem to constitute 
memories in their own right. Postmemory’s connection to the 
past is thus not actually mediated by recall but by imaginative 
investment, projection, and creation [researcher’s italics]. To  
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grow up with such overwhelming inherited memories, to be 
dominated by narratives that preceded one’s birth or one’s 
consciousness, is to risk having one’s own stories and 
experiences displaced, even evacuated, by those of a previous 
generation. It is to be shaped, however indirectly, by traumatic 
events that still defy narrative reconstruction and exceed 
comprehension. These events happened in the past, but their 
effects continue into the present. This is, I believe, the 
experience of postmemory and the process of its generation. 
(Hirsch, 2008, p. 106-107) 
Whether one uses Hirsch’s term ‘postmemory’ or the more common 
‘transgenerational transmission’, this is clearly a vivid characterisation of the 
collective trauma dynamic. 
3.2 Acknowledging controversies 
It would be remiss at this point not to acknowledge that many of the theories 
regarding the transmission of trauma in societies attempt to drive a wedge 
between ‘psychological’ and ‘cultural’ or ‘sociological’ trauma. An 
examination of Kira’s taxonomy of psychological traumas (see Figures 1 and 
2, below) demonstrates, for instance, that individual psychological traumas 
do, in fact, have wider impact; in this sense they can be said to have 
sociological effects, not least because the traumatized transport their trauma 
back to their families and communities.   
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Trauma Etiology Effect 
Attachment trauma Disruption of bond of 
warmth and security 
between child and adult 
(Bowlby) e.g. through 
abandonment, death, 
kidnapping, divorce, 
loss, incest 
Avoidant or disordered 
attachment, 
relationship/personality 
disorders; impact on 
emotional/cognitive 
processing 
Autonomy/identity/individuation 
(personal or collective) trauma 
Sexual/physical abuse, 
DV, rape, slavery, 
torture, imprisonment, 
genocide 
Shattering of 
behavioural & emotional 
independence of 
individual/group; loss of 
identity, feelings of 
inadequacy, loss of 
control, helplessness 
More than one value 
processing subsystem 
may be affected 
Interdependence/Disconnectedness 
trauma 
Events that threaten 
social embeddedness & 
support systems e.g. a 
child moving from 
school to school, state 
to state, involuntary 
uprootedness e.g. 
refugee experience 
Traumatizing; loss of 
sense of belonging, 
security and meaning in 
life 
Achievement/self-actualization 
trauma 
Failure to achieve a 
target that is perceived 
as essential to survival 
or progression / goals, 
e.g. becoming 
unemployed, demotion, 
substantial loss of 
money/health/valuables, 
failure to achieve life 
goals. 
Traumatic, may lead to 
depression, stress-related 
disorders, suicide 
Survival trauma Direct/indirect threat 
to self/significant 
others’ lives e.g. war, 
attempted suicide, 
homicide, killing, 
violent crime, natural 
or man-made disaster 
Multiple effects. A strong 
belief system may help to 
manage terror; or to cause 
the traumatized individual 
to commit terror. More 
than one value processing 
subsystem may be 
affected 
Fig 1. A clinical taxonomy of psychological traumas, Type 1, after Kira (2001) 
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Trauma Etiology Effect 
Factitious trauma or trauma-
like events 
Cascade/accumulation of 
stressors/ordeals creates 
trauma-like experience 
PTSD-like symptoms; negative and non-
supportive attitudes toward the 
traumatized individual can create 
secondary traumatization (factitious 
trauma). 
Indirect/vicarious trauma 
a. One-step transmission of 
trauma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Multiple-step indirect 
traumas transmitted 
across generations 
 
c. Collective cross-
generational trauma 
transmission 
 
 
 
d. Multigenerational 
transmission of 
structural violence 
Transmitted between 
persons/generations 
a. Transmission from 
one person to 
another, or 
individuals in 
connected group 
e.g. parent 
discovering sexual 
abuse of child; Other 
examples: clinicians, 
firefighters, 
emergency and 
relief workers, police 
personnel 
 
b. Generational family 
trauma transmission 
e.g. abuse, incest, 
DV 
c. Historical trauma 
(HT) e.g. slavery of 
African Americans, 
Armenian genocide, 
Jewish experience 
of Holocaust 
d. Extreme social 
disparities, deprived 
social structures e.g. 
poverty, malnutrition  
An extreme effect might be shared 
psychotic disorder 
a. For relief workers etc., burnout, 
compassion fatigue; over-empathetic 
enmneshment or empathetic 
withdrawal, full or partial PTSD 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Repeating cycle of violence, anxiety, 
disorganization, reexperiencing PTSD 
c. Can predispose individual to lifetime 
traumas or higher incidence of PTSD 
(e.g. in combat veterans who are 
second generation  Holocaust 
survivors). 
 
 
d. Multiple effects on achievement, 
functioning 
Direct trauma  
a. Single unexpected 
trauma (type 1) 
b. Complex trauma 
 
a. A single sudden blow 
or event 
b. Type II - a related 
series of blows e.g. 
combat (survival), 
ongoing 
physical/sexual abuse; 
ongoing chronic 
poverty, disease, 
terminal illness; 
extended traumatic 
experiences that 
cease 
c. Type III – cascade of 
traumatic events, 
direct or indirect I or II 
e.g. refugee 
experience; may be 
longitudinal. 
 
a. Type 1 trauma can cause PTSD 
symptoms and/or impaired functioning 
b. Past extended trauma can create 
massive defensive mechanisms e.g. 
denial, repression, dissociation, 
somatization, self-anaesthesia, 
identification with aggressor, 
aggression against self; impaired 
emotional processing e.g. absence of 
feelings, rage, sadness & fear 
 
 
 
c. Different kinds of effects—can focus on 
one area of human functioning or affect 
different or all areas of functioning. 
Fig 2. A clinical taxonomy of psychological traumas, Type 2, after Kira (2001) 
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Furthermore, certain questions present themselves when we move from the 
individual to the wider distribution of psychological trauma (typically arising 
from the result of war or a major catastrophe, whether natural or man-made). 
Is collective trauma an extension or ‘scaling up’ of psychological trauma, 
mimicking certain diagnostic features of psychological trauma as they have  
been documented so far, or is it a slightly different animal? If so, in which 
ways?  
Abstracting sociological trauma from its psychological substrate misses the 
whole picture of the developmental pathways of collective trauma and their 
cyclical, mutually reactive nature (see Figure 3). Recognition of this point is 
critical, as many sociologists (notably Jeffrey Alexander) make a deliberate 
decision not to pay attention to the conceptual heritage; but without such 
recognition, the phenomenon is no more than an empty vessel, a hauntology 
that cannot be taken seriously. Alexander et al’s approach effectively 
downsizes the role of psychological trauma (‘naïve’ or ‘lay’) in stressing its 
cultural emanation, implying that the former is a-scientific and non-empiricist, 
an intriguing reduction in view of strenuous positivist approaches to validate 
psychological trauma through extensive research projects) (Alexander, 
2004b, p. 3).1  
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Fig. 3: Developmental pathways of collective trauma 
The argument becomes still more complicated by the fact that the status of 
psychological trauma itself is still contested, as Alexander notes dryly: ‘Every 
argument about trauma claims ontological reality’ (Alexander, 2004b, p. 9). 
Even when examinations of the ‘naturalization’ (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009) 
of the trauma concept attempt a critical approach, they tend to meander 
untidily between discussions of the psychologically traumatized individual 
and the traumatized mass or group (therefore having a sociological 
component) and are unable to escape an implicit acceptance of 
psychological trauma’s unclear ‘ontological reality’. Can one build a theory of 
collective trauma apart from, or on top of the supposedly as-yet 
undetermined foundation of individual psychological and psychiatric trauma 
theory? 
Arising from the seemingly inescapable elision of psychological and 
sociological trauma, does the acute psychological trauma of a massive 
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number of individuals then become a ‘collective trauma’? Or to put it another 
way, is collective trauma more than additive, i.e. more than the sum of mass 
individual psychological traumas? Loss experienced on a devastating scale 
may not necessarily lead to collective trauma, as Heins and Langenohl 
(2016, p. 4) illustrate, asserting that ‘the memory of the [Allied] bombing war 
[on German cities during World War II] has not been turned into a national or 
“cultural trauma.”’ They suggest that defeat did indeed cause ‘a trauma 
process’ that was worked through by Germans, allowing them ‘to 
fundamentally redefine themselves … this process was successful precisely 
because Germans learned to connect their own suffering to the suffering of 
others’ (Heins and Langenold, 2016, p. 4). Surveying memory wars in which  
Germany’s left and right argue about the meaning of the Bombenkrieg, they 
conclude that attempts ‘to translate …[it] into a cultural trauma have failed. 
The psychological trauma of being bombed has not been transformed into a 
cultural trauma of “the” bombed’ (2016, p.  21).2 Overall, German consensus 
would not allow it.  
A further argument revolves around how trauma is ‘passed on’ to succeeding 
generations. On the one hand, there is a huge, continually evolving body of 
medical literature on the psychological transmission of trauma; while it may 
have much to tell us, this research is currently highly controversial. There is 
unresolved debate among psychologists and psychiatrists about the extent 
and long-lasting nature of the transgenerational transmissive (‘sequential 
traumatization’) clinical aspect of trauma, which is considered to have played 
a critical role in the Israel-Palestine conflict through Holocaust survivors and 
their children (Auerhahn and Laub, pp. 21-42, in Danieli, 1998; Felsen, pp. 
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43-68 in Danieli, 1998; Solomon, pp. 69-84, in Danieli, 1998). Among the 
most prominent ongoing investigations is that of Rachel Yehuda and 
colleagues; from 1985, Yehuda et al3 began to examine significant findings in 
low cortisol levels in Holocaust survivors suffering with PTSD and later, their 
transmission to offspring, predisposing them to a range of PTSD symptoms 
such as depression and anxiety.  
Dissenters largely cite human resilience and coping strategies, and find fault 
with research design or absence of large-scale empirical studies, ‘research 
methodology, sample selection and generalisability’ (Auherhahn and Laub, p. 
22, in Danieli, 1998; see also Felsen, p. 43, in Danieli, 1998). Analyzing a 
wide range of literature, van IJzendoorn, Bakermans-Kranenburg and Sagi- 
Schwartz (2003) comment that ‘studies on intergenerational transmission 
show inconsistent outcomes … Secondary traumatization, therefore, still is a 
concept in need of further empirical validation’ (p. 460). Sagi-Schwartz, van 
IJzendoorn, Grossmann, Joels, Scharf, Koren-Karie and Alkalay (2003), 
examining attachment and traumatic stress in Holocaust survivors’ 
daughters, concluded that Holocaust survivors did not transmit their trauma 
as per child abuse victims, because the traumatic events were exogenous 
and ‘emerged from an almost anonymous destructive force (the Nazis)’ (pp. 
1090-1091) and also because they had previously enjoyed ‘several years of 
normal family life before the Holocaust’ (pp. 1091).  
 
Running against conventional wisdom, Sagi-Schwartz, van IJzendoorn and 
Bakermans-Kranenburg (2008) carried out a further statistical meta-
analysis of literature and concluded controversially that ‘second generation 
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as well as third generation offspring of Holocaust survivors are, in general, 
well-adapted’ (p. 118) and the ‘potential “sleeper effect’’’ of trauma 
(delayed response, or skipping a generation, p. 118) does not seem to 
have emerged, for similar reasons surmised in the previous 2003 study. 
Expectations of Holocaust trauma transmission, say the researchers, ‘have 
become ingrained to a large extent in the belief system within the 
professional as well as the wider community (not necessarily with sound 
conceptual or theoretical basis for such a transmission)’ (p. 106). A further 
study conducted in 2010 (Barel, van IJzendoorn, Sagi-Schwartz and 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2010) also concluded that long- term post- 
genocide sequelae for Holocaust survivors themselves indicated 
‘remarkable resilience’.  
 
In time, epigenetic case studies (such as Yehuda, Halligan and Bierer, 2001; 
Labonté et al, 2012; Roth, 2014; Reul, 2014; Yehuda et al, 2016) may 
substantiate conclusively the psychological or medical basis for traumatic 
inheritance. On the other hand, scientific research on transmissable 
psychological trauma, although fascinating, is not a necessary condition for 
the empirical verification of the workings of collective trauma in societies; it 
has yet to account for the collective trauma’s continuing power to disorganise 
societies and social groups over the long term.  
Nor does collective trauma require every single member of a collectivity to 
manifest psychological trauma or traumatic damage; the phenomenon is of 
larger dimensions.4 The sheer scale of the sociological and political 
phenomenon of memorialisation of painful events (discussed in Chapter 
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Two) creates a convincing ideological mechanism for the consolidation and 
expression of collective trauma.  
Finally, Elizabeth Breese, Alexander and Eyerman’s co-author in Narrating 
Trauma: On the Impact of Collective Suffering (Eyerman, Alexander and 
Breese, 2013) makes an interesting distinction between the two contentious 
terms, ‘collective trauma’ and ‘cultural trauma’ asserting, ‘Collective trauma is 
primarily an emotional state, whereas cultural trauma is an emotional and 
cognitive process having to do with construction and contestation of 
meaning’ (Breese, 2013, p. 220). I contend that the former ‘state’ of 
‘emotional’ and psychological stress is indeed a necessary response (not an 
Alexandrian ‘Enlightenment’ response) as the critical trigger before the 
cultural impacts may manifest themselves, with all their presumed 
intergenerational force. 
This chapter aims not only to raise questions about the nature of collective 
trauma, but also to answer them, by identifying common characteristics and 
responses to selected major ‘traumatic’ events of the 20th century. These are 
events distinguished by the manner in which political violence occasioned 
widespread, catastrophic, long-lasting (and continuing) impact on certain 
collectives, entailing levels and forms of violence which, following Lemkin, 
was later deemed to be ‘genocidal’.5 Writing in Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe, Raphael Lemkin offered his watermark definition: 
By ‘genocide’ we mean the destruction of a nation or of an 
ethnic group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an 
old practice in its modern development, is made from the 
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ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide 
(killing)…. Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily 
mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when 
accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is 
intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions 
aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of 
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups 
themselves. Genocide is directed against the national group as 
an entity, and the actions involved are directed against  
individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of 
the national group.’ (Lemkin, 1944/2008, p.80)  
I do not use the words ‘trauma’ and ‘genocide’ (as defined by Raphael 
Lemkin) interchangeably, but in the cases discussed below, the genocides 
that occurred are said to have produced wide-ranging trauma, since they 
were strategically aimed at the cultural decimation of particular collectives.  
The twentieth century has endured at least four major episodes of this 
nature: the Armenian genocide, the World War Two Holocaust of Jews and 
Sinti-Roma, the Rwanda genocide and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Bosniaks and 
Bosnian Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina that took place between 1991-
2001 following the dissolution of former Yugoslavia;6 three of these cases 
have also benefited from commissions of transitional justice, with less than 
clear results for the healing of societal trauma; all of the examples in question 
remain contested or denied for political reasons by various actors, a key 
factor in their residual ability to be constituted as traumatic. There are, alas, 
many, many other episodes, hidden (Hinton et al, 2013) or slightly less well-
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remembered, less familiar or less well-documented, such as the Herero and 
Namaqua Genocide in Namibia (1904-1907) and the enslavement, torture 
and murder of Aboriginal peoples in Latin America (Brazil, Columbia, 
Ecuador and Peru).  
As it is necessary to limit the scope of the inquiry in order to elicit key 
attributions and arrive at a distinctive taxonomy, I have, therefore, 
deliberately selected two temporally discrete major events—the Armenian 
Genocide and the Holocaust—which are identified by their ethnic or cultural  
component. In both cases, the trauma suffered by the collectives is 
historically verified, but critically, remain disputed for explicitly political 
reasons, with ongoing or recurrent issues of recognition that do not 
permit traumatic healing.  
My intention is not to compare similarities and differences of the cases 
themselves as per Dadrian (2007) but to examine exogenic and/or endogenic 
propagation and operationalization of collective trauma: the events of the 
selected cases—sufficiently devastating as to be almost outside the 
possibility of assigned meaning—are now beyond or almost beyond the 
fringes of living memory. Their liminality is critical, in that it affords us the 
identification of the pathways and distinctive features of unresolved 
transmissable trauma in subsequent generations: silence or repression, and 
conversely, a mechanism for disorganisation and fragmentation, 
reemergence and retelling of narratives by heritage groups, who may include 
a new generation of traumatic entrants; memorialisation practices, many of 
which have become increasingly politicised (both in the sense of exposing 
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hidden politics, and of instrumentalisation) and have caused further 
amplification of collective trauma; linkage with other traumas or conversely, 
non-empathetic refusal to link to others’ collective traumas, for fear of ‘de-
exceptionalisation’ or an insistence on exceptionality; unrecognised legal and 
political claims and compensation issues. Studying these and other cases 
necessarily engages interdisciplinary methods, and in the selected examples, 
may also take into account the field of diaspora studies. 
Finally, there is a cascading connection between these cases and the Israel-
Palestine conflict (this project’s main case study, in which accusations of  
‘genocide’ and ‘massacre’ also abound, the latter most recently in regard to 
the three recent Gaza wars in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014).7 The Holocaust 
stands in contrapuntal relation to the Armenian Genocide, from which Hitler’s 
inspiration for cultural genocide was reportedly derived, noted by Dadrian 
(2003), Jones (2011), Kuper (1983), Landau (2006) and Travis (2013b). 
Dadrian (2003) in particular analyzed this issue with rigour (pp. 401-410), 
verifying the authenticity of Hitler’s many statements in his search to create a 
territory and a new world order for a purely Aryan Third Reich, including the 
infamous ‘Wer redet heute noch von der Vernichtung der Armenier?’ (‘Who 
after all today is speaking of the destruction of the Armenians?’) (p. 403).8 
Dadrian asserts: 
A number of utterances Hitler made in the 1920s and 30s 
indicate that he was knowledgeable … about the historical 
record of the persecution of the Armenians, and their demise in 
Turkey through ‘annihiliation’. In one of the earliest surviving 
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written documents containing statements or speeches by Hitler 
and covering the period up to 1924, the future Nazi leader 
made an allusion to the Armenians as victims of their lack of 
courage for combativeness. The ‘solution of the Jewish 
question’, he added, requires, therefore, ‘a bloody clash’. 
Otherwise, Hitler noted, ‘the German people will end up 
becoming just like the Armenians’ ( … das deutsche Volk wird 
ein Volk wie die Armenier …) Hitler made an analogous remark 
some two decades later … (Dadrian, 2003, p. 402.) 
Hitler reportedly admired both Genghis Khan and Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), 
the former because of his attempt at empire creation despite sending 
‘millions of women and children into death knowingly and cheerfully 
(fröhlichen Herzens). Yet, history sees in him only the great founder of 
States’ (Dadrian, 2003, p. 404). The latter reportedly greatly esteemed 
Genghis Khan too: ‘For one thing, Atatürk himself exalted the historical figure 
of Genghis in a November 1, 1922, speech in the Grand National Assembly, 
describing him as a source of pride for the Turkish nation’ (Dadrian, 2003, p. 
404). Hitler envisioned emulating Kemal’s triumph in founding the new 
Turkish regime ‘and the world not only consigned the annihilation of the 
Armenians to oblivion but has accepted the new order of the things because 
“The world believes only in success” (Die Welt glaubt nur an den Erfolg.)’ 
(Dadrian, 2003, p. 404). Lemkin furthermore remarked on how the Armenian 
Genocide had served as an example of cultural destruction for Hitler.9  
Thus these two cases have particular historical linkages and can be said to 
form counterpoints of collective trauma, even if mutual empathy is far from 
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consistent and at times produces truly contradictory denial (Finkelstein, 2003, 
pp. 68-70).  
3.3  The Armenian genocide (1895-1923) 
‘… the rumour in the market-place here is that every Christian at Van 
has been killed, and that the Government have turned the cannon on 
the towns of Erzeroum and Bitlis and levelled them with the ground….’ 
(Harris, H.B., 1896, p. 113)  
‘… at Eghin the scene was terrible. Most of the Christian houses were 
burnt, many of the best and most respected townsmen are killed; a 
father and his three sons, for example, who have all left widows 
except the youngest. Some of the women and girls, to escape 
dishonour, flung themselves into the river.’ (Harris, H.B., 1896, p. 206) 
 
Fig 4. Map of the Armenian Genocide.10 
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Fig 5. Red District where [earlier Hamidian] massacres occurred, after Bliss, 
Turkey and the Armenian atrocities (Bliss, 1896,.p. vi.) 
 
Known as either the Meds Yeghern (meaning ‘great crime’) or by the more 
literary term, Aghét (‘catastrophe’) the Armenian linguistic parallels of the 
Palestinian Nakba or the Shoah refer to the deportations, death marches, 
torture, mass killings, rapes and upheaval of an estimated one and a half 
million Armenians that took place during the dying years of the Ottoman 
empire and its transformation into the new Kemalist republic. One of the 
tragic effects is the long geopolitical shadow these events continues to cast, 
over a hundred years later.11 As with the Jewish Holocaust and the 
Palestinian Nakba, it is important to note that the events did not succeed in 
extinguishing the Armenian community altogether, as Figure 6 (below) 
indicates; if that were the case, we would today be discussing only the 
trauma of perpetrators. Survivors of the Armenian Genocide scattered and 
rebuilt their lives not only in former Soviet Armenia and other states of the  
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FSU, but also in the Middle East, Western Europe, Australia and North 
America; in 2015, around 8-10 million ethnic Armenians currently live outside 
the Republic of Armenia: 
The sun never sets on the Armenian diaspora. Its constituent 
communities include, in a descending order that reflects 
population and not cultural, political, or economic importance, 
communities in Russia (nearly 2 million), the United States 
(800,000), Georgia (400,000), France (250,000), the Ukraine 
(150,000), Lebanon (105,000), Iran (ca. 100,000), Syria 
(70,000), Argentina (60,000), Turkey (60,000), Canada 
(40,000), and Australia (30,000). There are some twenty other 
communities with smaller populations, ranging from 25,000 
down to 3,000, in Britain, Greece, Germany, Brazil, Sweden, 
Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, the Gulf Emirates, Italy, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Venezuela, 
Hungary, Uzbekistan, and Ethiopia. (Tölölyan, 2000, p. 107) 
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Armenian population by country (in thousands): 
  > 2,000   1,000–2,000   500–1,000   200–500   100–200   75–100   10–
75   1–10   0.1–1   <0.1 
 
 
Fig. 6. Armenian population by country (in thousands). (Kentronhayastan.)  
 
The most distinctive feature of the Armenian Aghét12 or Meds Yeghern is the 
international community’s general inability to recognize or agree on the 
‘genocidal’ nature of the event (although it was the fate of the Armenians that 
inspired Holocaust survivor Raphael Lemkin to push for the creation of the 
term genocide, together with the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, discussed above). Acknowledgement 
has remained contested, leaving the open wound to fester and for traumatic 
construction to grow.13 Thus it appears that although there are historical ‘end 
dates’ during which the various traumatic events occurred in different 
locations, in fact the Armenian Genocide as a phenomenon remains without  
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resolution, apparently endless in its painful impact (Göçek , 2014) and 
subject to the relentless vagaries of power politics.14  
 
3.4  Refusing recognition 
 
In the operationalizing of collective trauma, the twin prongs of denial and 
commemoration are paramount. Discourse regarding recognition becomes 
particularly acute on April 24th, the traditional day for memorial ceremonies 
and statements about the Armenian Genocide, commemorated across the 
Armenian diaspora worldwide and particularly in Yerevan, the capital of the 
Armenian republic (former Soviet Armenia).15 There are memorial sites and 
museums in 34 countries,16 and discourse in English often centres on 
whether or not the Armenian Genocide is completely recognized by the 
world’s superpower, the U.S., at a federal level (although individual American 
states have recognized the Genocide)17 despite the guarantees of 
clarification given by Samantha Power, author of the Pulitzer prizewinning 
Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (Power, 2002). 
(Power’s book devotes Chapter 1 to the Armenian Genocide.) Power was 
one of Barack Obama’s senior foreign policy advisors in his campaign for the 
presidency in 2008, and campaigned for Armenian Americans to vote for 
Obama, promising them that Obama would be the first U.S. president to 
recognize the Armenian Genocide.1819 On 24th April 2015, the centennial 
memorial day of the largest massacres in 1915, it was widely noted that 
President Obama still avoided the English use of ‘the G-word’,20 possibly in 
order to avoid offending a vital NATO ally and ensure Turkish President 
Erdoğan’s continued cooperation in operations to combat Daesh. However,  
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President Obama had used one of the Armenian terms for the catastrophe, 
Meds Yeghern on Armenian Memorial Day in 2009.21  
 
Despite this, a photographic museum dedicated to the Armenian genocide 
exists in the Armenian quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem, which the 
researcher has visited. Prior to the 100th anniversary of the Armenian 
Genocide, American Armenian poet and scholar Peter Balakian reminded 
Tablet readers of ‘distinguished Holocaust scholar Deborah Lipstadt’ and her 
‘statement [that] reminds us what a morally important issue denialism is for 
both Jews and Armenians: ‘Denial of genocide whether that of the Turks 
against the Armenians, or the Nazis against the Jews is not an act of 
historical reinterpretation … but an insidious form of intellectual and moral 
degradation’ (Balakian, 2015a; 2015b). 
 
The continuing international disagreement over whether genocidal events 
actually occurred is even more remarkable in view of the extensive news 
reports (Kloain, 2005) and eye witness accounts compiled by then-diplomats, 
consuls and British and American missionaries in the region, and the 
American Red Cross, many of them collected in Bryce and Toynbee’s British 
Parliamentary Blue Book, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire 1915-16 (Bryce and Toynbee, 2000) and other independent 
publications (see, for example, the many books digitalized at 
ArmenianHouse.org or published by the Gomidas Institute in London) and 
memoirs such as Ambassador Henry Morgenthau’s Story: Formerly 
American Ambassador to Turkey (1919).22 Kateb (2003) offers an account of 
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how the massacres were extensively covered in the Australian media; and 
there are many works of history, as well as personal memoirs (Akçam, 2007; 
Alayarian, 2008; Balakian, 2008; Dadrian, 2003; Dadrian and Akçam, 2011; 
De Waal, 2015; Hovannisian, 1999, 2007a, 2007b; Kevorkian, 2011; 
Naimark, Suny and Gocek, 2011, Schrodt, 2014; Suny, 2015, Winter, 2004). 
T.S. Kahvé (2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015) provide a cumulative and 
updated extensive bibliography of publications that detail the different phases 
of documentation of data. Attempts to rebut data regularly rebound; for 
example, the Gomidas Institute’s Ara Sarafian, responding to further Turkish 
government denials, felt compelled to publish a stout defense of Bryce and 
Toynbee’s 1916 British Parliamentary Blue Book (Sarafian, 2005).  
As for ‘most Turks,’ explains Hürriyet Daily News columnist Mustafa Akyol, 
they ‘… only use the much more innocent term “tehcir,” or deportation’ about 
the fate of the Armenians (Akyol, 2015). Disputing the ‘Muslims versus 
ancient Christian people’ version of the events, Akyol cites denialist historian 
Justin McCarthy (McCarthy, 1995) placing the Armenians in the wider 
political context of the winds of nationalism blowing through post-French 
Revolutionary Europe, in which many Ottoman Christian peoples, ‘such as 
Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians’ sought their own states, in the process often 
engaging in ‘ethnic cleansing, whose victims were often Muslims. A similar 
tragedy hit the Muslims of Crimea and Caucasus as well, who were 
persecuted by the Russian advance. … some 5 million Ottoman Muslims 
have perished during the decline and shrinking of the empire over two 
centuries — all due to various waves of ethnic cleansing’ (Akyol, 2015). 
(Bjørnlund [2008] refers to this historical process as ‘violent Turkification’, 
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focusing on the ethnic cleansing of Aegean Greeks as part of the process. 
This is a consensus also reflected in the 2007 Resolution by the International 
Association of Genocide Scholars, and in Genocide Prevention Now’s 
special web magazine issue, Armenian Genocide and Co-Victims: Assyrians, 
Yezidis, Greeks.)23 
Alleging that the Armenian nationalist support of the Russians led to their 
expulsion to Syria by the ‘Young Turks’(the Committee of Union and 
Progress who overthrew the last Ottoman Sultan, Abdul-Hamid II), Akyol 
echoes McCarthy’s analysis that it was ‘out of the fear that the Balkan 
nightmares would be repeated this time in Anatolia, the last stronghold of the 
Turks’.24 It is certainly true that friction did exist between the various 
populations, including friction between different Christian populations.25  
Finally, Akyol concludes, ‘the ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Armenians’ (his 
preferred term) ‘took place not because of the Ottoman system. Rather, it 
occurred because of the fall of the Ottoman system. Christian Armenians, 
who lived with Muslim Turks for centuries, were driven out not because of 
religion, but a modern ideology: nationalism’ (Akyol, 2015).  
Armenian-French historian Raymond Kévorkian similarly places the 
Armenian Genocide in its historical context, but there is an implication that 
contextualisation and understanding do not necessarily excuse: 
The destruction of historical groups by states is always the 
culmination of complex processes that unfold in particular 
political and social environments – most notably, in multiethnic 
contexts. The translation of genocidal intentions into action is 
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systematically preceded by periods of maturation rooted in 
diverse experiences, collective failures, frustrations, and 
virulent antagonisms. It is justified by an ideological 
construction that envisages the elimination of “internal 
enemies” from the social body. Each instance of genocidal 
violence, however, obeys an internal logic that lends it its 
singularity. The physical destruction of the Armenian population 
of the Ottoman Empire has, in its turn, a singular feature: it was 
conceived as a necessary condition for the construction of a 
Turkish nation state – the supreme objective of the Young 
Turks. The two phenomena, in other words, are indissolubly 
linked: we cannot understand the one if we ignore the other. 
(Kévorkian, 2011, p. 1) 
On this dialectic, Ronald Grigor Suny comments that ‘Revision of history is 
constant, even necessary’ (Suny, 2015). Yet as far as the interpretation of 
Lemkin’s original inspiration for the genocide convention goes, ‘it has led to 
the creation of two separate, contradictory narratives’. Pro-Armenian and 
pro-Turkish historical analyses concur ‘on many of the basic facts’ but the 
latter, the denialists, ‘have argued that the tragedy was the result of a 
reasonable and understandable response of a government to a rebellious 
and seditious population in time of war and mortal danger to the state’s 
survival. Raison d’état justified the suppression of rebellion, and mass killing 
was explained as the unfortunate residue (“collateral damage” in the now 
fashionable vocabulary) of legitimate efforts to establish order behind the 
lines’ (Suny, 2015). 26 
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Yet despite all this, as Noradounkian (2015) notes, ‘the classification of this 
crime as genocide has consistently been denied by the successive Turkish 
governments and a number of Turkish and non-Turkish scholars alike’27 
Scholar Richard Falk, former UNHCR special rapporteur for the situation of 
human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, and personal 
friend of Turkish PM Ahmed Davutoğlu, carefully explains with reference to 
the Turkish government that Pope Francis’s 2015 recognition of the 
Armenian Genocide especially rankled, just after Turkish President Erdoğan 
had softened his position the year before: ‘In an apologetic and conciliatory 
speech addressed directly to the Armenian community Erdoğan in 2014 said: 
“May Armenians who lost their lives in the early twentieth century rest in 
peace, we convey our condolences to their grandchildren.”’ (Falk, 2015). 
However, in 2015, Falk asserts that President Erdoğan 
… reverts to a much harsher tone, in a pushback to Francis 
declaring that religious leaders make a ‘mistake’ when they try 
to resolve historical controversies. In an effort to be 
constructive, Erdoğan restates the long standing Turkish 
proposal to open the Ottoman archives and allow a joint 
international commission of historians to settle the issue as to 
how the events of 1915 should most accurately be described, 
and specifically whether the term genocide is appropriate. 
…The Turkish position is that there were terrible killings of the 
Armenians, but at a level far below the 1.5 million claimed by 
Armenian and most international sources, and mainly as an 
incident of ongoing warfare and civil strife in which many Turks  
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also lost their lives, and hence it was an experience of mutual 
loss, and not ‘genocide.’ (Falk, 2015) 
Falk shows understanding of the Turkish position, explaining their ‘credible 
anxiety’ regarding a ‘furious right-wing backlash’ that might endanger the 
state’s stability (although currently it seems that the Turkish state has greater 
problems from other sources) and further complains of the construction of an 
‘almost uncontested international narrative’ and the ‘international consensus’ 
regarding the ‘ambiguous’ Armenian genocide, ‘the position endorsed and 
supported by Pope Francis, the European Parliament, and about 20 
countries, including France and Russia’. He resorts to the legal defence: the 
term did not even exist ‘until 1944 by Rafael Lemkin in his book Axis Rule in 
Occupied Europe, written in reaction to the crimes of the Nazis …’ and, 
sensing a circular argument, allows that: 
Lemkin’s text does indirectly lend support to the Armenian 
insistence that only by acknowledging these events as 
genocide is their true reality comprehended. Consider this often 
quoted passage from Lemkin’s book: “I became interested in 
genocide because it happened so many times in history. It 
happened to the Armenians, then after the Armenians, Hitler 
took action.” (Falk, 2015) 
Yet, according to Falk, even ‘the Nuremberg Judgment assessing Nazi 
criminality avoids characterizing the Holocaust as genocide, limiting itself to 
crimes against peace and crimes against humanity.’ Moreover, ‘If in 1945 
there was no legal foundation for charging surviving Nazi leaders with 
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genocide, how can the crime be attributed to the Ottoman Turks, and how 
can the Turkish government be reasonably expected to acknowledge it?’ 
Finally, the Nuremberg Judgment provides that ‘criminal law can never be 
validly applied retroactively (nulla poena sine lege)’ a ‘principle [which] is also 
embedded in contemporary international criminal law.’ Thus, ‘if genocide was 
not a crime in 1915, it cannot be treated as a crime in 2015,’ (Falk, 2015). 
This may be the case legally, but as Falk acknowledges, the preamble of 
Lemkin’s Genocide Convention does leave room for wider historical 
interpretation; it “Recognized in all periods of history that genocide has 
inflicted great losses on humanity.” Moreover: 
… even the premise of prior criminality is reinforced by Article 
1: “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether 
committed in time of peace, or time of war, is a crime under 
international law which they undertake to prevent and punish.” 
By using the word ‘confirm’ it would appear that the crime of 
genocide preexisted the use of the word ‘genocide’ invented to 
describe the phenomenon, and thus no persuasive 
jurisprudential reason is present to oppose redescribing the 
events of 1915 as an instance of genocide. (Falk, 2015) 
Finally, Falk gives up on a legal interpretation and concludes that we had 
better take the pressure to acknowledge Armenian Genocide ‘as a pycho-
political [sic] campaign’. The Armenians wish ‘to achieve an 
acknowledgement and apology … and possibly to set the stage for a 
subsequent demand of reparations’.28 The Armenian ‘insistence on the label 
“genocide” seeks to capture total control of the moral high ground’ and to 
 
 
127 
 
piggyback by association on ‘the most horrendous events experienced by 
others, and most particularly by the Jewish victims of Nazism’ (Falk, 2015) a 
stance that gave Bernard Lewis particular pause.29 The association with the 
Holocaust adds a further ‘element in the unfolding story,’ notes Falk, for 
‘there appears to be an Israeli role in deflecting Turkish harsh criticism of its 
behavior in Gaza by a show of strong support for the Armenian campaign’ 
(Falk, 2015).30 Yet after the huge falling-out between Israel and Turkey over 
the 2010 killing of nine Turkish activists (the death count rose to 10 on 25 
May, 2014)31 on the Gaza-bound aid ship Mavi Marmara, it is likely that 
Israel is keen to avoid further Turkish alienation, amid talk of a settlement 
having been reached.32 
3.5 Enduring impact  
Finally, how does the Meds Yeghern continue to affect subsequent 
generations of Armenians and the Armenian diaspora? While it remains 
active as collective cultural traumatic memory, evoked and preserved 
through highly-politicized annual memorialization ceremonies, and yearly 
rounds of denial or recognition, with the passage of time and the deaths of 
survivors, there are relatively few living witnesses; and in comparison to 
Holocaust literature, fewer extensive studies of its transgenerational 
psychological impact on remaining Armenian populations exist (Kalayjian and 
Weisberg, 2002).33 Many sites of memory have been all but erased within 
former Armenian areas of Turkey (Ṻngör, 2014, p. 151; pp. 165-166; Banco, 
2015) as the new state constructed its national memory through revised 
historical accounts and textbooks (Ṻngör, 2014, p. 156), and converted 
domestic issues inherited from its ‘traditionally multilayered cultural 
 
 
128 
 
composition’ to ‘foreign ones, such as Ermeni meselesi (the Armenian 
question) or Kürt meselesi (the Kurdish question)’ (Anahit, 2014, p. 206).  
Nevertheless, at present, sufficient social memories of mass violence remain 
preserved and transmitted among families, as various documentaries attest 
and promote (Ṻngör, 2014, p. 157; Eric Friedler’s documentary, Aghét – Ein 
Völkermord (Friedler, 2010) and many other documentaries are readily 
available on YouTube).34 Indeed, between 2002-2007, Ṻngör (2014) 
conducted ‘up to 200 interviews with the (grand)children of contemporaries of 
those events … elderly Turks and Kurds often remembered vivid stories from 
family members or villagers who had witnessed or participated in the 
massacres’ (pp. 158-159). Anahit (2014, p. 212) interviews on video ‘over 
250 Turkish Armenians’ between 2006-2010, in order to illustrate how ‘For 
many Armenians, their identity is principally associated with being violated as 
their unresolved traumas get transmitted to future generations’; she supports 
her project further by citing Slavoj Žižek’s contention that ‘Inherited memory 
of atrocity can indeed dominate a people’s heritage. Sometimes to the extent 
that it can be almost a defining factor of identity and cohesion, often for many 
centuries’ (Anahit, p. 212).  
3.6 New entrants to trauma 
As these generations pass away, it is inevitable that social transmission will 
degrade; but in a contemporary climate that emphasizes identity politics, a 
different kind of cultural trauma will evolve, not only among diasporic 
Armenians but also among the ‘hidden Armenians’ in Turkey, numbering 
‘from [the late Armenian-Turkish human rights journalist] Hrant Dink’s 
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300,000 to the Turkish Historical Society’s 500,000 to the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutuyn’s figure of two million’ (Ṻngör, 
2014, p. 163).  
Dink, assassinated on January 19th, 2007, in Istanbul, was one of the co-
founders and editor of the Turkish-Armenian weekly Agos, and sought to 
build empathy between Turks and Armenians, as well as greater integration 
for Armenians and others into Turkish society (Oran, 2006).35 He decried the 
state’s attempt to repress difference and divide its minorities in general, 
claiming ‘we can be a better unity with the multiplicity of our different 
identities’ (Anahit, 2014, pp. 206-207). While frequently challenging the 
Turkish State’s denial of genocide, Dink despised the political manipulation of 
the genocide by diaspora Armenians and the Republic of Armenia.36 
Reportedly ‘tens of thousands’ (or ‘hundreds of thousands’, ‘up to 100,000’) 
attended Dink’s funeral, bearing signs that read ‘We are all Hrant Dink’ or 
‘We are all Armenian’ (Hürriyet, 2007; Today’s Zaman, 2007; Krajeski, 2012). 
As Turkey has moved further and further to the right and its crackdown on 
the freedom of the press has become more severe, 37 particularly 
newspapers and media organizations associated with Fetullah Gülen’s 
Hizmet (‘service’) movement, such as the Feza Gazatecilik Media group,38 
Dink’s death represents a new phrase in the evolution of this collective 
trauma within Turkey, with additional entrants choosing to identify: 
In the years since Dink’s murder, the movement has grown and 
become more complex, bringing together Turkish liberals, 
Armenians, and journalists, and also Kurds and Alevi, and 
women and members of the L.G.B.T. community—basically all  
 
 
130 
 
marginalized minorities in Turkey. That round placard [“We are 
all Hrant. We are all Armenian.”] took on a neon hue at last 
year’s gay-pride parade. (Krajeski, 2012) 
In an era of identity politics that emerged largely from the U.S., Khachig 
Tölölyan (Stockholm University, Department of Social Anthropology 2012; 
Tölölyan and Papazian, 2014) alleges that the continuance of Armenian 
trauma in the U.S. is more a result of ethnic identification, rather than purely 
diasporic identification (making a distinction between diaspora and 
transnationalism, diaspora and ethnicity). Many of those who identify as 
Armenian may be Armenian American, but also mixed with other identities; 
however on April 24th, they may choose to identify with the Armenian 
Genocide.39 Only a small minority of the community are dedicated ‘diasporic’ 
committed activists – but as Tölölyan notes, catastophes can mobilize both 
kinds of community, for example for fundraising in times of disaster, such as 
the 1988 Armenian earthquake, and during the period of the Armenian war 
with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh, which ended in 1994. Meanwhile, 
the worldwide community of diaspora Armenians is extraordinarily diverse 
and difficult to generalize about; the one thing that connects all these 
communities is the memorialized trauma of the dispersal.40  
For an explanation of this phenomenon of transgenerational identification 
that is connected by the Meds Yeghern, Tölölyan suggests we have to resort 
to the concept of ‘postmemory’ as adumbrated by Marianne Hirsch (2012). 
Remembering the Genocide in an organized, constructed fashion is the 
‘postmemory’ work of ‘communal elites … in the name of the nation-in-exile’ 
(Tölölyan, 2000, p. 107).  
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Yet the diaspora is no longer wholly the community of tragic victims 
presented in, for example, Henri Verneuil’s classic films Mayrig and 588 Rue 
Paradis or Atom Egoyan’s Ararat. It is a dynamic community ‘undergoing an 
accelerating transition from exilic nationalism to diasporic transnationalism.  
… this transition is challenging the agendas, discourses, and resources of 
existing institutions, causing changes and occasionally leading to the 
creation of new organizations’ (Tölölyan, 2000, p. 107). Nonetheless, the 
unrecognized Armenian Genocide remains a central unifying frame for its 
construction of identity, constituting an extensive and extended ‘symbolic 
boundary… in which members of the collective, which treats a certain event 
as a cultural trauma, categorize the modes of relating to others, within and 
outside the collective, to that cultural trauma’ (Lazar and Litvak-Hirsch, 2009, 
p. 189). Thus the unanswerable question remains: despite the tremendous 
resilience shown by Armenians, will the Genocide continue to be the ultimate 
traumatic organizing factor for the collective’s cultural memory, even beyond 
such time as resolution and restitution take place?  
3.7  The Holocaust 
Developmentally, the Holocaust or Shoah is generally considered to be ‘the 
starting point for the contemporary manifestation of collective trauma in the 
public arena’ (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009, p. 17). Have and Boender 
(2012, p. 7) emphasize the Holocaust’s centrality as a ‘a paradigm’, noting 
that: 
Research into other cases of genocide uses the Holocaust as 
a benchmark, whether consciously or subconsciously. This 
becomes evident in the methodology and the use of related 
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terms such as ‘victims’, ‘perpetrators’ and ‘bystanders’. When 
cases of mass violence and genocide are analysed or 
discussed, the Holocaust is often used as an example.  
As the ‘paradigm’, interdisciplinary examinations of the Holocaust arc 
between political, juridical, philosophical and psychological disciplines; as 
the Ur-trauma, it has also been notably co-opted by cultural studies through 
the work of Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub, Arthur Kleinman, 
and Veena Das. In particular, the Shoah also the avowed political ‘never 
again’ raison d’être and rationale for establishment of the State of Israel, 
enshrined into its Proclamation of Independence: 
The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people - the 
massacre of millions of Jews in Europe - was another clear 
demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its 
homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish 
State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to 
every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a 
fully privileged member of the community of nations. 
Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from 
other parts of the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, 
undaunted by difficulties, restrictions and dangers, and never 
ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and 
honest toil in their national homeland. (Provisional Government 
of Israel, 1948) 
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The traumatic underpinnings of the Israel-Palestine conflict—producing a 
further set of victims, the Palestinians—undoubtedly emanate from the 
Shoah, layered on top of earlier historical persecutions throughout the 
centuries.  
 
3.8 Avoiding recognition 
Paradoxically, there was a somewhat tardy growth of the notion (or 
construction) of ‘the Holocaust’ itself. In Europe, assert Levy and Sznaider 
(2006, p. 5) ‘initially … revulsion about the Holocaust was prominent’. 
Alexander concurs, commenting that at war’s end in 1945: 
… the Holocaust was not the “Holocaust” but rather 
‘atrocities’; in fact the first American media reports of atrocities 
were not of the Nazi genocide of Jews but of the Japanese 
army’s brutal treatment of American and Filippino war 
prisoners after the fall of Bataan and Corregidor. News of the 
Nazi concentration camps filtered out slowly, as ‘from the late 
thirties on, reports about them had been greeted with 
widespread public doubt about their authenticity … they were 
dismissed as a kind of Jewish moral panic’ (Alexander in 
Alexander et al, 2004a, pp. 197-198).  
In the U.S., for example, ‘in the first postwar years, the Holocaust was 
viewed, by Jews, as well as Americans in general, as part of history. It was 
an event that had taken place there and not here; it was an aspect of a 
period—the era of fascism—that was now ended’ comments Peter Novick 
(Novick, 2000, p. 177). Fassin and Rechtman also reinforce this picture by  
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describing the meaning-making of the Holocaust as both piecemeal and 
cumulative : 
As we know, the emergence and unfurling of this memory did 
not follow immediately after World War II and the discovery of 
the extermination camps. Collective remembering was a 
gradual process, coming through the first books by survivors 
(primarily those of Primo Levi) and collections of testimonies 
… through historiographic studies, some of which were 
strongly contested … and occasionally through controversial 
screen works (such as the TV series Holocaust or the film 
Schindler’s List) and finally through a belated commemoration 
procedure … (Fassin and Rechtman, 2007, pp. 17-18) 
Indeed, the term Holocaust itself was not employed in those early years: 
… those Jews who suffered in the ghettos and camps of Nazi-
occupied Europe did not think of themselves as victims of a 
“Holocaust.” Nor did most of them employ such Hebrew terms 
as churban or shoah, which today sometimes alternate with 
“Holocaust” in popular usage. Rather, in referring to their fate 
in the immediate postwar years, they typically spoke about the 
“catastrophe,” or the “recent Jewish catastrophe,” or the 
“disaster.” These more or less general terms remained 
dominant through the latter 1940s and into the early 1950s, 
when “Holocaust” or “the Holocaust” gained currency and took 
on the connotations it has largely retained until today. 
(Rosenfeld, 2011, pp. 57-58) 
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While the Holocaust may well not have symbolized the ultimate expression 
of evil until it was interpreted in this way in subsequent years, in contrast, 
there was little contemporary doubt regarding the Armenian Genocide, as it 
initially occurred. There was a wealth of horrified contemporaneous 
reporting (mentioned above). Moreover, Grand Vizier Damad Ferit Pasha 
convened a military tribunal in Istanbul between 1918-1920 to prosecute the 
government of the Committee of Union and Progress and the military for 
their atrocities; leading members were sentenced to death in absentia, 
leaving little doubt that a systematic decimation of the Armenians had been 
attempted. (The sentences were never carried out for a multitude of 
reasons, the most pressing of which was the nationalist revolution of Kemal 
Pasha.)41 This makes the later denials and concealment even more acutely 
tragic; but what is common to both the Armenian Genocide and the 
Holocaust is the lacuna of time before a definitive traumatic narrative picked 
up pace, together with a widening of cultural memorialisation practices and 
dedicated sites of memory.  
 
The Catholic Church and the Allied Powers are often accused of knowing 
about the horror of the Nazi plans for Europe’s Jews all along, and having 
failed to prevent it, even before the events of Kristallnacht (9th-10th 
November, 1938). It is a point frequently made in the labelling of exhibits in 
Israel’s Holocaust museum, Yad Vashem. Tom Lawson (2010, p. 88) 
offers a note of caution, pointing out multiple problematic issues of 
contemporary ‘bystander historiography’, which seeks ‘to impose a fixed 
moral code on the past …[and] judge the past anachronistically using the 
standards of the present … it is replete with suggestions that the 
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 “international community failed” ... the Church “should” have shown more 
concern for the Jews … the pope “should” have issued a protest against 
the deportation of Roman Jews … the “American response to the 
European Jewish catastrophe was a dismal failure”’. Nevertheless he 
agrees that ‘what the documents that have been progressively released 
since the end of the war have provided is a basis for a narrative of the 
Allied response to the Nazi persecution and murder of Europe’s Jews over 
which, just like the scholarship on the Church as bystander, there is 
widespread agreement’ (Lawson, 2010, pp. 104-105). 
 
Although inaction or partial ‘bystanding’ does not precisely constitute denial 
as per the Armenian case (Britain did, after all, take in 10,000 ‘assimilable’ 
Kindertransport children, including this researcher’s late father) there 
remains heated argument about the extent to which the knowledge of the 
atrocities was suppressed in Europe and the U.S., even among existing 
Jewish communities, for fear of exacerbating the situation and worsening 
their own, thereby contributing to an ‘unresolved’ aspect of the collective 
trauma. 42 Louise London notes that for the British government, the 
‘problem of what to do with the Jews’, if they could be saved, ‘took 
precedence over saving them … Humanitarian aid to the Jews was 
assigned much lower priority than, for instance, the maintenance of severe 
restrictions on alien immigration to the United Kingdom’ (London, 2000, pp. 
1-2). One thinks today of Europe’s disarray and moral panic at the Syrian 
refugee crisis, unlikely solutions for which involve a dubious deal with an 
increasingly repressive Turkish regime. 
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This failure to cope with the details of the Holocaust is supported by 
Shephard (2005, 2010) who offers another revisionist take on history in his 
description of the British liberation of typhoid-stricken Belsen concentration 
camp: 
For half a century the British regarded their conduct at Belsen 
as one of the great epics of medical history; ‘perhaps never in 
the history of medicine has a more gallant action been fought 
against disease’, a doctor wrote in 1947. … But when 
historians looked at this episode again in the 1990s, they 
noticed several disturbing elements. Why were the British not 
prepared for what they found at Belsen? Why did it take so 
long (almost two weeks) to organize a proper medical 
response? Why were the medical teams sent to the camp so 
poorly equipped, with only aspirin and opium, and no surgical 
instruments and anaesthetics? Why, when specialists did 
arrive, did they get so much of the medicine wrong? Above all, 
was it inevitable that nearly 14,000 people should die at 
Belsen after it was liberated? … The ‘mishandling’ of the 
medicine of liberating the camps, argued Rabbi Irving 
Greenberg, ‘reflected Allied ignorance and failure to plan, 
which in turn mirrored the democracies’ lack of concern for the 
fate of the Jews’. ‘The organized mass killing stopped,’ he 
said, ‘but the dying went on’. (Shephard, 2005, p. 4) 
 
The delayed revelation of the Holocaust and the situation of the victims has 
political meaning for the social construction of trauma. For people to feel 
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disturbed by such events, ‘symbolic extension and psychological 
identification are required’ but the ‘starving, depleted, often-weird-looking 
and sometimes weird-acting Jewish camp survivors seemed like a foreign 
race … a mass… a petrified, degrading, and smelly one ’ (Alexander in 
Alexander et al, 2004a, p. 199).43 Moreover, the ‘evil’ of Nazism, alleges 
Alexander, was only coded and appropriately weighted retroactively, despite 
the judgment of ‘crimes against humanity’ through the Nuremberg Trials 
from 1945-1949 (in which the mention of the Jewish Holocaust was minor) 
and the 1948 UN Convention Against Genocide.  
 
 3.9 Turning points 
Principally, as Michael Rothberg notes, ‘The year 1961 is generally 
considered a turning point in the history of Holocaust memory’ (Rothberg, 
2004) with the media coverage of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem that year, 
and Hannah Arendt’s 1963 serialization of it in The New Yorker (later to 
become Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil), and the 
1963 Auschwitz Trial in Frankfurt. As for the ‘belated commemoration 
procedure’ noted above by Fassin and Rechtman, (2007, pp. 17-18), this 
took rather longer; it can be said to include the foundation in 1998 of the 
intergovernmental organization, the Task Force for International 
Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research, 
renamed in 2013 the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA, 
https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/). The ‘31 member countries, ten 
observer countries and seven permanent international partners’ of IHRA 
(IHRA, n.d.) cooperate with the United Nations Outreach Programme on 
Holocaust education programmes in a pedagogical enterprise to instruct on 
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the critical global meaning of the Holocaust 
(http://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/taskforce.shtml).  
 
Among the outcome of such activities was the 2000 Stockholm International 
Forum on the Holocaust, ‘when representatives from 46 governments 
around the world met in Stockholm … all attendees signed a declaration 
committing to preserving the memory of those who have been murdered in 
the Holocaust’ (Holocaust Day Memorial Trust, 2005). In Article 1, the 
declaration underlined the overarching, global message that ‘the Holocaust 
(Shoah) fundamentally challenged the foundations of civilization. The 
unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold universal 
meaning.’ Its conclusion (Article 8) is a clarion call for transnational 
solidarity, ‘We empathize with the victims’ suffering and draw inspiration 
from their struggle. Our commitment must be to remember the victims who 
perished, respect the survivors still with us, and reaffirm humanity’s 
common aspiration for mutual understanding and justice’. (Holocaust 
Memorial Day Trust, 2005).  
 
The Forum also instituted an annual International Holocaust Memorial Day, 
27th January, marking the anniversary of Auschwitz’s liberation by the 
Soviet army. In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly also adopted 
the International Holocaust Memorial Day formally (UNGA, 2005).44 A 
‘corresponding willingness to let a set of transnational ideas and 
institutions take over certain aspects that had been under the firm 
sovereignty of the nation-state’ (Levy and Sznaider, 2006, p. 5) informed  
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such decisions, especially as ‘by the 1990s the Holocaust had been 
reconfigured as a decontextularized event oriented toward nation-
transcending symbols and meaning systems such as the United Nations’ 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Memories of the 
Holocaust helped shape the articular of a new rights culture’  (ibid.).  
 
3.10 The banality of evil 
By the late 1990s, discourse in Western countries about the Holocaust 
had moved on from reticence to a veritable flood of official 
memorialization. In contrast to Theodor Adorno and George Steiner’s 
famous injunctions about the imperative for silence in the face of 
unrepresentable evil, the Holocaust had become firmly established in 
Western contemporary awareness through its cultural performance—via 
the literary work of survivors such as Primo Levi (referred to above) and 
Eli Wiesel, accounts such as Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl 
(adapted for both stage and screen), best-selling historical works such as 
Hitler’s Willing Executioners (Goldenhagen, 1996) and above all, through 
popular culture, such as the graphic novel (Art Spiegelman’s Maus) and 
television (the series Holocaust, 1978, mentioned above) to ‘blockbuster’ 
movies (The Odessa File, 1974; Marathon Man, 1976; Sophie’s Choice, 
1982; Enemies, A Love Story, 1989; Schindler’s List, 1993, mentioned 
above; Jakob the Liar, 1999; The Pianist, 2002) through to European 
movies (The Night Porter, 1974; Les Uns et les Autres, 1981; Au Revoir 
Les Enfants, 1987; La Vita è Bella, 1997)45 and the 1985 documentary, 
Claude Lanzmann’s nine-hour-plus opus, Shoah.46 
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Despite the European origin of the Holocaust, the fact that the majority of 
these works of broadest popular culture emanate from the U.S. is largely 
a reflection on demography and circumstances: the U.S. contains the 
largest surviving population of Jews outside of Israel, and historically, 
Jews have been active in Hollywood, originally finding fewer prejudicial 
bars in the entertainment industry than elsewhere in the U.S. Yet the 
banal performance of Holocaust trauma, the widening of consciousness 
through its ‘Americanization’, comes at a certain price: Rosenfeld (2011, 
p. 54) laments its degradation, but there is little escape from the process 
whereby ‘historical memory in a popular culture is determined chiefly by 
popular forms of representation’.  
 
Yet this outpouring of memorialization and popular culture can be said to 
have produced both a partially globalizing and a particularizing 
consciousness regarding the event in North America, adding new 
entrants to carry forward traumatic transmission. ‘By and large, the story 
of how the Holocaust was first marginalized, then came to be centered in 
American life,’ according to Novick (2000, p. 6) was also a conscious 
choice of American Jewish organizations to reinforce collective identity 
through Hallbwachian collective memory of European roots; this 
phenomenon of memorializing trauma as a reinforcement of collective 
identity can be found in contemporary Armenian identification with the 
Meds Yeghern. Not only direct descendants of victims, but also those 
included in the wider process of diasporic identification may be drawn in, 
often strategically. Novick, for example, comments how: 
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The Holocaust, as virtually the only common denominator of 
American Jewish identity in the late twentieth century, has 
filled a need for a consensual symbol … well designed to 
confront increasing communal anxiety about “Jewish 
continuity” in the face of declining religiosity, together with 
increasing assmilation and a sharp rise in intermarriage, all 
of which threatened a demographic catastrophe. (Novick, 
2000, pp. 6-7) 
Novick’s contention finds support in Pew Research’s 2013 report, which 
claims that ‘Roughly seven-in-ten say remembering the Holocaust and 
leading an ethical life are essential to what it means to them to be Jewish, 
while far fewer say observing Jewish law is a central component of their 
Jewish identity’ (Pew Research Center, 2013). 
 
Meanwhile, alongside popular cultural dissemination of the Holocaust, 
collective memorialisation, institutionalisation of social memory and 
traumatic reinforcement developed in parallel through the burgeoning 
growth of Holocaust museums, memorial sites, educational and 
academic research centres.47 The international roster of Holocaust 
museums and memorial sites is too extensive to detail; outside of 
Israel―whose major Holocaust museum, Yad Vashem, was established 
in Jerusalem in 1953 and renewed in 2005 as an extensive (and explicitly 
political) site of memory, mourning and study48 and the U.S., which hosts 
(among its 50 Holocaust museums) the comprehensively-endowed and 
much-visited United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington 
D.C. (opened in 1993)―the greatest concentration of museums and 
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memorial sites are of course in Europe;49 Auschwitz concentration camp 
itself became a museum in 1947, and a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 
1979, a site of pilgrimage and tourism. Yet it must be noted that in its 
early years, when Poland remained part of a Soviet Union that preferred 
a Judenrein interpretation of the Holocaust, ‘it was projected as a crucial 
memory site of the martyrdom of the Polish nation, and only in more 
recent years has it also been shown to be a place where over a million 
European Jews were destroyed’ (Rosenfeld, 2011, p. 55). Sixty years 
after the war’s end, Eisenman’s Memorial to the Murdered Jews of 
Europe (https://www.stiftung-denkmal.de/en/home.html) was inaugurated 
in Berlin in 2005, and from 2009, included memorials to the Sinti-Roma 
and homosexuals murdered by the Nazis. 
 
Fig. 7 Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Berlin (Beate Müller, 
2012; reproduced with her permission) 
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Fig. 8 Yad Vashem interior, Jerusalem (Esta Tina Ottman, 2011) 
 
Fig. 8 Children’s Memorial at Yad Vashem, Jerusalem (Esta Tina 
Ottman, 2011) 
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3.11 Challenges to collective trauma interpretation: The universal, 
the unexceptional and the particular 
 
How the Holocaust has been remembered and represented in Europe 
(especially Germany and France), the U.S. and Israel since 1945 continues 
to change. In an era of intersectionality, one trend of Holocaust 
representation has been to universalise (and thereby, according to some 
arguments, to de-exceptionalise) its traumatic message: the Holocaust as a 
signifier for all genocides and atrocities, widening the traumatic inclusion of 
victims; lack of recognition of Armenian Genocide prevents it becoming a 
similar signifier. ‘Discussion of Holocaust memory within the realm of 
juridical, political, and ethical thought,’ observes Goldberg ‘… inevitably 
involves questions of universal moral laws and the relations of inclusion 
and exclusion that necessarily arise’ (Goldberg, 2015, p. 10). Despite its 
being the primary traumatic event of the first half of the twentieth century, 
the Holocaust now serves a wider, more symbolic function; its ‘shared 
memories … [will] provide the foundations for a new cosmopolitan memory, 
a memory transcending ethnic and national boundaries … In an age of 
ideological uncertainty these memories have become a measure for 
humanist and universalist identifications’ (Levi and Sznaider, 2006, p. 4).  
 
Not all scholars are comfortable with this universalising trend. Alvin 
Rosenfeld (2011) notes dubiously that: 
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… there is ongoing argument today over whether the 
Holocaust is to be understood as but one example of a larger 
phenomenon—genocide—and, consequently, seen within the 
wider framework of state-sponsored mass violence, or whether 
its distinctive features make it a singular crime best 
comprehended in its own terms. Similarly, the once widely 
shared view that the Holocaust was “unique” has eroded in 
scholarly circles, although it generally persists among people 
outside of the academy, at least in North America. (Rosenfeld, 
2011, p. 55) 
This erosion concerns Rosenfeld; the Holocaust’s memory is ‘beset by an 
array of cultural pressures that challenge its place as a pivotal event in 
modern European and Jewish history’ (p. 239). Among the pressures he 
lists are Holocaust denial, a phenomenon of both the far right and the far 
left;50 downgrading of the Holocaust’s ‘magnitude and consequences’; 
distortion, trivialisation and universalisation; ‘Holocaust fatigue and 
Holocaust resentment’; finally, he refers to the misappropriation of the 
Holocaust in the political struggle to delegitimise or defend the State of 
Israel (Rosenfeld, 2011, p. 239).  
 
Norman Finkelstein, a child of concentration camp survivors, controversially 
declared much of the outpouring of Holocaust studies to be ‘shelves upon 
shelves of shlock that now line libraries and bookstores’ (Finkelstein, 2003, 
p. 7). Enough is enough, he exclaims: 
The time is long past to open our hearts to the rest of humanity's 
sufferings. This was the main lesson my mother imparted. I never 
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once heard her say: Do not compare. My mother always compared. 
No doubt historical distinctions must be made. But to make out moral 
distinctions between "our" suffering and "theirs" is itself a moral 
travesty. "You can't compare any two miserable people," Plato 
humanely observed, "and say that one is happier than the other." In 
the face of the sufferings of African-Americans, Vietnamese and 
Palestinians, my mother's credo always was: We are all holocaust 
victims. (Finkelstein, 2003, p. 8) 
The trend towards treating ‘the Holocaust and other genocides’ as moral 
learning material (although apparently as humans, we still have not learned 
the lesson adequately) is reflected in a 2010 Education Working Group 
Paper on the Holocaust and Other Genocides (Task Force paper), which 
offers eight reasons to ‘relate or compare the Holocaust to other genocides, 
crimes against humanity and mass atrocities’ (United Nations, 2010).51 In a 
similar vein, one may note from the official website  
http://hmd.org.uk/genocides for the UK’s Holocaust(s) Day (commemorated 
on January 27th since 2001) that other victims of Nazi persecution and other 
genocides are also remembered (Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur). Yet 
there was sufficient remembrance of Jewish deaths at the core of Holocaust 
Day to invoke political controversy, in the shape of a boycott by the Muslim 
Council of Great Britain; the boycott ended in 2007 (Dodd, 2007), only to 
resume in 2009 in protest at Israel’s Gaza attack; the Jewish Chronicle 
notes that finally ‘a junior representative’ was designated to attend in 2010 
(Bright, 2010).  
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Weighing in on the relativistic turn, Michael Rothberg (2009) considers the 
undignified jostling competition for victimhood (the Holocaust and other 
atrocities) and asks whether ‘collective memory really works like real-estate 
development’ (p.  2). He suggests that rather than ‘competitive memory … a 
zero-sum struggle over scarce resources’ memory should be 
reconceptualised as ‘multidirectional … subject to ongoing negotiation, 
cross-referencing, borrowing; as productive and not privative’ (Rothberg, 
2009, p. 2).  
 
Yet it is both real estate and collective memory that is very much at stake in 
the by-product of the Holocaust, the Israel-Palestine conflict; and there are 
currently very few possibilities for ongoing negotiations. The Jewish state is 
very territorial in its insistence on the Holocaust as its national trauma 
sine qua non.52 Nevertheless, Rothberg’s claim that it is ‘crucial for scholars 
of the Holocaust to acknowledge the ways that their topic intersects with 
another ongoing conflict’ is critical, as is his acknowledgement of the 
problematic issue that ‘Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land has produced 
some of the most obvious—and often invidious—analogizing of the Nazi 
genocide in relation to political struggle’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 311).  
 
Intentionalist Holocaust historian Saul Friedländer, whose parents died at 
Auschwitz, concurs, commenting that ‘learning about the Holocaust may 
lead some to right-wing conclusions but it can be the other way around and 
lead you to emphasize more the moral imperative in accepting “the other”’ 
(Pfeffer, 2014). He found it possible both to insist on ‘the peculiar evil of 
National Socialism’ (Friedländer, 2001, p. 25) and the wider meaning of the  
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Holocaust. A member of Peace Now, Friedländer has also spoken out 
consistently against Israel’s post-1967 continued occupation of the West 
Bank, and decries the ‘invidious analogizing’ referred to by Rothberg 
(above), ‘Since the 1970s when Menachem Begin described Yasser Arafat 
as a ‘second Hitler,’ we have seen how the political right in Israel has been 
using the Holocaust and its memory to justify more and more radical 
positions. It caused the left to refrain from even mentioning the Shoah. 
Personally, it caused me a dilemma when I saw how the subject which I 
devoted my life to has been used to prop up the most repulsive political 
attitudes’ (Pfeffer, 2014). 
 
At a time of perceived rising antisemitism in Europe and the U.S,53 more 
conservative scholars, diasporic Jewish communal institutions and Jewish 
media see the de-exceptionalism of the Holocaust as perilous. Indeed, for 
many, the process of de-exceptionalism itself constitutes a form of 
antisemitism, particularly when bitter arguments over the Boycott, 
Divestment and Sanctions campaign and antisemitism intersect, particularly 
on university campuses in the West, and in the British Labour Party.54  
 
The late Robert Wistrich, a prolific scholar of antisemitism, characterizes 
this position, asserting that ‘distortions of Holocaust memory have 
considerably diluted whatever remaining effectiveness this cataclysmic 
event may still have as an antidote to present-day anti-Semitism. If 
anything, it seems more plausible to assume that contemporary 
Judeophobia derives at least, in part, from a feeling of resentment that Jews 
have “monopolized” the martyr’s crown of pain and persecution’ (Wistrich, 
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2012). Wistrich’s traumatic background no doubt informed his worldview; 
born in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic to leftist Polish parents who 
were repatriated to post-war antisemitic Poland, fleeing to post-Vichy Paris 
and finally to the U.K., he viewed ‘the longest hatred’ as present throughout 
the continuum of history and foremost in its expression in contemporary 
times among the revolutionary left, the anti-Zionist left and Islamism, 
particularly the Holocaust-denying Islamism of former Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmedinijad (Wistrich, 2010, 2012). The State of Israel provides 
post-war Europe’s conscience with a get-out clause for the atrocities of the 
Holocaust and for its Judeophobia, since in a neat inversion, the victim 
becomes the perpetrator: 
In fact, by branding Israel as a Nazi State, one is killing two 
birds with one stone. One may point the finger at the erstwhile 
victims who are no better than “we, Europeans” (in fact they 
are worse, since they did not try to learn from their history); 
and one is free to express in a “politically correct” anti-Zionist 
language those sentiments which are no longer respectable 
among educated people—namely dislike of Jews. … Jews (or 
others) who defend the Nazi State of Israel can expect to be 
vilified as “racists” “fascists” and “ethnic cleansers”. Indeed, in 
many European countries it is becoming increasingly difficult 
to discuss the Shoah without balancing it by appropriate 
references to Palestine, intending to offset the horrors of Nazi 
Germany with those of the Palestinian naqba … (Wistrich, 
2012b, pp. 257-258). 
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Alain Goldschläger (2012) amplifies this view. Discussing the 1980s 
Canadian trials of the German neo-Nazi publisher Ernst Zündel,55 he fears 
that ‘assaults against the memory of the Holocaust are no longer taboo’. 
The Holocaust cannot simply be ‘reduced to just another “detail” of history 
(to quote Jean-Marie Le Pen … )’. He insists on its exceptional nature as ‘a 
unique event that has marked not only Jewish consciousness, but also 
world history; it is the symbol for cruelty toward Jews.’ Universalisation (‘To 
equate other acts of genocide to it and to reduce it to the scope of a 
“normal” massacre’) would ‘denigrate its particularities and atrocities’; it is 
preferable to consider ‘each act of genocide ... in its historical, social, and 
human context. Amalgamating all massacres into one category only denies 
the particular lessons in each of these events’ (Goldschläger, 2012, pp. 
109-110). However, the conclusion that Goldschläger draws from ‘open 
denial of the Holocaust by neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and Arab 
governments’ is similarly problematic; it fuses anti-Semitism indivisibly with 
‘an attempt to delegitimize the State of Israel’ (Goldschläger, 2012, p. 110).  
 
Clearly these conflicting accounts of the meaning and ways of 
memorialisation of the Holocaust point to an unresolved and uneasy 
narrative, through which fear of re-enactment bubbles up repeatedly, 
exacerbated by political manipulation and the insecurity of the contemporary 
political climate. Resistance to symbolic universalisation of the trauma story 
indicates that those who are in positions of cultural or political power to frame 
the consensus still perceive that either the social collective’s existence or its 
identity remain under threat, leaving little space for solidarity with victims of 
other traumas.  
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It is a puzzling conundrum; the Holocaust has been comprehensively (but 
clearly not exhaustively) studied and analysed; witness testimonies continue 
to be collected and preserved, and witness journals continue to be 
discovered and translated into English, adding to the archives of irrefutable 
evidence; Holocaust denial has been legislated against in various forms in 
many Western countries, although the internet and social media still remains 
a vibrant space to nourish this particular pathology. Yet if the collective were 
a traumatised patient on the analyst’s couch, the impression is that the 
patient’s account has not yet been sufficiently heard or talked through. 
Certainly resolution or ‘closure’ has not been adequately reached, in large 
part because the topic of the Holocaust is intimately connected with the 
political future of the State of Israel. Perhaps, as Alexander observes, the 
‘spiral of signification’ is indeed ‘not rational’; perhaps it is ‘intentional’; or 
perhaps it is both irrational and intentional (Alexander, 2016, p. xxii). Finally, 
maybe it is still ‘too soon’, although as the persistence of collective trauma in 
the case of the more distant Armenian Genocide indicates, time is not 
necessarily a healer. 
3.12 Conclusion 
 
In the above discussion I have endeavoured to clarify and identify the 
markers for the sociological phenomenon of collective trauma, through the 
examination of two historically-connected instances of catastrophic mass 
violence. Both cases involve vast suffering and unbearable loss of life, and 
have a genocidal component, in that the major intent was to extinguish 
entirely an ethnic collectivity or group, according to Lemkin’s original 
definition of the term.  
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Neither the Ottoman Turks nor the Nazis were able to complete their attempt 
at wholesale destruction. The survival of a sufficient number of victims 
among the Armenian people and the Jews of Europe has ensured a haunted 
remembrance, divided between communities of diaspora and their respective 
newly-constituted states, where commemoration is most highly politicised, 
and attracting other entrants to traumatised memory in the process. As 
Hutchison and Bleiker observe, ‘A particular emotional politics—centred on 
loss, humiliation, anger and even guilt … triggers forms of remembering that 
preclude the possibility of working through the legacies of war’ (Hutchison 
and Bleiker, 2015, p. 210). The unresolved post-genocide trauma of these 
collectives has ‘come to inscribe and perpetuate exclusive and often violent 
ways of configuring community. … ensuring political attitudes generate new 
antagonisms that increase rather than reduce the propensity for violence’ 
(Hutchison and Bleiker, 2015, p. 210).  
In both cases, the early feature of ‘silence’ has been frequently remarked on; 
this refers both to the delayed revelation of genocides and an inability on the 
part of the perpetrators, collaborators or international community to 
acknowledge the immensity of losses, causing further suffering. It is also 
refers to victim silence, although there is not unequivocal agreement on this 
point; in many cases the disempowered victims’ testimonies only came to 
light or were translated later; some accounts may remain unrecovered.56 
Above all, it refers to the necessary hiatus before cultural carriers were able 
to shape coherently and disseminate the narrative of social suffering. 
The juridical and political aspects of silencing—in the shape of refusing 
recognition or incomplete recognition and reparations―remain common to  
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the lack of resolution in both cases and contribute to ongoing trauma. The 
Armenian Genocide remains bitterly contested to this day, as discussed at 
length above, and survivors and descendants have never received any 
reparations. In contrast, legislation by individual states worldwide for 
Holocaust recognition and anti-semitic hate speech is widespread, although 
Holocaust negationists and deniers show remarkable persistence, 
contributing both to unremitting diasporic communal apprehensions and 
extreme paranoia regarding  Iran (and other Islamist deniers) among Jewish 
Israelis. Moreover, there are progressive attempts at restitution to Jewish 
survivors of the Holocaust and other victims of Nazi slave labour.57 Both the 
State of Israel and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against 
Germany (http://www.claimscon.org/) have negotiated since 1952 with the 
German and Austrian governments for Wiedergutmachung reparations, 
despite the vociferous ‘blood money’ objections and demonstrations from 
both left and right in Israel; the much-criticised Claims Conference continues 
to distribute compensation to individual Holocaust survivors and attempts to 
recover assets and property; however, many claims remain open or have 
been judged inadmissible58 although between 2012-2017 the German 
government has agreed to pay further monies to elderly survivors, including 
those who lived in ‘open ghettos’.59 France has also agreed to compensate 
elderly deportee or internee survivors.60 
Finally, while the psychological suffering of survivors and their heirs 
represents a different aspect of trauma investigation, what is inescapable is 
that such groups are generally marked by accents of distress that go beyond 
simulcra of individual suffering. These communal accents are most  
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pronounced when that account of suffering is challenged or dismissed, and 
on days of commemoration and in sites of memory; they are also highly 
subject to manipulation by elites and interest groups. Narrativised and 
ritualised remembrance of a particular traumatic history has been viewed as 
promoting a tendency towards insularity or parochialism, and frequently 
combined with an unethical refusal to extend empathy to other groups, as if 
the core identity of the group is rooted in suffering and thereby threatened by 
such empathy. We all wish for mourners to move on from the stage of grief; it 
is partly for our own ease and convenience, and partly for their own healthy 
functioning. Yet if an adequate resolution is not secured, that stage may 
become a fixed position or complex fixation—destabilising, irrational and 
ultimately perilous. 
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Chapter Four: The politics of collective trauma: Israel  
4.1: Methodological approaches to collective memory and trauma: the 
Israel-Palestine conflict. 
The researcher has thus far essayed a critical analysis of the origins and 
development of the notion of collective trauma as a sociological phenomenon 
in Chapters One through Three, clarifying the key features that underpin 
unresolved historical and cultural conflicts.1 For this, two key historical 
incidences of resonating violence were examined: the Armenian Genocide 
and the World War II Holocaust of Jews (excluding the genocide of Sinti-
Roma owing to limitations necessary for this thesis). As has been noted 
earlier, these episodes represent a cascading connection to the further case 
of the Israel-Palestine conflict that has been selected to form the empirical 
nexus of this study. The conflict is composed of two mutually dependent 
traumas that are highly interactive and reactive, which will be dealt with both 
separately (in order to avoid competing claims of a hierarchy of suffering) 
and together, at the points where the traumas intertwine and impact on each 
other. As Thomas (2015, pp. 194-195) notes, although both ‘cultures of 
victimhood’:  
… share similar features … the positioning of the Holocaust 
and the Nakba are distinct and not completely comparable … 
Jews suffered at the hands of Nazi Germany, a third party not 
represented in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, whereas the 
Palestinian trauma was directly the result of the creation of the 
state of Israel. … Israel approaches this conflict as an 
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established state with a strong economy and developed 
military, while the Palestinians act from a relative position of 
disempowerment, statelessness, and occupation … a factor in 
explaining the tactics, motivations, and perspectives of the 
conflict actors in a chain of victimhood. (Thomas, 2014, pp. 
194-195) 
Generally speaking, in considering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
conventionally the focus has largely remained on key issues such as 
‘borders, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and the rights of Palestinian 
refugees’ (Rogers, 2013); water is frequently appended to these. Attempts at 
resolution to date have focused mainly on ‘process’: interstate-style 
peacemaking, despite the ‘state versus occupied entity’ asymmetry. 
Meanwhile, the conflict ethos and flare-ups of deadly violence—such as the 
current Gaza conflict—regularly render bottom-up civil society intergroup 
peacebuilding projects unfeasible and unreal; this is exacerbated by the lack 
of official Israeli government and Palestinian Authority support for such 
projects. 
The starting point of this research is the epistemic shift that has taken place 
in recent years towards examining the conflict from a somewhat different 
perspective: that of psychological trauma, largely through the extensive work 
of Daniel Bar-Tal and Rafi Nets-Zehngut, among others. Extrapolating from 
this, it can be seen that it is fundamentally the force of traumatic narratives 
that perpetuates the conflict, on the (macro) collective sociological level, 
resulting in further damage on the (micro) psychosocial level. 
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Although certain kinds and degrees of progress have been made at different 
points in the history of the conflict, leading to adjustments in attitudes 
suggestive of the notion that the conflict is open to a more dynamic 
interpretation (Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal, 2014) it is the frequent backsliding 
into episodes of violence that have led many to characterize the conflict as 
one of  apparent ‘frozenness’, suggesting an underlying morbid pathology at 
work, to borrow a medical diagnostic term. Without addressing the 
powerful traumatic undercurrent that underpins a chronic conflict, no 
amount of top-down formal peacemaking is likely to be sustainable. 
Peace theory recommends that peacemaking processes must be situated 
within a continuum of peacebuilding; transitional justice practices, which 
discharge trauma, generally take place only in post-conflict scenarios. In the 
absence of such a continuum or post-conflict scenario, what questions can 
be asked about dealing with intractability? Are there societies that are so 
addicted to destructive, trauma-fixated narratives (including narratives that 
are held to be sacred), that a therapeutic approach on the level of 
national/group discourse is called for? If so, how can this be effected? Does 
the concept of ‘collective trauma’ have explanatory power with respect to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and if so, does it offer new approaches for 
peacebuilding? Within that traumatic concept, what is the under-explored role 
of collective emotion for the research case? Finally, what are the possibilities 
for the transformation of resilient traumatic discourse in the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict?  
In order to explore this, the researcher returns the discussion to the pungent 
role of collective memory, adapting from the widely-accepted and much-cited 
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Hirschian ‘postmemory’ or heritage memory. In Hirsch’s case, as the 
Romanian-born daughter of Holocaust survivors, she used it largely: 
… to describe the relationship of survivors of cultural or 
collective trauma to the experiences of their parents, 
experiences that they “remember” only as the stories and 
images with which they grew up, but that are so powerful, so 
monumental, as to constitute memories in their own right. The 
term is meant to convey its temporal and qualitative difference 
from survivor memory, its secondary or second-generation 
memory quality, its basis in displacement, its belatedness. 
(Hirsch, 1999, p. 8) 
For our purposes, the second part of Hirsch’s observation is more germane, 
as she observes that: 
Postmemory is a powerful form of memory precisely because 
its connection to its object or source is mediated not through 
recollection but through projection, investment, and creation. 
That is not to say that survivor memory itself is unmediated, but 
that it is more directly connected to the past. Postmemory 
characterizes the experience of those who grow up dominated 
by narratives that preceded their birth, whose own belated 
stories are displaced by the stories of the previous generation, 
shaped by traumatic events that they can neither understand 
nor re-create. … Postmemory in my terms is a form of 
heteropathic memory in which the self and the other are more  
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closely interconnected through familial or group relation … 
(Hirsch, 1999, pp. 8-9) 
In the selected example of Israelis and Palestinians, some Israelis (a more 
heterogeneous group) but not all are direct descendants of survivors of 
trauma; almost all Palestinians have had their lives impacted by the 
foundation of the state of Israel. Despite this disparity of directly inherited 
trauma—or perhaps because of this—both groups are subject to a 
synchronous traumatic discourse of official or canonical memory.  
In concert with a range of mnemonic practices, what can be observed is the 
harnessing of powerful emotions to ensure the evocation and continuance of 
traumatic responses, ‘lest we forget’ and collective loyalties become 
degraded, less accessible to mobilization. Great anxiety is attached to 
forgetting, as Sa’di and Abu-Lughod observe, ‘Forgetfulness and the 
passage of time, as various analysts of collective memory have argued, are 
the enemies of causes, meaningful events, and their commemorative 
symbols’ (Sa’di and Abu-Lughod, 2007, p. 18). 
Remembering and the evocation of powerful emotions are most clearly seen 
on memorial days, and it is these that the researcher will focus on in order to 
gain insight. ‘How many people in the West,’ ask Sa’di and Abu-Lughod, 
‘know why Palestinians feel such different emotions from Israelis on their 
“Independence Day” on May 15?’ (Sa’di and Abu-Lughod, 2007, p. 9.) More 
pertinently, aside from the minority of Israel’s left, how many Israelis care to 
dwell on this during their Independence Day parades and barbecue parties? 
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Punctuating the rhythm of the year in the region, days of memory (and 
protest), such as Palestinian Yawm an-Nakba (Nakba Day), Naksa and Land 
Day, Israel’s Yom ha’Shoah ve HaGevurah (Holocaust and Heroes’ Day), the 
solemn Yom ha Zikaron (Day of Remembrance for Fallen Soldiers) that 
precedes Yom Ha’Atzma’ut (Independence Day) range in emotions including 
anger, loss and triumphalism; they are tasked with maintaining and 
mobilizing an uptick in collective trauma. Discourse surrounding the 
commemoration of such days, including controversies emanating from 
commemorative speeches, provide the core data for this study.  
Naturally, such days of remembrance are part of a supporting complex 
mnemonic web that features foundational documents (Hamas, 1988; Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1948; Palestinian Liberation Organization, 1964, 
1968; 1988), controversial educational artefacts that mediate the 
presentation of the official past, such as history textbooks (Adwan, Bar-on 
and Naveh, 2012; Akram and Rudoren, 2013; IMPACT-Se studies on PA 
textbooks and curricula, such as those of 2009, 2011; Pardo, 2016; Pardo, 
2017a; Pardo, Agassi and Sheff, 2017b; IMPACT-Se studies on Israeli 
curricula and textbooks (2000a, 2002; Teff-Seker, 2009; Teff-Seker, 2012; 
Teff-Seker, 2016); Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information 
investigations on Palestinian curricula, 2003, 2004 and 2006; Nets-Zehngut, 
2013; Peled-Elhanan, 2012), cultural-historical artefacts of popular memory, 
such as numerous collected oral histories of the Nakba and the Shoah, 
together with films and documentaries; literary construction includes both 
popular memory and cultural artefacts, from the village books of former 
Palestinian villages (Davis, 2011), to the immense proliferation of works of 
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literature, literary autobiographies and poetry dedicated to remembrance; 
finally both official and individual sites and spaces of memory are 
represented by museums with richly-endowed websites (largely in well-
resourced Israel, such as the Holocaust museum of Yad Va’Shem, Beit 
Lohamei Haghetaot-the Ghetto Fighters’ House Museum, the Israel Museum, 
Eretz Israel Museum) and memorials, abandoned and displaced villages, and 
lastly, in cyberspace, numerous internet websites dedicated to 
remembrance, such as http://www.palestineremembered.com/,  
http://nakba-archive.org/ and 
http://www.webgaza.net/background/Palestine1948/index.htm. Yet it is 
necessary to restrict the focus to that which is feasible for the purposes of a 
single study; and it is the days of remembrance that act regularly as a 
mediating force to bring to the fore the strong emotions of collective trauma 
that continue to fuel this conflict, and on these we shall concentrate.  
 
4.2 Israel – A history of collective traumas  
Israel, from its foundation onwards, presents no lack of tragic histories on 
which to build an empirical account of sociological trauma; as has been 
observed earlier, the former has a way of infiltrating into the latter. Both 
Palestinian and Jewish paradigmatic narratives are steeped in culturally 
traumatic memories, connected by the foundational narrative at Israel’s 
nascence, the ‘ur-trauma’ of the Jewish Holocaust (the Shoah) that in turn, 
is often considered to have contributed in some way to the Palestinian 
Nakba (catastrophe).  
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4.3 Immigration as trauma 
For Palestinians, these memories flow into present day ongoing trauma of 
loss and occupation; the impact is not only cultural but psychosocial and 
clinical; as trauma sufferers, they are positioned as both ‘subjects’ and 
patients. For Israeli Jews, symptoms of trauma present over a more diffuse 
period of time, and differ according to each immigrant group that arrived 
during the rapid massive waves of immigration (aliyah) that succeeded the 
declaration of the state, as will be summarised below. 
While Israel has long and variously been characterized as an opportunistic 
settler colonial society (Degani, 2016; Kimmerling, 1983; Robinson, 2013; 
Shafir, 1996; Veracini, 2013, 2016), many of its immigrant groups arrived as 
refugees fleeing from immediate―and also endemic or historic―situations of 
traumatic persecution, danger and loss of life. Immigration and forced 
relocation, moreover, carries its own wellspring of deep traumatic 
intergenerational memories. In the case of Israel’s Middle Eastern, North 
African, African and Asian Jews, many were placed in grim transit camps 
(ma’abarot) on arrival, and confronted with not only sudden loss of property 
and status, but also significant discrimination from the already-settled 
predominantly Eastern European or European-origin Ashkenazi Jews in 
Yishuv Palestine (pre-state Israel) and early state Israel (Lev-Wiesel, 2007) 
who subjected them to ‘Zionist normalization’ and a hegemonic secular 
Hebrew culture complete with a revived language (Ottman, 2001). Many 
continued to struggle for generations with discrimination and displacement 
from their (mal)absorption into the young state, which did not treat (nor have 
the resources to treat) the newcomers with any especial sensitivity.  
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Later waves of Jewish immigrants (olim), from Ethiopia and the former Soviet 
Union similarly faced many traumatic acculturation challenges, including 
significant absorption struggles, ongoing discrimination and the humiliation 
(in the case of the Ethiopians) of having to validate their ‘Jewish identity’. 
Regular protests by Ethiopian Israelis against their treatment, particularly 
with regard to harassment by Israeli police, parallel to some degree the 
situation for African Americans in the U.S. (Kubovich, 2016; Pulwer, 2016; 
Yaron, 2016). These narratives of suffering, struggle and loss provide the 
sociopsychological ‘infrastructure’ (Bar-Tal, 2007, p. 1431) to nourish the 
roots of trauma. 
4.4 Holocaust survivors’ trauma 
Not only did the Jews of the Middle East and Asia suffer during the process 
of absorption; those earlier arrivals, survivors and refugees from Nazi 
Europe, fared little better, despite providing the rationale for the foundation of 
the state. The work of the Israeli revisionist historians reveals that early 
attitudes in pre-state Mandate Palestine towards the ongoing atrocities 
against Europe’s Jews was as ambivalent as that of the Allies. Historian and 
journalist Segev (2000, p. 73) discussing how the Hebrew press chose to 
downplay the genocide, notes that ‘The news came not in a flood but in a 
trickle, and it did not immediately arouse all who heard it’. Reliable 
information was hard to come by and in their zeal not to frighten their 
readers, ‘the newspapers missed one of the biggest stories of the century’, 
often relegating seemingly unsubstantiated reports of massacres to less 
prominent pages (Segev, 2000, p. 73). 
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By late 1942, the stories were becoming harder to avoid; officially, the hands 
of the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine) were tied partly 
by the British, who limited immigration and permitted the establishment of a 
Jewish Brigade only towards the end of World War Two, and partly by less 
than empathetic attitudes towards Holocaust victims from the Yishuv’s 
Zionist leadership.  Zertal (2011) records that Labour Zionist leader Berl 
Katznelson ‘admitted that there was an unbridgeable mental and emotional 
abyss between the people of Eretz Israel and the dying Diaspora’ (p. 26). 
Elsewhere Zertal cites Zionist rescue operatives telling David Ben Gurion, ‘‘It 
will be hell if all the [DP] camps come [to Palestine]’ and asking ‘All this filth, 
just as it is, you [the Jewish Agency/Ben Gurion] plan to move to 
Palestine?’’ (Zertal, 1998, p. 216). Certainly they did not fit the masculinist 
profile of early Zionist leader Max Nordau’s Muskeljudentum (‘Muscle Jewry’, 
based on the Bismarckian German Turner movement); Zionism’s ‘new Jew’, 
according to the political movement’s founder Theodor Herzl, must not be 
one of those ‘Ghetto creatures, quiet, decent, timorous’ and ‘must answer the 
call to freedom and manliness’ (Hertzl, 1956, p. 39, in Mayer, 2000, p. 285). 
The rugged Sabra (‘native born’ Israeli, named after the prickly pear cactus 
fruit of Palestine) stood in sharp contrast to the ‘emasculated’ victims of the 
Holocaust, who were considered to have gone meekly to their deaths in the 
gas chambers ‘like sheep to the slaughter’ (Zerubavel, 1995, p. 74, citing 
Zionist Socialist poet Abba Kovner’s resistance call to Vilna Jews in 1942). It 
was the ‘ideal New Jew—the youth movement graduate turned pioneer 
settler (chalutz), colonizer and defender—[who] became the emblem of 
Zionism’ (Mayer, 2000, p. 289). 
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Zertal (1998, p.  218) commenting on the strategic operationalization of the 
Holocaust trauma, notes that it ‘provided [future Prime Minister David] Ben-
Gurion with the object he needed for the complete realization of his concept 
of “exploiting the Jewish tragedy in the establishment of a Zionist Jewish 
state”’ (1998, p. 218). She adds, ‘Talks about transforming Jewish suffering 
into Zionist redemption reverberate in Ben-Gurion’s statements throughout 
the 1930s and 1940s … In the Mapai [Labour Party] Council on 25 October 
1942, Ben-Gurion explained his entire “Zionist view”: “to forge Jewish 
catastrophe into redemption matrix … We have power … and there is a great 
disaster—this is  power” (1998, p. 316). 
Ben-Gurion’s ‘selective appropriation’ (Zertal, 2005, p. 5) of the Holocaust 
also led at times to his abandonment of its victims, in order to further his 
aims; particularly egregious was ‘his functional and expedient attitude 
towards the Exodus refugees’ (Zertal, 2005, p. 46). Indeed, Ben-Gurion 
‘intervened’ in Haim Weizmann and Léon Blum’s promotion of their cause in 
order to ensure their return to Germany: 
The Holocaust survivors aboard the Exodus, who for over 
two years, since the war ended, had been wandering from 
camp to camp, passed from hand to hand, and “unloaded on 
some quay or other,” as Léon Blum had phrased it, were now 
Zionism’s trump card, and the greater their suffering, the 
greater their political and media effectiveness. Not only did 
the Zionist leadership make no effort to spare the refugees 
the appalling return to Germany; it actually took distinct steps 
 
 
167 
 
towards preventing any solution other than Germany. (Zertal, 
2005, p. 48) 
At other times the resistance of the dying Diaspora—in particular the battle 
of the Warsaw Ghetto—was freely promoted into the pantheon of Zionist 
superhero exploits. ‘The [Warsaw] ghetto fighters were retrospectively 
“conscripted” into the Haganah’s fighting unit, the Palmach, set apart from 
their brethren in the Diaspora and described as true sons of combatant 
Zionism,’ notes Zertal (2005, p. 26). Yet the truth was that the Warsaw 
ghetto uprising ‘was not a major operation. It made no contribution towards 
shortening the war or vanquishing Nazism. It did not save Jewish lives and 
made no real difference to the process of systematic murder of the Jews of  
Europe’ (Zertal, 2005, p. 27). Moreover, the Warsaw rebels were not 
necessarily all members of Zionist youth movements, but included 
Communists and anti-Zionist Bundists, such as Marek Edelman 
(Greenstein, 2009, Barnett, 2017) and were also supported by the 
American non-Zionist ‘Joint’ (Joint Distribution Committee). These points 
will be taken up again later in this chapter. 
Thus while the state of Israel cherry-picked which parts of the traumatic 
memory of the murder of Europe’s Jews it wished to adopt, in its early years 
it may have further exacerbated the suffering of survivors who reached its 
shores. Danieli (1998, pp. 70-71) notes that part of this was related to the 
fact that many survivors arrived at a time when national resources were 
scarce, and in the midst of the bloody 1948 war; the state could neither 
provide adequate treatment nor facilitate an easy absorption; ‘they were 
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generally left alone in their struggle,’ commented Danieli (1998, pp. 70-
71). A survivor, David Leitner, ‘reflects ruefully how the attitude has 
changed in Israel since he first arrived in 1949’ and recalls: 
They mocked survivors then. When I told some of my new 
friends in the army that a Gypsy boy had tried to steal my 
shoes in Auschwitz, they said “Why did you let him? You 
soap (a derisory nickname in use at the time for Holocaust 
survivors).” I don't want to blame people from back then, 
people just couldn't believe this had happened, even we who 
had been there had trouble believing it happened. (Pfeffer, 
2015). 
Leitner asserts that ‘for years [he] didn't tell his own family of his time in 
Auschwitz’ (ibid). Mordechai Ronen, another survivor, also recalls how:  
It was a massive blow, to come like this to Israel and feel 
totally rejected. People were afraid of the survivors, many 
didn't want us in their homes, they couldn't understand what 
we had been through and didn't want to try. So we quickly 
understood that we should remain silent. … I never spoke 
about my past in all the years in the army. It was very 
different to the way it is today when the army sends officers 
together with survivors to Poland to see the camps. (Pfeffer, 
2015, ibid.) 
Former Speaker of the Knesset and former chairman of the Jewish Agency 
Avram Burg also noted how Israelis ‘despised weakness and frailty and 
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lacked empathy for the arriving Jews. As the Israelis absorbed the Jews, 
they fused into one silent, insensitive society’ (Burg, 2008, Loc.1295). Burg 
published a book in 2008 that was explosive and detailed in its criticism of 
the abuse of the ‘Shoah industry’—to paraphrase the title of Norman 
Finkelstein’s work (Finkelstein, 2003)—in Israeli life: the English title, The 
Holocaust is Over, We Must Rise from its Ashes, is rather more prescriptive 
than the Hebrew title, Lenatseach et Hitler (‘Vanquishing Hitler’). We shall 
be referring to his observations again in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, the official ceremonies of Holocaust Remembrance Day, 
Yom HaShoah, routinely represent and honour the experiences of those 
remaining survivors of the Holocaust. At the same time, many media 
reports also focus on survivors’ poverty, isolation and difficulties in 
receiving necessary benefits in Israel.2 Ariel David (2015) relays that  
On the eve of Holocaust Remembrance Day in Israel on 
Thursday, and 70 years after the end of World War II, 
survivors and groups that represent them say the 
complexities of Israeli law have created inequalities in the 
benefits given to Holocaust victims. 
 
Despite a new law passed last year that increased the funds 
and services granted to Holocaust survivors, they say that 1 
in 4 survivors in Israel live in poverty, and some 20,000 are 
unrecognized or only partially supported by the state. 
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The 2014 report of the Foundation for the Benefit of Holocaust Victims in 
Israel (http://www.k-shoa.org/eng/) counts ‘193,000 Holocaust Survivors … 
living in Israel. Two thirds of the survivors are women and 50,000 of them 
are living below the poverty line’ (Foundation for the Benefit of Holocaust 
Victims in Israel, 2014, p. 2). The survivors, whose average age is in the 
late 80s, are passing away at the rate of about 13,000 people per year, 
despite the slight increment of newly-recognized survivors to their 
numbers; the report considers that there is thus ‘a time window of five 
years, in which “a national last chance effort” to assist the population of 
Holocaust survivors in Israel will ensue’ (Foundation, 2014, p. 3) with about 
‘14,200 [dying] each year – nearly 40 per day’ (David, 2015). While the 
generation of survivors is fast disappearing, some allege that the state is 
actually waiting for this (Rubin, 2013). As the report notes, with age 
comes an increase in survivors’ ‘medical and general needs’ (Foundation, 
2014, p. 3). Most shocking of all is the fact that: 
… Until recently, only survivors who had immigrated to Israel 
before 1953 automatically received a monthly pension, 
regardless of their individual experiences during the 
Holocaust. Those who arrived later were not entitled to 
benefits. 
 
This situation was partially amended last year, when a law 
spearheaded by then-Finance Minister Yair Lapid allocated 
an additional one billion shekels ($254 million) per year to 
survivors and granted them other benefits, including a total 
 
 
171 
 
exemption on all medical costs and subsidized psychological 
treatment. 
 
The law also granted equal treatment to survivors who had 
immigrated to Israel after 1953―but only if they had been in 
concentration camps or ghettos. (David, 2015) 
Amos Rubin, a survivor hidden during the war by non-Jews in Munkács, 
Hungary (now Mukachevo, Ukraine) meanwhile condemns ‘several Israeli 
banks’ who ‘hold the property of Jews murdered in the Holocaust’ for 
preventing Holocaust heirs from receiving their inheritances. The banks: 
… shamelessly benefit from the funds of the dead, those 
without heirs and even those with them. … It is saddening to 
see how the Jews who determine government priorities in our 
country, which was founded on the ruins of the Holocaust and 
thanks to the tremendous Zionist endeavor, are in practice 
waiting for Holocaust survivors to die.’ (Rubin, 2013) 
All in all, this adds up to a picture of a fledgling society whose various groups 
are riven by the stresses and strains of emergence from the series of knock-
on tragedies caused by the impact of European anti-Semitism, stressors that 
are carried forward through a form of memorial institutionalization that 
permeates sociocultural frameworks widely, as will be discussed in the 
section below. 
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4.5 Trauma as historical narrative and constant condition – days of 
     remembrance in Israel 
As Leeat Granek notes, ‘Grief is one of the most powerful affects in our lives 
… more powerful than love, anger, and desire’ (Granek, 2014, p. 67). Hence 
it is profoundly vulnerable to manipulation and excessive forms of control, 
‘policing’ or ritualized observance; it can be easily mobilized or 
operationalized for political ends. Such control is especially necessary 
since: 
Open grieving is bound up with outrage, and outrage in the 
face of injustice or indeed of unbearable loss has enormous 
political potential … whether we are speaking about open 
grief or outrage, we talking about affective responses that 
are highly regulated by regimes of power and sometimes 
subject to explicit censorship. (Butler, 2009, p. 39) 
As is known, the lunisolar Hebrew calendar is punctuated with sacred 
festival days of celebration, poignant remembrance and ‘awe’; yet to 
these must be added those secular-yet-sacralized days of remembrance 
in which recollection of trauma is paramount and highly politicized. These 
days are, namely, Holocaust and Heroism Memorial Day (Yom HaZikaron 
la’Shoah ve la’G'vurah), the 27th of Nisan3 (henceforth referred to as Yom 
HaShoah, falling around April or May, dependent on its proximity to the 
Jewish Sabbath, and different in date from the International Holocaust 
Remembrance Day,4 which is observed on 27th January by UN decree 
since 2005, as discussed in Chapter Three); and Memorial Day for the 
Fallen (in full, Yom Hazikaron l'Chalalei Ma'arachot Yisrael ul'Nifge'ei 
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Pe'ulot Ha'eivah, or ‘Memorial Day for the Fallen Soldiers of Israel and 
Those Injured by Hostile Actions’, i.e. victims of terror and conflict, 
henceforth referred to as Yom HaZikaron) celebrated by Knesset decree 
since 1951 and falling on 4th Iyar, the day before the dramatic turn to 
exuberant celebrations on Yom Ha’atzamut or Independence Day.5 (Again, 
the coincidence of this date is adjusted depending on the proximity to the 
Jewish Sabbath, when the dates might be moved, for example, to the 2nd 
and 3rd of the lunar month of Iyar.) Yom HaShoah and Yom HaZikaron 
provide an exemplary illustration of what Granek refers to as ‘Mourning 
Sickness Type II’ wherein ‘the politicization of grief is about consciously 
manipulating individual and collective grief in the service of nationalism and 
military power’ and providing ‘justification for further war, aggression and 
violence’ (Granek, 2014, p. 67). The discussion will focus on the changing 
ways in which the former of the two days has been publicly remembered in 
recent years to promote emotive, traumatic triggers toward maintaining the 
political ethos. The analysis reveals the pervasiveness throughout 
sociocultural institutions, as well as discourse centering on reactions to 
utterances of key political actors during those days.  
In procedural aspects, both memorial days have certain notable 
similarities: both commence at sunset of the previous day (deliberately 
following the pattern of all sacred days in the Jewish calendar), and both 
feature prayers, speeches and a siren at 10:00 a.m. (disconcertingly, the 
same siren used to warn Israelis of impending missile attacks) in which all 
traffic stops and Israelis pause in respect. For Holocaust Memorial Day 
itself, the official opening ceremony is broadcast live on television and 
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radio and takes place at Warsaw Ghetto Square in the Yad Vashem 
Museum, Jerusalem, with speeches by the president and prime minister 
of Israel, and words from Holocaust survivors; also featured is the lighting 
of the Memorial torch by the Chairman of Yad Vashem Council, Rabbi 
Israel Meir Lau, and six symbolic memorial torches are lit by Holocaust 
survivors, to remember the six million souls lost during the Holocaust. 
Psalms, Kaddish (the Jewish prayer of mourning) and prayers for the 
souls of the dead are recited by Israel’s Chief Rabbi, the IDF cantor, and 
actors are at hand to read prose or poetry or accounts of survival and 
heroism; generally there is chamber music as an accompaniment, and 
television and radio preserve 24 hours of solemnity in their programming 
(as they do on Yom HaZikaron). Observes Yitzhak Laor: 
It is hard to find your own space in the totality of the Israeli 
culture of mourning. From the outset, this culture was intended 
to create subjects of its realm, harness immigrants and 
reproduce offspring into nationalism, dependent on death and 
its imagery. It is customary to measure our lives with the help 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. So let’s do that, by checking television 
broadcasts. There is no other country within the OECD that 
shuts down its programming on a day resembling Yom Kippur 
or Holocaust Remembrance Day. (Laor, 2014) 
Laor argues against these: 
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… modern patterns of controlling consciousness from which 
there is no escape. The ideological mechanisms of the state – 
army, education, media – are recruited, and recruit their 
subjects to jointly shrink before the uniform story, which is 
gradually taking over our lives. Even the lives of kindergarten 
children. And so, from all the windows we hear fragments of 
bereaving phrases, edited into television programs made to 
order by journalists who grew up into this uniform culture. … 
Television is a key instrument in this totality. (Laor, 2014) 
There is no critical voice in the media representation of Yom HaShoah or 
Yom HaZikaron, argues Laor; the media does not: 
… interview parents who curse the day their son joined a 
combat unit. On Holocaust Remembrance Day, they do not 
interview survivors who demanded, and who still demand, to 
cease this cheap preoccupation with the horrors. Of course,  
they do not interview the people whom the Holocaust taught a 
“lesson” different from the “national lesson” (Laor, 2014).  
The dark goal, according to Laor, in the ‘culture of commemoration’ is to 
preserve Israelis’ self-image as ‘victim’. The state, claims Laor, ‘remains in 
control of consciousness’ with the insidious objective of ‘permit[ting] and 
conceal[ing] the apartheid and colonization of the Palestinians’ (Laor, 2014). 
After the solemnity of the 10:00 a.m. siren on Yom HaShoah, a ceremony 
takes place at Yad Vashem in which wreaths are placed by survivor 
groups’ representatives at the torches; as with the Memorial Day for the 
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Fallen, there are other ceremonies at other locations throughout the 
country, such as schools, colleges and army bases. Sites of particular 
relevance also hold their own ceremonies, such as Kibbutz Lochamei 
Haghetto’ot (the Ghetto Fighters’ Kibbutz, which hosts a museum, the 
Ghetto Fighters’ House, http://www.gfh.org.il/Eng/) and Kibbutz Yad 
Mordechai, which contains the Mi’Shoa li’Tkuma Museum (From the 
Holocaust to the Revival, http://eng.shimur.org/yadmor/ ). The latter 
kibbutz celebrates the commander of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, 
Mordechai Anielewicz, and features a model of the Warsaw Ghetto’s 18 
Mila Street bunker and of the Ghetto itself.  
It should be acknowledged that approaches toward the Warsaw Ghetto 
uprising have been subjected to much controversial historical revisionism 
in recent years, along with various other aspects of Israel’s Shoah 
memorialization; some of these contentions are a critical attempt to ‘de -
Masadafy’ or de-mythologize the uprising (Jungwirth, 2016); other  
rebuttals, such as that of Robert Faurisson, represent a form of Holocaust 
denial (Faurisson, 1994; Rehmat’s World, 2013). Notably, Eli Gat, 
Holocaust survivor and author of the memoir Not Just Another Holocaust 
Book, engaged in a public spat in the media with historians regarding the 
Warsaw Ghetto uprising when he contended, most controversially, that: 
… the very name is deceptive … The Jews of the Warsaw 
Ghetto never revolted. … These people never thought about 
revolt, they thought about survival. Only a small group of young 
people revolted, whose size and efforts were inflated to mythic 
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proportions in Israel after the state was established in 1948. 
More importantly, the uprising, which started on April 19, 1943, 
contradicted the survival strategy of the masses of Jews who 
remained in the ghetto.  
…. It was exaggerated by the activist part of the Labor 
movement – the Ahdut Ha'avoda party and its affiliated kibbutz 
movement – which also laid claim to the uprising while 
repressing the memory of other movements that took part, like 
the Bundists, Communists and right-wing Revisionists. (Gat, 
2013) 
Gat asserts that the uprising caused the Germans to extract a terrible 
revenge on the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto. He also takes issue with 
Israel’s Labour movement, claiming that it was due to their ‘spin’ that Yom 
HaShoah received its official name of ‘Holocaust and Heroism 
Remembrance Day, as if there was any proportionality between the two  
parts of the phrase’ (Gat, 2013). Furthermore, Gat maintains that the 
Warsaw Ghetto uprising was ‘inflated by a blurring of the numbers: the 
number of German casualties, the number of ghetto fighters and the length 
of the uprising’ and accuses various leaders by name of exaggeration 
regarding the numbers of fighters. Although two uprising participants, Marek 
Edelman (a non-Zionist Bundist who controversially remained in Poland after 
the war) and Prof. Israel Gutman estimated respectively that only 220 and 
350 fighters participated, others pushed the participation figures still higher: 
Jewish Combat Organization leader Yitzhak Zuckerman claimed 500 
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fighters, participant Stefan Grayek 700 fighters, Prof. Yehuda Bauer of the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem estimated up to 1000 fighters.  
The length of the fighting was also inflated, says Gat, and in another article 
(Gat, 2013), in response to historian’s Dr. Havi Dreifuss’s vociferous 
objections (Dreifuss, 2013) to Gat’s assertions, he continues to maintain: 
The myth was created in Israel after the Holocaust by scholars 
who came from a very specific political camp.  It came to have 
a decisive influence on the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial 
and museum, and on shaping the memory of the Holocaust. It 
still dominates to a great extent in the awareness of their 
students and disciples – and is sometimes expressed in 
genuine historical naïveté. (Gat, 2013) 
Gat goes into great detail to explain that the usage of the word ‘bunker’ to 
refer to the places of concealment for Jews in the ghetto should also be de-
mystified, for these were simply ‘hiding places’ rather than military outposts  
or ‘entrenchments’, as Dreifuss imagines; nevertheless it is the military 
image of the bunker that is celebrated in the museum at Kibbutz Yad 
Mordechai. 
Finally, however, we must leave the last words to Dreifuss; it may well seem 
that the Jews of the Warsaw Ghetto paid the ultimate price in reaction to the 
uprising, but what is also sure is that they ‘were murdered in the Holocaust 
… rather as a result of German policy, and those who survived did so thanks 
to luck and resourcefulness’. Dreifuss finds that the ‘uniqueness of the 
Warsaw Ghetto Revolt lies in its popular nature, its combination of armed 
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resistance and mass defiance’. She may overstate the ‘mass defiance’ but is 
correct in noting its ‘desperate’ symbolic power (Dreifuss, 2013). 
4.6 Educating towards remembrance 
Much of the enduring and recurring emotional potency of Yom HaShoah is 
derived from careful and intensive priming. Although, as Porat notes (2008, 
p.  345) the Holocaust was not taught or discussed in Israeli schools and 
universities directly from the inception of the state, all began to change in the 
1980s-1990s, after a long process in which understanding became more 
sophisticated and nuanced, and public attitudes shifted from ‘contempt and 
criticism to empathy and identification’ (Porat, 2008, p.  389). The right-wing 
Likud party, elected in 1977, was the first to mandate the teaching of the 
Holocaust at high school levels; Likud’s leader, Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin, was utterly shaped by and a quintessential product of the Holocaust 
generation—having lost his parents and brother in the Holocaust—and 
referred to it constantly. Since then, national education programmes on the  
Holocaust have commenced at increasingly youthful ages in Israel—latterly, 
from kindergarten upwards, in programmes promoted by the Israel Ministry of 
Education (Lanir, 2013; Aderet, 2014; Landsmann, 2014; Kordova, 2014; 
Skop, 2014; Skop, 2015). Israeli teens take their own version of the 
unashamedly Zionist ‘March of the Living’ (https://motl.org/) -style school trips 
or youth movement trips to Poland, and young army conscripts take part in 
the ‘Witness in Uniform’ tours to the concentration camps; soldiers visit 
Holocaust survivors in Israel, present them with flowers, and take photos with 
them. New schemes for youth volunteering with elderly Holocaust survivors 
in Israel are regularly set up (Eisenbud, 2017). 
 
 
180 
 
Not all of this passes without mishap. The IDF campaign Hashtag 
#WeAreHere, which encouraged young national service conscripts to upload 
‘selfie’ photos of themselves with Holocaust survivors to social media, was 
the butt of a great deal of criticism and parody throughout the internet (Ben 
Zion, 2014; Grossman, 2014; IDF, 2014; Schechter, 2015), causing pro-
Palestinian supporters to also upload images to remind the public of their 
forgotten reality. Moreover, in recent years some high schools have 
withdrawn from programmes to visit the concentration camps in Poland, 
citing expense and fearing that such programmes supported the rise in flag-
waving right-wing nationalism (Avivi, 2016; Skop, 2016; Maltz, 2016). 
Starkman and Dattel (2016) report the comments of anthropologist Dr. Idan 
Yaron, co-author of a three-year study on racism in Israeli schools (Yaron 
and Harpaz, 2015) who has travelled on five such trips and studied their 
impact on schoolchildren: 
 “The main problem is the values promoted on them … In their 
present format, the trips are driven by an agenda and miss the 
educational goals. The story is, ‘We have overcome the 
Holocaust, and we are here to stay. And we – my words – 
showed them.’ It’s the narrative on a national and systematic 
level. And when we harness the trip to Poland in order to 
advance an agenda of strengthening nationalism, that’s a 
problem. We’re missing the other goals, and the overall, human 
message of the Holocaust is blurred. … The trips are usually 
built around the Jewish-Zionist and Jewish-nationalist story, 
and much less on a universal message and the significance of 
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the Holocaust. This is so targeted, timed and managed in a 
manipulative fashion by a very well-oiled educational system, 
until there is almost no space for the students to say ‘Let’s look 
at the suffering of other peoples, too.’ If someone tries to say 
something like that, there’s a feeling that it is grating, it is 
almost taboo.” (Starkman and Dattel, 2016) 
Or Kashti finds the ‘cynical’ exploitation of emotions of fear aroused by Yom 
HaShoah and school trips to the death camps echoed throughout the 
education system in Israel; Kashti condemns the acute rise in intolerance 
produced by their ‘otherization’ effect, accompanied by unhealthy sensations 
of victimhood: 
Instilling fear is one of the few tasks in which the Education 
Ministry actually succeeds. It begins with pre-school, when 
Pharaoh, Hitler and the Arab countries that rose up to destroy 
us in 1948 become one big, confusing mess and continue to be 
so for the 12 years of studies. One can see its traces in, among 
other areas, history instruction, from which any hint of 
complexity or dissent is removed – absent are any ideas that 
would deviate even slightly from narrative of self-reliance. The 
result is the memorization of a chain of tragedies with very little 
context. This is no mistake. … 
Fear is a necessary ingredient in justifying the status quo 
in the story that the Jewish majority tells itself about itself. The 
ideas projected towards those outside – the Arab minority, the 
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Palestinians in the territories who simply follow in the path of 
the Nazis, and all the other anti-Semites in the world - are an 
illusion. A student educated to interpret the reality around him 
using a victimized world view will ultimately decide to withdraw 
behind large gates and high walls and live surrounded only by 
those who are like him. That life is much simpler. The tolerance 
for those who are different – with respect to class, ethnic origin, 
culture and the like - is gradually eroded …The education 
system has fostered a fear of catastrophe, suspicion of raising 
historical questions and apprehension of those who are 
considered outsiders. (Kashti, 2013) 
From this one can see that the debate over how the Holocaust is taught and 
recalled produces an echo chamber effect that goes to the debate over the 
symbolic essence of the state of Israel itself, its ambivalent yet critical 
relationship with the Jewish Diaspora from which it emerged, and asks 
anxious questions about the effects on Israelis of their 50-year occupation of 
the Palestinians in the wake of the 1967 victory, while reminding Israelis of a 
time of existential doubt, when many believed that, like Europe’s Jews, their 
survival hung in the balance.  
  
 
 
183 
 
4.7 The IDF and Yom HaShoah 
‘Israel today is becoming Yad Vashem with an air force. … The 
Holocaust is well on its way to becoming the defining feature of Israeli 
society. Even Sephardic and Oriental Jews who came to Israel from Muslim 
countries now treat it as part of their personal family memories. “The 
Holocaust is now no longer a trauma that affected certain families in Israel,” 
said Sidra Ezrahi, an Israeli expert on Holocaust literature, “it has become a 
collective pathology affecting the entire nation.”  
(Friedman, 1991/2012, p. 281)  
One might reasonably expect the presence of Israel’s Defense Forces to be 
felt powerfully in shaping the rituals of Yom HaZikaron, but the same is also 
true of Yom HaShoah, where the army provides the honour guard at many 
Yom HaShoah ceremonies, in particular those which take place at Yad 
Vashem. Remembrance of the Holocaust, in particular the concentration 
camps, also provides a substantial platform for the promotion of a 
securitization discourse, especially within the army and also throughout the 
nation at large, which serves as the military’s recruiting ground. The 
participation of army recruits in visits to survivors and to the camps has been 
alluded to above. The IDF’s Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi has addressed 
participants wrapped in blue and white Israeli flags at the March of the Living 
(Ha’aretz, 2008), while the army’s ‘Witnesses in Uniform’ (Edim Be’Madim) 
programme continues to take soldiers on missions to Poland and Germany 
that include tours of the camps: 
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Unique delegations of IDF officers, dubbed “Witnesses in 
Uniforms,” continue to fly to Europe. These delegations consist 
of some 180 IDF officers from various units, including reservists. 
The delegations visit the concentration and death camps, the 
ghettos and the old communities of the destroyed European 
Jewry. 
 
These trips are preceded by extensive studying and 
preparation that the delegation members undergo, including a 
tour of Yad Vashem. They study Jewish history in general and 
specifically that of the Holocaust. Each delegation is 
accompanied by a Holocaust survivor who adds their personal 
story and contributes their perspective on the Holocaust. (Savir, 
2013) 
The profound effect of these experiences has been blogged by IDF members 
(https://www.idfblog.com/tag/witnesses-in-uniform/). Even those serving 
soldiers from the country’s Muslim minorities deeply feel the impact of 
witnessing the places where the Holocaust took place and extract from it a 
military message, according to a Bedouin officer, Lieutenant Colonel Falach 
Hayib: 
Lt. Col. Hayib firmly believes not only the Jews have a duty to 
remember and a responsibility to never forget: “Unfortunately, 
we still hear about a lot of people who deny the Holocaust and 
threaten to destroy the state of Israel,” he said. “As a country, 
we need to be united and strong to guard the land against all 
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enemies, far and near. This is our job – to defend the country.” 
(IDF blog, 2013) 
For Jewish members of the Witnesses in Uniform programme, participation is 
reportedly a profoundly unsettling experience, yet one which drives home a 
triumphal message, as Lieutenant Colonel Avital Leibovich affirms, ‘Our 
presence there alone was proof that the Nazis failed in their mission to 
destroy the Jewish people’ (Leibovich, 2013). The various tragic sites of 
memory visited by the IDF’s spokesperson Major Peter Lerner during the tour 
produce an even more vivid triumphalist cry: 
I have visited the death ditches in the Lopuchowo forest where 
nameless mass graves lie in the midst of the tress. I have 
visited the memorial sites of Treblinka death camp and its rocks 
that remind us of the communities erased from the face of 
Poland. I have breathed in the air of the Majdanek camp in its 
shocking gas chambers where the Nazis watched as they 
murdered Jews and wheelbarrowed them through the camp to 
the crematorium and I have walked from the gates of Birkenau 
to the steps where 2000 Jews at a time disappeared down in to 
the belly of the Nazi death machine. In all these places I have 
stood head held high in my military dress uniform bearing the 
blue Star of David and the Israeli flag. When, in the not so far 
away future, the survivors are no more, the responsibility to 
remind the world of the atrocities will be ours. I, Major Peter 
Lerner, am the Israel Defense Forces Spokesman in the 
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Central Command and now I am a Witness in Uniform. (Lerner, 
2011) 
The involvement of the army in Shoah ceremonials for Europe’s Jewry is an 
historic one, marked by episodes such as the 30-second IAF flyover of three 
F-15 fighter jets over Auschwitz on the 85th anniversary of the Polish Air 
Force on September 4th, 2003. During the flyover, one of the participants, 
Major-General Amir Eshel, whose parents were Holocaust survivors, 
controversially broadcast the army’s pledge to defend all Jews, saying, “We 
pilots of the Air Force, flying in the skies above the camp of horrors, arose 
from the ashes of the millions of victims and shoulder their silent cries, salute 
their courage and promise to be the shield of the Jewish people and its 
nation Israel” (Jewish Virtual Library, 2003). Intones Israeli-American 
philanthropist Adam Milstein, reminiscing on the momentous event: 
… in today’s tumultuous world, the sole guarantor of Jewish 
safety is a strong Israeli military. Jews facing mortal danger in 
any corner of the globe can count on Israel to protect them. 
… Before Israel’s founding in 1948, Jews were easy prey. They 
could run but they were not safe. Not anymore, never again! 
Thanks to its strength, the Israel Defense Force is fulfilling its 
true purpose – to serve as the ultimate insurance policy for the 
Jewish people against our enemies. 
… While Jews are often the first to be targeted by tyrants and 
bigots, it almost never ends with the Jews. 
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Remember that the next time you hear the news about an IDF 
operation. When Israel goes to war, it is not doing so just for its 
citizens or Jews around world. 
When Israel fights, it does so on behalf of Western civilization 
as a whole. Israel is the floodgate – it sits on a strategic fault 
line between enlightenment and tyranny. (Milstein, 2016) 
In fact, the flyover went ahead while ‘Ignoring protests by the National 
Museum of Auschwitz-Birkenau and a heavy cloud cover’, and the museum’s 
spokesman, Jaroslaw Mensfelt, protested that Auschwitz-Birkenau is “a 
cemetery, a place of silence and concentration … Flying the [F-15s] is a 
demonstration of military might which is an entirely inappropriate way to 
commemorate the victims” (Barkat, 2003). Israeli historian of the Holocaust 
Yehuda Bauer concurs in criticizing the gesture: 
Auschwitz is the largest Jewish cemetery in our entire history. 
You do not fly over a cemetery as a gesture of mourning, and 
not even fury. Certainly not in a foreign, rather friendly, country, 
against its will. If foreign military planes were to fly over Israel 
for any reason whatsoever, in defiance of our demands, would 
Maj. Gen. Eshel not scramble the whole air force to intercept 
the alien planes? 
… There is a peculiar argument that says the “lesson” of 
Auschwitz is that there should be a strong Israel. Well, had it 
not been for Auschwitz, would Israel have had to be weak? And 
if we’d had a choice between nearly six million living Jews and 
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establishing a state, which would we have chosen? I do not 
know what Mr. Shavit [journalist Ari Shavit] and Maj. Gen. 
Eshel would choose, but I would have opted for millions of 
Jews. 
Columnist Tom Friedman of The New York Times was quoted 
as writing that Israel is Yad Vashem with an air force. It is very 
good that we have the air force we have. But there is no 
connection between that and the Holocaust of the Jewish 
people. (Bauer, 2013) 
Former PM and then-defence minister, Ehud Barak, added his own touch of 
controversy to the linkage between the victims of the Holocaust and the 
military might of the Israeli army during one of his various visits to the 
Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp in 2009 by writing in the visitors’ 
book, ‘Remember and don't forget. Preserve our strength and know to 
depend only on ourselves. A strong Israel is both consolation and revenge 
for all those who died. Auschwitz - never again’ (Arutz Sheva, 2009). (On an 
early visit in 1992, Barak is reported to have said ‘Maybe Israeli soldiers have 
come to Auschwitz 50 years too late’ [JTA News, 1992], although in general 
his speech at Auschwitz offered the revolutionary perspective that the victims 
of the Holocaust were not to be disparaged in the face of the overwhelmingly 
brutal forces of history, ‘We who did not stand in your place, know that we 
are, therefore, unable to criticize you’ [cited in Porat, 2008, p.  390]). In a 
similar vein, IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz also wrote in the same visitors’ 
book in 2013, ‘The state of Israel is the security that an atrocity like this will 
not happen again. The IDF is the shield for the national home — the safe  
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haven for the Jewish people,’ (Winer, 2013 ). Thus the message is clear: 
there is no way to unlink the destruction of Europe’s Jews from the rise and 
necessity of Israel’s military might. In reflecting upon the one, one cannot 
help but remember that the other invokes the complications of a threat of a 
different order. 
4.8 Yom HaShoah and some further political uses of collective 
      trauma 
The opening and closing ceremonies of Yom HaShoah, together with the 
period leading up to the day of remembrance, are generally a signal for 
Israel’s politicians to make their mark in the local and international media, 
beyond the general saturation of the Holocaust in Israeli public life and 
culture. Frequently, the message is directed not only towards local 
consumption but outwards, to the international community; there is generally 
an urgent contemporaneity to the themes of such messages, beyond eternal 
remembrance, reflective of current international events.  
Of course, not only on Yom HaShoah is the Holocaust referenced as an 
ever-present entity in Israeli public life; in recent years, two such notable 
eruptions emanated from Prime Minister Netanyahu. The first, widely 
dubbed ‘Irangate’ represents a frequent coruscation of the international 
community for not taking a stronger line with Teheran and its alleged nuclear 
bomb programme, climaxing in an address to the 70th General Assembly of 
the United Nations on October 2015 in which Netanyahu threatens an 
impending Holocaust6, warning that ‘Seventy years after the murder of six 
million Jews, Iran’s rulers promised to destroy my country, murder my 
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people,’ (The Jerusalem Post, 2015). The second and more controversial 
eruption, ‘Muftigate’ widely parodied across social media networks (Kaplan 
Sommer, 2015) and hugely analyzed by the Israeli and Diaspora Jewish 
media (Avnery, 2015; Ilany, 2015; Sokol, 2015; Zalman, 2015), refers to an 
episode of a peculiar speech to the 37th Zionist Congress in 2015 in which 
Netanyahu recounts ‘ten big lies’ and concocts an imaginary dialogue 
between Haj Al-Amin Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, and German 
Chancellor Adolf Hitler (but not an imaginary meeting; their encounter in 
Berlin in 1941 is a matter of documentary record, whereupon the Mufti can 
be witnessed proffering a Heil Hitler salute to his host).7 While it was 
undoubtedly correct to vilify the Mufti for pro-Nazi sympathies, Netanyahu’s 
claim (which he was later encouraged to retract, at the insistence of the 
German government [Barkin, 2015; Beaumont, 2015]) that the Mufti was 
responsible for inspiring Hitler with the notion of the Final Solution is a flight 
of sheer historical revisionist fancy. As the son of a historian, the prime 
minister ought to have been cognizant that the destruction of Europe’s Jews 
had begun well and in earnest with the activities of the Einsatzgruppen 
before their meeting in 1941; the massacre of Babi Yar, for example, in 
which 34,000 Jews were shot, had already taken place, together with many 
other atrocities, such as the mass shooting of the Jews of Pinsk, Belarus, 
including my father-in-law’s entire family. (Netanyahu’s flight of rhetoric 
points, moreover, to an implication that Palestinians also harbour similar 
Nazi sympathies, and largely draws on what historiographer Michael Sells 
refers to as the ‘Perish-Judea literature’ that relies on three frequently 
recycled, problematic and biased sources [Sells, 2015]). Referring to the 
uprisings against the pre-state Yishuv (Jewish community) in the 1920s, 
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Netanyahu stitches together local Palestinian resistance, his own 
grandfather’s immigration to Palestine and the Nazis’ Final Solution in one 
breathless sweep, together with the old-new ‘big lie’ that Israel is attempting 
to change the status quo on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem 
and destroy al-Aqsa mosque: 
And this attack and other attacks on the Jewish community in 
1920, 1921, 1929, were instigated by a call of the Mufti of 
Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini, who was later sought for war 
crimes in the Nuremberg trials because he had a central role in 
fomenting the final solution. He flew to Berlin. Hitler didn’t want 
to exterminate the Jews at the time, he wanted to expel the 
Jews. And Haj Amin al-Husseini went to Hitler and said, ‘If you 
expel them, they'll all come here.’ ‘So what should I do with 
them?’ he asked. He said, ‘Burn them.’ And he was sought in, 
during the Nuremberg trials for prosecution. He escaped it and 
later died of cancer, after the war, died of cancer in Cairo. But 
this is what Haj Amin al-Husseini said. He said, ‘The Jews seek 
to destroy the Temple Mount.’ My grandfather in 1920 seeks to 
destroy…? Sorry, the al-Aqsa Mosque. So this lie is about a 
hundred years old. It fomented many, many attacks. The 
Temple Mount stands. The al-Aqsa Mosque stands. But the lie 
stands too, persists. (Netanyahu, 2015) 
Commenting on Netanyahu’s particular obsessions—the Holocaust, Iran and 
the purported anti-Semitism of the Palestinian leadership, in particular PM 
Mahmoud Abbas, whose doctoral thesis investigated the alleged  
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collaboration between Zionist leaders and the Nazi regime during the 
Holocaust (Rosenberg, 2014)—political analyst Chemi Shalev opines that: 
The Nazis may move from Tehran to Ramallah and back, 
Barack Obama will remain Neville Chamberlain only for the 
remainder of his term in office, but Netanyahu plods on, at 
least in his own mind, as Winston Churchill. The only thing he 
promises the Israelis is a future of blood, sweat and tears: 
many tears, and very little hope. (Shalev, 2015) 
Netanyahu returned to his familiar ‘blood, sweat and tears’ theme on the 
occasion of the Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes’ Remembrance Day 
Ceremony at Yad Vashem on April 23rd, 2017. On this occasion, he referred 
to the publication of a study based on UN archival material and alleged that 
‘the Allies knew about the mass murder of the Jews as early as 1942’ yet did 
‘nothing’ (Netanyahu, 2017). This, he explained darkly, was due to the age-
old ‘unfathomable hatred of Jews … it would be naïve to think that it is going 
to disappear in the foreseeable future’. Turning towards more contemporary 
trends, Netanyahu sees the ‘resurgance’ of ‘new-old’ Jew-hatred ‘in the 
West’ and (a side-swipe at the UN here) ‘it is also common in UN institutions. 
The hypocrisy is so blatant’. In addition, notes Netanyahu, there is ‘a fierce 
hatred bursting forth from the east: the anti-Semitism of both streams of 
radical Islam, headed by Iran and ISIS, which openly work for our 
destruction’. This enmity is not only directed against Jews, but additionally, 
‘against the nation-state of the Jews’ (Netanyahu, 2017). The world stands 
by in indifference, not only at resurfacing anti-Semitism, but also in the case 
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of other genocides ‘in Biafra, in Cambodia, in Rwanda, in Sudan and indeed, 
also in Syria’.  
Israel, however, has not been indifferent to Syrian suffering, and ‘has treated 
thousands of wounded Syrians’ at a border field-station hospital; but by and 
large, the message to be taken from all of this is that only, ‘The strong 
survive. The weak are wiped out. Our people experienced this personally in 
the Holocaust and we have kept that lesson at the forefront at all times’ 
(Netanyahu, 2017). The message segues into a reiteration for the supreme 
necessity of a militarily powerful Israeli state; in contrast to the 
powerlessness of Holocaust victims, Israel ‘traded weakness for strength’. A 
paean to Israeli militarism ensues: 
From a helpless people, we have become a strong nation. 
From a defenseless people we have become a nation with a 
defensive force that is among the strongest in the world. We 
nurture our military, intelligence and technological strength and 
propel them forward.  … Together we will defend our home and 
together we will guarantee the eternity of Israel.  (Netanyahu, 
2017) 
The more global tide of rising nationalism, anti-Semitism and populism in 
2016-2017 was also evoked in more measured terms by Israel’s president, 
Reuven Rivlin, in his Yom HaShoah address for the closing ceremony at the 
Ghetto Fighters’ House Museum, in the presence of Former President of 
Germany Joachim Gauck. Criticizing the turn to the right in Europe and North 
America, President Rivlin found that:  
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… the prevalent message arising from recent political 
statements is uniquely disturbing. And in every place that 
message is the same: we are not responsible for the Holocaust.  
We are not responsible for the extermination of the Jewish 
people which occurred within our borders. (Israel MFA, 2017).  
Referring indirectly to French presidential candidate Marine Le Pen, and 
further east to Poland and Ukraine, he continued: 
So denied for example a French presidential candidate, 
France’s responsibility for the deportation of its Jewish citizens 
to the Nazi concentration and death camps. (A member of her 
party denied not only French involvement in the deportation of 
the Jews to destruction, but their very murder). In Poland, the 
debate surrounding the involvement of the local population in 
the persecution and murder of Jews has become a political 
issue of the first order. In the Ukraine, elected officials were 
enraged by my speech before the Ukrainian Parliament, when I 
recalled that many of those who collaborated with the Nazis 
were Ukrainian, and among them those who betrayed, and 
slaughtered Jews, and in many cases turned them over the 
Germans. 
President Rivlin acknowledged that the ultimate responsibility for the 
‘systematic planning and the implementation of the Final Solution’ lay with 
Germany, but those nations who cooperated should also face some serious 
‘moral internal reflection’. Their refutation represents ‘Holocaust denial of a 
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new, more destructive and dangerous kind from that we have known till now 
… a denial of the distinction between a victim and a criminal’ (Israel MFA, 
2017). Without a shred of irony, Rivlin adds, ‘Victimization is the most 
comprehensive and effective note of exemption from responsibility. …We  
must resist the renunciation of national responsibility in the name of alleged 
victimhood. As a society and as a state, we must resist unholy alliances with 
extreme right-wing elements.’ (This last comment being, no doubt, an indirect 
dig at the Israeli right’s exuberance on the election of American President 
Donald Trump, considered to be more pro-Israel in inclination than his 
predecessor, Barak Obama.) 
At another ceremony at Yad Vashem earlier, President Rivlin also courted 
controversy, firstly by indirectly taking aim at President Trump’s following of 
an international trend in his neglect or refusal to recollect or specify the 
Jewish victims of the Holocaust in his earlier International Holocaust 
Remembrance Day comments. Those who adopt a ‘universalist’ perspective 
on the Holocaust, missing out the singular experience of the Jews as the 
target victims of the Nazi extermination programme, are making ‘a historical, 
national, and educational error’ (Rivlin, 2017). The ‘universal approach’, 
states Rivlin: 
…. negates the uniqueness of the Holocaust as a historical 
event that has no parallel, that happened to us, the members of 
the Jewish People. According to this approach, the Shoah is 
just one specific occurrence of genocide, of racism, and such 
events have happened in the past and may happen again in the 
history of humankind. In the case of the Shoah, they would say, 
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this terrible genocide attacked the Jewish People. This is a 
dangerous approach. It downplays the Shoah. It distorts 
history. It denies the program of systematic extermination that 
was aimed specifically at the Jewish People. It denies anti- 
Semitism, a malignant disease that is two thousand years old. It 
denies the right and the obligation of the Jewish People to a 
history of its own, and to a state of its own. The Shoah has 
always been, and will always be a program of annihilation that 
was planned and implemented against the Jewish People. The 
gas chambers were not built ‘as a crime against humanity’, they 
were built for the purpose of annihilating the Jewish People, 
and specifically that nation. (Rivlin, 2017) 
The message is not only to refocus on the particular nature of the Final 
Solution, but to reemphasize the particular identity of the ethnic group singled 
out for annihilation; and the solution Rivlin draws from this is not the 
toleration of diversity in societies, but rather the traditional Zionist solution, a 
solution to which Theodor Herzl arrived in the wake of the 1894 Dreyfus 
Affair: a Jewish national state is necessary to bulwark against anti-Semitism. 
Once again, the lurking danger of anti-Semitism even in the most advanced 
and cultured of societies is reemphasized. The Shoah, Rivlin points out, did 
not happen in a vacuum of moral decay, it ‘happened in the heart of Europe 
of enlightenment. In the heart of the Germany of Kant - the father of modern 
ethics. In the heart of the France of the declaration of the rights of man, the 
rights of the citizen’ (Rivlin, 2017). That said, the spectre of the Shoah should 
not become ‘the lens through which we view the world’ notes Rivlin, in an 
 
 
197 
 
oblique reference to the ‘approach’ of the current Prime Minister Netanyahu, 
whereby, ‘the Shoah, and preventing it ever happening again, are all that is 
important’ (Rivlin, 2017). Recalling Netanyahu’s Likud predecessor, 
Menachim Begin, whose tendency to justify all Israeli actions and reactions 
as prevention of further Holocausts, Rivlin reminisced how:  
On the eve of the IDF’s entry into Lebanon in June 1982, Begin 
said to me, and I quote, “The alternative to the IDF’s entry into 
Lebanon, is Treblinka, and we decided that there would never 
be another Treblinka”. According to this approach, the 
justification for the existence of the State of Israel is the 
prevention of the next Holocaust. Every threat is a threat to 
survival, every Israel-hating leader is Hitler. (Rivlin, 2017) 
This kind of approach, born in fear and paranoia, suggests that Holocaust is 
the only Israeli Jewish reality, but ‘the Jewish People was not born in 
Auschwitz,’ affirms Rivlin, ‘…the Shoah is not the lens through which we 
should examine our past and our future’: 
It was not fear that kept us going through two thousand years of 
exile, it was our spiritual assets, our shared creativity. 
Externally, this approach damages our ability to develop 
relations with the nations of the world and with our critics from a 
safe place, appropriate for dialogue. (Rivlin, 2017) 
There must be another, less bipolar approach, a ‘third way’ in which the 
international community is neither identified with ‘“Righteous among the 
Nations” on the one hand, and anti-Semitic Nazis on the other’ so that any 
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censure of Israel’s behaviour does not automatically amount to anti-Semitism 
(Rivlin, 2017). Rivlin’s third way consists of three ‘pillars’. The first pillar 
reaffirms the traditional Zionist perspective that ‘We shall always undertake 
our own defense’: 
… the State of Israel is not compensation for the Holocaust, but 
the Holocaust teaches us that we must take our fate in our own 
hands. The Jewish People has the right and the duty for a 
defensive force, for national independence, for sovereignty, 
here in our historic homeland. (Rivlin, 2017) 
For the second pillar, Rivlin reaffirms the connection to the Jewish Diaspora,  
‘and our obligation to their safety and welfare’ (as the state of the Jewish 
people) especially in the light of the current wave of anti-Semitism; the third 
pillar is a universal message of concern for all humanity, for ‘this is the 
immense courage bequeathed to us by the victims … in actions for the sake 
of others’ (Rivlin, 2017). Yet nevertheless, the message reiterated is 
ultimately a traditional Zionist one; and concludes with a parable about a 
Holocaust survivor and witness to the ceremony, Peter Josef Grünfeld 
Kleinmann, who has emigrated to Israel. Like Grünfeld Kleinmann, the Jews 
‘have returned to our land, and from here we shall never get lost’ (Rivlin, 
2017).  
Contrasting the personalities of the two Likud rivals, President Rivlin and his 
prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu political commentator Chemi Shalev 
concludes with a commentary on Netanyahu’s bleakness and paranoia that 
ultimately prevails among Israelis:  
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Where Rivlin sees a glass half full, Netanyahu sees a glass half 
full of poison. Like his predecessor Shimon Peres, Rivlin is an  
optimist; Netanyahu, on the other hand, sees enemies and 
misfortunes everywhere. It is one of the common traits he 
shares with Donald Trump.  … it is Netanyahu’s dark view of 
the world that gets [Israelis’] vote time and time again. His 
fatalism is a natural fit for Israeli Jews haunted by memories of 
the Holocaust and concerned about the real enemies that 
surround them. Netanyahu’s hopelessness, his insularity 
…[feeds] the natural pessimism of Israelis, they … perpetuate it 
and ensure that Netanyahu’s despondency will return him to 
power time and time again. (Shalev, 2017) 
Finally, in Netanyahu’s defence, he has partaken in the trend in recent years 
for a growth in compassion towards Holocaust victims as individuals, rather 
than solely as a carrier of a larger message in service of the survival of the 
Jewish state. The 2017 Yom HaShoah ceremony at Israel’s Knesset was 
entitled ‘Unto every person a name’ (Knesset, 2017) and during it, PM 
Netanyahu eulogized his own father-in-law, the writer, educator and 
Holocaust survivor, Shmuel Ben-Artzi, whose entire family perished during 
World War II; family members too were named and eulogized at length. Even 
in the darker speech discussed earlier, Netanyahu did not omit to retell the 
stories of two survivors present at the ceremony, Max Privler and Moshe 
Porat, both of whom lived on to contribute to the growth of the state by (of 
course) serving in the IDF and producing children, grandchildren and great 
grandchildren. 
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4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to portray how the ‘re-traumatising’ 
commemoration of the Holocaust in Israel remains both a sacred and 
strategic issue, since its 1951 adoption of the observance of Yom 
HaShoah ve-Hagevurah (Holocaust Day and Heroism) on the 27th of the 
lunar Hebrew month of Nisan; the day memorialises the anniversary of 
the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, and falls eight days before Yom HaZikaron 
(the Day of Remembrance, commemorating Israel’s war dead) and the 
subsequent Yom Ha’Atzmut (Independence Day, which follows directly 
after the Day of Remembrance). While Israel did not necessarily treat its 
Holocaust refugees particularly well, these cascading rites of memory are 
central to the routine instrumentalisation of Israeli collective trauma. It is 
noted that the date of Yom HaShoah is different from International 
Holocaust Memorial Day, and puts the emphasis on those who resisted the 
genocide: 
Ultimately, in 1951, Israel’s Yom HaShoah (literally, 
Holocaust Day) was scheduled close to the anniversary of 
the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. The choice of date was an 
attempt to focus on those who fought against the Nazis, 
rather than on those who never had that chance. Those who 
“went like sheep to the slaughter," as it was phrased in those 
days, were an embarrassment to the so-called “new Jews” 
of Israel. The official name of the new memorial day—
Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Day—
reflected this mindset: It was, in large part, a  
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commemoration of the lucky few who had been able to fight, 
rather than the unfortunate majority. In effect, Israel’s 
version of Holocaust memorial day was not a 
commemoration, but a denial of memory. (Shahar, 2015) 
Levy and Sznaider concur, finding that Holocaust memorializing in the 
Zionist state ‘fulfilled two mutually exclusive functions’. On one hand, they 
‘represent the victims as typical examples of Jewish passivity as a 
consequence of the lack of sovereignty’ while ‘on the other, they 
commemorated those Zionist martyrs who actively resisted the Nazis’ (Levi 
and Sznaider, 2002). 
The Holocaust, notes Avram Burg, is ‘woven into almost all of Israel’s 
political arguments … a past that is present, maintained, monitored, heard, 
and represented’ (Burg, 2008, Loc. 436 of 4852). Over 50 years have 
passed since the end of the 1967 or Six-Day War, but even the relatively 
dovish late foreign minister Abba Eban described the 1949 Armistice 
borders erased by the new occupation as ‘Auschwitz borders’ to which Israel 
should never return. ‘He coined a term that is still used today … [rendering] 
legitimacy to the worst argument of the right, as empty rhetoric sometimes 
carries nations to unwanted destinations’ (Burg, 2008, Loc. 448 of 4852). 
Discourse in Israel about the Holocaust continues to be highly political 
and traumatically charged in a way that is utterly different from debates 
elsewhere in Europe and the U.S. Bound up with the state’s image of 
itself as under constant existential threat, inextricably linked in the 
contemporary imagination of the Left with the fate of the Palestinians  
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whom the Jewish state displaced and continue to displace, despite robust 
arguments for unlinking (Bauer, 2017),8 the atrocities of the Holocaust 
continue to be used and abused instrumentally, a collective trauma that 
operates as a substantial barrier to peace.  
A further feature also emerges from the unending streams of analyses on 
Israeli leaders’ latest pronouncements on the Holocaust: despite its  
enduring sacred status, remarkable in a 24-hour news society in which so 
much is rapidly forgotten, Holocaust memorialization is a subject on 
which there is far from complete consensus within Israeli society. At first 
glance the topic appears sacrosanct, but it is nevertheless much 
deliberated upon, as: 
Statements on that subject are rigorously scrutinized by 
historians, journalists, organizations and the public at large. 
Every inaccuracy summons forth a demand for correction 
and a reprimand, as though merely to speak the words is 
damaging. Talk about the Holocaust carries a status similar 
to that possessed by pledges of faith in medieval Europe: 
Anyone who deviated from the doctrine about the holy trinity 
or about Jesus’ divine nature was considered a heretic and 
risked denunciation and severe punishment. (Ilany, 2015, 
ibid.) 
Yet deviation does occur. There are ‘group narratives, which constitute an 
alternative to the dominant narrative’ to be found on the internet, on 
social media in Hebrew and in English that may suggest that the ‘“official 
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version” of the Holocaust is unraveling at the edges’ (Ilany, 2015). This 
diversification of discourse, will, however, remain on the fringes for the 
foreseeable future. Orthodoxy is likely to prevail for quite some time to 
come until the generations of survivors disappear or become less 
connected with the official state narrative; whether Middle East peace can 
wait that long is another question. 
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Chapter Five: Palestine and the politics of collective trauma 
 
I have learned and dismantled all the words in order to draw from 
them a single word: Home. (Darwish, 2003, p. 8.) 
 
I will tell the world, I will tell… 
About a house whose lantern was broken, 
About a hoe that cut down an iris 
And a fire that destroyed a braid of hair. 
I will tell stories about a goat that was not milked,  
About a morning cup of coffee never drunk 
About a mother’s bread that was not baked, 
About a mud roof sprouting grass. 
I will tell the world, I will tell… 
(Al-Qasim, 1993) 
 
5.1 Palestine: empirical evidence of historical trauma 
Chapter Four examined the problématique of collective or cultural trauma as 
it is manifested in Israeli society, particularly through its formative traumatic 
history, which remains so focused on the Holocaust, the ‘central axis of 
[Israel’s] national experience’ (Elkana, 1988). A key event that is enduringly 
present in contemporary discourse, the Holocaust is recalled cyclically and 
instrumentally through mnemonic triggers (days and sites of memory). As 
Chapter Four argues, the State of Israel extensively operationalized the 
Holocaust, and still continues to do so, but it is the State that bears extensive 
(but not exclusive) ongoing responsibility for Palestinian suffering and the 
fractured nature of Palestinian society, wherein indubitable empirical 
evidence of collective trauma is to be found. 
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Chapter Five will similarly analyze the construction and operationalization of 
the Palestinian traumatic narrative, but does not intend to attribute direct 
causality to the Jewish Holocaust, even if the Declaration of Independence of 
the State of Israel has often inspired the conflation: 
The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people—the 
massacre of millions of Jews in Europe—was another clear 
demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its 
homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish 
State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to 
every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a 
fully privileged member of the community of nations. (Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013 [1948]) 
As the historian and Holocaust survivor Professor Yehuda Elkana observed, 
‘There is not now, and never has been any historical process that necessarily 
leads to genocide,’ (Elkana, 1998) (my italics); nor, conversely, is there any 
genocidal episode that necessarily leads to another. This linkage is the realm 
of the post hoc fallacy. Thus, historian Yehuda Bauer takes distinguished 
actor and director Mohamed Bakri to task in an open letter for allegedly 
making just such an assertion [‘Dear Mr. Bakri, I write to you because of 
something you said at the Nakba Day ceremony held at Tel Aviv University: 
that the Holocaust caused the Nakba [the “disaster”] because it caused the 
State of Israel to be established’] (Bauer, 2012). Bauer’s claim (the 
supporting details of which otherwise evince a troubling denial of 
responsibility for the Palestinians’ tragedy) is reiterated elsewhere in another 
open missive, directed at the conductor Daniel Barenboim (Bauer, 2017, 
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mentioned in Chapter Four), in response to the latter’s assertion, ‘Without the 
Holocaust there never would have been a partition of Palestine, there would 
have been no al-Nakba, 1967 war, and occupation’ (Barenboim, 2017). What 
can be said is that there are certain ineluctable ‘symmetries’, as Gilbert 
Achcar acknowledges, particularly with regard to nomenclature, ‘that should 
give us pause, even if the situations are not perfectly symmetrical’ (Achcar, 
2009, p. 23). The major point of similarity, of course, is that both events 
represent sacred foundational narratives (Litvak and Webman, 2009, p. 35) 
and both events constitute the defining or ‘chosen trauma’ of Palestinians 
and Israeli Jews, to adopt the terminology of Turkish Cypriot psychiatrist 
Vamık Volkan, whose theories of ‘large group’ and transgenerational trauma, 
evinced throughout the body of his work (see, for example, Volkan, 1996; 
2001; 2004, 2018) serve to bridge the interdisciplinary gap between 
individual psychological suffering and propel us toward a sociological or 
anthropological approach: 
I call the shared trauma a ‘chosen trauma’ … Since a group 
does not choose to be victimized, some of my colleagues take 
exception to my term ‘chosen trauma’. But I hold that the word 
‘chosen’ fittingly reflects a large group’s unconscious choice to 
have their group identity be defined by the transgenerational 
transmission of the shared trauma. (Volkan, 1996, p. 110) 
Resembling Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’, large-group 
identities, claims Volkan, ‘are the end-result of myths and realities of 
common beginnings, historical continuities, geographic realities, and other 
shared linguistic, societal, religious, cultural and ideological factors’ (2018, 
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Loc. 196). Palestinians define themselves by the very real rupture of their 
existence caused by the Nakba; Israeli Jews refer frequently to Jewish 
persecution throughout history, and the State of Israel as a whole 
continuously operationalizes the trauma of the Shoah or Jewish Holocaust 
when it wishes to mobilize its Jewish citizens into support for its policies. It 
seems, at times, as if both groups would be adrift without this unwelcome yet 
resounding self-image; but any discussion of this point strays into the 
controversial area of ‘victim blaming’. 
 5.2 A human geography of trauma 
The societal, cultural, political and historical losses of Palestinians literally 
represent a human geography of trauma, punctuated by the absence of the 
‘present absentees’ in the towns and countryside of contemporary Israel. 
This was the official terminology of the Israeli Custodian of Absentee 
Property,1 who in 1950 compiled lists of their ‘some 94,000 residential rooms, 
9,700 shops and 1,200 offices, worth in total some 11,800,000 pounds 
sterling’ and in villages, ‘tens of thousands of buildings … real estate assets 
belonging to refugees amounted to nearly a quarter of all buildings in the 
country at the time’, not to mention personal and livelihood possessions, 
livestock and vehicles, valued at ‘twenty million pounds sterling’ by the UN 
Conciliation Commission for Palestine (Kadman, 2015, loc. 473/5416). ‘The 
geography is such that without knowledge of the Palestinian villages’ 
existence in the past, it would be impossible to know that they were once 
there,’ writes Rochelle Davis (Davis, 2011, p. 1) of two such villages, Suba 
and Bayt Mahsir, today subsumed inside Kibbutz Tzova and Beit Meir in the 
Ya’ar HaK’doshim (the Forest of the Martyrs, established in the Jerusalem 
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hills in 1951 by the Jewish National Fund in memory of the Holocaust’s six 
million perished European Jews). In one of those cruel juxtapositions of 
history,2 Yad Vashem also outlooks onto this scenic forest, whose less than 
picturesque symbolism includes the site of the former village of Deir Yassin 
(Dayr Yasin), infamous as the scene of one of the worst atrocities on April 9th 
of the 1948 war, in which an estimated and highly contested number of 
villagers (between 94 to 254) were massacred (Brooks, 2008, p. 297; Morris, 
2006; PalestineRemembered.com; Sharvit, 2004). Israelis are encouraged to 
go hiking the forest trails, which constitute ‘the green lung of the residents of 
Israel's capital. The forest has a variety of trees, flowers and wildlife, remains 
of ancient farming implements and burial caves’ (Jewish National Fund, n.d.). 
As Ronit Lentin observes, ‘The link between remembering and forgetting in 
constructing collective memories … entails a memory boom, as each 
generation invests lieux de mémoire with different interpretations so they 
become their own referent’ (Lentin, p. 209). 
As with those who survived the Jewish Holocaust, those who have suffered 
through the Palestinian Nakba (and the later Naksa of 1967) perceive their 
experience to be without parallel: 
The Palestinian Nakba is unsurpassed in history. For a country 
to be occupied by a foreign minority, emptied almost entirely of 
its people, its physical and cultural landmarks obliterated, its 
destruction hailed as a miraculous act of God and a victory for 
freedom and civilised values, all done according to a 
premeditated plan, meticulously executed, financially and 
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politically supported from abroad, and still maintained today, is 
no doubt unique. (Abu-Sitta, 2000, p. 5) 
Likewise, as with the Jewish Holocaust, the broad strokes of the Nakba are 
familiar to us now, and equally contested: the details of the 1948 war (for 
Israelis, Milchemet Ha’atzma’ut, the War of Independence) that pre-empted 
the flights, expulsions and atrocities (Morris, 2007, loc. 729/4448; Abd al-
Jawad, 2007) remains the subject of intense historiographical controversy, 
about which many others have written in the past, including this researcher 
(Ottman, 2008). As Picaudou (2008) has observed, ‘The historiography of the 
1948 events in Palestine remains a work in progress and a true battlefield, 
for in this case, writing history is one of the issues at stake in the conflict itself 
– to the point that claiming to review the facts only, dissociated from their 
interpretation, appears to be a huge challenge’.  
In the ‘traumatic rupture’ of 1948 (Masalha, 2012, p. 13), approximately three 
quarters of a million of Palestinians (the exact number is contested, but the 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics [PCBS] suggests ‘more than 
800,000’ [PCBS, 2017]) became internally displaced or exiled abroad from 
their towns and villages in 1948 (and more again in 1967).3 PCBS President 
Ola Awad tells us that: 
According to documentary evidence, the Israelis controlled 774 
towns and villages and destroyed 531 Palestinian towns and 
villages during the Nakba. The atrocities of Zionist forces also 
included more than 70 massacres in which more than 15 
thousand Palestinians were killed. (PCBS, 2017) 
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Studies such as Sami Hadawi’s monumental Palestinian Rights & Losses in 
1948 (Hadawi, 1988), Michael Fischbach’s Records of Dispossession (2003), 
the critical mapping work of Salman Abu-Sitta (Abu-Sitta, 2000; Abu-Sitta, 
2007; Abu-Sitta, 2010) the photographic records of pre-Nakba Palestine 
published by the co-founder of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Walid 
Khalidi (1984, 2006), Rochelle Davis’s examination of Palestinian village 
books that emerged from the 1980s on, Palestinian Village Histories (2011) 
and Noga Kadman’s account of the Palestinian strata upon which Israel has 
been established (Kadman, 2015) provide comprehensive evidence of the 
fabric of the world that was lost.  
As with the past century’s major unresolved historical traumas, such as the 
Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust of World War II, the further 
that event recedes in terms of the lived memory of survivors, the more its 
living memorialization grows. This is heightened by the phenomenon 
identified by Marianne Hirsch as ‘post-memory’ (discussed in Chapter Three) 
whereby ‘descendants … connect so deeply… that they need to call that 
connection memory and … memory can be transmitted to those who were 
not actually there to live an event’ (Hirsch, 2008, pp. 105-106). Thus although 
2018 marks 70 years since the Nakba, and 2017 marked 50 years since the 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, these events are entirely present in 
Palestinians’ lives, a ‘society crystallized as a “community of memory”’ whose 
narrative spans the ‘continuum between past and present’ (Milshtein, 2009, 
pp. 48-49). This feature is particularly acute for those enduring ongoing 
repression and loss, as regular reports from regional NGOs and NPOs such 
as Adalah (https://www.adalah.org/), Addameer (http://www.addameer.org/),  
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Al Haq (http://www.alhaq.org/) Al-Awda (http://al-awda.org/ ), Badil 
(http://www.badil.org/) B’Tselem (https://www.btselem.org/) Gisha 
(http://gisha.org/) HaMoked (http://www.hamoked.org/home.aspx) the 
Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR http://pchrgaza.org/en/), 
Physicians for Human Rights (http://www.phr.org.il/) and Rabbis for Human 
Rights (http://rhr.org.il/eng/) attest.  
Precise demographics of the Palestinian population within Israel and the 
Occupied Territories and in the diaspora from 1948 until now are difficult to 
obtain;4 since 2005 on there has been a debate about numbers, in particular 
about the looming projection for Palestinians to outnumber Israeli Jews in 
Israel and the Occupied Territories; COGAT (Coordination of Government 
Activity in the Territories, http://www.cogat.mod.gov.il/en/Pages/default.aspx) 
reported to the Knesset in April 2018 that the number of Palestinian Arabs 
and Jews throughout the region has now reached equilibrium, at 6.5 million 
in each case (Brown, Abunimah and Parry, 2005; DPA, 2013; Hasson, 2013; 
Lazaroff, 2016; Abu Toameh, 2018; Beilin, 2018; Harkov, 2018; Cook, 
2018a; PCBS, 2018; WAFA, 2018). The United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA) (Lindsay, 2009) records 5,266,603 refugees registered for 
its assistance in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (UNRWA, 
n.d.) but its data is problematic, according to its original narrow then 
expanded definition of Palestinian refugee identity (‘persons whose normal 
place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 
1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 
1948 conflict … The descendants of Palestine refugee males, including 
adopted children, are also eligible for registration. When the Agency began 
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operations in 1950, it was responding to the needs of about 750,000 
Palestine refugees. Today, some 5 million Palestine refugees are eligible for 
UNRWA services.’) (UNRWA, n.d.). Who may be counted among 
descendants of those who fled or left or became refugees once again after 
the 1967 war or, for example, due to the destruction of refugee camps in the 
current war in Syria is deeply relevant when it comes to the question of the 
‘right of return’ for refugees. Nevertheless, Al-Awda tells us that ‘One in three 
refugees worldwide is Palestinian. There are about 7.2 million Palestinian 
refugees worldwide’ (Al-Awda, n.d.) On the 69th anniversary of the Nakba, its 
president, Ola Awad declares: 
The estimated Palestinian world population totaled 12.70 
million by the end of 2016. This indicates that the number of 
Palestinians worldwide has multiplied more than 9.1 fold since 
the Nakba. According to statistics, the total number of 
Palestinians living in historical Palestine (between the Jordan 
River and the Mediterranean) by the end of 2016 was 6.41 
million and this number is expected to rise to 7.12 million by the 
end of 2020 based on current growth rates. 
Statistical data also show that refugees constitute 42% 
of the total Palestinian population in Palestine. … Around 29% 
of Palestinian registered refugees live in 58 refugee camps, of 
which 10 are in Jordan, 9 in Syria, 12 in Lebanon, 19 in the 
West Bank, and 8 in Gaza Strip.  These estimates represent 
the minimum number of Palestinian refugees, given the 
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presence of non- registered refugees. These estimates also do 
not include Palestinians who were displaced between 1949 and 
the 1967 war, according to the UNRWA definition, and do not 
include the non-refugees who left or were forced to leave as a 
result of the 1967 war. 
The number of Palestinians who remained in their 
homeland in the 1948 territory after the Nakba was estimated at 
154 thousand persons, but 2016 estimations show that it has 
grown to 1.53 million on the 69th annual commemoration of the 
Nakba. (PCBS, 2017) 
5.3 The naming of suffering 
Palestinians are also commonly referred to as victims of ethnic cleansing 
(Abunimah, 2009; Cook, 2010, p. 1; Hamzeh and May, 2003, pp. 154-166; 
Masalha, 2012, p. 161-162; Pappé, 2006; Pappé, 2014; White, 2012, p. 6) , 
apartheid5 (Abdelnour, 2013; Bargouthi, 2011, p. 63; Cook, 2018c; Falk, 
2017; White, 2014, 2016; Yiftachel, 2006, p. 80) and ongoing genocide 
(Boyle, 2013, 2014 ; Lendman, 2010, pp. 29-38; Polya, 2008, pp. 39-42 ) or 
‘sociocide’ Russell Tribunal on Palestine, 2014) not only by Palestinian 
intellectuals themselves but also by engaged academics and journalists and 
legal experts (Center for Constitutional Rights, n.d.; Falk, 2014). Whether or 
not Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, intended to ‘transfer’ the 
entire Palestinian population beyond Palestine’s borders is part of the 
historiographical dispute that hinges on whether there has been selective 
translation or mistranslation of his diaries; and whether Plan Dalet contained  
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an organized and uniform intention to expel the indigenous population, or 
whether the expulsions were ad hoc and piecemeal according to individual 
commanders (Hazkani, 2013). In contradiction to Palestinian historian Adel 
Manna (2017; Golani and Manna, 2011) Israeli revisionist historian Morris 
claims it did not (Morris, 2017).  
The accusation of genocide regularly levelled at the State of Israel 
(especially after the Gaza wars) is perhaps the most highly contested point. 
Significantly, the CCR reiterates Raphael Lemkin’s explanation that genocide 
‘does not necessarily signify mass killings’:  
More often [genocide] refers to a coordinated plan aimed at 
destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national 
groups so that these groups wither and die like plants that have 
suffered a blight. The end may be accomplished by the forced 
disintegration of political and social institutions, of the culture of 
the people, of their language, their national feelings and their 
religion. It may be accomplished by wiping out all basis of 
personal security, liberty, health and dignity. When these 
means fail the machine gun can always be utilized as a last 
resort. Genocide is directed against a national group as an 
entity and the attack on individuals is only secondary to the 
annihilation of the national group to which they belong. 
(Lemkin, cited in Center for Constitutional Rights, n.d.) 
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5.4 The correspondence with cultural trauma 
The particular interpretation of ‘sociocide’ or ‘genocide’ discussed above 
corresponds closely to Kai Erikson’s original conception of cultural trauma 
(Erikson, 1976) portrayed in his groundbreaking study of the destruction of 
the Appalachian community of Buffalo Creek. (The community was 
decimated as a result of a catastrophic flood that was largely a consequence 
of criminal human neglect rather than a natural disaster, as discussed in 
Chapter 1.)6 It has been theorized that in the case of the former kind of 
traumatic event―largely or wholly intentional, either as the result of human 
inaction or action―then the acute sense of betrayal is far greater (Zinner and 
Williams, 1999; Edkins, 2003, p. 4), exacerbating the struggle to deal with the 
consequences. The many pages of interviews with survivors of the Buffalo 
Creek flood reiterate the profundity of their shock and distress. 
Like the Nakba, the disaster at Buffalo Creek caused people to be ‘wrenched 
out of their communities, torn from the human surroundings in which they 
had been so deeply enmeshed’ (Erikson, 1976, p. 186). Compare this with 
Edward Said’s description of the Nakba as the very definition of ‘the 
wrenching, cataclysmic quality of the collective experience’ (Said, 2007, Loc. 
3914/4438) and:  
‘a human tragedy so profound, so extraordinary in saturating 
both the formal as well as the informal life of its people down to 
the smallest detail … For Palestinians, a vast collective feeling 
of injustice continues to hang over our lives with undiminished 
weight’ (Said, 2007, Loc. 3929/4438) 
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The loss of what Erikson calls a supportive ‘communality … the network of 
human relationships that make up their general human surround’ (Erikson, 
1976, p. 187) caused the Appalachians great disorientation, accompanied by 
a ‘sense of constant apprehension’ that expresses itself either as a ‘raw 
sense of fear’ or ‘fear … more generalized and diffuse’ (Erikson, 1976, pp. 
234-235) which he details through inclusion of their accounts (Erikson, 1976, 
pp. 186-245), citing the disintegration of families, children’s extreme distress 
at any loud noises, insomnia, erratic hostility, and survivors’ descriptions of 
their abandoned environment as ‘frozen’ ‘dreary’ ‘like a graveyard’ ‘deserted, 
forsaken’ ‘people are depressed, unhappy, mournful, sick’ (Erikson, 1976, p. 
195), ‘“Our lifestyle has been disrupted, our home destroyed. We lost many 
things we loved, and we think about those things. We think about our 
neighbors and friends we lost. Our neighborhood was completely 
destroyed…”’ (Erikson, 1976, p. 196). Likewise, Abu-Lughod and Sa’di 
describe their own Palestinian ‘catastrophe’ as that of ‘a society 
disintegrated, a people dispersed … taken for granted communal life was 
ended violently. …. After 1948, the lives of the Palestinians at the individual, 
community, and national level were dramatically and irreversibly changed’ 
(Abu-Lughod and Sa’di, 2007, p. 3).  
Erikson is at pains to stress the critical nature of communality: ‘It is the 
community that cushions pain, the community that provides a context for 
intimacy; the community that represents morality and serves as the 
repository for old traditions,’ he notes (Erikson, 1976,pp. 193-194), 
suggesting that ‘most of the traumatic symptoms experienced are a reaction 
to the loss of communality as well as a reaction to the disaster itself, that the 
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fear and apathy and demoralization one encounters … are derived from the 
shock of being ripped out of a meaningful community setting’ (Erikson, 1976, 
p. 194). Among those reactions detailed by Erikson are ‘anxiety, depression, 
apathy, insomnia, phobic reactions, and a pervasive feeling of depletion and 
loneliness’ (p. 198); granted, these are psychological responses suffered by 
individuals, but there is a Halbwachsian dialectic in the interaction between 
individual and group or society; thus, en masse, this suffering translates to 
the pervasive symptomology of an entire society that has been damaged by 
a sudden catastrophe, and is exhibiting ‘the classic symptoms of mourning 
and bereavement’ (Erikson, 1976, p.  200). These symptoms were also to be 
found in abundance in the early years after the Palestinian Nakba, which 
were ‘mostly about fear, helplessness, violent uprooting, and humiliation … a 
new era dominated by estrangement, and often poverty’ (Abu-Lughod and 
Sa’di, 2007, p. 9). Moreover, the ongoing occupation and lack of resolution or 
acknowledgement of the Palestinian catastrophe has not permitted any 
meaningful healing to take place, as the ‘sociocide’ continues. This point is 
emphasized in Mahmoud Darwish’s letter published on the 53rd occasion of 
the Nakba, ‘Our catastrophe was the creation of Israel’: 
We do not need to be reminded of an ongoing human tragedy 
which has haunted us for the past 53 years. We are still cut by 
the elements of that tragedy here and now. We are still 
resisting the expression of its effects, here and now, on the soil 
of our homeland, our only homeland. How can we forget what 
happened on this motherland of ours, a motherland which is 
still losing children to this catastrophe? 
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We cannot forget because our collective and individual 
memories remain fertile and capable of recalling our sad past, 
the chronology of which is the chronology of a land and a 
people, the chronology of tragedy and heroism, the chronology 
of a tale related in drops of blood, in open conflict between 
what we are told to be, and what we aspire to be. (Darwish, 
2001.) 
Like the Appalachians in Erikson’s account, there is a tendency towards 
‘geographic nostalgia’, (Davis, 2007, p. 54) an idealization of all that went 
before, particularly amongst those who ‘generations later, still live in refugee 
camps that have become unsettlingly permanent. For them, memories of 
home were frozen,’ (Abu-Lughod, 2007, p. 78.) Poet Mourid Barghouti 
reminisces on this as he makes the long-awaited journey home in the lyrical 
2004 memoir, I Saw Ramallah: 
I used to tell my Egyptian friends at university that Palestine 
was green and covered with trees and shrubs and wild flowers. 
What are these hills? Bare and chalky. Had I been lying to 
people, then? Or has Israel changed the route to the bridge and 
exchanged it for this dull road that I do not remember ever 
seeing in my childhood?  
 Did I paint for strangers an ideal picture of Palestine 
because I had lost it? I said to myself … I had a lump in my 
throat and a feeling of being let down. 
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Had I been describing Deir Ghassanah [his home village] with 
its surrounding olive groves, and convincing myself I was 
describing the whole country? (Barghouti, 2004, pp. 28-29) 
…The closer we drew to the village square the clearer I saw the 
traces of departure, of desertion. … The deserted houses tell 
their stories in eloquent silence. (Barghouti, 2004, p. 67) 
Those who recall at first hand their villages and towns often exhibit what Ben-
Ze’ev refers to as a kind of ‘“Proustian” type of recall, namely the 
overwhelmingly sensual and emotional effect’ (Ben-Ze’ev, 2004, p. 142). This 
form of sensual nostalgia should be contrasted with ‘secondary sources, 
such as the Internet and the novels [that] reflect and circulate the imagery 
that is taking root in collective commemorations’ (Ben-Ze’ev, 2004, p. 142). 
As the generation of the Nakba passes away, it is this form of nostalgic 
recollection that predominates. 
Another characteristic that Erikson notes is in accord with survivors’ initial 
silence or ‘conspiracy of silence’, a feature often attributed to the Jewish 
Holocaust (previously mentioned in this study) and, as we shall see, the 
Nakba: 
Virtually every study of a disaster in the social science literature 
reports that the first reaction is one of dazed shock and 
numbness, and one of the reasons for that stunned reaction … 
is a feeling on the part of survivors that the larger community 
has been demolished. Even when the individual has not 
suffered any serious personal loss and has not been exposed 
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to any immediate danger, he is shocked by the “cultural 
damage” and is likely to drift around in a state of “stunned 
disbelief”. (Erikson, 1973, p. 199) 
The ‘stunned silence’ not necessarily the polar opposite of speech, nor is it 
necessarily concomitant with forgetfulness, as Winter (2010, p. 4) observes: 
We cannot accept the commonplace view that silence is the 
space of forgetting and speech the realm of remembrance … it 
is a socially constructed space in which and about which 
subjects and words normally used in everyday life are not 
spoken. … people … at one point in time deem it appropriate 
that there is a difference between the sayable and the 
unsayable, or the spoken and the unspoken, and that such a 
distinction can and should be maintained and observed over 
time.7  
A similar phenomenon of silence was noted in the case of the Nakba, for a 
variety of factors including shock, depression, humiliation, apprehension and 
disempowerment. On the initial silence surrounding the catastrophe, 
Webman (2007) cites Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani, who ‘claimed in 
the first years after the Nakba, “there was a muteness, as a result of the 
bewilderment and confusion”’ (p. 30). Ronit Lentin affirms that:  
… the [Nakba] story is still full of silences regarding the 
experiences of different Palestinian communities, some living in 
the western diaspora, others living in refugee camps; it is also 
marked by the erasure of the struggle of internal refugees who 
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remained in Israel after 1948. … There was also a degree of 
self-silencing of Nakba memories, due some argue, to shame 
at not having fought … but also to fear, particularly during the 
military government which ended only in 1966. (Lentin, 2009, p. 
211) 
The ‘shame at not having fought’ is, of course, reminiscent of one of the 
accusations levelled at Jewish Holocaust victims, who kept their own silence. 
Lila Abu-Lughod and Ahmad Sa’di also comment that ‘Some might fault the 
Palestinians for somehow having remained silent, for not having told enough 
of their story’, (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di, 2007, p. 9). Recounting the interview 
of a Nakba victim who was asked about her silence, ‘particularly since so 
little was known to the world about what had happened in that period’ they 
report her disempowered response, ‘“How can those without lips whistle?”’ 
(Abu-Lughod and Sa’di, 2007, p. 10). This comment is both a reflection on 
the status of the victims, and also on the traditional patriarchal nature of 
Palestinian society, in which women’s voices were seldom heard; and it 
furthermore hints at the phenomenon of delayed trauma that was identified 
by Erikson and others. Ben-Ze’ev additionally points to the passage of time 
as a critical component before interviewees were able to unburden 
themselves, ‘Many of the interviewees I met were old people, and by telling 
their stories they reconsidered the trajectory of their lives. … Secrets 
escaped … gray took the place of black and white. Very often it was the 
interviewees who wished to be freed from the moment,’ (Ben-Ze’ev, p. 190, 
2011). Time is required before memory work can begin, together with the 
conditions that enable the permission to narrate. Some of the conditions are  
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social, but others are political: Ahmad Sa’di notes that despite the enormity of 
the ‘rupture in history’ (Sa’di, 2007, p. 287), the narrative ‘failure’ 
corresponded not only to the ‘victims’ silences … but also … a general lack 
of desire by those responsible to deal with the moral weight of the Palestinian 
catastrophe’ (Sa’di, 2007, p. 297), pointing the finger at the West in general, 
and Israeli Jews. ‘The debilitating factor … is that powerful nations have not 
wanted to listen,’ say Abu-Lughod and Sa’di (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di, 2007, p. 
11). Others also point the finger at the Arab world, whose shame over its 
ability to prevent the events of 1948 was substantial (Bresheeth, 2006, p. 
500).  
Meanwhile, other historiographical reasons for silence on and the lack of 
exposure of the Palestinian narrative are well known: Benny Morris 
discusses them at length in his introduction to The Birth of the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem Revisited: 
Perhaps curiously, little serious historiography has been 
produced, both in the four decades before the publication of the 
original version of this book [The Birth of the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem] or since … Soon after 1948, several 
chronicles were published by Palestinian exiles, including ‘Arif 
al ‘Arif’s Al-Nakba, 1947-1952 … and Haj Muhammad Nimr al 
Khatib’s Min Athar al Nakba (following the catastrophe). About 
a decade after the event, Walid Khalidi, a Palestinian scholar, 
published two academic essays … All had suffered from the 
relative paucity of archival materials. … Historians … need 
luck. 1982 proved to be a pivotal year in the Israeli archives.  
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The government began opening large amounts of 
documentation on 1948 at the Israel State Archive (ISA). 
Simultaneously, local and party political archives began 
organizing and releasing materials … But a major problem 
remained: Arab documentation. Unfortunately, the Palestinians 
failed to produce and preserve ‘state papers’ from 1947-1949 
and the Arab states – dictatorships of one sort or another … 
refused and continue to refuse access to their papers from the 
1948 war, which they regarded and still regard as a humiliating 
catastrophe. (Morris, 2004, pp. 1-3.)  
Morris’s is a ‘positivist’ approach that relies extensively on the victor’s 
sources—those who were privileged enough to preserve documentation, and 
furthermore, those who are able to access it. As Kraft (2018) notes, many 
Palestinian historians cannot even acquire the necessary permits to enter 
Israel in order to examine archival material; those who succeed may also be 
informed that they need further security clearance to view the materials. (A 
further obstacle is presented by the fact that many materials may be non-
digitized or gradually undergoing digitization, and not easily searchable due 
to transliteration issues). Even for Israeli historians, access to materials is not 
a given, and much documentation is in the Israel Defense Forces and 
Defense Establishment Archives 
(http://www.archives.mod.gov.il/Pages/default.aspx), the Central Zionist 
Archive (http://www.zionistarchives.org.il/Pages/Default.aspx) and the State 
Archives (http://www.archives.gov.il/) that was serendipitously de-classified in 
the 1980s and 1990s―permitting the wave of Israeli ‘new historians’ such as  
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Morris, Shlaim and Pappé to produce their work―has since been re-
classified or redacted (Goldman, 2016; Gratien and Hazkani, 2014 [Ottoman 
History Podcast]). 
As censorship and restrictions of access to documents provided a particular 
historiographical challenge to breaking the silence on the story of the Nakba, 
Palestinian historiography has relied heavily on the utilization of oral history 
accounts, both through choice and also absence of alternatives. For the 
evidence-bound Morris, this is problematic, owing to the greater fallibility of 
memory: 
I believe in the value of documents. While contemporary 
documents may misinform, distort, omit or lie, they do so, in my 
experience, far less than interviewees recalling highly 
controversial events some 40-50 years ago. My limited 
experience with such interviews revealed enormous gaps of 
memory and terrible distortion and selectivity born of ‘adopted; 
and ‘rediscovered’ memories, ideological certainties and 
commitments and political agendas … The value of oral 
testimony about 1948, if anything, has diminished with the 
passage of the 20 years since I first researched the birth of the 
Palestinian refugee problem. Memories have further faded and 
acquired memories, ideological precepts, and political agendas 
have grown if anything more intractable; intifadas and counter-
intifadas have done nothing for the cause of salvaging historical 
truth. (Morris, 2004, p. 4.) 
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Morris may have a point about the fallibility and subjectivity of memory; but 
that is hardly the issue.8 The ‘value of oral testimony’, together with the 
‘entitlement to speak’, is somewhat a cultural construction, and as such, ‘is in 
no sense universal. Some have the right [to speak]; others do not. The 
difference between the two categories is a matter of social and cultural 
codes, which can and do change over time’ (Winter, 2010, p. 8). Such 
memories have tremendous representational and traumatic power and gain 
conviction when retold and passed on to subsequent generations, and are 
preserved in the former of digital archives. Moreover, in combination with 
conventional primary documented sources, they provide a critical source that 
offers us a deeper and richer perspective into historical experience, and can 
hardly be ignored. Furthermore, such a position is tantamount to 
‘memoricide’ as far as historians Nur Masalha and Ilan Pappé are concerned. 
‘The Palestinians share common experiences with other indigenous peoples 
who have had their narrative denied, their material culture destroyed and 
their histories erased or reinvented by European white settlers and 
colonisers,’ Masalha retorts (Masalha, 2012, p. 88), noting at length the 
‘asymmetrical power relationship between Israel and the Palestinians and the 
reinforcement of this asymmetry  by … repeated cycles of Israeli looting of 
Palestinian historical documents, archives and library collections in and since 
1948’ (Masalha, 2012, p. 137). Masalha repeatedly accuses Israel of the 
‘appropriation of the Palestinian heritage and its voices … In 1948 the Israeli 
state appropriated immovable Palestinian assets and personal possessions, 
including schools, libraries, books, pictures, private papers, historical 
documents and manuscripts …’ (Masalha, 2012, p. 135). The attacks on 
Palestinian centres of research and documentation continue, alleges  
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Masalha, referring to the raids on the Palestinian Research Centre in Beirut 
in 1982 during the Lebanon War, and likewise on Orient House in East 
Jerusalem in 2001 (Masalha, 2012, p. 137). Similar allegations regularly 
resurface in Arab and Israeli media (YNet, 2010; Aderet, 2012; Hatuqa, 
2013; Dearden, 2014; Segev, 2015).  
 Nevertheless, despite its catastrophe, contemporary Palestinian society in 
the MENA region largely characterizes itself as highly resilient (it has, after 
all, expanded hugely in numbers despite its territorial losses), practising 
sumud (forbearance and staying put or endurance in the face of adversity) 
together with various degrees of resistance (muqawama) that included a 
revolutionary approach,9 as ‘the nationalist awakening of youth marked a 
transition from a resigned jīl al-nakba (Ar. generation of disaster) to the 
activist jīl al-thawra (Ar. generation of revolution),’ (Pearlman, 2011, p. 64) to 
popular resistance including nonviolence strategies such as direct action and 
civil disobedience (Awad, 1983, pp. 22-26; Amnesty International, 2018; 
Darweish and Rigby, 2015; Qumsiyeh, 2011; Rigby, 1991; Rigby 1999; 
Rigby, 2010). Memory work projects have contributed to this resistance in the 
determination to not to be forgotten (Davis, 2007; 2011; ‘Issa, 2013, Loc. 
3516-3856/7585; Sleiman and Chebaro, 2018) resulting in a substantial body 
of ‘subaltern’ oral history ‘from below’ as ‘in this existence of dispossession, 
dispersion, and statelessness, collections of personal stories and memories 
are what Palestinians have in comparative abundance’ (Davis, 2011, pp. 
122-123). These accounts are most particularly celebrated through the work 
of anthropologists Rosemary Sayigh (Sayigh, 2007)10 and Julie Peteet 
(Peteet, 2009; Peteet, 2017). There are two further oral history projects  
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based in Beirut, the Arab Resource Center for Popular Arts (AL-JANA, 
http://al-jana.org/) and the Nakba Archive (http://nakba-archive.org/), now 
combined into the Palestinian Oral History Archive 
(https://website.aub.edu.lb/ifi/programs/poha/Pages/index.aspx), at the 
American University of Beirut. The Birzeit University Digital Palestinian 
Archive, which started in 2011, also collects documentation and audio-visual 
materials, accessible online (http://awraq.birzeit.edu/ar); indeed, the internet 
has enabled many other projects such as Palestine Remembered 
http://www.palestineremembered.com/. Together they present a formidable 
resource, in addition to numerous personal and literary accounts that mourn 
the loss of Palestine inconsolably (Al-Qattan, 2007, pp. 191-206; Karmi, 
2004; Tamari and Hammami, 1998). At the heart of these is the work of the 
national poet, Mahmoud Darwish, and his contemporaries, Samih al-Qasim, 
Tawfiq Zayyad and Rashed Hussein.  
As we shall see in the next section, the Nakba itself constitutes a unifying if 
painful site of Palestinian collective memory, in which remembering is far 
from bringing the redemptive power of healing. Palestinian society coalesces 
around days of memory such as Nakba Day together with the increasingly 
politicized March of Return (in which historical Palestine itself, and the 
depopulated villages are literally the site of memory). Other days of memory 
also form part of the contemporary canonical calendar, such as the 
commemoration of the 1956 massacre of villagers from Kafr Qasem, the 
1976 Land Day strikes and killings (recognized as an official holiday by the 
PNA in 1994, and marked on March 30th) and Al Aqsa Day (commemorating 
the martyrs of the 2000 Al Aqsa Intifada, although the Northern Branch of the  
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Islamic Movement, outlawed since 2015,11 interprets this more literally as a 
day of dedication to the monument itself, which is perceived as always under 
threat). The evolution of these further days of memory is thoroughly 
discussed in Tamir Sorek’s Palestinian Commemoration in Israel: Calendars, 
Monuments, and Martyrs (Sorek, 2015) and the limitations of chapter length 
do not permit a reinvestigation here. Yet like the core Nakba Day and March 
of Return on which this chapter focuses, all of these have a nation-
(re)building aspect, as Masalha affirms: ‘Narratives of memory and 
commemoration have also been part of grassroots initiatives to bring to life 
marginalized and counter-narratives that have been suppressed, either by 
hegemonic discourses or by unwillingness on the part of repressive regimes 
to acknowledge the past’ (Masalha, 2012, pp. 205-206). 
5.5 Palestine – trauma as historical narrative and lived 
condition: the construction of memorial days 
The 1948 catastrophe did not immediately become ‘the Nakba’, just as the 
Jewish Holocaust required a period of time until it acquired its sacrosanct 
and tragic stature and nomenclature through a process of iconic construction, 
as Jeffrey Alexander has commented (Alexander, 2004a, p. 197).12 To 
reiterate, I have referred (with reservations) elsewhere to Jeffrey Alexander’s 
two classifications of ‘lay trauma theory’, the second of which, the 
‘psychoanalytic version’ relates to above-discussed period of delayed 
reaction of ‘silence and bewilderment’ (Alexander, 2004a, p. 201). Like 
Erikson, Alexander posits that ‘only after two or even three decades of 
repression and denial were people finally able to begin talking about what 
happened and to take actions in response to the knowledge’ (Alexander,  
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2004a, p. 201). The long lens or ‘grid’ through which we view events such as 
the Nakba, ‘has a supra-individual, cultural status; it is symbolically 
structured and sociologically determined’ as we come to interpret the trauma 
(Alexander, 2004a, p. 201).  
How, then, was the Nakba ‘symbolically structured and sociologically 
determined’? How did its status and commemorative practices come into 
being? The first usage of the term ‘Nakba’ is generally attributed to Syrian 
philosopher Constantin(e) Zurayk (his name is also transliterated as Zureiq, 
or Qustantin Zurayq), whose Ma’na al-Nakba (sources date this to 1948 or 
1949) was published in English in 1956 as The Meaning of the Disaster 
(Webman, 2009, p. 28; Masalha, 2012, p. 213; Picaudou, 2008). Webman 
(2009, p. 28) contends, however, that ‘perusing Egyptian papers from 1945 
reveals that Egyptian intellectuals were already using the term to describe 
the evolving political situation in Palestine’. In any case, the term stuck, and 
was used from then on in later accounts of the Palestinian catastrophe, 
pregnant as it was with powerful symbolism: 
Traditionally, Arabs used the word “Nakba” in reference “to 
strong misfortunes caused by external forces they could not 
confront,” explains the Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim. The connotative significance of the term … adds the 
Palestinian columnist Hassan Khadr, is “firstly, a deference to 
nature, with all its latent violence and its impetuosity; secondly, 
resignation to the vicissitudes of fate; and thirdly, 
relinquishment of responsibility for the catastrophe.” (Webman, 
2009, p. 29.)  
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If the Palestinians initially felt that they lacked agency to repel the seemingly 
overwhelming and unstoppable force of the catastrophe, they compensated 
for it in ensuing years; the response to the tragedy became the making of the 
Palestinian political consciousness as it gave definition and framing to all that 
went afterwards. The construction of Nakba memory, and of ways of 
remembering and days of memory ‘provides a cyclical structure for political 
mobilization and a distinct pantheon of martyrs that fuels political protest’ 
suggests Tamir Sorek. Not only a funnel for pain and loss, it has ‘played a 
central role in the gradual process of post-1948 recovery and empowerment’, 
(Sorek, 2015, loc. 189/7631). Furthermore:  
The memory of the Nakba evolved as a central national myth 
that elucidated three issues: the way in which their past 
evolved, the course in which their present is conducted, and the 
goals they must strive for in the future. It has become a 
powerful tool, shaping and disseminating Palestinian national 
consciousness and mobilizing the community. Hence the 
memory of the Nakba was never merely the object of grief and 
longing, nor an idea encouraging passivity, but a means of 
stimulating Palestinian activism, inter alia, by enhancing the 
yearning for return (al-‘awda). The Palestinians never really 
portrayed the Nakba as a story of the distant past, but as a 
living, continuous event, integrated into the present and 
spanning several generations, different sectors of the 
population, and geographic locations.’ (Milshtein, p. 48) 
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Yet despite the profound shaping force of the catastrophe, which replaced 
older, more local or regional loyalties as a thread of commonality, serving to 
piece together the fractured Palestinian psyche, no uniform or coordinated 
commemoration of ‘Nakba Day’ as a day of memory was possible until 50 
years later in 1998, after the advent of the 1993 Oslo Peace Process and the 
institutional recognition of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA); nor would 
such a commemoration have been deemed progressive by the PLO during 
the ‘revolutionary’ period in the 1960s and 1970s, when struggle was 
preferred as a dynamic form of memory. As for the perpetrators who had 
caused the Nakba, until then, not so many Israelis were even familiar with 
the term itself, much less the notion that the Palestinians had their own right 
to a day of memory that encroached chronologically upon Yom Ha’atzmut 
(their Day of Independence—in 2005 both events even took place within the 
same week). This was partly due to the fact that 18 years after the 
establishment of the State of Israel, until November 1966, those Palestinians 
who were living within the new State of Israel (with the exception of 
inhabitants of Jewish-Arab cities) had been constrained by military 
emergency regulations from movement that might permit political activity; 
considerable self-censorship remained in marking the day officially.13 This 
tight control of more Palestinian lives was to re-emerge a year later after the 
1967 war, when citizens of the West Bank and Gaza came under Israeli 
occupation. As for Palestinians living in al-kharij, the wider regional diaspora: 
The experience of collective dislocation and uncertain exile and 
the desire to return to a specific territory made patriotism 
(wataniyya), the sentimental attachment to homeland or even a 
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more localized birthplace, a common denominator among 
Palestinians. But the rise of a distinctly Palestinian nationalism 
(or its precursors, nationalist patriotism or proto-nationalism) 
was not inevitable, given the absence of the common political 
and institutional framework of the state. (Sayigh, 1999, p. 36.)  
Amal Jamal also affirms that ‘Any form of coherent self-image was 
challenged by the differing existential conditions in which the various 
Palestinian communities lived after their expulsion and dispersal from 
Palestine’ (Jamal, 2003, p. 2). Their widely diverse circumstances ‘led to a 
growing discrepancy in Palestinian practices of subjective self-constitution’. 
This produced ‘multiple and diversified self-images that did not cohere and/or 
even contend with the official national discourse … intensified by the internal 
differences regarding the future political vision that Palestinians foresaw for 
themselves,’ (Jamal, 2003, p. 2). What draws these diverse identifications 
together is the unifying traumatic force of the Nakba experience, ‘a bipolar 
symbol of concurrent destruction and building’ (Milshtein, 2009, p. 47, my 
emphasis); the usage of an adjective that has both psychological and political 
force here is striking.  
Thus it was that in 1998, despite considerable opposition to the Oslo 
Process, the time had come to come to terms with the collective trauma in a 
less diffuse fashion, in the form of a PNA-sanctioned Nakba Day on May 
15th, 1998, when a Supreme National Commission for Commemorating the 
Nakba guided the outpouring of events that were to counter Israel’s 50th 
anniversary of independence. The official entry of May 15th into the 
canonical calendar connects the ‘forgotten Palestinians’ living within Israel  
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with those outside of it and marks a growing similarity in their 
commemorative practices (Sorek, 2015, loc. 1437). In the Gaza Strip, 
meanwhile, a less secular cultivation of Nakba memory, focusing on the 
restoration of mosques, shrines and cemeteries, has been preferred since 
the 2006 election of Hamas [Harakat al-Maqawama al-Islamiya], and other 
movements in the Islamist camp, such as Islamic Jihad. 
The PNA commemorations were marked by the ‘million people’ masirat al-
milyun rallies in the Occupied Territories, processions of young people 
holding signs of destroyed villages and keys to houses, speeches, art and 
photography exhibitions and performances of traditional arts that have 
characterized Nakba Day commemorations ever since then, together with 
outbreaks of violence against participants whenever Israeli troops attempt to 
disperse crowds. At the inception, there was also, says Masalha: 
… a remarkable proliferation of Palestinian films, memoirs and 
archival websites—all created around the 50th anniversary of 
the Nakba. In conjunction with this 50th anniversary, several 
films were released, including Edward Said’s In Search of 
Palestine, Muhammad Bakri’s 1948, Simone Bitton’s film about 
the poet Mahmoud Darwish Et la terre comme la langue. More 
Nakba films have recently been released in conjunction with the 
60th anniversary, including Maryse Gargour’s La Terre Parle 
Arabe, with which I have been personally involved. Also since 
1998 several “online archives” have been created on oral 
history and refugee experiences and recollections of the 
Nakba. (Masalha, 2009, p. 42) 
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Mahmoud Darwish’s ‘Palestinian People’s Appeal on the 50th Anniversary of 
the Nakba’ (Darwish, 1998) marks the occasion in tones of triumph over 
trauma (‘we have vanquished all attempts at our obliteration and denial and 
at the eradication of the name of Palestine from the map of Palestine’), 
connecting the people of Palestine to their land since time immemorial in a 
‘commemorative narrative’ which ‘creates its own version of historical time as 
it elaborates, condenses, omits, or conflates historical events’ (Zerubavel, 
1995, p. 9).  Delivered at the end of the Nakba Day March, Darwish’s 
address on behalf of ‘the victims of half a century of perpetual night of 
occupation and dispersion’ reminds the listener of the eternal connectedness 
of the Palestinian people to its ‘sacred land’ through their ‘resounding 
presence in time and place’. There is a nod to the diverse ancient cultures of 
the region, but no mention of the Hebrews (although later ‘compassionate 
recognition of the unspeakable Jewish suffering during the horror of the 
holocaust’ is made, only to be swiftly followed by the rebuke that ‘we find it 
unconscionable that the suffering of our people be denied or even 
rationalized’).  
The speech pays homage to those who have sacrificed so much; Palestine’s 
martyrs, its prisoners, its bereaved mothers and its refugees who have 
‘carried Palestine in their hearts along with their land deeds and the keys to 
their homes. Both the topography and demography of our reality remain alive 
in our collective memory and continuity.’ Palestinians remain steadfast as 
‘advocates and witnesses of the authentic narrative of Palestinian endurance 
and the will to live’. Rather than mourning victimhood, ‘we stand in awe at the 
heroism of the ordinary individual and the collective will to endure … Slated  
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for national obliteration and severance from the land, we have affirmed our 
identity and ties to our homeland, snatching our reality from the jaws of 
oblivion’. A sweep of recent history reminds us of how, ‘From revolution, to 
Intifada, to nation building’ the Palestinians ‘have extracted recognition from 
the world. The dual injustice of exile and occupation could not break the will 
of a people bent on achieving freedom, dignity and the redemption of history’. 
Triumphalism aside, Darwish reminds the listener that the traumatic struggle 
remains ongoing: 
Fifty years since the Nakba were not spent in grief over a 
painful memory. The past has not entirely departed, nor has the 
future entirely arrived yet. The present is an open potential to 
struggle. For 50 years, Palestinian history has stood witness to 
epics of perseverance and resistance, to confronting the 
implications, consequences and injustices of the Nakba. For 
half a century Palestinian history became a living pledge to 
future generations for their right to a life of freedom and dignity 
on their own land. We have begun painstakingly the nation-
building process, to ensure a free homeland for a free people. 
(Darwish, 1998.) 
In the climax of the address, Darwish calls on the international community to 
take Israel to task for reneging on the peace process. Zionist ‘racist 
exclusivity’ will not permit the democratic one-state solution to the present 
predicament, therefore ‘we formulated the alternative of sharing the land on 
the basis of the two state solution’ with Jerusalem as the eternal Palestinian 
capital. The two-state solution represents a ‘conciliatory compromise of 
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historical magnitude’ but ‘must not be misconstrued as self-negation or 
weakness’ (Darwish, 1998).  
Other formative cultivations of the Nakba as a site of memory prior to and 
concurrent with the inception of Nakba Day in 1998 have included the 
Palestinian Ministry of Education’s educational textbooks, in which the 
history, geography and literature of the catastrophe feature prominently; it 
would require a separate study beyond the bounds of this one to engage with 
this extensive material in sufficient depth. The textbooks have already 
attracted considerable attention, and many reports have already been written 
by Israelis themselves on what they perceive as ‘inflammatory’ curricula.14 
The summer youth camps constitute a further wing of PNA mobilization of 
Nakba memory (Sorek, 2015, Loc. 3670-4009). Then there are the daily 
mnemonic practices that are common to Palestinians, regardless of 
geographic location (whether in al-karij, the diaspora, or al-dakhil, the 
Occupied Territories and the Gaza Strip) or political control (PNA, Hamas, or 
neither), such as retaining property deeds from Ottoman times, keys to 
former homes, and naming streets, businesses and public and educational 
institutions after former villages, cities and towns; maintaining associations 
that preserve the memory of lost homes (including the publication of village 
books, and narration of personal and familial stories). In refugee camps, Ben-
Ze’ev reminds us: 
… the Palestinian landscape is recreated by a residency 
pattern that imitates that of the place of origin and by naming of 
quarters after demolished villages … Second and third 
generations of refugees are encouraged to marry into families  
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from the same ex-village or ex-locality … people tend to use 
the services of those from the ex-village or ex-locality, such as 
a grocery store, a garage, or a restaurant (Ben-Ze’ev, 2004, p. 
143).  
There are also poignant accounts of personal visits, made wherever and 
whenever possible, to the sites of former homes (see, for example, Abu-
Lughod, 2007; Al Qattan, 2007; Karmi, 2004, pp. 423-451). For those 
Palestinians possessing passports of other countries and IDPs residing 
within Israel wishing to visit their (often nearby) former villages and towns, 
this is less challenging than for Palestinians of the Occupied Territories (and 
those in Gaza rarely gain permission from the Israeli authorities to enter 
Israel). Those who can visit engage in a variety of practices such as prayer, 
tending to family graves and picking local herbs, fruit and vegetables (Ben-
Ze’ev, 2004, pp. 143-156). 
While the commemoration of Nakba Day is necessarily proximate to Israeli 
Independence Day, many of its features are constructed to contain traumatic 
triggers patterned on those of Yom Ha’Shoah and Yom HaZikaron, as have 
been picked up by the Israeli media: a 68-second siren, for instance, is 
sounded in the towns of the Occupied Territories, and the ‘Right to Return’ 
marches that precede Nakba Day recall the annual March of the Living 
(https://motl.org/) through the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camps. 
There is even black-painted train in Bethlehem for Nakba victims that 
recollects the cattle cars taking Holocaust victims to the concentration camps 
(Levy, 2011; Al Jazeera, 2013; Times of Israel Staff and AP, 2013; Groisman, 
2016).  
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The commemoration of Nakba Day within Israel itself has suffered from the 
state’s further rightward turn: in March 2011, a bill was passed in the Israeli 
Knesset ‘prohibiting any activity “which would entail undermining the 
foundations of the state and contradict its values”’ (Ma’an News, 2011) and 
seeking to impose fines on any organizations or institutions (particularly 
state-funded ones, such as foundations, schools or universities) that 
participate in Nakba commemoration (Adalah, 2012a; Kestler-D’Amours, 
2011; Kremnitzer and Fuchs, 2011; Sofer, 2011; Stoil, 2011. The human 
rights organization Adalah (the ‘legal center for Arab minority rights in Israel’) 
and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) campaigned vigorously 
(Adalah, 2012b) against the intervention:  
Palestinians traditionally mark Israel’s official Independence 
Day as a national day of mourning and organize 
commemorative events. The law violates their rights, and 
restricts their freedom to express their opinion, and will cause 
substantial harm to cultural and educational institutions and 
further entrench discrimination. The law causes major harm to 
the principle of equality and the rights of Arab citizens to 
preserve their history and culture. The law deprives Arab 
citizens of their right to commemorate the Nabka [sic], an 
integral part of their history.(Adalah, 2012) 
Despite a 2012 petition (Adalah 2012c, Adalah 2012d) to the Supreme Court 
in Israel brought by Adalah and ACRI, together with representatives of two 
schools that practice Nakba Day commemoration (the Alumni Association of 
the Arab Orthodox School in Haifa and parents of students at the Arab- 
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Jewish school ‘Galilee’ in Misgav) the law was upheld (HCJ 3429/11, 
January 5th, 2012), prompting an angry response from Adalah and ACRI that 
‘The High Court ignored the chilling effect of this law’. Adalah’s lawyer, 
Sawsan Zaher, reiterated the organization’s disquiet: 
There is a concern that the legitimation of this law by the court 
could encourage the Knesset to introduce additional racist 
legislation against Arab citizens. This law seeks to present the 
identity and the narrative of Arab citizens in the lowest possible 
way and it legitimizes the continuation of deep discrimination 
against them. (Adalah 2012e) 
The legislation aimed at reining in those publicly-funded institutions and 
preventing Nakba commemoration has discouraged Arab mayors and Arab 
municipal representatives from participating in the March of Return (Sorek 
2015, Loc. 3300) but in general, it has had precisely the opposite effect on 
the numbers of people attending these rallies. Furthermore, the ‘Nakba Law’ 
has had the function of arousing the ire of the Israeli Jewish public in 
furiously partisan discussions through the media. One such foundation 
touched by the law, the New Israel Fund, which ‘… invest[s] in hundreds of 
Israeli organizations whose work changes the equation on civil rights, on 
religious freedom, and on social justice. … building a community committed 
to a vision of a democratic, just, and equal Israel’ (New Israel Fund, 2018) 
has come under fire regularly for its financial support of progressive civil 
society groups that recognize the Nakba, such as ACRI 
(https://www.acri.org.il/) Adalah, Breaking the Silence (former IDF soldiers 
who discuss atrocities carried out during military service in the oPTs,  
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http://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/ ), B’tselem, Machsom Watch 
(https://machsomwatch.org/, Israeli feminist peace activists who monitor IDF 
checkpoints between Israel and the oPTs), Mossawa Center (Advocacy 
Center for Arab Citizens in Israel, http://www.mossawa.org/), Sikkuy (The 
Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality, ‘a shared organization of 
Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel who have dedicated themselves to 
advancing equality and partnership, in all spheres and at all levels, between 
Palestinian Arab citizens and Jewish citizens of Israel’, 
http://www.sikkuy.org.il/en/about/) and Yesh Din (https://www.yesh-din.org/, 
an NGO that reports on human rights violations in the oPTs). The NIF is 
regularly accused by Israeli politicians such as PM Netanyahu of constituting 
a ‘fifth-column’ supported by external funding (the fund is American in origin, 
but with offices in Jerusalem) and aimed at destroying the state of Israel 
(Harel, 2018; Netzer, 2017; New Israel Fund, 2017; Sokol, 2014). Meanwhile 
Zochrot (http://zochrot.org/), an Israeli NGO that works with Palestinian 
citizens to conscientize Israeli Jews through an annual transitional justice 
programme of Nakba commemoration and March of Return ‘tours’ to 
depopulated villages, receives no government funding15 and therefore is not 
subject to the ‘Nakba Law’. Journalist Jonathan Cook correctly sums up the 
‘effect’ of the Nakba Law as a ‘backfire’, claiming that there is ‘greater 
attention on the Nakba than ever before. Recent [return] marches have been 
among the largest in the event's history, and have increasingly attracted a 
younger generation of Israel's Palestinian citizens’ (Cook, 2018b). Zochrot, 
meanwhile, attracts the Israeli Jewish public in growing numbers to its own 
Nakba commemoration activities and is largely responsible for introducing 
the term ‘Nakba’ to Jewish Israelis,16 but by and large, like the majority of  
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Israeli ‘radical’ NGOs, remains a marginal element in Israeli society, even if 
the issue of the Nakba itself has become absolutely impossible to ignore. 
Israeli Jewish society’s attempt at the ‘act of erasure’ of the Palestinian past 
has prompted an opposite tendency among Palestinians, in ‘an ever-growing 
effort to document, map, revive, and glorify the memory of the pre-1948 
Palestinian society’ (Kadman, 2015, p. xi). With increasing amounts of 
racism, oppression and hopelessness following the failure of the Oslo Peace 
Process and the drift towards the right in Israeli Jewish society, the extent of 
collective trauma for Palestinians living both within Israel and the oPTs is 
mirrored by the expansion and intensity of commemorative practices; for 
Palestinians, the past is definitely not a ‘foreign country’ and all attempts to 
extinguish the names and locations of their pre-1948 world (vividly 
documented by Meron Benvenisti in Sacred Landscapes) are to be resisted 
(Benvenisti, 2002). To paraphrase Pierre Nora, Palestinians speak so much 
of memory because there is so little of theirs left—and so few Nakba 
survivors remaining to carry the struggle forward (Nora, 1989). 
5.6 Encroaching upon memory: Collective trauma and the politics of 
      return 
 
‘There is no question that our relationship to memory is 
treacherous. … Sometimes it seems to me that we become 
prisoners of an angry, stubborn and bitter tenacity to return—to 
the past, to the land that has been taken away, to a sort of 
national childhood from which none of us wishes to awaken.’ 
(Al-Qattan, 2007, pp. 200-201) 
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As Ben-Ze’ev and others have observed (Ben-Ze’ev, 2004; Sorek, 2015), the 
pilgrimage to former sites of abode for Palestinians was formerly a private 
and ad-hoc event, depending on possibility of access and taking place at a 
variety of dates, sometimes congruent with Israel’s Yom Ha’atzmut, 
sometimes on Land Day, sometimes on Nakba Day, sometimes as part of 
young people’s summer camps. During the period of the Emergency 
Regulations, in the 1950s and 1960s, for Palestinians living in Israel, 
memorialization was of necessity private by nature; Sorek notes that some of 
these control tactics (including pre-emptive arrests of activists prior to Land 
Day) continued throughout the 1980s (Sorek, 2015, Loc. 2926). 
Nevertheless, the ‘48 IDPs’ within Israel (the largest group of whom are 
those descended from refugees expelled from the village of Saffuriya in 
northern Israel) have maintained a tradition of the March of Return to 
depopulated villages on Israel’s Independence Day for the past three 
decades, representing a critical infusion of ‘post-memory’, a handing-on of 
collective trauma to young Palestinians as part of their cultural education 
(Social TV, 2018). Jonathan Cook reports: 
Abu Arab, one of the founders of ‘Adrid’ – the Association for 
the Rights of the Internally Displaced, the main body 
representing the internal refugees – said the March of Return 
had played a vital role in raising awareness among the younger 
generations of what had taken place during the Nakba. 
Ziad Awaisi, a 43-year-old physiotherapist whose 
grandparents were expelled from Saffuriya and who was raised 
in Nazareth, is one of the organisers …. ‘The annual march is 
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now by far the largest event in the calendar of Palestinians 
inside Israel. …Our march to the destroyed villages is closely 
followed by all Palestinians but especially by the refugees in the 
camps,’ said Awaisi. ‘It shows them that they are not forgotten 
and that we continue to stand with them. 
Organisers seek out refugees from the destroyed village 
at the centre of each march – often those in camps in the 
region – to relay a video message to the marchers. 
‘It is a heavy responsibility for those of us inside '48," 
added Awaisi. … ‘We march on behalf of all the refugees, to 
represent them because they are denied the right to attend.’ 
(Cook, 2018b) 
In 2008 (on the 60th anniversary of the Nakba/Israel’s Independence Day) 
Israeli police violently attacked the convoy of participants (Alarz TV, 2008); 
Cook (2018b) recounts that this ‘marked a sea-change in Israel's attitude 
towards the Nakba march’, which began to be regarded with great anxiety by 
Israeli authorities and the Jewish public; it is matched by an even greater 
determination on the part of Palestinians to engage in active memorial 
practices.  
Despite the introduction of the above-discussed Nakba Law, the 
commemorative practice of return has nevertheless grown enormously in 
size, symbolic power and politicization, as the result of a combination of a 
range of factors: political desperation (indicated above), together with more 
liberal approaches to citizenship within certain sectors of Jewish Israeli and 
Palestinian society; the eruption of the Israeli revisionist historians into public 
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discourse, and critically, the development of both Arab print and online media 
and satellite television channels such as the highly influential Al Jazeera in 
the 1990s,17 followed by social media in the 2000s and the emergence of a 
new generation of citizen journalists armed with cellphones and later, drones. 
There can be little doubt that the internet has changed everything as far as 
how young Palestinians receive and disseminate cultural knowledge, and by 
association, how they are drawn to commemorative practices such as the 
March of Return and Nakba Day. Khoury (2018) notes that in northern Israel, 
over 20,000 people marched this year in a ‘procession of return’: 
The Association for the Protection of the Rights of the 
Displaced organized the event for its 21 consecutive year [sic] 
alongside Israel's Independence Day celebrations. … the event 
takes place each year on the lands of a different village that 
was uprooted in 1948. This year, it took place in the area of Atlit, 
just south of Haifa in northern Israel. 
In recent years, the procession has become a large 
demonstration, with people participating from the entire political 
spectrum of Israeli Arab society. Jewish Israelis who associate 
themselves with the liberal-democratic camp also participated. 
Ultra-Orthodox Jews were seen marching in the procession as 
well. 
Protesters held up Palestinian flags and signs bearing 
the names of over 530 villages they say were uprooted in 1948. 
This year, organizers were pleased with the increased number 
of young people participating in the event, saying that it sends 
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the message that younger generations will not forget the Nakba 
and the right of return. 
In a highly charged speech, Chairman of the High Follow-Up Committee for 
Arab Citizens of Israel Mohammad Baracha declares, ‘On this day they try to 
distort history, but we are here to say we have not forgotten. The Nakba is a 
hard, painful memory for every Palestinian, especially those who were 
uprooted from their homes,’ (Khoury, 2018). Clearly for Palestinian 
participants, the March of Return is more than a ceremonial ‘re-enactment … 
a simulacrum of the scene or situation recaptured’ (Connerton, 1989, p. 72); 
it represents a very present collective action, a challenge to the status quo 
that has resulted in confrontations with existentially-threatened right-wing 
Israelis from the 2000s onwards (Sorek, 2015, Loc. 3134-3203).  
5.7 The Great March of Return: Acute trauma politics 
At the time of writing, the most politicized form to date of the March of Return 
has been adopted to protest along the borders of the heavily blockaded 
Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, as activists originally scheduled 45 days of 
non-violent demonstrations to run from Land Day on March 30th until the 
‘million person’ climax on Nakba Day on May 15th, 2018 (one day after the 
opening of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem) although it now appears that 
there is no precise end-date.18 19 The demonstrations are at their most 
intense on Fridays, the Muslim day of prayer; however, their larger context 
derives from the historic deprivation of its citizens, 70% of whom are 
descendants of 1948 refugees, whose freedom of movement beyond the 
densely-populated Strip is heavily restricted by Israel and who face  
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increasingly untenable living conditions since the 2006 election of Hamas, 
followed by three violent wars in 2008-2009, 2012 and 2014 in which Israel 
heavily bombed Gazans in response to rocket fire. Suffering from radical 
economic de-development and over 40% unemployment, Gazans do not 
receive constant supplies of electricity and are almost entirely lacking in 
uncontaminated potable water or sewage treatment (Gisha, n.d.; Gisha, 
2016; OCHA, 2018; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
2015; United Nations Country Team, 2012, 2017; UNRWA, 2015; World 
Bank, 2016).  
In an interview with the progressive Israeli news site, 972mag, one of the 20 
organizers, Hasan al-Kurd, expressly declares that the aim of the ‘Great 
Return March’ is to roll back Gazans’ situation to a time of greater freedom: 
‘We want to send a message that we want to live in peace — 
with the Israelis. We’re against stone throwing or even burning 
tires. We will make sure the protest doesn’t escalate to violence 
— at least from our end. … Our message is peaceful and we’re 
against violence. If you remember back in 1987, Gaza was 
packed with Israelis. We want the siege to be lifted and to go 
back to these days. … The situation in Gaza has become 
unbearable and we absolutely can’t live in Gaza anymore – 
that’s what prompted us to plan this march and that’s why we 
anticipate so many people to attend the protest. … The whole 
idea is based on UN Security Council Resolution 194 (the right 
of return) and the current unbearable living conditions in Gaza. 
It is actually a peaceful act. We want to ask the Israelis to  
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welcome as if we were visitors from another country, the same 
way they welcome refugees in certain countries in Europe — 
though we’re not actually visitors here.’ (Younis, 2018) 
The organizers claim that they desired the protests to include cultural events 
and to attract families (Younis, 2018); Ahmad Abu Artema, an originator of 
the Great Return March, and other organizers ‘agreed they would pitch tents 
and have meals, traditional dabke dancing, football games and even 
weddings hundreds of metres from the perimeter. “We are looking for a new 
culture,” [Abu Artema] said, showing a video on his phone of a marriage at 
the protest camp last weekend’ (Holmes and Balousha, 2018). Fadi Abu 
Shammalah’s emotive New York Times Op-Ed, ‘Why I march in Gaza’, a cry 
for human dignity, also stresses the cultural nature of the event: 
The resistance in the encampments has been creative and 
beautiful. I danced the dabke, the Palestinian national dance, 
with other young men. I tasted samples of the traditional 
culinary specialties being prepared, such as msakhan (roasted 
chicken with onions, sumac and pine nuts) and maftool (a 
couscous dish). I sang traditional songs with fellow protesters 
and sat with elders who were sharing anecdotes about pre-
1948 life in their native villages. Some Fridays, kites flew, and 
on others flags were hoisted on 80-foot poles to be clearly 
visible on the other side of the border. (Abu Shammalah, 2018) 
This is far from the portrayal of events in Israeli media, both broadcast and 
print, which do not examine the issues being protested, nor the troublingly  
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youthful age of victims and mostly focus on sensationalist description of 
‘riots’. With the exception of the left-liberal newspaper Ha’aretz, they do not 
query the IDF’s use of lethal force against demonstrators, which may be the 
subject of an independent UNHRC investigation (Al Hussein, 2018; Miles, 
2018, UN Watch, 2018). Reports and analysts emphasize the use of burning 
kites that have set fire to fields and forestry over the border (Ben Zikri, 2018; 
Khoury and Kubovich, 2018b; i24 News, 2018; TOI Staff and agencies, 
2018a; The Tower Staff, 2018; Weber Rosen, 2018), ‘incendiary’ balloons 
(Tzuri and Levi, 2018), burning tyres, weaponized drones, anti-Semitic 
chants, slingshots, homemade firebombs and Molotov cocktails, wire-cutters 
and knives (MEMRI TV, 2018a, 2018b); among the goals are to ‘kidnap 
Israeli civilians and murder soldiers’ (Marcus and Zilberdik, 2018). Israeli 
media also views the protests as largely or entirely Hamas-orchestrated 
(Beck, 2018; Gilboa, 2018; Lenarz, 2018; Lev Ram and Okbi, 2018; Khoury 
and Kubovich, 2018a; Ragson, 2018, Siryoti et al, 2018; TOI Staff and 
agencies, 2018b; Yemini, 2018; Zitun, 2018). It has widely publicized Hamas’ 
official admission that 50 of its members are among those killed (MEMRI, 
2018c; MEMRI 2018d). Jonathan Halevi, a retired lieutenant colonel, writing 
in Jerusalem Issue Brief, concurs: 
‘The Great Return March’ is the Hamas codename for its 
campaign that is striking against Israel’s existence. … Attempts 
are being made to tear down the fences to enable infiltration 
into Israel.  
Khalil al-Hayya, a senior Hamas official and member of 
the Hamas political bureau, defined the three main objectives of  
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the return marches in Gaza: inculcating the right of return 
among the Palestinian people and the younger generation, 
thereby giving a focus to the struggle against the ‘occupation’; 
torpedoing the ‘deal of the century’, President Trump’s 
diplomatic plan for resolving the Middle East conflict; and 
breaking the embargo on the Gaza Strip. (Halevi, 2018) 
Jerusalem Post journalist Khaled Abu-Toameh, reporting also on the website 
of the right-wing Gatestone Institute, credits the demonstrations as being 
entirely ‘organized by Hamas and other Palestinian factions’ (no mention of 
non-violent origins) with an entirely different aim in mind, one that is sure to 
stir extreme existential fear among Israeli Jews: 
The organizers of the ‘March of Return’, including several 
Hamas leaders, have repeatedly made it clear in the past few 
weeks that the real goal of the campaign is to ‘achieve the right 
of return’ for Palestinian refugees and their several generations 
of descendants to their former homes and villages inside Israel. 
… a demand no Israeli government could ever accept as it 
would means turning the Jews into a minority in their own state. 
Thus, the ‘March of Return’ is hardly about a 
‘humanitarian crisis’ in the Gaza Strip.  Instead, it is a campaign 
designed to put the issue of the Palestinian refugees at center 
stage and let the world know that the Palestinians will not give 
up what they call their ‘right of return.’  
The ‘March of Return’, as Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh 
said a few days ago, marks the beginning of a new Palestinian 
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intifada, or uprising, against Israel. As Haniyeh and other 
organizers of the campaign have clearly stated in recent weeks, 
the Palestinian protests are aimed at thwarting US President 
Donald Trump's yet-to-be-announced plan for peace in the 
Middle East. (Abu-Toameh, 2018) 
Indeed, the Palestinian Information Center website, reporting Haniyeh’s 
speech, affirms that the aim of the march is not to protest against 
humanitarian conditions (‘a matter of bread, bread and electricity’ but rather a 
‘battle for independence and confronting apartheid … a political issue for a 
people displaced from its land and an illegal state has been established on 
its land. The issue of a people who wants independence and a return to their 
land… no retreat, no concession and not compromise, and that Hamas and 
Gaza will not recognize Israel’ [researcher’s translation]) (Palestinian 
Information Center, 2018). Meanwhile, Anshel Pfeffer looks at the struggle 
between Hamas and the PA, and sees the Great March of Return as a 
strategic move by Hamas not merely to marshal Gazans’ frustrations at their 
deprivation, but also to buttress their power and appeal against the waning 
influence of the PA: 
Hamas has recognized its limits and a historic opportunity to 
grasp the leadership of the Palestinian cause from its rivals in 
Fatah, as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at 83, with his 
popularity plumbing new depths, may soon be leaving the 
scene. That’s why Hamas in the last three and a half years has 
stuck to the cease-fire with Israel, tried to enforce it on other  
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factions in Gaza, and searched for a diplomatic way out of its 
and Gaza’s isolation. 
… The Hamas leadership will never say so publicly but it 
realizes it has lost every single round since the bloody coup in 
which it took over Gaza in 2007. With few options remaining, it 
has changed tactics, and its behind-the-scenes organizing of 
the “Great March of Return” that began Friday reflects this, 
more than a sudden embrace of nonviolence. Sinwar and his 
comrades who came of age in the early days of the first intifada 
are returning to that ethos of ‘popular uprising’, not because 
they plan on dismantling their impressive arsenal but because 
they understand the old ethos is more effective at present. 
(Pfeffer, 2018.)  
Yet Abu Shammalah (cited above) disagrees that Hamas is at the heart of 
the Great March of Return: 
Representatives of the General Union of Cultural Centers, the 
nongovernmental organization for which I serve as executive 
director, participated in planning meetings for the march, which 
included voices from all segments of Gaza’s civil and political 
society. At the border, I haven’t seen a single Hamas flag, or 
Fatah banner, or poster for the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine, for that matter — paraphernalia that have been 
widespread in virtually every other protest I have witnessed. 
Here, we have flown only one flag — the Palestinian flag. 
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True, Hamas members are participating, as they are part of the 
Palestinian community. But that participation signals, perhaps, 
that they may be shifting away from an insistence on liberating 
Palestine through military means and are beginning to embrace 
popular, unarmed civil protest. But the Great Return March is 
not Hamas’s action. It is all of ours. (Abu Shammalah, 2018) 
The demonstrators, groups of whom moved increasingly closer into the ARA 
(access restricted areas) buffer zones along the border, and in some cases, 
beyond it, have inevitably been met with a sharp response from the IDF, who 
have inflicted a huge number of casualties (OCHA, 2018b, OCHA, 2018c; 
OCHA, 2018d; Palestinian Center for Human Rights, 2018). The peak day of 
casualties, May 14th, when 60 Palestinians were killed and at least 2,771 
injured (Dabashi, 2018, citing figures from the Gaza Ministry of Health; 
different figures reported by the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights [PCHR, 
2018] ), coincided with the opening of the American Embassy in Jerusalem. 
At the time of writing, the numbers are of course still rising: 
Since the first protest on 30 March, according to the MoH 
[Ministry of Health] in Gaza, Israeli forces have killed 104 
Palestinians, including 14 children, during the course of the 
“Great March of Return” demonstrations. In addition, 12 
Palestinians have been killed during the same period in other 
circumstances, including five reportedly shot at the fence or 
after crossing into Israel, whose bodies are reportedly being 
withheld by the Israeli authorities. The cumulative number of 
injuries by Israeli forces is approximately 12,600, of whom 55 
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per cent have been hospitalized. One Israeli soldier has been 
injured. The violence reached a peak on 14 May, coinciding 
with the official transfer of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem, when Israeli forces killed approximately 60 
Palestinians and injured over 2,700 in Gaza, the highest 
casualty toll in the Gaza Strip in a single day since the 2014 
hostilities. 
The large number of casualties among demonstrators, 
in particular the high percentage injured by live ammunition, 
has raised repeated concerns about excessive use of force, 
alongside calls for independent and transparent investigations 
of these incidents, including by the UN Secretary-General. 
Israel has stated that a large number of fatalities were Hamas 
members and that an investigation will review the use of force, 
including incidents of fatal shooting. 
In the wake of this week’s events, today, the UN Human 
Rights Council convened a special session on the deteriorating 
human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territory 
(oPt). By 29 to two votes, with 14 abstentions, the Council 
condemned ‘the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of 
force by the Israeli occupying forces against Palestinian 
civilians’ and called for the urgent establishment of an 
‘independent, international commission of inquiry’ to 
investigate the killing of Palestinians during the protests. 
(OCHA, 2018c.) 
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The IDF also fired gas canisters at encampments far from the buffer zone, 
which were ‘set up specifically for the demonstrations at a distance of 400 to 
600 meters from the fence’. These tents included ‘field clinics, food vendors 
and various activities for children and adults, such as clown shows, poetry 
readings, live music shows and soccer matches,’ explains B’tselem, adding, 
‘Many families gathered inside tents where they ate and talked.’ (B’tselem, 
2018a.) 
It is not only the abnormally large quantity of persons injured, but the grave 
nature of the injuries caused by IDF live-fire sniper tactics that have earned 
international condemnation (Hass, 2018; UNHR: OCHR, 2018a, 2018b). 
Medècins Sans Frontiéres (MSF) reported that their clinics are 
‘overwhelmed’ (Patel et al., 2018) and they have treated more patients 
already than during the 2014 Gaza war: 
MSF medical staff report receiving patients with devastating 
injuries of an unusual severity, which are extremely complex to 
treat. The injuries sustained by patients will leave most with 
serious, long-term physical disabilities. … MSF surgeons in 
Gaza report devastating gunshot wounds among hundreds of 
people injured during the protests over recent weeks. The huge 
majority of patients – mainly young men, but also some women 
and children – have unusually severe wounds to the lower 
extremities. MSF medical teams note the injuries include an 
extreme level of destruction to bones and soft tissue, and large 
exit wounds that can be the size of a fist.’ (MSF, 2018) 
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This has resulted in an admonition of Israel, together with a threat of further 
investigation of the Israeli military from the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
(International Criminal Court, 2018); three NGOs (Al-Haq, Al Mezan and the 
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights) jointly submitted further sets of 
complaints to the ICC (Abunimah, 2018). Meanwhile, B’tselem took the 
unusual tactic of openly urging IDF soldiers in Gaza to refuse orders to shoot 
(B’tselem, 2018b) and carried out a media campaign in which the names and 
ages of victims who had lost their lives were published (Fig.1). Despite a 
petition filed in Israel’s High Court of Justice by human rights NGOs (Yesh 
Din, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Gisha and Hamoked: Center for 
the Defense of the Individual) querying the army’s rules for live fire and 
requesting that it be made illegal (Kubovich, 2018a), the IDF refused to 
reveal its rules of engagement and the Court ruled the Gaza situation 
constituted a state of war and therefore, ‘“The state opposes the applying of 
human rights law during an armed conflict,”’ (Kubovich, 2018b; Winer and 
TOA Staff, 2018).  
What can be inferred from the protests (ongoing at the time of writing) is that 
they have returned the focus back to the issue of the 1948 refugees, of 
course central to Nakba commemoration and at the core of the collective 
trauma; and away from discussion of political compromise on refugees (such 
as ‘limited return’ or other similar conditions pertaining to the two-state 
solution) that has been raised as a prospect for peace negotiations by the 
PLO (in the Oslo peace process) and occasionally by Hamas (including 
recently [Harel, 2018]). Observes Rashid Khalidi (2018): 
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Palestinians … understand the futility of the approach of both 
wings of their national movement, located in Ramallah and in 
Gaza. Instead of futile diplomacy and pointless (and easily 
exploited) armed resistance, nonviolent grassroots movements 
are growing stronger. They range from the boycott, divestment, 
and sanctions (BDS) movement to the kind of marches we’ve 
seen for the past several weeks in Gaza. …Such an approach 
terrifies the Israeli security establishment, which depends on 
demonizing any Palestinian resistance … As retired Maj. Gen. 
Amos Gilad said of Israel’s response to Palestinian 
nonviolence, “We don’t do Gandhi very well.” 
 Finally, not all Gazans meet the demonstrations against Strip’s collective 
punishment with a response that speaks only of collective distress. At the 
time of writing, the Gaza Peace Doves initiative (Figs. 2 - 4) focuses on the 
original non-violent aims of the Great March, with a symbolic peace action 
that attempts transcendence over collective trauma. It is documented through 
social media and comments under the postings subject it to accusations of 
‘fake news’. However, the initiative appears as a series of posts by Israeli-
American peace negotiator Dr. Gershon Baskin (co-founder of  the NGO and 
think-tank IPCRI [Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, 
http://www.ipcri.org/] on his Facebook page and was broadcast on 
Palestinian television (see Fig. 4, AlGhad TV).  
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Fig. 10. Soldiers, hold your fire! Israeli media campaign by B’tselem.20 
[Source: B’tselem, 2018b.] 
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Fig. 11. FROM GAZA - LIKE AND SHARE THIS MESSAGE ALL OVER ISRAEL, 
PALESTINE AND THE WORLD! 
21 [Source: Gershon Baskin, Facebook, 2018a.] 
 
Fig. 12: ‘Gaza sends messages of peace to Israelis.’22 [Source: Gershon 
Baskin, Facebook, 2018b] 
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Fig 13: AlGhad TV: Gaza Peace Doves.23 .[Source: Gershon Baskin, 
Facebook, 5 May] (Baskin, 2018c) 
5.8 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has endeavoured to show how Palestinians’ empirical 
experience of historic and continuing loss and violence has been encoded 
into cultural and contested historiographical narratives, and gradually given 
shape and iteration through commemorative practices, in particular through 
days of memory (primarily Nakba Day) and the March of Return, the corollary 
of which is to be observed in the current Great March of Return in Gaza, 
perhaps the most political attempt of all to redress the issue of the return of 
Palestine’s 1948 refugees and descendants.  
I have discussed the manner in which Palestine’s remembrance days bear 
points of correspondence to Israel’s remembrance days (Yom HaShoah and 
Yom HaZikaron); but while there is a syncopation in both collective traumas, 
the unresolved and ongoing nature of Palestinians’ suffering adds the 
qualitative (and cumulative) intensity of immediacy. The re-traumatising re-
enactments involved in annual Nakba marches and visits to abandoned  
 
 
260 
 
villages are reminiscent of Jenny Edkins’ non-linear ‘trauma time’ , which, 
unlike ‘historical, narrativised time …has [no] beginnings and ends’. In such 
cases, ‘Events from the period of the trauma are experienced in a sense 
simultaneously with those of a survivor’s current existence’ (Edkins, 2003, p. 
40). For Palestinians living under occupation, whether in the oPTs or as IDPs 
within Israel, their ‘current existence’ contains sufficient daily stress on top of 
the collective revisiting of historical injury.  
Scholars are preoccupied with identifying what the Nakba represents to their 
particular disciplines: According to Volkan, it is Palestinians’ undesired 
‘chosen trauma’; for the Russell Tribunal on Palestine, it is a ‘sociocide’. 
However, of especial interest to our analysis are the characteristics of 
Palestinians’ collective experience, which can be matched closely with Kai 
Erikson’s original notion of cultural trauma, namely the destruction of 
community in the wake of violence, accompanied by initial silence and 
mourning, together with other aspects such as confusion, disorganization 
and a sense of shame and disempowerment, together with a strong nostalgia 
for the past that is handed on to future generations. These features are all 
present as a result of the Palestinian Nakba, thus validating the notion that 
they have suffered a collective trauma, as per Erikson’s conception, which is 
distinct from the individual psychological experience; and yet of course, the 
individual experience touches on the experience of others, producing a 
rippling of wider impact throughout a community or society. Audergon, writing 
about fieldwork in post-war Croatia, affirms these reverberations: ‘Entire 
communities are traumatized, and the dynamics of trauma have collective 
dimensions that influence the course of global history. … When whole  
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communities suffer atrocity, the trauma stays in the fabric of family, 
community and society for generations’ (2004, pp. 6-20). That said, there is 
an overarching context beyond individual and summative suffering; and, for 
the purposes of this investigation, in the case of the Palestinians, it is that of 
political violence, which impacts on all the other levels of trauma (sociological 
and psychological). I concur with Fierke’s argument that: 
… it is more useful to develop political trauma as a separate 
level of analysis in which the traumatic ‘shock’ is directed at a 
political and social category and where this shock has 
implications for the identity and agency of the group.  While war 
involves physical, psychological and political trauma, these are 
all byproducts of a political context. The three experiences may 
intermingle as part of a ‘politics of trauma’, while remaining 
separate levels of experience or treatment. Political trauma is 
larger than the sum of traumatized individuals in a context. 
While the psychological and political are related, they are not 
equivalent (Fierke, p. 482.) 
The frameworks for remembering are problematic for societies facing 
ongoing political violence. Shoring up (or revising) memory in the absence or 
inaccessibility of official documentation of a tragedy represents one aspect of 
this, and has been the work of memory projects, both physical and online, 
such as the Palestinian Oral History Archive at the American University of 
Beirut, and the Birzeit University Digital Palestinian Archive. Meanwhile, both 
the land and the loss of it combine to present a unifying site of collective  
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memory and commemorative practices, among which I have singled out 
Nakba Day and the March of Return as core elements in this chapter. 
Finally, particularly in light of contemporary events occurring around Nakba 
Day and the March of Return, we may advance the theory that memory 
practices in situations of unresolved trauma do not necessarily serve to 
mitigate or promote healing; they may result in temporary catharsis, but can 
also result in a deepening of suffering and entrenched hostility that can 
actually contribute to further harm. Indeed, Antonius Robben (2012) who 
studies political violence in post-dirty war Argentina, comments that in that 
case, ‘memorialization and continuous narration of past massive violence … 
did not advance the coexistence of adversarial groups but intensified their 
enmity and revived certain repressive practices’ (p. 305). We can also see 
this, for example, in the regular standoffs between bitter rivals Fatah and 
Hamas (Abu Toameh, 2018; Alsaafin and Tahhan, 2017; Ma’an News, 2017) 
which prevents the amelioration of the Palestinian condition.  Furthermore, 
Fierke (2004, p. 473) argues that ‘social trauma can find expression in a 
political solipsism, which has dangerous consequences’, and vice versa, the 
experience of social trauma creates conditions for political leaders to 
mobilize the solipsism of the group (pp. 482-488). This point will be taken up 
further in the penultimate and the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter Six: Reconsidering collective trauma: Israel and the 
Palestinians. 
 
6.1 Introduction: Factoring in collective trauma 
Among the questions asked by this project was, to what extent does 
privileging and instrumentalising the concept of collective trauma hinder 
progress in the resolution of the Israel/Palestine conflict? Does one need to 
accept the ‘naturalized’ concept of collective trauma as a salient feature of 
this conflict? Is the concept helpful to sustainable peacebuilding? One might 
contend that noticing unhealthy behaviour patterns is as productive as 
validating a designation. In any case, it is the extent of certain behaviour 
repertoires that have been extensively observed by social and political 
psychologists Daniel Bar-Tal, Rafi Nets-Zehngut and Vamık Volkan (albeit 
almost all of their research focuses largely in the Israeli sector) that underline 
the value of taking such perspectives into account. These need to be 
factored in alongside the conventional final-status sticking points in the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, such as ‘borders, settlements, the status of 
Jerusalem, and the rights of Palestinian refugees’ (Rogers, 2013) and water 
rights (all previously mentioned as sources of conflict). Experts tend to select 
their focus and claim the greatest attention needs to be paid to that 
perspective; for example, with reference to the recent May 2018 relocation of 
the US embassy to Jerusalem, peace negotiator Dr. Gershon Baskin and 
educator/activist Aziz Abu Sarah particularly privilege the city as ‘the core of 
the Israeli Palestinian conflict. In the coming days we will be witnesses to the 
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centrality of Jerusalem in the conflict. Jerusalem is also the core of any future 
Israeli Palestinian peace’ (AlQuds Yerushalayim, 2018). Then there are 
overarching political claims for the significance of proxy power jockeyings in 
the Middle East, a feature that has been present since the Cold War; 
meanwhile the identities and influence of proxy powers has shifted and 
widened as a result of the failure of regional states consequent to the Arab 
prodemocracy uprisings; and beyond this, further claims for sets of persistent 
attitudes that view the conflict as incompatibilities due to ‘civilization clash’ 
(pace Samuel Huntington), religious differences, competing sets of 
nationalisms and most especially, rampant settler-colonialism (Busbridge, 
2018). Finally, there are the conflict resolution debates post-Oslo on the 
claims for the one-state or two-state solution (Baskin, 2018d; Qumsiyeh, 
2004) or even approaches that ponder the ‘nuclear version’ of the one state 
solution (Rigby, 2017) (total annexation of all territories by Israel, likely to 
bring about maximum opprobrium and hence, perhaps, provoking resolution 
through conflict).   
While all of these accounts of contributing factors to the Israel-Palestine 
conflict are undeniably important, situating the parties’ stances according to 
overlapping perspectives on collective trauma sheds the most critical light on 
how the conflict itself is locked in perpetual stasis owing to the respective 
pathologies of the parties. This study’s core claim rests on the notion that the 
parties’ traumatic interpretation of their histories and their associated 
remembrance rituals and practices function as a negative source of conflict 
sustenance; greater attention needs to be paid to privileging and 
instrumentalisation of collective trauma in order for peace to take hold in any  
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meaningful form. Failure to take into account the significance of this 
undertow is likely to produce perpetual instability and most likely the 
forestalling of any top-down attempts at securing conflict resolution. While 
this chapter cannot investigate every single ill-fated peace initiative that has 
ever been launched in the attempt to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, 
particular attention will be paid to the only one that remains extant: the Arab 
or Saudi Peace Initiative (hereafter, API), as an example of ‘pressing for 
peace’ (presenting a fait-accomplis comprehensive Track-1 multilateral 
package). Like all the previous attempts, it too pays little attention to the 
traumatic underpinnings of the conflict, but does represent the Arab world’s 
most significant proposal since the legendary ‘three noes’ of the 1967 
Khartoum Summit (‘no peace’, ‘no negotiations’ and ‘no recognition’ of Israel) 
and thus was hailed in 2007 by Israeli PM Ehud Olmert as ‘a revolutionary 
change in outlook’ (Benn, 2007). 
6.2 Pressing for peace 
In connection with ‘pressing for peace’, Jerusalem-based author and 
journalist Nathan Thrall, who heads up the International Crisis Group's Arab-
Israeli Project, makes an interesting contention (Thrall, 2017a) that the actors 
in this conflict can only make peace through tough external pressure―i.e. 
when strong international Track-1 diplomatic duress is applied. However, this 
approach misses the mark when one considers the fate of all the peace 
agreements constructed so far in this manner. Without concern for parties’ 
respective traumatic histories, follow-through on negotiations has been 
undeniably impacted. Of course one cannot over-claim: there have been 
many other factors that contributed to breakdown of peace initiatives, as 
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Thrall himself acknowledges in respect of his own contention: most 
significant was the murder of Israeli premier Yitzhak Rabin, signalling the 
failure of the Oslo Accords. However, both at the time and in the decades 
afterwards, Palestinian criticism of the Oslo Process has always indicated 
their view of it as deeply flawed, biased and doomed to failure for a wide 
range of reasons that included not only the superior Israeli ‘matrix of control’ 
but also the lack of foresight among the donor-driven Palestinian leadership 
(Bauck and Omer, 2016; Said, 2000; Sayigh and Ereket, 2015; Shlaim, 2016; 
Turner and Hussein, 2015). Other initiatives also failed largely―but not 
entirely―as a result of contingent factors, too numerous to unpack here, 
such as the 1998 Wye River Memorandum, the 2000 Camp David summit, 
the 2000 Clinton parameters, the 2001 Taba negotiations, the 2002 Arab 
peace initiative1 (reaffirmed by the Arab League in 2007, 2013 and 2017), the 
Quartet’s 2003 Roadmap to Peace; and unofficial initiatives such as the 2003 
Geneva Accord and the 2009 Kairos Palestine document. With each failure, 
collective trauma intensifies as the parties respectively retreat into their 
familiar conflict ethos.  
6.3 The implications of the Arab Peace Initiative 
At the time of writing, the API remains the only initiative still in play (Baroud, 
2017; Khoury, 2017; Lieber and Winer, 2017; Okbi/Ma’ariv, 2017; Savir, 
2018; Terris, 2015). It was recalled by President Abbas at the UN Security 
Council as recently as February 2018 (WAFA, 2018) and is also projected to 
be the basis of US President Trump’s Middle East ‘deal of the century’ 
(Black, 2017).  
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The API is widely known as the ‘Saudi Peace Initiative’ in American and 
Israeli diplomacy, primarily as it was the initiative of then-Saudi Crown Prince 
Abdullah. (“Saudi Arabia is the country that in the end will determine the 
ability of the Arabs to reach a compromise with Israel,” Israeli PM Olmert is 
quoted as saying in an interview in Ha’aretz [Benn, 2007]). The Crown 
Prince, moreover, reportedly took a milder and more ‘acceptable’ version of 
the API to U.S. President George W. Bush’s Texas ranch; even this version, 
which had not been endorsed by the Arab League Summit, was ‘immediately’ 
rejected by Israel (Podeh, 2007, citing The New York Times, 27 April 2002; 
Ha’aretz, 28 April 2002, and al-Watan, 28 April 2002).  
The Israeli reaction to the Arab League’s wider reaffirmation of the API in 
2007 fared little better, despite PM Olmert’s widely-reported enthusiastic 
reaction towards it (The Guardian Staff and agencies, 2007). As Aluf Benn 
affirms, ‘Israel's official response, released in a statement by the Foreign 
Ministry in coordination with the Prime Minister's Bureau, was lukewarm. It 
ignored the content of the Riyadh resolution and focused on the call by the 
moderate Arab nations to enter a dialogue with Israel’ (Benn, 2007). 
Palestinian-American journalist and author Dr. Ramzy Baroud concurs that 
Olmert ‘stripped [the API’s] content of any practical value … what Olmert—as 
with current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—was keenly interested in 
was the idea of “unconditional normalization”’ (Baroud, 2017). Today 
business is much the same, according to Baroud: the conflict continues, but 
‘what truly interests Israel and its American backers is breaking Israel’s 
isolation through regional “peace” pacts and separate deals—in other words, 
normalization under occupation’ (Baroud, 2017).  
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Meanwhile, a Jerusalem Post article (Okbi/Ma’ariv, 2017, op.  cit.) discusses 
an exposé from the Hezbollah-aligned Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, 
reportedly detailing a ‘secret document of the Saudi Foreign Ministry’ 
confirming further recent secret API back-channels between the Saudis, the 
Israelis and U.S. President Donald Trump ‘including the rumored visit of the 
Saudi Crown Prince to Tel Aviv’. The alleged document features 
‘“compromises Riyadh will offer to end the Palestinian issue” and in addition, 
“Riyadh’s effort to gain support against Iran and Hezbollah”’. While Al-Akhbar 
‘has a history of fabrications … [it is] the Lebanese proxy of Iran’, Okbi 
nevertheless appears to be intrigued by the unverifiable contents, which 
include a demand for Israeli military denuclearization. Furthermore, in this 
latest alleged re-characterization of the API, Jerusalem will be subject to 
international sovereignty; Palestinian refugees will be resettled in the West 
Bank or will be able to gain ‘naturalization by other Muslim states’ and there 
will be a ‘major summit to launch a final peace agreement’. In return, the U.S. 
must ‘ratchet up U.S. and international sanctions against Iran for its ballistic 
missile program and its sponsorship of terrorism around the world and revisit 
the P5+1 nuclear agreement’. (As we now know, since 8 May, 2018, the U.S. 
has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between the 
P5+1 [+1 being Germany], Iran and the EU.) The report concludes by 
speculating on ‘denied’ allegations that ‘Saudi Arabia is pressuring … Abbas 
into accept [sic] Trump’s peace terms, most recently on an emergency visit 
Abbas was called to pay to the kingdom earlier this month’ but notes that the 
‘leakers’ have ‘reasons to discredit Saudi Arabia by painting it as capitulating 
to the US and Israel’. Yet reports in Al Jazeera, subject to its own anti-Saudi 
bias (‘MBS: Palestinians should ‘accept Trump’s proposals or shut up’, Al  
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Jazeera, 2018) and drawn from Israel’s Channel 10 news (Ravid, 2018) 
perhaps suggest that there is some substance to Saudi back-channel 
rumours.  
Whatever the truth of these fascinating speculations, the text of the official 
version of the API, endorsed by 22 Arab states, is the only one that remains 
available to us, and thus benefits from the ‘legitimacy’ of approval, backed by 
‘the custodian of the Islamic holy places’; it also: 
… deals with all the remaining parts of the conflict (Syria, 
Lebanon and the Palestinians) and … given the impasse in the 
Palestinian track as a result of the Fateh-Hamas split, the plan 
can offer a multilateral track, bypassing the deadlocked bilateral 
track. In such a case, an Arab solution may be imposed on the 
recalcitrant Palestinians. (Podeh, 2007).  
Yet for all this, the API constitutes a salient illustration of how a sweeping 
take-it-or-leave-it peace initiative arouses the greatest apprehension, at least 
as far as Palestinian and Israeli collective trauma is concerned; the notion of 
‘imposition’ provokes tremendous anxiety, and this enforcement aspect, 
together with a thorough consideration of the API, forms the focus of this 
chapter.  
In a revealing article (‘Why is Israel so afraid of the Arab peace initiative?’) 
Raphael Ahren (2013) cites Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon rejecting the 
API ‘as a “spin” and a “dictation” that would force Israel to make great 
concessions before being able to present its own demands.’ The familiar 
conflict repertoire behaviours (Bar-Tal, 1998) are in evidence as Ahren asks: 
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Why the objections, the reservations, the mistrust? Okay, the 
likelihood of peace with Iran may sound beyond improbable, 
but why doesn’t Israel at least ride the initiative toward 
normalization with ostensibly moderate Arab states, many of 
which appear to be interested in teaming up with Israel against 
their common enemies in Tehran? (Some analysts say that the 
Gulf states are especially willing to normalize relations with 
Israel, mainly because they seek allies in their struggle against 
the Iranian threat.) 
Skeptics say the Arab Peace Initiative is unacceptable to Israel 
because of certain clauses that no government can ever agree 
to. Well, if so, why doesn’t Jerusalem at least try to engage with 
the Arab world by professing interest in the initiative, if only to 
demonstrate the will for peace and avoid being labeled as the 
party that prevents an agreement? There is so much to gain — 
politically and economically — in making peace with the entire 
Arab world. What is Israel afraid of? (Ahren, 2013) 
The devil is in the details, as far as Israelis are concerned, ‘such as a return 
to the 1967 lines and the right of return’, explains Ahren; the API’s Item 2 
calls for ‘full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, 
including the Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967, as well as 
the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon’ 
(Muasher, 2008, p. 281). It is also conceived to be an unlikely scenario by 
Israelis that the Jewish state will ever be accepted in an Arab Middle East.  
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For example, then Deputy Defense Minister Danny Danon, ‘a declared 
opponent of a Palestinian state’, is quoted as saying, ‘“You have to sacrifice 
a lot, and on the other hand you’re not really going to get peace. … Maybe if 
you sit in Qatar or Abu Dhabi it sounds good.”’ However, he infers that ‘those 
who know what happened in Gaza after the Hamas take-over fear that the 
terror group could also conquer the West Bank and rain rockets on central 
Israel from there,’ (Ahren, 2013). Existential security fears loom large, for 
‘the ’67 lines, land swaps notwithstanding, are indefensible’ according to 
those on the Israeli right who are opposed to the API and Resolution 242 (the 
‘land-for-peace’ resolution voted on after the 1967 war): 
“I don’t foresee any Israeli government willing and/or capable of 
returning to the 1967 lines, with or without territorial swaps,” 
said Dani Dayan, a former chairman and current chief foreign 
envoy of the pro-settler Council of Jewish Settlements. 
…“Territorial swaps do not make the 1967 borders more 
defensible. Territorial swaps have to do with demography, they 
have nothing to do with security,” Dayan said. “I do not see any 
territorial compromise that can reconcile Israeli and 
Palestinians demands. Therefore the Arab Peace Initiative, 
exactly like Oslo and John Kerry’s initiative, are [sic] a waste of 
time.” (Ahren, 2013) 
Joshua Teitelbaum, writing for the right-wing think tank, the Jerusalem 
Center for Public Affairs, quibbles that the API’s Item 2 demands are ‘at odds 
with Resolution 242, which calls for withdrawal from territories, not all the  
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territories’ and claims that this ‘effectively placed the Syrians on the shore of 
the Sea of Galilee, Israel’s main water source’ and moreover, ‘Israel’s 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 was certified by the UN as a 
withdrawal to the international border’ (Teitelbaum, 2009, p. 15). 
Not only borders but the ‘right of return’ of refugees (clause 11 in UN 
Resolution 194)2 arouses great anxiety among Israelis, who foresee a flood 
of Palestinians returning to reclaim lost lands and homes as result of 
agreements such as the API. Furthermore, the ‘right of return’ issue is also of 
particular interest to countries such as Lebanon and Syria, where large 
numbers of not entirely welcome non-naturalized Palestinian refugees reside; 
the somewhat obscurely-worded Item 4 in the 2002 text ‘assures the 
rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation, which conflicts with the special 
circumstances of the Arab host countries’.)3 Ahrens flags these demands for 
‘resettlement’ placation: 
Another little-known clause in the Arab Peace Initiative rejects 
“Palestinian patriation,” which implies that refugees living in 
camps on Israel’s borders will not be granted citizenship of their 
current host countries. … critics fear it could further complicate 
issues. 
Not only these details, but also the API itself is not particularly familiar to 
many Israelis. Allegedly the ‘unfamiliar’ API was aimed not at the Israeli 
government itself, but at more progressive Israelis, who might then 
pressurize their government to negotiate for peace (Podeh, 2007).4 In the  
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context of a publicity drive to spread awareness of the API among Israelis, 
Joshua Teitelbaum enlarges on the deliberate Arab lack of clarity regarding 
the thorny issue of the ‘right to return’:  
During the months of November and December [2009], 
advertisements containing the text of the API were placed in … 
Israeli newspapers in Hebrew in a well-orchestrated publicity 
campaign. These ads were placed by the Negotiations Affairs 
Department of the PLO. Additional Hebrew ads included the 
endorsements of prominent Israelis calling on the government 
to examine the API, and explained the Initiative in a manner 
that would appeal to Israelis, emphasizing an end to the conflict 
and that a solution to the refugee problem would require Israeli 
agreement. The publication of the ads stimulated a debate in 
the Israeli press about how much progress the API represented. 
In the Hebrew translation of the API, the proponents translated 
the word tawtin (patriation, or resettlement) as izruah 
(naturalization), which is a considerably softer term. The 
impression was that they were trying to soft-peddle the API by 
avoiding the difficult questions. (Teitelbaum, 2009, p. 27) 
This is the critical issue, as far as Israel is concerned; anything resembling 
UN Resolution 194 ‘would undermine Israel’s Jewish identity’ (Teitelbaum, 
2009, p. 15); thus above all, the ‘patriation’ issue is the one that is the ‘deal-
killer’; countries that refuse to accept permanently their Palestinian refugees 
would insist on sending them back home:  
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The refugees would have nowhere to go but Israel. Israel, of 
course, would not agree to this. …The Final Statement which 
accompanied the API was even stronger on the refugee issue, 
explicitly demanding all of the Palestinians’ rights, including 
“guaranteeing the right of return (ta’min haqq al-‘awda) for the 
Palestinian refugees on the basis of the resolutions of 
international legitimacy and the principles of international law 
including General Assembly Resolution 194,” and rejecting any 
solutions that involve “resettling [of the Palestinians] outside of 
their homes (tatwinihim kharij diyarihim).” (Teitelbaum, 2009, p. 
17) 
Majority Israeli existential fears are presented with stark clarity: Israel will not 
countenance waves of returning Palestinian refugees claiming their pre-1948 
villages and towns, although some might be able to return to the eventual 
State of Palestine: 
As part of its diplomatic offensive, Israel needs to be 
particularly clear to the Arabs that they must disabuse 
themselves of the notion of Palestinian refugee settlement in 
Israel. On the discursive level, one has to begin talking not of 
return to their homes, as does Resolution 194, but of return to 
Palestine, as defined by the eventual Palestinian state to exist 
next to Israel. 
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As a consequence, Teitelbaum recommends that Israel reject the API: 
‘because it contains seriously objectionable elements, as discussed above. 
Israel should also reject the “all or nothing” approach of the Saudis and the 
Arab League. Peacemaking is the process of negotiation, not diktat’ 
(Teitelbaum, 2009, p. 3, my italics). He concludes: 
… There is only so far that repackaging, complementing, and 
improving atmosphere can go when the parties are so far apart. 
Any government elected in Israel today cannot make an offer 
acceptable to the Arabs and still survive. It is equally unlikely 
that the weak Palestinian leadership, whether it be Hamas or 
Fatah, would be able to make an offer acceptable to Israel and 
remain in power. (Teitelbaum, 2009, pp. 27-29.) 
Above all, it is evident that Israelis remain unconvinced that The Other 
means peace (and indeed, the significant changes in the successive versions 
of the API regarding the wording of ‘normalization’, friendly or not, do indicate 
the difficulties the Arab states themselves encountered in reaching 
consensus). Ahrens (2013) cites Dr. Yossi Beilin (one of the architects of the 
Oslo Declaration of Principles), who imagines the Israeli response as, ‘“No, 
you don’t really mean it. You can’t mean it, after all—we know you.”’ Hebrew 
University specialist in Arab-Israeli relations Prof. Elie Podeh is also quoted 
as saying, ‘“The Arab and Muslim world, in our minds, are generally linked to 
threats and danger; when they ‘launch’ a peace proposal at us, we don’t 
know how to react.”’ An ‘anonymous’ Israeli official is given the last word: 
‘“Peace with Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan—very funny. Let’s be clear: We will  
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not get New Year’s cards from Iran, Sudan or Libya under any foreseeable 
circumstances. It is nothing but a lack of seriousness to rely on such 
promises,”’ (Ahren, 2013). 
It is not only chronic mistrust and fear that leads Israelis to reject such peace 
overtures and to resort to tried-and-trusted ‘conflict management’ techniques. 
The costs are simply too high, as Nathan Thrall wryly observes, with a 
pungent prediction of Israelis’ worst security and economic nightmares: 
The damages Israel would risk incurring through such an 
accord are massive. They include perhaps the greatest political 
upheaval in the country’s history; enormous demonstrations 
against – if not majority rejection of – Palestinian sovereignty in 
Jerusalem and over the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary; and 
violent rebellion by some Jewish settlers and their supporters. 
There could also be bloodshed during forcible evacuations of 
West Bank settlements and rifts within the body implementing 
the evictions, the Israeli army, whose share of religious infantry 
officers now surpasses one third. Israel would lose military 
control over the West Bank, resulting in less intelligence-
gathering, less room for manoeuvre in future wars, and less 
time to react to a surprise attack. It would face increased 
security risks from a Gaza-West Bank corridor, which would 
allow militants, ideology and weapons-production techniques to 
spread from Gaza training camps to the West Bank hills 
overlooking Israel’s airport. Israeli intelligence services would  
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no longer control which Palestinians enter and exit the 
occupied territories. The country would cease extraction of the 
West Bank’s natural resources, including water, lose profits 
from managing Palestinian customs and trade, and pay the 
large economic and social price of relocating tens of thousands 
of settlers. (Thrall, 2017b) 
None of the suggested benefits of peace, nor ‘the moral costs of occupation 
for Israeli society’ or even ‘international opprobrium’ (I would dispute this last 
point, as it is a powerful traumatic stressor, reawakening ancient fears of 
anti-Semitism) are evenly faintly close to ‘outweighing the deficits’; according 
to Thrall, ‘no strategy can succeed if it is premised on Israel behaving 
irrationally … waiting would serve the country well’ (Thrall, 2017b). This is a 
very provocative and seductive argument, were it not for the fact that when 
examined closely, much of the repertoire of conflict ethos behaviours is far 
from rational, even when stemming from the drive for self-preservation. True, 
Israel can indeed continue to function profitably to a certain extent behind its 
many walls and barriers, shielded diplomatically and materially by the U.S. 
government; it is barely chastised by the U.S. for its conduct in the occupied 
territories, where there is the ‘illusion of U.S. castigation … in reality it 
insulates Israel from answering for its actions … by assuring that only 
settlements and not the government that creates them will suffer 
consequences for repeated violations of international law’ (Thrall, 2017b). 
Meanwhile the Palestinians can continue with their ‘quasi-state in the 
occupied territories, with its own parliament, courts, intelligence services and 
foreign ministry’. which allows for a simulacrum of post-Oslo donor-driven  
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functionality to be maintained, although as we know in Gaza, parts of that 
equation are in danger of near or imminent collapse, and this may have a 
domino effect.  
For anything to change meaningfully, Thrall suggests, severe economic 
sanctions have to be brought to bear on Israel, together with strong 
international pressure from the U.S. and Europe; sticks have to be applied for 
the carrot of peace and international acceptance. Others argue that removing 
financial support for the PA might force a change in leadership and bring 
about a more unified challenge to Israel. However, both scenarios, 
considering the geopolitical power balance, are exceedingly unlikely; 
enabling of oppression is likely to continue for quite some time. Thrall 
concludes that ‘too many insist on sparing Israelis and Palestinians the pain 
of outside force, so that they may instead continue to be generous with one 
another in the suffering they inflict’. I do not disagree with this conclusion, but 
would argue for a different or a combined approach, a therapeutic outside 
intervention; force alone is unlikely to bring long-term peace. 
6.4 Conclusion: Towards peacebuilding mechanisms and the politics 
 of recognition 
 
When theorizing the Israel-Palestine ‘conflicts’ ethos (since there are two 
Palestinian institutions of government who claim representation for 
Palestinian people within the region) they may be viewed either as conflicts 
occurring between sets of actors, who cannot make progress, indirectly or 
unconsciously, owing to trauma; or sets of actors, who make cynical 
discursive use of trauma, as a consequence itself of trauma. Whichever 
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combination is correct, this has a significant effect on the capability to 
negotiate a political peace agreement, such as the one remaining one on the 
table, the API. In the following sections I will discuss first of all the notion of 
the introduction of a therapeutic framework into conflict transformation, and 
then the issue of memorialization within such a framework. 
 6.4.1 The therapeutic framework 
A therapeutic framework is an approach that specifically addresses trauma 
through the use of trained and trusted mediators from the fields of social and 
political psychology to pinpoint and unpack traumatic narratives when 
discussion becomes looped around these narratives. Generally speaking, 
such therapeutic approaches are part of graduated initiatives to ‘create 
preconditions’ and promote cooperation, particularly in the case of ethnic 
conflict, as Ross (2000) notes; some ethnic conflicts are so complex 
(involving a number of groups) that ‘no single leader can be said to fully 
represent the group’ (Ross, 2000, p. 1004) and in the case of the Palestine-
Israel conflict, leaders of groups are not necessarily trusted by their own 
populations. Thus initiatives may be conceptualized along the lines of 
whether they can be projected to have ‘internal’ and ‘external criteria of 
success’ (Ross, 2000, p. 1005), the former relating to transformations in 
attitudes and practices (in everyday settings or even major political actions) 
and the latter to intervention-dependent particular effects on the conflict. 
Approaches range from ameliorating relations between communities and 
groups through a range of projects, some of which include utilizing 
intercultural communications theory; human needs workshops; ‘principled 
negotiations’ (Ross, 2000, p. 1011) such as the Minds of Peace project 
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(http://mindsofpeace.org/ ; Handelsman, 2014) which brought together 
Palestinians and Israelis from a diverse range of backgrounds in a series of 
experimental ‘popular negotiations’ or public congresses in various locations 
in the Israel-Palestine region and in the U.S. and Canada, to talk peace 
where elites (primarily political leaders) have failed. The latter project also 
shades into a theory of practice that Ross categorizes as ‘psychoanalytically 
informed identity theory’ (Ross, 2000, p. 1014) whereby groups explore their 
‘targets of externalization—common enemies … High emotional salience is 
attached to group differences which are reinforced through symbolic and 
ritual behaviours binding individuals to their own groups’ (Ross, ibid). The 
American Psychological Association-sponsored 1980s workshops with 
Egyptians, Palestinians and Israelis conducted by Vamık Volkan, who 
formulated the concept of ‘chosen trauma’ (discussed in Chapter Five) 
represent the earliest example of this attempt at conflict transformation, 
vividly recounted in his book, Enemies on the Couch (Volkan, 2013). 
Likewise social and political psychologists Herbert Kelman and Nadim 
Rouhana provided context towards the Oslo process with a series of more 
than 30 interactive problem-solving ‘unofficial intervention’ workshops for 
Israeli and Palestinian Track II leaders in order to change the flow of the 
‘conflict ethos’ (Bar-Tal, 2007). Politically influential ‘cadres’ of Palestinians 
and Israelis took part in the workshops from the 1970s to the 1990s (Kelman, 
2005a; Kelman, 2005b). These continued even after the Oslo Accords, until 
the second Intifada. The ultimate success rate of such experimental 
interventions is far from guaranteed, as Rouhana observed in 1998, but there 
remains a healthy and invested commitment to their success: 
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… there does seem to be sufficient interest in academia and 
curiosity among diplomats to give theorists and practitioners in 
this emerging field a chance to advance its theories, develop 
new tools and methodologies, and demonstrate its 
effectiveness in dealing with conflicts. …As with any emerging 
field, there are serious challenges that theorists and 
practitioners are facing. These challenges range from how to 
formulate and standardize meaningful terminology to how to 
define the most fruitful objectives of unofficial interventions. 
(Rouhana, 1998, p. 112). 
According to Rouhana, although neither diplomats nor negotiation scholars 
are convinced of the wisdom of such approaches, ‘the same sources of 
weakness can also be seen as advantages that unofficial intervention can 
use in order to make singular contributions to conflict resolution that official 
diplomacy is not equipped to achieve’ (Rouhana, 1998, p. 116). 
Nevertheless, more research is recommended as ‘ some theoretical and 
methodological advances are needed for such a contribution to take place’ 
(Rouhana, ibid). The approach does certainly indicate ‘potential’ as long as 
practitioners are able to: 
… explain how the micro processes of their unofficial activities 
are related to macro processes of the conflict, to develop 
methods for evaluating their interventions, define the 
relationship between official and unofficial processes, and 
demonstrate how ideas developed regardless of the power 
balance can be accepted in conflicts defined by power 
asymmetry. Methodologically, practitioners will have to deal 
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with issues of training and professional standards, examine 
tools of practice, and develop research methodologies. Finally, 
it is of utmost importance that the field develop ethical 
guidelines to guard against possible harm to participants and to 
societies in conflict. (Rouhana, 1998, p. 128) 
While the therapeutic approach can be used in a variety of forums, primarily 
Track 2 negotiations, media debates, educational curricula, and in religious 
settings, working (not exclusively) with gatekeepers and authorities in these 
different settings, what has not yet been attempted is a scaling-up at the 
Track 1 level. In preparation, however, the multi-track aspect of the approach 
is critical, since it aims to represent the ‘complexity’ of a conflict, and avoid 
focusing merely on elites or binary portrayals of a conflict, for ‘Cycles of 
violence are often driven by tenacious requirements to reduce complex 
history into dualistic polarities that attempt to both describe and contain 
social reality in artificial ways’ (Lederach, 2005, p. 35). As advocated 
throughout the body of the work of seminal conflict resolution scholars such 
as Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach, a holistic view of a conflict is 
necessary in order to arrive at an understanding of ‘core patterns’ of 
dysfunction that ‘generate complexity’ (Lederach, 2005, p. 33). Lederach 
(Ibid.) offers a ‘working definition of complexity’ as one that involves ‘multiple 
actors, pursuing a multiplicity of actions and initiatives, at numerous levels of 
social relationships in an interdependent setting at the same time’; for 
Galtung this complexity requires the involvement of empathetic, respected 
mediators meeting parties engaged in intractable conflicts separately to ‘map’ 
the conflict thoroughly in order to bring in the widest possible range of goals 
(Galtung, 2000). In terms of the Israel-Palestine conflict, this means taking 
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into account not only Jewish Israelis and Palestinians living within Israel and 
in the West Bank and Gaza, but also non-Jewish minority groups living within 
Israel and Palestinians who are living in adjoining Middle Eastern countries 
with refugee status as a result of the 1948 and 1967 wars. As Bainbridge 
(2012, p. 222) observes, ‘Refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan will still 
remain an integral component of any process that may emerge in the future’. 
Evoking Lederach’s ‘three stages to achieving justice’, she suggests that 
Israelis and even the Arab states need to accept ‘accountability’ and differing 
degrees of responsibility for the refugees’ situation; agree on compensation; 
and treatment of the refugees should involve ‘equality and fairness’ so that 
they are less ‘marginalized in relation to the peace process’. Bainbridge calls 
for the ‘issue … [to] be addressed more by the Palestinian Authority, which is 
the only political representative of the Palestinian population in the peace 
process’. The refugees have been neglected and ‘sidelined’ owing to ‘the 
PA’s ‘policy of concentrating on the West Bank and Gaza that means 
refugees are nowhere near to achieving stage three’ (Bainbridge, 2012, p. 
236). 
 
Based on contemporary experience, political agreements between elites 
and/or military leaders that do not take into account a therapeutic approach 
merely scratch the surface of what is necessary to build sustainable peace; 
they ‘tend to hide the reality that the conflict has not ended. [It] has been 
placed within a newly defined context where it can be pursued by other … 
means’ (Lederach, 2005, p. 47), bringing to mind, for example, the lack of 
peace induced by the 1993 Oslo Accords and the ensuing Oslo Process. A 
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wider and deeper follow-through process is necessary for peace to take root, 
as Lederach notes:  
Constructive social change and peacebuilding itself promote 
and must harness multiple processes of change, which cut 
across the levels and populations affected by the conflict we 
recognize agreements for what they are: social and political 
antacids, temporary acid reducers that creates an exit for 
symptomatic problems and an opportunity to create a way to 
work on repeated patterns and cycles of destructive 
relationships. (Lederach, 2005, p. 48) 
Continued engagement is critical for a process to avoid the ‘authenticity gap’ 
whereby no parties believe in the ‘miraculous’ prescribed solution, as 
Lederach (2005, p. 49) observes: ‘Authentic engagement recognizes that 
conflict remains. Dialogue is permanent and requires platforms that make 
such engagement at multiple levels of the affected society possible and 
continuous’. When such conditions are not met, agreements are not taken 
seriously and efforts are likely to peter out. With regard to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, as Telhami and Kull (2013) observe, there is a deep lack of 
faith in the ‘miraculous’ solution, with almost half of Israelis and Palestinians 
believing that ‘a peace agreement will never be reached’ (p. 5). Telhami and 
Kull’s research analyzes polling by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion 
and the Midgam Projects of Israeli and Palestinian attitudes towards nine 
months of peace talks in 2013. Yet at the end of the day, Israelis and 
Palestinians are choosing not to hope for peace based only on past 
experiences that did not contain the necessary conditions for conflict 
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transformation. A sustainable therapeutic framework has not, until now, been 
assayed. 
Finally, it would be remiss to neglect the critiques of certain scholars 
regarding the implications of the therapeutic approach; primarily this 
opposition has been voiced by Michael Humphrey (2006) and most notably 
by Vanessa Pupavac. Pupavac (2001, 2002, 2004a, 2004b) and Hughes and 
Pupavac (2005) are critical of what they consider to be the 1990s soft-focus 
neoliberal emphasis on ‘pathologization’ of states and ‘emotionality’ or 
‘emotionology’ in politics. Objecting to the individualist trend in contemporary 
conflict solution, Pupavac (Hughes and Pupavac, 2005, pp. 874-875) objects 
powerfully to the way that: 
Perspectives on conflict emerging from psychosocial 
foundations are framed in such a way as to remove from 
analysis questions of political or social structure. They also 
downplay the significance of the state as the institutional 
expression of self-determination on the part of the political 
community. The complexity of interrelations between the state, 
society and international or transnational forces in a globalizing 
world is subordinated to the simple metric of rationality or 
irrationality of individual agency. Conflict is represented as a 
series of individual experiences of violence. States are 
portrayed as failed service providers run amok, separate from 
victimised and oppressed populations, even while preying upon 
them. Societies are viewed as formed of violated or violating 
individuals, whose actions spring from a hopeless cycle of 
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conflict from psychological processes rather than from political 
beliefs or economic needs. This excision of political processes 
from the depiction of conflict, oppression and poverty has 
opened the way for therapeutic approaches to intervention. … 
The complexity of politics, social and economic imperatives that 
both renders conflict and violence an option for ordinary people, 
and determines responses to it, is ignored in favour of a view of 
conflict as causeless (‘the confiscation of memory’) and 
responses as traumatized (‘the pathologisation of populations’). 
In adopting this approach, contradictions ... are elegantly 
solved through the denial of capacities for autonomy to 
populations. Echoing colonialist discourses, which awarded 
rights only to populations deemed mature, this discursive 
strategy de-legitimates local politics and gives the green light 
for the disciplinary and rationalizing intervention of outside 
forces. By this means the international discourse of failed 
states legitimises perpetual international supervision. 
While the primary frame of reference for Hughes and Pupavac in 
consideration of the above is the problematic ‘professionalizing’ of emotional 
distress in the shape of psychosocial intervention of teams of trauma 
specialists in Cambodia and former Yugoslavia that ‘may unintentionally 
weaken communal responses’ (Pupavac, 2004a) and de-emphasise 
resilience, Pupavac takes on a host of other issues as she tilts at ‘therapeutic 
governance’. There is a muddied elision of psychological and (sociological) 
collective trauma that fails to distinguish between the two expressions of 
individual and societal responses. She additionally implies that trauma 
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intervention in post-conflict states may necessarily lead to other colonialist-
style forms of militarist intervention, such as the U.S. reaction to the 11 
September 2001 attacks. There is some merit to her portrayal that under 
certain circumstances Western psychosocial intervention approaches 
represent a well-meaning form of paternalistic treatment of victims of war and 
political violence, but it is rather a leap to suggest that one is the logical 
corollary of the other: military intervention does not necessarily follow on from 
the compassionate therapeutic response.  
 
Pupavac rightly appreciates the complex interplay ‘between the state, society 
and international or transnational forces’ in conflict yet fails to engage with 
the concept that collective expression of emotions also entails political 
implications, namely in cases of entire societies whose dominant discourse is 
one of overwhelming violence due to mediated perceptions of existential 
threat. She also suggests that states are the ultimate and preferential 
expression of citizens’ political and social collectivity, and that they (whether 
stable or ‘failed’) have the best interests of their citizens at heart. (Yet neither 
are necessarily the case; it is the considerations of just such notions that lie 
at the core of the contested ‘R2P’ doctrine.) Additionally, Pupavac’s 
allegations that the ‘international trauma model treats trauma as a cause of 
future wars’ is somewhat of an oversimplification. One thing does not 
necessarily lead to another, whereby ‘individual emotions … become a 
legitimate target of external intervention’ (Pupavac, 2004b, p. 156). Taking 
into account a further complex factor (such as engaging with a more 
collective expression of trauma) may expand our comprehension of modes of 
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transformation of intractable conflicts and does not invalidate other 
contributory factors, nor suggest total causality. 
 
In particular Pupavac ascribes to the Clausewitizian conception of war as a 
continuation of politics by other means. This is perhaps the most problematic 
element of Pupavac’s seductive deconstruction of the therapeutic paradigm: 
the claim that war is a ‘rational’ response to political violence or oppression. 
This belief in particular is the one that is fundamentally at odds with any form 
of pacific progress. She does concede, nonetheless, that it is largely the 
political operationalization of trauma that is at issue, for ‘trauma is invoked to 
authenticate suffering, and validate political, social and moral claims’ 
(Pupavac 2004b, p. 151). 
 
 6.4.2 Transforming remembrance 
As I have previously discussed, the central traumatic concept itself remains 
contested and is continuously evolving. However, this does not devalue the 
concept, but rather expands the multidimensionality and contextualisation by 
which a conflict may be comprehended—particularly a political conflict with 
two very different narrative memories. As Michael Rothberg observes, 
‘understanding political conflict entails understanding the interlacing of 
memories in the force field of public space’ (Rothberg 2009, p. 314). Hence 
the exogenous centrality of the trauma of the Jewish Holocaust for 
Palestinians; its eternal remembrance serves as a particular foundational 
trope in Israeli society and politics, and indirectly has great impact on 
Palestinian lives. The fatal combination of the Shoah, together with the 
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ideologies of various streams of Zionism, arising also from the cumulative 
trauma of centuries of persecution in Europe, combine to produce an 
alternate traumatic suffering predicated on the loss of the Palestinian 
homeland. From this reading of this conflict, it is trauma that drives the 
conflict’s conduct and persistence. 
The majority of analyses of this historic conflict are solutions-oriented, 
focusing on proposals for its resolution that are based on detailed 
examinations of proposed divisions of contested resources. However, if 
trauma can be conceived of as a wound to the memory, in which the 
comprehension of the past is damaged, inducing sufferers to revisit the 
pathological loop of distress, then above all, unacknowledged pain and 
fractured memories are at the root of the conflict, creating further mutually 
reactive episodes, from which very little is learned. ‘Remembering may serve 
good ends and bad ones,’ writes Tzvetan Todorov, continuing, ‘It may be 
used to further self-interest just as it may be used for the good of others. 
Memories do not always bear fruit and may even lead us astray. If we treat 
the past as holy, we exclude it from the world of meaning and prevent it 
teaching lessons that might apply to other times and places, to other agents 
of history’ (Todorov, 2003, p. 311).  
Memory is at the root of our identity, but what and how we remember is very 
much the product of societal mediation. As Anthony Smith was wont to say, 
‘no memory, no identity; no identity, no nation’ (Smith, 1996, p. 383). The 
memories of the group are especially resonant in the Israeli-Palestinian case, 
in particular as neither party recognizes the validity of the other’s memory. In 
such a case, ‘the peaceful or bellicose end to crises often depends on the 
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presence or absence of a conciliatory policy of recognition. Indeed, this 
policy takes into account others’ security fears, but it also attempts to 
preserve the face of the other and to take its symbolic interests into 
consideration,’ argues Lindemann, rightly concluding that ‘the emotional 
dynamics of recognition should not be underestimated, especially for the 
legitimacy of political decision makers with domestic opinion. (Lindemann 
2011, pp. 68-70). 
Since all substantial peace agreements (but not necessarily peace itself) are 
concluded at Track 1 level, creating an attractive framework for recognition at 
this level in which Israeli and Palestinian mutual acceptance of narratives can 
take place is critical to reducing existential de-legitimisation of peacebuilding; 
it is more effective as a first step rather than reverting―in the first 
instance―to familiar formulae such as transitional justice commissions or 
extra-territorial international judicial proceedings (whose authority, like the 
ICC, Israel may choose not to recognize). Israelis live in a permanent state of 
exception and emergency at the price of Palestinian lives, and attempts at 
judgment by the international community, although survivable (as Thrall 
suggests above) would surely be perceived as threatening; I concur with 
Lindemann’s assessment that ‘a politics of recognition can maintain peace by 
alleviating others’ security and identity fears through the de-legitimization of 
the option of war. Military threats and identity offenses are associated,’ 
(Lindemann, 2011, p. 72). This is illustrated not only by Israel’s refusal to 
recognize the ICC and to ratify many Optional Protocols in human rights 
conventions; panic at the widening economic and moral impact of the BDS 
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campaign has resulted in a variety of non-state and state pushback 
strategies. As Lindemann observes: 
Materially dominant actors [such as Israel] do not inevitably and 
exclusively possess symbolic power. In an asymmetrical social 
conflict, the weaker party can compensate for its material 
inferiority through better moral standing. ... In international 
relations, there are strategies of victimization attempting to 
make the stronger actor lose face if it does not comply with the 
will of the weaker actor ... state leaders are not inevitably eager 
to maintain peace’ but a ‘politics of recognition can ‘‘force’’ 
peace as it increases the moral costs of armed aggression for 
[the] attacking state. (Lindemann, 2011, pp. 70-84). 
Beyond moral re-legitimization, an accepted recognition framework is also 
likely to have more overarching and long-term impact than the ‘alternative’ 
work of numerous well-intentioned individual dialogue, encounter and 
reconciliation groups that are unsupported officially, and subject to powerful 
opposition from anti-normalization activists. Regrettably, in order for civil 
society capacity building for peace to be truly effective, official support is 
necessary. Thus far, a sincere proposition for memory work and recognition 
has not been attempted at Track 1 level; it is surmised that perhaps the costs 
of non-recognition are simply not yet high enough, but as BDS activity and 
ICC work become still more prominent, the Israeli government may reach a 
point where it will conclude that there are greater benefits in opting for such a 
course. It may also recall the strategic benefits of the politics of recognition, 
which resulted in two major ‘cold’ peace treaties beneficial to Israel (with 
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Egypt and Jordan); but as Thrall (2017b) has indicated, it will always carefully 
count the costs before embarking on such measures. 
The formal management of memory work needs to be compelling and 
suprapolitical, in order to avoid susceptibility to subsequent manipulation. 
When such conditions are not met, efforts are likely to peter out; for example, 
social and political psychologists Herbert Kelman and Nadim Rouhana’s 
workshops designed around the Oslo process (as discussed earlier). Yet 
despite the modest co-acknowledgement of identities and humanities and the 
acceptance of a two-state solution, progress was not maintained, and the 
rest, as we say, is history. 
How would the societies of Palestine and Israel mainstream the acceptance 
of mutual recognition? Certainly recognition would also need to be 
enforceable by law in order for it to be reflected in media representation and 
centered in political discourse, in addition to bottom-up ideological 
mainstreaming through education for peace. Some 14 European countries 
have passed legislation regarding Holocaust denial or have criminalized 
genocide denial in the case of critical 20th century traumas, such as the 
Armenian and Bosnian Genocides; while such laws remain controversial, 
legislation of positive import requiring mutual commitment to recognition of 
each other’s humanity and a shared history of trauma cannot be argued to 
constitute an infringement of freedom of speech. Moreover, legislating in 
order to reduce international opprobrium can bring a sufficient moral, 
economic and political payoff, as Lindemann (2011) notes. Discussing the 
case of the U.S. rapprochement with Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya, he reminds us 
that ‘All in all, joining the community of nations was the primary goal of 
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Libyan diplomacy. American officials had identified this need for recognition. 
The politics of recognition is not expensive but its benefits can be huge,’ 
(Lindemann, 2011, p. 84). Of course, here one must disregard the violent 
consequences of the Arab Spring in Libya—something that none of the 
parties, nor the author, could have foreseen. 
Despite the emphasis on the need for official recognition and positive 
legislation, such a process cannot only be top-down; education for peace is 
critical to underwriting national curricula for coming generations, and in 
particular, history textbooks that form an ongoing source of contestation. An 
updated and mandatory-use version of the joint dynamic to create dual 
narrative history textbooks for Israeli and Palestinian schools, such as 
Adwan, Bar-On and Naveh’s Side by Side: Parallel histories of Israel-
Palestine (2012) which was facilitated by PRIME, the Peace Research 
Institute in the Middle East, would be critical to this venture. 
An open discourse that ‘speaks truth to power’ is critical to paving the way 
towards memory work, in order to dismantle trauma-based national 
myths―particularly to counteract the rhetoric of national leaders whose 
flagrant abuse of commemorative practices exacerbates chronic conflict. 
From this, it is possible that other ameliorations will ensue. Concretely, Burg 
(2008) recommends ‘three areas that deserve careful attention’ in Israel’s 
‘public life and jurisdiction’: its Law of Return (‘enacted as a mirror image of 
Nazi Germany’s Nuremberg Laws’), its Law of Punishment of the Nazis and 
their Collaborators, and its relationship with Germany (Burg 2008, Loc. 
3964]. Such recommendations constitute a mere beginning in a judicial 
overhaul that needs to roll back many discriminatory and abusive practices of 
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governance, including emergency laws inherited from the period of the British 
Mandate and the Ottoman era that facilitate illegal imprisonment, use of 
torture and a basic racialized withholding of equal access to resources. 
Finally, as Rothberg notes, a zero-sum conflict is also often a zero-sum 
competition of memories, primarily traumatic ones, as ‘conflicts of memory 
converge with contests over territory’ (Rothberg 2009, p. 309). While there 
are no facile answers, an inclusive recontextualisation of memories ‘can 
contribute especially to rethinking questions of recognition and 
representation ... crucial for establishing and contesting what form justice will 
take, who gets to count as a subject of justice, and how or under what 
jurisdiction justice will be adjudicated’ (Rothberg 2009, p. 309). Out of such a 
thicket, sustainable peacebuilding might tentatively proceed.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
This study is particularly wide-ranging in scope as it has endeavoured to offer 
a contribution to the understanding of the emergence of the concept of 
experiential collectivities and, consequently, collective trauma, and apply the 
validity of the latter to an ongoing conflict, an approach that is especially 
necessary when the conflict is longstanding, intensely biased and prone to 
outbreaks of extreme violence.  
There are various studies of the Israel-Palestine conflict that focus on either 
specific aspects of the parties’ collective trauma as a given and contributory 
factor (Thomas, 2015) or transgenerational Palestinian psychological trauma 
emanating from the Nakba (Peddle, 2015, a limited case study of a select 
population) or Israeli collective memory in relation to the conflict (Nets-
Zehngut, 2016; Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal, 2018; the latter examines popular 
memory through a large-scale questionnaire) but so far none that attempt to 
connect all of these (trauma as a wound to the memory, and memory as a 
generative force for further trauma, and the mutually reactive effects of both 
factors on conflict) and place the inquiry into a generalizable framework 
supported by case studies.  
Tracing the construction of the notion of trauma, from its nineteenth century 
European roots in the new discipline of psychology, which attempted 
treatment of individuals suffering from psychological stress, I have plotted the 
widening of the understanding of traumatic stress as it manifested itself in 
contemporary Western society. The conception of what has constituted a 
traumatic event originated largely from the attempts to diagnose and care for  
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those suffering from psychological damage as a result of the two World Wars 
of the past century. While, as Marianna Torgovnick noted, ‘soldiers and 
civilians have always died in war’ (Torgovnick, 2005, p. xi) the new 
technologies of these two wars (from the First World War on) resulted an 
exceptionally brutal and experience of combat with devastating and 
widespread loss of life: 
The world saw death in new and shocking forms: speeded up, 
multiplied, and dealt by human beings with deliberate and 
stunning technological speed, often under government 
auspices, and sometimes burning or vaporizing bodies on 
religious, ethnic, or racial grounds. (Torgovnick 2005, p. xi)  
For Torgovnick, this produced what she calls ‘ the war complex’, but for 
philosopher and psychoanalyst Robert D. Stolorow, it has segued into part 
and parcel of our fearful existence, lived in an ‘age of trauma’ whereby the 
‘tranquilizing illusions of our everyday world seem in our time to be 
threatened with collapse from all sides—by global diminution of natural 
resources, by global warming, by global nuclear proliferation, and by global 
terrorism’ (Stolorow, 2009, p. 207). Elsewhere Stolorow describes these 
perpetual sensations of menace or ontological insecurity as ‘forms of 
collective trauma’ that ‘threaten[s] to obliterate the basic framework with 
which we as members of our particular society have made sense out of our 
existence and derived a sense of security’ (Stolorow, 2013).  
Thus it can be seen that there is a clear connection between collective 
trauma and the degeneration of other elements that go to make up peaceful,  
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healthy lives and constitute human security. During the World Wars, the 
focus was on individual rather than collective suffering, although there was 
indeed immense collective suffering. It was not until Kai Erikson’s 1972 
portrayal of the destruction of an Appalachian community as the result of a 
human-engineered disaster that we can really consider the emergence of the 
notion of the cultural trauma of a whole society (Erikson, 1972). He was the 
first to engage with social breakdown in the wake of mass trauma, and I have 
applied his criteria for the diagnosis of collective trauma to the Palestinian 
and Israeli situations. 
In common with Erikson and Stolorow, Jenny Edkins observes that trauma 
frequently involves ‘a betrayal of our expectations of – and trust in – the 
family or community in which we live. And it brings to the surface existential 
questions which at least in the modern world we prefer to keep submerged’ 
(Edkins, 2002, p. 245). This crosses beyond an expression of millennial 
angst or personal psychological unease into overarching political concerns; it 
is our government and the state that is tasked with keeping us safe and has 
the responsibility to protect. Consequently in recent years, as I have already 
noted in the pages of this project, interest has arisen among IR scholars in 
the widening arc of trauma and comprehending how traumatic events are 
‘experienced, felt, perceived, memorialized and forgotten, as well as how 
they influence – and are influenced by – norms, identities and interests in 
world politics’ (Resende and Budryte, 2014, p. 1). Questions arising from the 
intersection of perspectives on human security, collective trauma and 
memory studies have begun to preoccupy scholars, producing ‘thought-
provoking insights about practices of memorialization and remembrance in  
 
 
298 
 
IR’ (Resende and Burdryte, 2014, p. 1). In connection with this, I have 
highlighted Andreas Huyssen’s observation on ‘the emergence of memory as 
a key concern in Western societies’ (Huyssen, 2000, p.  21). The 
researcher’s own project, too, locates itself at the intersection of politics, 
cultural/collective trauma and memory, and specifically analyzes how official 
collective memory practices, such as days and sites of memory, may both 
reflect and reinvoke collective trauma, impacting on an ongoing conflict, 
namely the Palestine-Israel conflict.  
While we have all internalized Santayana’s injunction on the necessity of 
remembrance of the traumatic past in order not to repeat it, memorialisation 
is a present and active process, as memory (generally official and cultural 
memory, which in turn influence popular memory)1 is ‘reconstructed on the 
basis of the present’ (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 40) or, in other words, 
‘retrospectively produces a past while claiming merely to invoke it’ (Zehfuss, 
2007, p. xiii) and thus is clearly open to extensive and unhealthy political 
manipulation that can significantly exacerbate an intractable conflict. Despite 
memory’s claim to represent perpetuity, one of its ‘few genuinely constant 
attributes … is that it is likely to undergo change’ (Wertsch, 2002, p. 46) as it 
provides a dressing-up chest from which items can be plucked to suit and be 
adapted to the wearer’s contemporary desires, whether the ‘wearer’ is a 
group or a political authority. It ‘functions to provide a usable past for the 
creation of coherent individual and group identities’ (Wertsch, 2002, p. 31) 
and this may not necessarily have a pacific or healthy effect.  
Clearly consideration of traumatic events presents an emerging 
interdisciplinary turn, whose deliberations on such intersected areas will  
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continue to expand in coming years, and which presents a fertile field for 
further investigation. Experts and scholars will doubtless also continue to 
contend over the definition of trauma itself, and what constitutes a traumatic 
stressor, both in the psychological sense (with further refinements and 
editions of the DSM) and in the collective, sociological sense for many 
decades to come, certainly beyond the life of this project; and to question the 
construction of theories and explanations, as Jeffrey Alexander, Didier 
Fassin, Richard Rechtman and others have done (including myself). What 
has been agreed upon so far by the majority of scholars across disciplines is 
that the traumatic event is one that is intense, inassimilable and beyond the 
human coping capacity, both at the individual psychological and at the 
collective sociological level; it cannot ‘slot into the framework of normal social 
reality, which is why there is no language for it or any of the other tools on 
which one would normally rely to make sense of the world’ (Resende and 
Burdryte, 2014, p. 2), thus we struggle to offer a definitive interpretation, to 
‘process’ it satisfactorily, at least for now. This is at once the limitation of the 
present project, and a topic for further investigation. To paraphrase Adorno, it 
constitutes a ‘barbaric’ paradox to attempt to render into words (let alone 
poetry) a supremely traumatic mass experience (such as Auschwitz, to which 
he referred). Perhaps it can only ever be expressed as series of 
contradictions in which ‘trauma is felt, but not understood; it is memorized 
and recalled, but not necessarily experienced; it defies language, but insists 
on being communicated; it refuses to be incorporated into normality, but goes 
on perpetuating itself in memory; it is triggered at a specific moment in time, 
but alters the linearity; it must be forgotten, but is always being recalled and 
relived’ (Resende and Burdryte, 2014, p. 2). 
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What does it mean when a longstanding trauma (or collection of traumas) 
caused by political violence is perpetually relived and reiterated, even when 
some of its participants are only the heirs to the original participants in that 
trauma? Gatekeepers to the trauma will on the survival of the traumatic 
memory, like an open wound; for bystanders, it is history’s wound and should 
be resolved. There is only so much invocation of past collective suffering that 
can be tolerated, particularly if present behavior is not deemed acceptable to 
the international community. I am both the daughter of a gatekeeper—in a 
certain sense—and a bystander, studying events from the luxury of a not-
entirely-detached distance; this too is my limitation (and privilege). I 
experience frustration, disquiet, foreboding and perplexity. How can the 
instrumentalisation of memory be avoided, in the case of political violence? 
‘Memory breathes revenge as often as it breathes reconciliation,’ comments 
Avishai Margalit (2002, p.  5). It is tempting to consider the value of 
forgetfulness. Indeed, some societies (such as Japan, where the researcher 
temporarily resides) have functioned relatively well by employing cultural 
amnesia—a reverse form of memory instrumentalisation—even if the 
diplomatic repercussions are profound.  
Yet we are supposed to strive for perfect memory, as a form of perfect 
consciousness; this represents an ideal, if somewhat challenging, goal. The 
injunction not to forget is based on our notion of non-repetition; and most of 
all, honouring the memory of victims (‘may her/his memory be a blessing’, 
zichronah livracha/ zichronoh livracha, in Hebrew). Moreover, by 
acknowledging the past, truth-telling and reconciliation processes may take 
place (Zehfuss, 2007, p.  33; she recalls the Kabbalistic proverb attributed to  
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the Baal Shem Tov, ‘Wanting to forget prolongs the exile, and the secret of 
redemption is remembering’ cited by Federal President Richard von 
Weizsäcker in his address at the 40th anniversary of the conclusion of World 
War II, and taken up by German discourse thereafter). 
Thus far forms of remembrance have brought little relief to allaying collective 
trauma in the researcher’s core study, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and 
Israel’s long occupation of Palestinian territories continues without any sign 
of resolution, while both societies remain critically and chronically divided, 
without consensus on core issues or strategies. Even attempts to tell a more 
complete history of the seminal period of 1948 have been stalled and 
censored (Gratien and Hazkani, 2014) although Nets-Zehngut (2016) notes 
that there has been a greater openness towards a critical inquisition of the 
past in Israeli society, and, to a far lesser degree, in Palestinian society. Yet 
the past does not necessarily hold all the keys to this conflict, or any other; 
and memory, as a form of knowledge, is ‘from the past’ as Avishai Margalit 
observes, but it is ‘not necessarily knowledge about the past’ (Margalit, 2003, 
p. 14). Meanwhile, it could be said that through employing claims from 
subjective histories, any prospect of peace is now as far away as it has ever 
been. This sobering fact is an indicator of the urgent need to examine more 
closely what is remembered, and how; this is what I have endeavoured to do 
in Chapters Four and Five. It is a modest beginning; much more work 
remains to be done in-field (in situ) than is possible for the itinerant and 
precariously-funded researcher. As Zehfuss notes, ‘How we should 
remember is a significant ethno-political question’ and what we recall faces 
 
 
302 
 
the challenge of acknowledgment and inclusivity, of taking into account a 
multitude of  
 ‘different experiences and perspectives on these events’ (Zehfuss, 2007, p. 
74). Clearly much more remains to be considered with regard to these 
questions if the parties to the conflict are ever to face each other in honesty, 
tabling damaging national myths and addictions to mutual delegitimisation 
and victimhood for the purposes of dialogue.  
Finally, as the dominant power in the asymmetrical conflict, the greatest onus 
lies with the Israeli state. Treading water may seem a tempting method for 
managing conflicts, but it is neither an ethical nor reliable method, as the 
current Gaza crisis indicates. Ultimately, exhaustion sets in, and with fatal 
effects. 
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Notes for Chapter One 
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 See, for example, the list of reports mentioned on the World Health Organization’s ‘Mental 
health and psychosocial support in emergencies’ index page, 
<http://www.who.int/mental_health/resources/emergencies/en/index.html>; also The World 
Health Report 2001: New Understanding, New Hope at  
<http://www.who.int/whr/2001/en/whr01_en.pdf>; the World Health Organization’s The World 
Health Report 2002: World Report on Violence and Health at 
<http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/introduction.pdf>; 
the World Health Organization’s Mental and Social Aspects of Health of Populations 
Exposed to Extreme Stressors. (2003) at 
<http://www.who.int/mental_health/emergencies/MSDMER03_01/en/>; the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee’s 2007 IASC Guidelines for Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in 
Emergency Settings at 
<http://www.who.int/mental_health/emergencies/9781424334445/en/index.html>; the World 
Health Organization’s 2010 report, Mental health and development: targeting people with 
mental health conditions as a vulnerable group at 
<http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/mhtargeting/en/index.html>; also in 2010, the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee’s Reference Group for Mental Health and Psychosocial 
Support in Emergency Settings report, Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in 
Humanitarian Emergencies: What Should Humanitarian Health Actors Know? at  
<http://www.who.int/mental_health/publications/what_should_humanitarian_health_actors_k
now/en/index.html>; the World Health Organization, War Trauma Foundation and World 
Vision International report of 2011, Psychological first aid: Guide for field workers at 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/publications/guide_field_workers/en/index.html ; the World 
Health Organization and UNHCR 2012 publication Assessing mental health and 
psychosocial needs and resources: Toolkit for humanitarian settings at 
<http://www.who.int/mental_health/resources/toolkit_mh_emergencies/en/index.html>; the 
World Health Organization’s Mental health action plan 2013 – 2020 at 
<http://www.who.int/mental_health/publications/action_plan/en/index.html> (World Health 
Organization, 2013c) ; also in 2013 by the WHO, Investing in mental health: Evidence for 
action at 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/publications/financing/investing_in_mh_2013/en/index.html 
(World Health Organization, 2013b)and Building Back Better: Sustainable mental health care 
after emergencies at 
<http://www.who.int/mental_health/emergencies/building_back_better/en/index.html>. 
(World Health Organization, 2013a). 
2
 For extensive definitions of longstanding conflicts that resist resolution, see Peter T. 
Coleman’s ‘Intractable Conflict’, Chapter 30 in Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman, The 
Handbook of Conflict Resolution (2006, San Francisco: Jossey Bass).. 
3
 Psychologist Elizabeth Loftus controversially researches the issue of false memories and 
testimony. 
4
 German scientist Emil Kraepelin (Neustrelitz, 15 February 1856 – 7 October 1926, 
Munich), considered to be an influential leader in the new fields of scientific psychiatry, 
psychopharmacology and psychiatric genetics.  
5
 Despite the reservations of José Merquior and others, it is impossible not to acknowledge 
the inevitable domination of theoretical approaches to the subject since the 1961 
publication of Michel Foucault’s controversial Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge 
classique (the title and the extent of the book would undergo various changes in various 
editions, emerging firstly in 1964 in an abridged English translation as Madness and 
Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason in English and later in 2006 as 
History of Madness).  
6
 Bethlem Royal Hospital - South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust 
<http://www.slam.nhs.uk/our-services/hospital-care/bethlem-royal-hospital>.  
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7
 From the Greek for womb, hystera - ὑστέρα. 
8
 Dell (2009, p.713) notes that ‘The field of dissociation did not begin with trauma. It began 
with hypnosis. From the time of Mesmer (circa 1778) until the turn of the century in 1900, 
Western Europe experienced recurring waves of fascination with animal magnetism or 
hypnosis. Each wave of fascination was, in turn, undercut by periods during which hypnosis 
was widely discredited. The fact that each discrediting was supplanted by yet another surge 
of interest testifies to the inherently fascinating nature of hypnotic phenomena’.  
9
 ‘Survivors’, by Siegfried Sassoon, can also be viewed in the First World War Digital Poetry 
Archive, University of Oxford, <http://tinyurl.com/mc3lex4> ‘This poem was written while 
Sassoon was a patient at Craiglockhart War Hospital in October 1917. Originally published 
in 'Counter-Attack and Other Poems' (1918).’ 
10
 Horace, Odes III.2.3 
11
 Danieli, however, remarks that the implementation of the reparation law was ‘traumatic in 
itself’ and that psychiatrists who examined survivors were only required speak German, 
rather than Polish or Yiddish; and that experts and courts displayed contempt and hostility 
for the victims (Danieli, 2009). 
12
 Fassin and Rechtman (2009, p.72) disagree, claiming that ‘two important psychiatrists’ 
Robert Lifton and Mardi Horowitz, supported the ‘new clinical entity’ of ‘survivor syndrome’, 
which ‘replaced traumatic neurosis as a description of the symptomology of civilian victims’.  
13
 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQbg1HcYEBs>  
14
 Shephard (2002, p.342) claims that the recent Korean War had significantly prepared 
military psychiatrists for battle readiness in the Vietnam War. ‘There was military psychiatry 
from the start, not from the point where things began to go wrong; it was different because 
this time the military saw the need for psychiatrists and psychiatrists understood their 
function in the military, so there didn’t have to be all that manoeuvring and neglect before the 
programme came into effect’. 
15
 According to the World Health Organization, the International Classification of Diseases 
11th Revision is due by 2018 (see <http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/revision/en/>) 
16
 According to Tartakovsky (2011), ‘the term reactions originated from Adolf Meyer, who 
had a “psychobiological view that mental disorders represented reactions of the personality 
to psychological, social and biological factors” (from the DSM-IV-TR)’. 
17 James Sanders comments, ‘Many users of the DSM-III or DSM-IV may be surprised to 
know that many of the diagnostic criteria are not based on empirical research but on expert 
consensus and, in some cases, political appeasement’ (Sanders, 2011, p. 394). 
18 ‘Reviews of the history of the DSM and mental disorders can be subject to such 
misapprehensions. For example, the inclusion of homosexuality as a disorder … was 
consistent with general attitudes toward homosexuality at the time. It was included as a 
supplementary term for sexual deviation in DSM-I (1952) and as a specified type of sexual 
deviation in DSM-II (1968), which was later changed to sexual orientation disturbance in the 
same manual in 1973 under pressures from activists in the Gay Liberation movement … 
Ego-dystonic homosexuality, included in DSM-III (1980) but removed in DSM-III-R (1987), 
does not refer to homosexuality as a disorder per se but that homosexuality is for the 
individual unwanted and a source of distress. Social values regarding homosexuality 
changed over time, and the DSM evolved with those changes. Unfortunately, literature 
reviewing the historical inclusion of homosexuality in the DSMs has been “whiggish,” 
criticizing DSM classifications from decades ago’ (Sanders, 2011, p.395). 
19 ‘Unfortunately, up to now, the standard glossaries, such as the first or second edition of 
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual have not 
contained explicit criteria for psychiatric diagnoses. Therefore, the clinician or research 
investigator has been forced to select the diagnostic category in the glossary that most 
closely resembled the characteristics of the patient being diagnosed. In practice, this has 
meant that, by and large, the diagnostician used his own concept of the disorder even 
though a publication referring to those diagnoses  might state that the diagnoses were 
made “according to the DSM-II criteria.” The inadequacies of the standard glossaries have 
led research investigators to develop their own explicit criteria and classification schemes’ 
(Spitzer, Endicott and Robins, 1978, p. 773). 
20
 For a discussion of the Feighner criteria, see Kendler, Muñoz and Murphy, 2009: ‘In 1967, 
at the urging of the then-resident John Feighner, a discussion group led by Eli Robins and 
including Sam Guze, George Winokur, Robert Woodruff, and Rod Muñoz began meeting 
with the initial goal of writing a review of prior key contributions to psychiatric diagnosis. In 
 
 
433 
 
                                                                                                                           
their meetings over the next year, the task soon shifted to the development of a set of new 
diagnostic criteria. For three diagnoses, major depression, antisocial personality disorder, 
and alcoholism, the authors could identify the original criteria from which this group worked 
and the rationale for many of the changes they introduced. Published in 1972, the Feighner 
criteria were soon widely cited and used in research, and they formed the basis for the 
development of the Research Diagnostic Criteria, which in turn were central to the 
development of DSM-III. The team that developed the Feighner criteria made three key 
contributions to psychiatry: the systematic use of operationalized diagnostic criteria; the 
reintroduction of an emphasis on illness course and outcome; and an emphasis on the need, 
whenever possible, to base diagnostic criteria on empirical evidence’(Kendler, Muñoz and 
Murphy, 2009, p.134).  
21
 Put differently, from a psychoanalytical perspective, ‘These manuals conceived of 
symptoms as reflections of broad underlying dynamic conditions or as reactions to difficult 
life problems. Dynamic explanations posited that symptoms were symbolic manifestations 
that only became meaningful through exploring the personal history of each individual. The 
focus of analytic explanations and treatment, therefore, was the total personality and life 
experiences of the person that provided the context for the interpretation of symptoms 
(Horwitz, 2002). The DSM-I and DSM-II made little effort to provide elaborate classification 
schemes, because overt symptoms did not reveal disease entities but disguised underlying 
conflicts that could not be expressed directly’ (Mayes and Horwitz, 2005, pp. 249-250). 
22 According to Sanders, ‘Eli Robins, Samuel Guze, and George Winokur, who sought to 
return psychiatry to its medical roots, were called the neo-Kraepelinians’ (Sanders, 2011, 
p.398) in addition to John Feighner and his colleagues. 
23 ‘Each individual is evaluated on each of these axes: 
Axis I Clinical Syndromes 
Conditions Not Attributable to a Mental Disorder That Are a Focus of Attention or Treatment 
Additional Codes 
Axis II Personality Disorders 
Specific Developmental Disorders 
Axis III Physical Disorders and Conditions 
Axes IV and V are available for use in special clinical and research settings and provide 
information supplementing the official DSM-III diagnoses (Axes I, II, and III) that may be 
useful for planning treatment and predicting outcome: 
Axis IV Severity of Psychosocial Stressors 
Axis V Highest Level of Adaptive Functioning Past Year’ (APA 1980, p. 23) 
24
 For a comparison of the ICD-10 PTSD diagnosis with the DSM-IV criteria, see U.S. 
Department of Veteran Affairs (2016) 
<http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/overview/comparison-icd-dsm-iv.asp> 
25 ‘In 2008, Congress passed the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity 
and Addiction Equity Act taking a great step forward in the decade-plus fight to end 
insurance discrimination against those seeking treatment for mental health and substance 
use disorders. This law requires health insurance to cover both mental and physical health 
equally. Under this law, insurance companies can no longer arbitrarily limit the number of 
hospital days or outpatient treatment sessions, or assign higher co-payments or deductibles 
for those in need of psychological services. 
The 2008 act closes several of the loopholes left by the 1996 Mental Health Parity 
Act and extends equal coverage to all aspects of health insurance plans, including day and 
visit limits, dollar limits, coinsurance, co-payments, deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums. 
It preserves existing state parity and consumer protection laws while extending protection of 
mental health services to 82 million Americans not protected by state laws. The bill also 
ensures mental health coverage for both in network and out-of-network services. 
Research shows that physical health is directly connected to mental health and 
millions of Americans know that suffering from a mental health disorder can be as frightening 
and debilitating as any major physical health disorder. Passage of this law will lead the 
health care system in the United States to start treating the whole person, both mind and 
body’. (American Psychiatric Association, 2018a)  
26
 An example of typical sour grapes is to be found on the APA’s DSM: History of the Manual 
webpage, <http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm/dsm-history-of-the-manual>. According to 
the APA (American Psychiatric Association, 2018b), there was a ‘lack of widespread 
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acceptance of the mental disorder taxonomy contained in ICD-6 and [its successor] ICD-7’ 
(published in 1955) thus prompting a further review leading to ICD-8 (1965).’  
27 It is beyond the scope of this account to enter into a discussion of traumatic stress 
screening instruments; there are simply too many and they are variously culture- and 
context-dependent (whether for research, or geared toward assessment for medical or other 
forms of compensation). For example, according to the U.S. Veterans Association, the 
‘Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale, or CAPS, is the “gold standard” for PTSD assessment’ 
and diagnosis for both military veteran and civilian trauma survivors’ 
(https://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/adult-int/caps.asp ). According to 
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/DSM_5_Validated_Measures.asp other 
measures include the Primary Care PTSD Screen (PC-PTSD) and the 17-item self-report 
PTSD Checklist (PCL); while 
<http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/all_measures.asp> lists more than 70 
other assessment measures; there are many more to be found in other clinical literature.  
28 Despite flip-flopping paradigmatically, Freud had earlier recognized the power of certain 
events such as abuse, war and railway accidents to produce traumatic stress, and his 
descriptions of symptoms eerily prefigured the descriptions of post-traumatic stress. ‘A 
fixation to the traumatic accident lives at their root. These patients regularly repeat the 
traumatic situation,’ wrote Freud in in The Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 
published in May 1917, adding, ‘The attack corresponds to a complete transplanting of the 
patient into the traumatic situation. It is as though these patients had not yet finished with the 
traumatic situation, as though they were still faced by it as an immediate task which has not 
been dealt with’ (1966, pp.274-275, cited in Wilson, 1994, p.684). 
29 ‘The Dissociative Disorders are the subject of considerable contemporary clinical and 
research interest, but their study is a relatively new field of inquiry. The committee attempted 
to incorporate the most reliable and valid insights of the newer clinical and research findings 
and the most cogent feedback from a wide variety of sources. It is anticipated that the DSM-
III-R criteria and text will require additional revision as psychiatry further explores this group 
of conditions’ wrote Kluft, Steinberg and Spitzer (1988, p.45). 
30
 ‘an event that is outside the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly 
distressing to almost anyone’ (APA, 1987, p.250); for Allan Young (1995) the ‘distress’ is as 
much of an issue as the ‘event’; is it fear, shame, perpetrators’ guilt, survivors’ guilt? The 
description implicitly conflates these issues, and contributes to the moral morass 
surrounding trauma discussions. 
31
 The revised diagnostic criteria ‘include a history of exposure to a traumatic event meeting 
two criteria and symptoms from each of the three symptom clusters: intrusive recollections, 
avoidant/numbing symptoms, and hyper-arousal symptoms. A fifth criteria concerns duration 
of symptoms and sixth assesses functioning’, according to 
<https://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/PTSD-overview/ptsd-overview.asp> 
32
 For a graphic description of the process, see Allen Frances’ articles in Psychiatric Times 
(Frances, A., 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d).  
33
 According to the APA’s PTSD Fact Sheet, downloadable from 
<https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-fact-
sheets> (American Psychiatric Association, 2018c) 
34
 ‘Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders’ include: Reactive Attachment Disorder; 
Disinhibited Social Engagement Disorder; Posttraumatic Stress Disorder; Acute Stress 
Disorder; Adjustment Disorders; Other Specified Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorder; 
Unspecified Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorder. 
35
 See again, the APA’s PTSD Fact Sheet at 
<https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-fact-
sheets> 
36
 According to the APA’s PTSD Fact Sheet, at 
<https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-fact-
sheets> 
37
 DSM-5, pp. 271-272. 
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Notes for Chapter Two 
1 Indeed, Jeffrey Alexander (2004a) argues, regarding the evolution of the psychological 
emergence of trauma, which he terms ‘lay trauma theory’ that it is , ‘“naturalistic,” either in 
the naively moral or the naively psychological sense’ because it ‘fails to see that there is an 
interpretive grid through which all ‘facts’ about trauma are mediated, emotionally, cognitively, 
and morally’. Unobservable to those who buy into these theories, the ‘interpretive grid … has 
a supra-individual, cultural status; it is symbolically structured and sociologically determined’. 
The undetectable ‘interpretive grid’ is far from positivist science, for it is we who carry out the 
interpretation or diagnosis, since a trauma cannot independently ‘interpret itself’. We choose 
to overlook or are unaware of the ‘the social, structural, or individual elements of the trauma 
process.’ (p. 201). 
2 Kerwin Lee Klein (2000, p. 135) warns against ‘indulging in mystical transpositions of 
individual psychological phenomena onto imaginary collectivities’. 
3 Writing in 1999, Jeffrey Olick describes the wide-ranging impact and acceptance of the 
emergent new field: ‘Collective memory, one might plausibly argue, often plays an important 
role in politics and society. Such claims are by now commonplace in scholarly as well as 
political discourses: images of the Vietnam war limit support for American military activities; 
memories of the Nazi period constrain German foreign and domestic policy; recollections of 
dictatorship shape the activities of transitional and post-transition regimes from Eastern 
Europe to Latin America; and Watergate has become the perennial reference point for all 
subsequent scandals in Washington, to name just a few possible such hypotheses. Indeed, 
the term collective memory has become a powerful symbol of the many political and social 
transitions currently underway, though there is also something broadly epochal about our 
seemingly pervasive interest in memory. New regimes seek ways to "settle" the residues of 
their predecessors, while established systems face a rise in historical consciousness and 
increasingly pursue a “politics of regret”’ (J.K. Olick, 1999, p. 333.) 
4 Connerton’s taxonomy of ‘forgetting’ includes (politically) repressive erasure; prescriptive 
forgetting; the forgetting entailed in a new identity formation; John Barnes’ ‘structural 
amnesia’ (as in patri- or matrilinealism); ‘forgetting as annulment’ in the case of a surfeit of 
documentation; ‘planned obsolescence forgetting’ inbuilt into the ‘capitalist system of 
consumption’; and finally, forgetting as humiliated silence (for example, the shame of the 
war-defeated Germany). 
5 Taking a broader view, Schwartz (1996) ‘identifies three related aspects of 1960s-1970s 
intellectual culture that gave rise to interest in the social construction of the past. First, 
multiculturalists identify historiography as a source of cultural domination and challenge 
dominant historical narratives in the name of repressed groups. Second, post-modernists 
attach the conceptual underpinnings of linear historicity, truth and identity, thereby raising 
interest in the relations linking history, memory, and power. Finally, hegemony theorists 
provide a class-based account of the politics of memory, highlighting memory 
contestation, popular memory, and the instrumentalization of the past’ (cited in Olick and 
Robbins, 1998, p. 106). 
6
 Wertsch (2002, p.23) citing Edward Hutchins 1994 theory of ‘socially distributed cognition’, 
terms this ‘complementary’: ‘In this case, it is assumed that different members of a group 
have different perspectives and remember different things, but these exist in a coordinated 
system of complementary pieces’.  
7 Jan Assmann, in his article ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’ (Assmann, 1995, pp. 
125-133) shifts the emphasis of the ‘lived experience’ on to what he terms everyday 
‘communicative memory’. However, when it comes to ‘objectivised culture … texts, images, 
rites, buildings, monuments, cities, or even landscapes’ a living memory becomes 
transformed into something more static; ‘mémoire is transformed into histoire’ says Assmann 
(p.128).  
8
 Assmann (1995, p. 129) describes non-proximate collective memory as ‘cultural memory 
… characterized by its distance from the everyday. Distance from the everyday 
(transcendence) marks its temporal horizon. Cultural memory has its fixed point; its horizon 
does not change with the passing of time. These fixed points are fateful events of the past, 
whose memory is maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and 
institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance).’ 
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9
 Assman (1995) asserts that ‘cultural memory preserves the store of knowledge from which 
a group derives an awareness of its unity and peculiarity, The objective manifestations of 
cultural memory are defined through a kind of identificatory determination in a positive (“We 
are this”) or in a negative (“That’s our opposite”) sense’ (p. 130). 
10
 See Jonathan Koppel and David C. Rubin (2016) for a review of ‘reminiscence bump’ 
research. 
11 In more moderate terms, Fentress and Wickham (1992, p. ix) also wondered about ‘how 
to elaborate a conception of memory which, while doing full justice to the collective side of 
one’s conscious life, does not render the individual a sort of automaton, passively obeying 
the interiorized collective will’. They settled on the term ‘social memory’ (as opposed to the 
more commonly-used collective memory), additionally because they feel it will ‘avoid the 
image of a Jungian collective unconscious’ (Fentress and Wickham,1992, p. ix)).   
12 Amos Funkenstein (1989, pp. 6-7) also found that although ‘Remembering is a mental act, 
and therefore it is absolutely and completely personal. … Despite all these reservations, 
"collective memory" is by no means a mistaken and misleading term. … Consequently, we 
cannot abandon the concept of collective memory, but must reformulate the relationship 
between collective memory and the constant act of personal remembering’. 
13 See also Jan Assmann, (1995, pp. 125-133).  
14
 Winter points out that memory has its problems too, particularly forgetting. “Witnesses 
forget, or reconstruct their narratives as a kind of collage, or merge what they say with what 
they read. Memory alone renders history, a documented account of the past, impossible’ 
(Winter, 2009, p. 255), 
15
 In millennial vein, Andreas Huyssen echoes Nora, commenting that ‘there is a deepening 
sense of crisis often articulated in the reproach that our culture is terminally ill with amnesia’ 
(Huyssen, 1995, p.1). 
16
 The notion of a place or site of memory, un lieu de mémoire, was hitherto unknown in 
French or English; Nora references a classical memory technique ‘founded on an inventory 
of memory places, loci memoriae’ in which speeches were rote-learned through ‘associating 
each topic … with some part of a real or imagined building in which the oration was to be 
delivered’ to evoke the ‘profound connotations in French: historical, intellectual and 
emotional, often subconscious’ (Nora, 1989, p. 25).  
17
 To date, the volumes in English available are:  
a. Nora, P. (1996) Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, Vol. 1 - Conflicts and 
Divisions. Directed by Pierre Nora. Translated from the French by Arthur Goldhammer. New 
York: Columbia University Press.  
b. Nora, P. (1997) Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past. Vol. 2: 
Traditions. Directed by Pierre Nora. Translated from the French by Arthur Goldhammer. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
c.Nora, P. (1998) Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past, Vol. 3, Symbols. 
Directed by Pierre Nora. Translated from the French by Arthur Goldhammer. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
d. Nora, P., Jordan, D. P. (Eds.) (2001) Rethinking France: Les Lieux de mémoire, Volume 
1: The State  Translated from the French by Mary Seidman Trouille. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
e. Nora, P. (Ed.) (2006) Rethinking France: Les Lieux de mémoire, Volume 2: Space. 
Translation from the French directed by David P. Jordan. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.  
f. Nora, P. (Ed.) (2009) Rethinking France: Les Lieux de mémoire, Volume 3: Legacies. 
Translation from the French directed by David P. Jordan. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.  
g. Nora, P. (Ed.) (2010): Rethinking France: Les Lieux de mémoire, Volume 4: Histories and 
Memories. Translation from the French directed by David P. Jordan. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
18
 ‘It would be impossible to overstate the influence of Pierre Nora's massive, multi-part 
Lieux de memoire project, a series of volumes that conjoins rich contributions to an 
understanding of France and French culture with an innovative methodology for studying 
collective memory,’ writes Michael Rothberg (Rothberg, 2010 ). ‘In the quarter century 
since the first volume was published in 1984 - and in the two decades since Nora's 
introduction to the project first appeared in English in 1989 - the concept of the "lieu de 
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mémoire" or "site of memory" has been at the center not just of considerations of French 
negotiations with its national past but of studies of remembrance on an international scale. 
Drawing our attention to the way the past finds articulation in a wide array of "sites" - 
considered broadly to include not only monuments and museums, but also novels, cities, 
personages, symbols, and more - Nora's project has inspired reflection and scholarship on 
national memory in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, among other places. 
Although emerging from a commitment to the exceptionality of France's relation to its 
national past, the approach pioneered in Les lieux de mémoire has proven highly exportable 
as a model for the consideration of diverse memory cultures’.  
19
 Writing as a Vietnamese, Hue-Tam Ho-Tai (2001, p. 907) found Nora’s selective ‘research 
agenda’ deeply problematic: ‘I write this review from the margins of both French history and 
of the French nation, as a historian (not of France but Vietnam) and as a postcolonial 
subject. Born in Saigon when it was still the capital of French Cochinchina, I began my 
schooling the very year the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu [excluded from Nora’s 
project]. As a result, unlike my father and even my older siblings, I was spared from having 
to recite "Nos ancetres sont les Gaulois." With numerous relatives permanently settled in 
France, I also write with a personal appreciation of the impact of postcolonial immigration on 
the French social and cultural landscape and on French notions of national identity.’ 
20 Nora himself finally acknowledged that although ‘the memorial model has triumphed over 
the historical model ... [it has] ushered in a new, unpredictable, and capricious use of the 
past’ [Realms 3, 618]’ (cited in Rothberg, 2010, p. 6). 
21
 Yerushalmi’s Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (1982) is cited by Klein (2000), 
Funkenstein (1989), Olick and Robbins (1998) and others as one of the leading works of this 
period to counter the claims of history and memory. 
22
 The Charter of the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual 
Slavery can be found at <https://droitcultures.revues.org/2189> (Annexe 2, 2009) and a 
transcript of the proceedings at 
<http://iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/tokyo/index.html> (Women’s Caucus for 
Gender Justice, 2001) 
23
 A web archive of the Tribunal’s work is available at 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20070329000519/www.worldtribunal.org/main/> (World Tribunal 
on Iraq, 2005) 
24 Almost everything is collective memory, snorts Olick, ‘Collective memory has been 
used to refer to aggregated individual recollections, to official commemorations, to 
collective representations, and to disembodied constitutive features of shared identities; it 
is said to be located in dreamy reminiscence, personal testimony, oral history, tradition, 
myth, style, language, art, popular culture, and the built world. What is to be gained, and 
what is to be lost, by calling all of these “collective memory”?’ (Olick, 1999, p.336). 
25 However, Confino (1997) defends the usefulness of Jacques Le Goff’s notion of ‘the 
history of mentalités’.and ultimately finds for methodological ‘open-endedness’. ‘The beauty 
of memory,’ he writes, ‘is that it is imprecise enough to be appropriated by unexpected 
hands, to connect apparently unrelated topics, to explain anew old problems’(1997, p. 1403). 
Over a decade later, (Confino, 2008, p. 83) he continues in the same undecided vein, that ‘in 
the unbearable lightness of interpretation—lies the risk of memory and mentality as methods 
of inquiry, and also the promise of their relations. They call for interpretation, which can be 
facile and superficial…. The challenge of the historian is to resist this unbearable lightness of 
interpretation. It is rather to sift meaning from memory via methods and theories, via 
interrogations of the use of evidence, of narrative, and of sources. Here lies today the 
potential of memory and the history of mentalities to set our historical imagination free, as 
they have done for a century’. 
26 Complained Jonathan Jones (2014), ‘the poppies are fake, trite and inward-looking – a 
Ukip-style memorial … It is deeply disturbing that a hundred years on from 1914, we can 
only mark this terrible war as a national tragedy. Nationalism – the 19th-century invention of 
nations as an ideal, as romantic unions of blood and patriotism – caused the great war. What 
does it say about Britain in 2014 that we still narrowly remember our own dead and do not 
mourn the German or French or Russian victims? The crowds come to remember – but we 
should not be remembering only our own. It’s the inward-looking mood that lets Ukip thrive.’ 
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<http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/jonathanjonesblog/2014/oct/28/tower-of-london-
poppies-ukip-remembrance-day> 
27 Ronal O’Callaghan (2014), analysing Jones’ article, also finds against ‘this reification of 
combatants’ heroic sacrifices bolsters the type of politics that allows governments (and 
publics) to send men and women to kill and be killed in various wars. Rather than 
confronting the public with the horror of violence, we allow them to continue celebrating the 
sanitised symbolism of combatant heroism. In other words, we allow the ideals of valour and 
nobility that enabled First World War politicians across Europe to send young, primarily poor, 
men to a bloody end in some squalid trench to remain fundamentally unchallenged. This, in 
turn, helps to encourage another generation of young Britons to view war and violence as an 
admirable aspiration rather than a deadly burden.’ However, he disagrees that ‘war 
memorials must be bloody and grotesque’ mentioning the ‘poignant memorial’ ‘to Auschwitz 
victims in Manchester’s Imperial War Museum, stacks of suitcases piled to the ceiling. 
<https://politicalhorizons.wordpress.com/2014/11/01/poppies-over-auschwitz/ > 
28 As an example, the Facebook page caption for Yad Vashem, ‘As the Jewish people’s 
living memorial to the Holocaust, Yad Vashem safeguards the memory of the past and 
imparts its meaning for future generations. Established in 1953, as the world center for 
documentation, research, education and commemoration of the Holocaust, Yad Vashem is 
today a dynamic and vital place of intergenerational and international encounter.’ 
<http://tinyurl.com/ycd4s2ln> (Yad Vashem World Holocaust Center Jerusalem, 2015) 
 
Notes for ChapterThree 
 
1 Alexander admits ‘It is neither ontology nor morality, but epistemology, with which we 
are concerned’ (Alexander, in Alexander et al., 2004b, p.9)—at one hand a stroke of 
genius in which it is only the construction of trauma that is investigated, by confining 
oneself to the sociological (and sociolinguistic) perspective; but on the other hand, this 
leaves the excavator with an empty vessel. In Alexander’s strong interpretation, there is 
no such thing as trauma; nor can there be any broadening of understanding of the non-
existent trope; all we can do is follow trauma’s alleged workings on social groups, as they 
transform their suffering into discourse, commemorative practice and political action. 
2
 Volker Heins and Andreas Langenohl (2016) specifically refute the conflation of perpetrator 
with victim, as ‘a cultural trauma “demands reparation” … Thus, if the memory of the air war 
ever crystallized into a cultural trauma, Britain, and to a lesser extent, the United States 
would have to repair the damage, starting perhaps with a formal apology. But the refusal of 
British officials, including Queen Elizabeth II, to apologize for any bombing raid has not 
caused more than a minor and passing public outcry, not even in Dresden … Leading 
German military historians have even argued that an “admission of guilt” on the part of Great 
Britain would be inappropriate … there are no indications of a memory project that is going 
to replace the double image of German civilians as victims/accomplices that corresponds to 
the perpetrator/liberator perception of the Allies, with the kind of polarizing discourse that is 
required to establish a cultural trauma’ (Heins and Langenohl, 2016, p. 22). 
3
 See, for example, Yehuda, R. et al (1995); Yehuda, R. et al (1998a); Yehuda, R. et al 
(1998b); Yehuda, R. et al (2000); Yehuda R. et al (2001a), Yehuda, R. et al (2001b); 
Yehuda, R. et al (2002); Halligan S.L., Yehuda R. (2002); Yehuda, R. et al (2002); Yehuda, 
R. et al (2005); Yehuda, R. et al (2007a); Yehuda, R., Bierer, L.M. (2007b); Yehuda, R. et al 
(2008); Yehuda R. et al (2014); and Bader, H.N. et al (2014); Lehrner, A. et al (2014); 
Yehuda, R. et al (2016). 
4
 Conversely, perhaps not every traumatic event experienced on a large scale produces 
long-term collective trauma, as Yaacov Vertzberger noted in ‘The Antinomies of Collective 
Political Trauma: A Pre-Theory’ (Political Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 4, Dec. 1997, pp. 863-
876). The politically traumatic assassination of Israeli PM Itzhak Rabin produced a short, 
sharp shock in Israeli society, rather than lasting trauma, despite the reactions of the 
moment. Bounce-back comes into play, as group recovery necessitates ‘self-purification’ and 
‘requires a scapegoat - somebody, preferably an outsider, against which to blame and direct 
both individual and collective rage’ (p. 865) such as Rabin’s assassin, Yigal Amir; or in the 
case of Israel’s traumatic near-defeat by Egypt and Syria in the October 1973 war, PM 
Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and the entire Labour Party cabinet. The tragic 
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events of 911 in the United States have also followed this pattern of decreasing 
remembrance of trauma, while the search for ‘the outsider’ for revenge has perhaps 
produced more long-lasting violent impact. 
Finally, the need for ‘compliance with socially imposed beliefs and attitudes’ to effect 
group recovery may actually result in ‘reversal and/or polarization; that is, the pretrauma 
cognitions maybe reversed, but may also be accentuated to a higher level of extremism, and 
result in polarization at both the macro- and microlevels, by (1) increasing the distance 
between the main competing views in the affected society concerning the definition of 
political reality, and (2) pushing individuals' positions toward greater extremism’ (p. 866). 
5
 Polish Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, who escaped to the U.S. having lost 49 family 
members, including his parents, to the gases of Treblinka in 1943, coined the term genocide 
in his work, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation—Analysis of Government—
Proposals for Redress, (1944; see Chapter IX, pp. 79-95). For a discussion of Lemkin’s work 
on genocide in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, see James J. Martin’s ‘Raphael Lemkin and 
the Invention of “Genocide”’ in The Journal of Historical Review, Spring 1981 (Vol. 2, No. 1), 
pp. 19-34 (viewable online at http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v02/v02p-19_Martin.html). 
   Lemkin was also behind the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 (UNOCHR, 1948) x a treaty which the U.S. notably 
did not ratify until November 4
th
, 1988. Michael Ignatieff, writing in the New Republic (2013), 
notes how Lemkin’s devotion to his cause lead to his untimely demise: ‘Unfinished fragments 
of autobiography poignantly document his decline: “As I am devoting all my time to the 
Genocide Convention, I have no time to take a paying job, and consequently suffer fierce 
privations.... Poverty and starvation. My health deteriorates. Living in hotels and furnished 
rooms. Destruction of my clothes. Increased number of ratifications.... The labors of 
Sisyphus. I work in isolation, which protects me.” He collapsed at a bus stop on 42nd Street 
in New York in August 1959 and died at the age of 59, friendless, penniless, and alone, 
leaving behind a bare rented room, some clothes, and a chaos of unsorted papers.’ 
(http://tinyurl.com/z7n692c). 
6
 William Safire in ‘On Language: Ethnic Cleansing’ recounts the contemporary usage of the 
term: 
In 1988, well before the Soviet Union came apart, clashes broke out between 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the autonomous enclave of Azerbaijan known as 
Nagorno-Karabakh. According to Sol Steinmetz, executive editor of Random House 
dictionaries, who cites Serbo-Croatian sources, the attempt by one group to drive 
out the other was called by Soviet officials etnicheskoye chish cheniye, ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’ 
On July 9, 1991, a Serbian building supervisor named Zarko Cubrilo told 
Tim Judah, a Times of London reporter: ‘Many of us have been sacked because 
they want an ethnically clean Croatia.’ On July 31 of that year, as Orthodox Serbs 
and Catholic Croats began the conflict that led to the breakup of Yugoslavia, we had 
the first English use of the phrase in its gerund form: Croatia's Supreme Council was 
quoted by Donald Forbes, a Reuters reporter in Belgrade, as charging, ‘The aim of 
this expulsion is obviously the ethnic cleansing of the critical areas . . . to be 
annexed to Serbia.’ (Safire, 1993) 
A year later, journalists in the battle zone picked up the phrase: John F. 
Burns, in The New York Times on July 26, 1992, described the movement for a 
‘Greater Serbia,’ observing that ‘the precondition for its creation lies in the 
purging―'ethnic cleansing' in the perpetrators' lexicon―of wide areas of Bosnia of 
all but like-minded Serbs.’  
7
 See, for example, ‘Israel’s assaults on Palestinian education amount to genocide’ by Nada 
Elia and Rima Najjar, The Electronic Intifada, 25 September 2015 http://tinyurl.com/jffqhwy 
‘Ending Zionism is a feminist issue’ by Nada Elia, The Electronic Intifada, 24 July 2014, 
http://tinyurl.com/zfwkbvu; ‘New York Times’ Jodi Rudoren whitewashes Israeli minister’s call 
for genocide’, by Ali Abunimah, Media Watch, The Electronic Intifada, 15 May 2015, 
http://tinyurl.com/heu5xn4; ‘Why was Palestinian suffering forgotten on Holocaust 
Remembrance Day?’ By Michael Lesher, The Electronic Intifada 17 April 2015, 
http://tinyurl.com/htyzsxw ; see moreover, the enormous number of articles brought up in the 
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same online journal for the tag ‘genocide’ https://electronicintifada.net/tags/genocide; 
‘Israel's War on Children’ (Hedges, 2015). 
8
 Comments Daniel Feierstein in Genocide as a Social Practice: Reorganizing society under 
the Nazis and Argentina’s Military Juntas ‘Dadrian has argued in several works that it is 
possible and desirable to compare the genocide of the Armenian and Jewish peoples. Even 
though he does not say so explicitly, his goals are as much political as academic. His work 
attempts to show that the genocide of the Armenian people—still denied by the Turkish state 
after nearly a century—was a social event comparable in its magnitude, severity, and 
consequences to the genocide of the Jewish people under Nazism’ (Feierstein, 2014, Loc. 
182/6997). 
9
 ‘Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew, saw the connection between the crimes committed against 
the Armenians and the rise of the Nazis in Germany. Lemkin was profoundly frustrated by 
the failure of the international community to hold leaders of the Young Turk movement 
accountable after the war. He worked tirelessly to have “crimes against humanity” 
recognized as a violation of international law. Indeed it was Lemkin who coined the term 
“genocide”—a concept that stands as one of the foundations of the international movement 
for human rights’. Facing History and Ourselves (2004, p. 148). 
10
 From the National Library of Australia http://nla.gov.au/nla.map-vn4703176 
11
 Discussing the usage of the term Aghét in a review of the documentary Aghét: Nation 
Murder by the German director Eric Friedler, Taline Voskeritchian (2011) comments,  
‘Genocide is the legal, universal term; it connects Armenians to the world, to activism, to 
community efforts at justice and reparations, all of them laudable, most of them necessary. It 
can connect Armenians also to other peoples and groups that have been threatened by 
annihilation. Aghét is the Armenian term in the broken family of such words—shoah, nakba 
included. The biography of the word aghét itself locates its origins in literary usage, as Marc 
Nichanian has so thoroughly demonstrated in his Writers of Disaster (Gomidas Institute, 
Princeton and London: 2002). It was the Western Armenian novelist and literary critic Hagop 
Oshagan who first used it in 1931 specifically and consciously as the term for the 
extermination of the Ottoman Armenians; it was the literary answer, if you will, to the tchart 
(massacre, in Armenian)’. 
12
 For a further discussion of the semantic connotations of the term see Taline 
Voskeritchian’s ‘Notes on Eric Friedler’s Aghét: From massacre to catastrophe to genocide’ 
(May 16, 2011) . 
13
 Notes Ian Black in The Guardian, ‘The Armenian Genocide – the Guardian Briefing’ on 
16
th
 April, 2015, ‘Diaspora organisations tend to be more militant than the republic itself on 
this question and are suspicious of moves towards normalisation with Turkey. The two main 
organisations in the US have made recognition their raison d’être. This helps them preserve 
a collective identity and resist assimilation.  
A recent pan-Armenian declaration focusing on the genocide was criticised by Levon 
Ter-Petrossian, the country’s former president, reflecting the view that Armenia needs to 
focus on its current problems and not be obsessed by a painful past.’ (See 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/16/the-armenian-genocide-the-guardian-
briefing.) 
14
 Not does only the Turkish government continue to dispute the facts or existence of the 
genocide, but it has also enlisted internationally-recognized scholars to this end, among 
them Bernard Lewis who actually faced lawsuits for denial (see his account in Notes on a 
Century: Reflections of a Middle East Historian, Chapter 11, ‘Judgment in Paris’; [Lewis, 
2012, pp. 286-297]); Stanford Shaw (Shaw and Shaw, 1977); David Fromkin (1995) 
Guenther Lewy (2005a; 2005b); Norman Stone (2011), Michael Gunter (2013); Atatürk 
biographer Andrew Mango (see below for his review of Peter Balakian’s Burning Tigris); 
retired US Army officer and World War 1/Ottoman military historian Edward J. Erickson 
(2013, and other publications). Dated August 8, 2014, A Select Bibliography on Denial of the 
Armenian Genocide (Zoryan Institute, 2014) lists still more works discussing denial (from all 
perspectives). 
An official statement from the Turkish embassy in London, published on 23
rd
 
October 2007 in The New Statesman, gives a taste of the typical strategy to enlist celebrated 
historians. Orhan Tung writes, ‘There is a legitimate historical controversy concerning the 
interpretation of the events in question and most of the scholars who have propounded a 
contra genocide viewpoint are of the highest calibre and repute, including Bernard Lewis, 
Stanford Shaw, David Fromkin, Justin McCarthy, Guenther Lewy, Norman Stone, Kamuran 
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Gürün, Michael Gunter, Gilles Veinstein, Andrew Mango, Roderic Davidson, J.C. Hurwitz, 
William Batkay, Edward J. Erickson and Steven Katz. This is by no means an exhaustive 
list,’(Tung, 2007). 
As Julien Zarifian (2013) affirms, ‘A few American historians and researchers, such 
as Bernard Lewis, Heath Lowry, Stanford Shaw, Edward Erickson, or Justin McCarthy, 
whose close ties with the Turkish state are often criticized, have opted, or still opt today, for 
revisionist and denialist positions …. The best example illustrating this tendency is the case 
of “the 69 American historians” and its aftermath. In 1985, 69 American historians, led by 
famous British-American scholar Bernard Lewis, signed a petition opposing a congressional 
resolution aiming at affirming the reality of the Armenian Genocide. These 69 scholars, who, 
according to several sources received funding from institutions directly linked with Ankara, 
such as the Institute for Turkish Studies or the Ankara Chamber of Commerce, published a 
full-page advertisement in the New York Times and the Washington Post, sponsored by the 
Assembly of Turkish American Associations. This was an important victory for those who 
deny the Armenian Genocide in the U.S.’  
A further example is the war of words over the publication of Peter Balakian’s 
Burning Tigris collected at Arlindo Correia’s website (Correia 2003a, 2003b, 2006) and 
Norman Stone’s ‘A bungled case for the prosecution’ (Stone, 2004); Andrew Mango’s review 
of Balakian’s Burning Tigris and angry responses is collected at http://www.aga-
online.org/news/attachments/PeterBalakian.pdf (Mango, 2004).  
Ronald Grigor Suny, in ‘Learning about the Armenian Genocide’ on the PEN 
America website, names further denial patterns: ‘In the last ten years a more sophisticated 
“neo-denialism” has emerged, which elaborated the argument that the Armenians were 
involved in insurrectionary activity that necessitated a counter-insurgency response from the 
Young Turk government. A number of authors have worked with Professor M. Hakan Yavuz 
and published works with the University of Utah Press. … these writers are to a large degree 
sympathetic to the defensive attitudes of Turkish government and military officials, favor 
evidence and accounts exculpatory of the Young Turk policies, and emphatically reject the 
notion of genocidal intention. See, for example: … Sean McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad 
Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); … and M. Hakan Yavuz, “Orientalism, the 
‘Terrible Turk’ and Genocide,”’ (Suny, 2015). 
Maria Karlsson’s paper, ‘A hoax and a sham: An argumentative analysis 
investigating Western denial of the Armenian Genocide’ (Karlsson, 2009) follows Richard 
Hovannisian in analyzing four denial strategies ‘of four separate Western scholars … 
arguments of absolute denial…  arguments trivializing the acts and actions of genocide … 
arguments aimed at “rewriting” the chronology and course of history’. Karlsson’s paper ‘re-
emphasises the “classic” type of denial, noticed by several scholars of the Armenian 
Genocide and its denial, where absolute denial is only partly visible, having to give way to 
arguments of trivialization and rationalization’ and also examines ‘most extreme type[s] of 
denial… represented by American writer Samuel A. Weems. He openly utilizes all patterns 
of denial. Nothing happened, Weems claims, but what happened was the fault of the 
Armenian victims themselves.’ Her paper also examples Bernard Lewis, whose ‘denial to a 
large degree is latent, but none the less present’. 
15
 According to an article ‘At the Origins of Commemoration: The 90th Anniversary Declaring 
April 24 as a Day of Mourning and Commemoration of the Armenian Genocide’ on the 
Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute’s website, < http://www.genocide-
museum.am/eng/31.03.2009.php> this observance of this commemorative date goes back 
to 1919: ‘A special committee was formed in Constantinople, in March 1919, by a group of 
Ottoman Armenian intellectuals who survived the Armenian Genocide. The main goal of this 
committee was the organization of commemoration ceremonies dedicated to the 4th 
anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. The committee, known as “The April 11th Board of 
Ceremonial Mourning” consisted of 13 members including Yevphime Avetisian, Zaruhi 
Galamkarian, Mari Stambulian, Perchuhi Parsamian, Miss Arpiar, Tigran Zaven, Merujan 
Parsamyan, Hakob Siruni, Gevorg Mesrop, Tagvor Suqiasian, Dr. Barsegh Tinanian, 
Shahan Perperian and Hovhannes Poghosian. Due to the efforts of these people the 
memory of the victims of Armenian Genocide was commemorated among the Armenians of 
Constantinople for the first time in 1919. Armenian writer, publicist and public figure Hakob 
Siruni wrote in his memoirs: “The mourning ceremony became a tradition. Since then, the 
24th of April was adopted as a symbol of mourning.”’ 
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16
 See the names and locations of sites of commemoration of the Armenian Genocide by 
clicking on a list of countries at the website Memorials of the Armenian Genocide 
<http://www.armenian-genocide.org/memorials.html> (Armenian National Institute, 2018a). 
17
 44 U.S. states are listed as having recognized the Armenian Genocide at 
<http://www.armenian-genocide.org/current_category.11/affirmation_list.html> (Armenian 
National Institute, 2018b) although the United States are listed among countries that 
recognize the genocide at <http://www.armenian-genocide.org/recognition_countries.html> 
(Armenian National Institute, 2018c)in actuality, the situation is rather more complicated. 
18 
‘Samantha Power on Obama and Armenian American Issues’ <https://youtu.be/8yNt7XsV-
Dg> (Armenians for Obama, 2008)  ‘“I know [Obama] very well and he’s a person of 
incredible integrity. … He’s a true friend of the Armenian people, an acknowledger of the 
history … he’s a person who can actually be trusted.” 
19
 See also Barack Obama’s pre-election statement, on January 19
th
, 2008, ‘Barack Obama 
on the Importance of US-Armenia Relations’: ‘As President, I will maintain our assistance to 
Armenia   I also share with Armenian Americans – so many of whom are descended from 
genocide survivors - a principled commitment to commemorating and ending genocide. That 
starts with acknowledging the tragic instances of genocide in world history. As a U.S. 
Senator, I have stood with the Armenian American community in calling for Turkey's 
acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide. Two years ago, I criticized the Secretary of 
State for the firing of U.S. Ambassador to Armenia, John Evans, after he properly used the 
term "genocide" to describe Turkey's slaughter of thousands of Armenians starting in 1915. I 
shared with Secretary Rice my firmly held conviction that the Armenian Genocide is not an 
allegation, a personal opinion, or a point of view, but rather a widely documented fact 
supported by an overwhelming body of historical evidence. The facts are undeniable. An 
official policy that calls on diplomats to distort the historical facts is an untenable policy. As a 
senator, I strongly support passage of the Armenian Genocide Resolution (H.Res.106 and 
S.Res.106), and as President I will recognize the Armenian Genocide.’ 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080222014453/http:/www.barackobama.com/2008/01/19/barac
k_obama_on_the_importance.php? (Obama, 2008). 
20
 See, for example, ‘Armenian hopes crushed as Obama decides not to use the word 
“genocide”’ by Noah Bierman (Bierman, 2015); Jon Schwarz in The Intercept notes that 
President Obama’s ‘Obama’s commitment [to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide] was 
quietly removed from his website sometime after December 2010 and this Armenian 
Remembrance Day, he broke his promise for the seventh year in a row. (‘What Obama’s 
Refusal to Acknowledge the Armenian Genocide Tells Us About the U.S. — and the Rest of 
the World’ (Schwarz, 2015). 
21
 See the ‘Statement of the President on Armenian Remembrance Day’ in 2010 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-barack-obama-
armenian-remembrance-day, 2011 <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2011/04/23/statement-president-armenian-remembrance-day>, 2012 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/24/statement-president-
armenian-remembrance-day>, 2013 <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2013/04/24/statement-president-armenian-remembrance-day>; 2014 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/24/statement-president-
armenian-remembrance-day>, 2015 <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/04/23/statement-president-armenian-remembrance-day> and 2016 
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/22/statement-president-
armenian-remembrance-day> in which the term Meds Yeghern is used (The White House, 
2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016). Not everyone felt compelled to rail against the 
president though; in a nuanced deconstruction of Obama’s statements on the Armenian 
genocide, historian Vartorian Matiossian noted on May 15, 2013, “Even though Obama the 
politician did not use the term genocide, Obama the lawyer, the graduate of Columbia 
University and Harvard Law School, has already clearly acknowledged the events of the 
Armenian Genocide. On behalf of the Bar Association of the Republic of Armenia, we would 
like to express our gratitude to President Obama for his historic statement,” (Matossian, 
2013). 
22
 Morgenthau was the American ambassador in Constantinople from 1913-1916; the 
volume is dedicated to ‘Woodrow Wilson, the exponent in America of the enlightened public 
opinion of the world, which has decreed that the right of small nations shall be respected and 
that such crimes that are described in this book shall never again darken the pages of 
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history’. See also The United States Diplomacy on the Bosphorus: The Diaries of 
Ambassador Morgenthau, 1913-1916 (Morgenthau, 2004). 
23
 See <http://www.genocidescholars.org/sites/default/files/document%09%5Bcurrent-
page%3A1%5D/documents/IAGS-Resolution-
Assyrian%20and%20Greek%20Genocide.pdf> ; the resolution’s text notes that ‘whereas the 
Ottoman genocide against minority populations during and following the First World War is 
usually depicted as a genocide against Armenians alone, with little recognition of the 
qualitatively similar genocides against other Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire, Be it 
resolved that is the conviction of the International Association of Genocide Scholars that the 
Ottoman campaign against the Christian minorities of the Empire between 1914 and 1923 
constitute a genocide against Armenians, Assyrians, and Pontian and Anatolian Greeks. Be 
it further resolved that the Association calls upon the government of Turkey to acknowledge 
the genocides against these populations, to issue a formal apology, and to take prompt and 
meaningful steps toward restitution.’  (International Association of Genocide Scholars, 2007). 
This topic is also reflected in Hannibal Travis’s ‘Constructing the “Armenian Genocide”: How 
Scholars Unremembered the Assyrian and Greek Genocides in the Ottoman Empire’ (Travis, 
2013a, pp. 170-192) and Tessa Hofmann, Matthiash Bjornlund and Vasileios 
Mechianetsidis’s The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored 
Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912-1922) and Its Aftermath: 
History, Law, Memory (2012). 
24
 McCarthy (1995) alleges, ‘The decision to force the Armenians to leave was sound in 
purely military terms ... it did have the desired effect: Armenian revolutionary attacks 
dwindled in areas still occupied by the Ottoman government.... Whether the decision was 
actually needed to affect the outcome of the war will never be known’ (p. 195). Later, he 
claims, ‘In its historical context, the deportation of the Armenian Ottomans is logical. . . If one 
examines the history of forced migration and mortality that Turks and other Muslims 
underwent, one finds an explanation for the Armenian deportations as part of a historical 
process. That is in every way preferable to theories that explain historical events simply as a 
series of irrational actions’ (p. 335). 
25 See Edwin Munsell Bliss’s Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities, p. 64, on the Christian 
sects at <http://tinyurl.com/jl95w2l> (Bliss, 1896): ‘It must be remembered also that the 
rivalries first occasioned by these theological differences and afterwards developed by the 
peculiar system of government adopted by the Sultans, has done very much to intensify the 
peculiarities of each of these sects. They are bitterly opposed one to the other. Armenians 
will have nothing to do with Greeks, and Greeks are bitterly opposed to the Armenians; 
Gregorian Armenians hate those of their own race connected with the Roman Catholic 
Church, and the Greeks despise the Bulgarians, although another branch of their own 
general faith; Nestorians, Chaldeans, Jacobites, all strive against each other. The position of 
the Protestants is somewhat peculiar. At first they were looked upon merely as one 
additional sect developing an additional nation, and to that extent detracting from the power 
of those from whom they sprung, and they were hated by all. Of late years, however, it has 
become evident that they are no less national in their feeling than those who have remained 
in the old churches, and they have been recognized more and more as parts of the same 
nations.’ 
26
 Grigor (2015) continues: ‘This position, which those who recognize the 1915 Genocide call 
denialist, might be summarized as follows: There was no genocide, and the Armenians were 
to blame for it. They were rebellious, seditious subjects who presented a danger to the 
empire and got what they deserved.[2] Relative peace and harmony had existed in the 
Ottoman Empire between the state and its religious minorities until outside agitators, usually 
from the Russian Empire, aroused the nationalist and separatist passions of the Armenians. 
Still—the denialists claim—despite the existential threat posed by the Armenians and their 
Russian allies to the survival of the empire, there was no intention or effort by the Young 
Turk regime to eliminate the Armenians as a people.’ 
27
 On April 22, 2015, Special Dispatch No.6029 of MEMRI, the Middle East Media Research 
Institute, notes ‘Over the past year, Turkey has been making preparations and taking 
diplomatic initiatives in advance of April 24, 2015.  … The Turkish government has called for 
the matter to be resolved by historians or by a joint commission…. To divert attention from 
this year's centenary, Turkey's AKP government has shifted the date of its own traditional 
commemoration of the legendary victory against the Allied forces at the 1915 Battle of 
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Gallipoli from the customary March 18 to April 24, to coincide with the Armenian 
remembrance. The AKP government has invited world leaders to come to Turkey for the 
three-day commemoration, in an attempt to steal them away from the Armenian ceremonies 
in Yerevan.’ (‘Turkey Angry At European Countries' Recognition of Armenian Genocide; 
Turkish President Erdogan Says He Disregards It: 'It Goes In One Ear And Out The Other’ at 
<https://www.memri.org/reports/turkey-angry-european-countries-recognition-armenian-
genocide-turkish-president-erdogan-says >) (MEMRI, 2015). 
28
 Turkish historian and holder of the Kaloosdian and Mugar Chair of Armenian Genocide 
Studies at Clark University, Professor Taner Akçam writes, ‘Such an admission implies an 
obligation for compensation. Of the nearly two million Armenians living in Ottoman territory in 
1915, only 67,000 Armenian-speakers remained by 1927. Even if we accept the higher 
estimate of 140,000 remaining, it still represents the effective elimination of most of the 
country's Armenian population, along with the unrecompensed seizure of their considerable 
assets and properties. Any admission of responsibility for this crime must surely be followed 
by claims for restitution.’ (Akçam, 2015) 
29
 Claire Berlinski’s controversial hyperlinked diatribe in the context of the 2006 French law 
against Armenian genocide denial at ‘The Voltaire Project: I Deny the Armenian Genocide’ 
(Berlinski, 2007) <https://ricochet.com/archives/the-voltaire-project-i-deny-the-armenian-
genocide/ > includes a video clip of Bernard Lewis on the topic <https://youtu.be/jZy27-x-
_UM> (video removed but can be found at <https://youtu.be/qG70UWESfu4> and 
<https://youtu.be/yCYz3IigNE0> ) ‘This is a question of definition …the point that was being 
made was that the massacre of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was the same as 
what happened to the Jews in Nazi Germany and that is a downright falsehood. What 
happened to the Armenians was the result of a massive Armenian armed rebellion against 
the Turks which began before war broke out and continued on a larger scale … great 
numbers of Armenians deserted and crossed the frontier and joined the Russian armed 
forces invading Turkey. Armenian rebels actually seized the city of Van and held it for a 
while, intending to hand it over to the invaders … This was what we now call nowadays a 
national liberation movement of the Armenians against Turkey. … There is clear evidence of 
a decision by the Turkish government to deport the Armenian population from the sensitive 
areas, which meant virtually the whole of Anatolia … there is no evidence of a [government] 
decision to massacre, on the contrary there is evidence of attempts to prevent it’. 
30
 Israeli support for recognition of the Armenian Genocide has waxed and wanted, 
according to its relations with the Turkish government, as Yair Auron’s The Banality of 
Denial: Israel and the Armenian Genocide (2003) acknowledges. 
31
 See ‘Mavi Marmara death toll rises to 10’ (Al Jazeera, 2014) and ‘Turkey orders arrests 
over Gaza flotilla raid’ by Hassan Ghani (2014). 
32 See the Reuters report carried by Al Arabiya, ‘Turkey, Israel close to deal on 
compensation over Mavi Marmara’ (Al Arabiya, 2016) ; and in Ha’aretz, ‘Israel and Turkey 
Officially Announce Rapprochement Deal, Ending Diplomatic Crisis’ (Ravid, 2016). 
33
 Dr. Anie Kalayjian and Marian Weisberg’s 2002 study of transgenerational psychological 
trauma among second- and third-generation Armenian-Americans living on the East Coast of 
the U.S. aims at redressing the balance of the overwhelming quantity of literature dedicated 
to Holocaust survivors, but notes that its clinical sample is too small (Kalayjian and 
Weisberg, 2002). 
34
 Currently available in English on YouTube at <https://youtu.be/ybSP04ajCDg> (Friedler, 
2010). 
35
 According to Oran in a 2006 interview with Hrant Dink, Dink told him that ‘Armenians 
should be able to get rid of the residues of the past and look at the problems through the 
eyes of the other side (the majority) as well. In other words, Armenians should be able to 
display empathy. This will incite the majority to act the same. This second observation, which 
H. Dink expressed by saying “Turkish-Armenian relations should be taken out of a 1915 
meters-deep well” , is of great importance, because it is a hundred per cent against the 
genocide thesis of the Diaspora and the Republic of Armenia. In this context empathy has 
nothing to do with accepting or refusing the genocide. Second, Armenians should be able to 
get rid of the residues of the past and look at the problems through the eyes of the other side 
(the majority) as well. In other words, Armenians should be able to display empathy. This will 
incite the majority to act the same. This second observation, which H. Dink expressed by 
saying “Turkish-Armenian relations should be taken out of a 1915 meters-deep well” , is of 
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great importance, because it is a hundred per cent against the genocide thesis of the 
Diaspora and the Republic of Armenia. In this context empathy has nothing to do with 
accepting or refusing the genocide.’ (Oran, 2006) 
36
 Baskin Oran writes further, ‘According to Agos, the genocide discourse is not a historical 
term but a political one. It is cherished by the Diaspora for two important reasons. First, it is a 
“national cause” that hinder its assimilation; second, it increases its political influence in the 
host State. But the same discourse is blocking both the Turkish-Armenian dialogue and the 
integration that is in the good interest of Armenians in Turkey. What’s more, this blocking is 
being made while the Turkish intellectuals have started questioning 1915 in every way. 
Everyone should abstain from blocking a dialogue that would for sure be beneficial to 
everyone (the Diaspora, Republic of Armenia, Turkey)’ (Oran, 2006).  
37
 According to Reporters Without Borders, in 2018 Turkey ranks 157 out of 180 countries in 
the World Press Freedom index <https://rsf.org/en/turkey> (Reporters Without Borders, 
2018). The Committee to Protect Journalists meanwhile commented that Despite releasing 
some journalists in 2017, Turkey remains the world’s worst jailer for the second consecutive 
year, with 73 journalists behind bars, compared with 81 last year. Dozens more still face trial, 
and fresh arrests take place regularly. … Every journalist CPJ found jailed for their work in 
Turkey is under investigation for, or charged with, anti-state crimes, as was true of last year’s 
census’ (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2017). 
38
 See, for example, in Turkish daily Today’s Zaman, on 4
th
 March 2016, ‘Turkish police raid 
Zaman HQs, fire tear gas on readers after gov’t takeover’ (original link unavailable due to 
closure of paper; the story can be viewed at <https://warsclerotic.com/2016/03/05/turkish-
police-raid-zaman-hqs-fire-tear-gas-on-readers-after-govt-takeover/>) and on 5
th
 March 2016, 
‘Reactions pour in against gov’t-orchestrated takeover of Zaman daily’ (original link 
unavailable due to closure of paper; the story can be viewed at 
<https://www.turkishminute.com/2016/03/05/reactions-pour-in-against-govt-orchestrated-
takeover-of-zaman-daily/) (Today’s Zaman, 2016a, 2016b); in another leading Turkish daily, 
the Daily Hürriyet, ‘Trustees appointed to Zaman media group’ (Daily Hürriyet, 2016); and on 
the BBC website, ‘Zaman newspaper: Defiant last edition as Turkey police raid’ 5
th
 March 
2016 (BBC News, 2016).  
39 Kalyaijian and Weisberg (2002) emphasize the constancy of the traumatic connection 
rather more, as they explore the ‘physical, psychosocial, and spiritual’ intergenerational 
impact of the Genocide on a relatively small group of Armenian Americans out of 
‘approximately one million Armenians living in the United States, with the majority settled on 
the West Coast; 90% of those who did not migrate from previously Soviet Armenia are 
offspring of the Genocide survivors’. Their study attempted to redress the balance of the 
hundreds of articles, dissertations and books that have been written on intergenerational 
transmission of the Holocaust on succeeding generations, but the number of subjects (eight) 
and the psychodynamic process makes it impossible to make wider sociological 
generalizations. However, what is notable is that the Turkish lack of recognition remained a 
source of anger and frustration ‘an outcome of feelings of helplessness and powerlessness’ 
(p. 273) and that ‘an explicit expression of remorse … would have enormous healing value,’ 
(Kalayjian and Weisberg, 2002, p. 274). 
40 Tölölyan explains, ‘The variety of communities in the Armenian diaspora today is one of 
the many reasons why it is difficult to coordinate their actions, let alone “unify” them. Simply 
to enumerate them is complicated. For instance, there is the intrastate diasporic community 
of Istanbul, the majority of whose members deny that they are a diaspora; the highly 
territorialized diaspora of Georgia 1; the post-deportation diaspora formed in 1604 in Iran …; 
the post-genocide (1923-on) and post-Independence (1991-on) diasporas, and the Soviet 
diaspora of the returnees of 1946-1948 3, many of whom left the homeland again in the 
1974-1989 period and reside primarily in the US. The list could be extended by naming the 
secondary diasporas created by the dispersion of the Iranian, Lebanese, Egyptian, Iraqi and 
now Syrian diasporas. 
Each has unique features. There are some connections among them, but not 
enough to coordinate them effectively. Furthermore, they differ along many registers: in 
terms of social behavior, language, and culture; in demography and economic prosperity; in 
terms of internal institutionalization and ideology; and by the level of available leadership. 
Some people hope that this heterogeneity may someday become a positive resource, but 
currently it is the reason why Armenia-Diaspora relations are hard to discuss: the Diaspora is 
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theoretically or conceptually real, but in quotidian practice it consists of deeply fragmented 
and diverse communities linked only by a few elites – of the Churches, the political parties, 
the AGBU [the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), founded in 1906 in Cairo by 
Boghos Nubar Pasha, is philanthropic pan-Armenian association, up to this day, one of the 
main actors in the Diaspora and Armenia.] 
The struggle for Karabagh … and the existence of post-independence Armenia have of 
course had a very large impact on the Armenian diaspora, but there are no reliable, 
conclusive studies that show just how. We do not have any pre-independence studies that 
reliably documented most features of various diaspora communities in a disciplined manner’ 
(Tölölyan and Papazian, 2014). 
41
 Details of the troubled and ultimately failed prosecution are to be found in Vahakn N. 
Dadrian and Taner Akçam’s Judgment at Istanbul: The Armenian Genocide Trials (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2011.) 
42
 In the U.S., ethnic quotas and an ambience of discrimination also prevailed in the 1940s, 
as portrayed in Elia Kazan’s 1947 Academy Award-winning film Gentlemen’s Agreement. A 
similar discreet and casual anti-Semitism prevailed in the UK (and other European countries) 
until at least the late 1970s (and has latterly returned, albeit for somewhat differing reasons). 
43
 This repulsion is often connected to the so-called ‘myth of silence’ of the international 
community (on the part of perpetrators and bystanders) and by turn, with Yael Danieli’s 
‘conspiracy of silence’ of survivors (victims) discussed in Chapter 1 and refuted in Cesarani 
and Sundquist’s After the Holocaust: Challenging the myths of silence (2012). The reaction 
of the American community, according to Hasia Diner in her 2009 work, We Remember with 
Reverence and Love: American Jews and the Myth of Silence after the Holocaust, 1945-
1962, was also far from silent; she fervently disagrees with the late Peter Novick, whose 
controversial thesis in his book The Holocaust in American Life (Novick, 2000) alleges that 
‘the Holocaust was first marginalized, then came to be centered in American life … as 
virtually the only common denominator of American Jewish identity in the late twentieth 
century … [it] filled a need for a consensual symbol’ (Novick, 2000, pp. 6-7).  
44
 According to the UN News Center’s press release (United Nations, 2005) ‘General 
Assembly designates International Holocaust Remembrance Day’, ‘January 27, 1945 is 
currently officially recognized as a day of remembrance for Holocaust victims in several 
countries, including the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany, because it marks the day when 
an advancing Soviet army liberated the largest Nazi death camp, Auschwitz-Birkenau, in 
Poland.’ 
45 This trend continues: in recent years, two films on the Holocaust have won Best Foreign 
Film at the Academy Awards; the Polish film Ida (2014), and the Hungarian film Son of Saul 
(2016). Regarding the former, Hoberman in an article in The Tablet on February 22
nd
, 2015 
(‘Ida’ wins: The count is now 20 out of 23’) recalls the old adage ‘“There’s no business like 
Shoah business” …  a bitter pun I first heard in the late 1970s, working as intern at YIVO, an 
institution then primarily staffed by Holocaust survivors and their children,’ and proceeds to 
detail the statistics of Academy Award-nominated Shoah-related films (Hoeberman, 2015). 
Son of Saul, although universally praised, also received some extreme criticism. Dan Kagan-
Kans, in an article in Mosaic magazine on March 7
th
, 2016, ‘That Holocaust feeling’ 
questions the filmmaker’s ‘immersive’, hyper-realistic virtual reality representation and asks 
‘why we should apprehend the Holocaust in this especially visceral and immersive way … 
The important thing is that it would focus not on what the Holocaust felt like but on how to 
comprehend it, not on the experiential and immersive à la Son of Saul but on the 
imaginative, intellectual, and moral. Simply to immerse oneself in the mechanics of 
Auschwitz—what is the point? There is none. Even Son of Saul’s makers, in their awkward 
itch to moralize, however inaptly, acknowledge as much. Judgment, as ever, is all.’ (Kagan-
Kans, 2016). John Podhoretz in a response article in the same Mosaic magazine on March 
16
th
, 2016, ‘Why I Don't Watch Holocaust Movies’, finds the act of profit-making from films 
that deal with the Holocaust deeply offensive, asserting, ‘The act of converting the Shoah 
into a story is itself a violation of its meaning, its force, and its evil’ (Podhoretz, 2016).  
46
 As Alvin H. Rosenfeld (2011, p. 15) notes, ‘It is not primarily from the work of 
historians that most people gain whatever knowledge they acquire of the Third Reich 
and the Nazi crimes against the Jews, but rather from that of novelists, filmmakers, 
playwrights, poets, television program writers and producers, museum exhibits ….’ . 
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47
 Amos Goldberg (2015, p. 7) particularly highlights ‘the Taskforce for International 
Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research (ITF) established in 
1988 through the initiative of then Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson … renamed 
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in 2013’ with members in 31 states 
(‘all North American or European, apart from Israel and Argentina’) as an example of ‘the 
institutional globalization of Holocaust memory’ .  
48
 About Yad Vashem (Yad Vashem, 2017) defines the museum as ‘dedicated to 
documenting the events of the Shoah by collecting and safeguarding millions of pieces of 
evidence, so that an accurate and detailed historical record of the atrocities committed 
against the Jewish people may be preserved and disseminated.’ but the museum has an 
explicitly political role in linking Jewish collective trauma to the fate and future of the State of 
Israel as far as Jewish continuity there is concerned. Visiting dignitaries and heads of state 
are always taken there on an obligatory visit.. 
49
Gedenkstätten Forum (Memorials Forum) provides a dense mapping of ‘Monuments, 
museums and institutions in commemoration of Nazi victims’ in Europe (and worldwide) 
(Gedenkstätten Forum, n.d.). 
50
 Rosenfeld recounts multiple egregious cases of celebrated individual denials, such as 
David Irving, who sued historian Deborah Lipstadt; the Polish Catholic bishop, Tadeusz 
Pieronek, in 2010; French deniers Maurice Bardèche, Paul Rassinier, Pierre Guillaume, 
Robert Faurisson, and Serge Thion. Simon Epstein also discusses Roger Garaudy, Abbé 
Pierre and the French Negationists in the 2012 book, Holocaust Denial: The politics of 
perfidy (Epstein, 2012). 
51
 For Peter Novick (2000), it was apparent that people abstract from the Holocaust 
according to their own belief-set or cause, hence it is difficult to argue that there is a 
universal message, or even lessons to be learned from it, as he argued memorably in 
Chapter 11 of The Holocaust in American Life, ‘Never again the slaughter of the 
Albigensians’, pp. 228-262. 
52
 Amos Goldberg (2012, p. 203) critiques vigorously Israel’s implicit rejection of genocide 
linkages in his deconstruction of Yad Vashem for its reductionist ‘antihistorical’ intentionality, 
noting that for the museum’s renewal ceremony in 2005, ‘no Armenian, Rwandan, Roma or 
Sinti, Cambodian or other representative of genocide victim nations was invited to attend let 
alone speak in these ceremonies’ although the Turkish minister of Justice Cemil Cicek was 
invited—and ‘just two months later Cicek, one of the most fervent Turkish nationalist deniers 
of the Armenian genocide, accused Bosphorus University as ‘stabbing the back of the 
Turkish people’ for holding a conference on ‘Ottoman Armenians’ while expressing regret 
that he had given up the rights to bring such cases to court.’  
53
 As sensationalised in a report commissioned by the right-wing Anti Defamation League: 
Anti Defamation League (2015) ADL Global 100: An Index of Anti-Semitism. 
<http://global100.adl.org/public/ADL-Global-100-Executive-Summary2015.pdf> 
54
 See, for example, the activities of BRICUP (British Committee for the Universities of 
Palestine) http://www.bricup.org.uk/; a Student Briefing tackling ‘Antisemitism on Campus’ 
(Student Rights, 2016) including the controversy surrounding the allegations of antisemitism 
in Oxford University’s Labour Club, which led to resignation of its Co-Chair of the Oxford 
University Labour Club, Alex Chalmers (‘Rampant Antisemitism exposed at Oxford 
University Labour Club’ (Campaign Against Antisemitism, 2016). Reviewing allegations on 
Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, suspended members Gerry Downing and Vicki Kirby, 
Guardian commentators Jonathan Freedland (2016) and Nick Cohen (2016) respectively 
claim that ‘Labour and the left have an antisemitism problem’. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn 
has repeatedly denied charges of antisemitism, e.g. in a Channel 4 interview published on 
August 17
th
, 2015 (Channel 4 News, 2015). 
In the U.S., right wing Jewish organization AMCHA’s ‘Report on Antisemitic Activity in 2015 
at U.S. Colleges and Universities with the largest Jewish undergraduate populations’ 
(AMCHA Initiative, 2016a) claims that ‘Recent studies… have suggested alarming rates of 
antisemitic activity on college and university campuses across the country’ and flags 
‘Targeting of Jewish Students’ ‘Campus BDS campaigns [which] routinely employ rhetoric 
and imagery intended to demonize and delegitimize Israel, expression which is consistent 
with the U.S. State Department definition of antisemitism’ (AMCHA Initiative, 2016b). 
(Campus BDS activity also receives legitimate political support from anti-Zionist Jews, but 
the report presents this purely as antisemitism.) According Rabbi Brant Rosen, writing in 
Ha’aretz on March 18
th
, 2016, AMCHA’s pressure led to UCLA’s Regents being compelled to 
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draft a tolerance statement in which expressions of anti-Zionism included anti-Semitism, 
‘Anti-Zionism Isn't a “Form of Discrimination,” and It's Not anti-Semitism’ (Rosen, 2016). The 
‘Final Report of the Regents Working Group on Principles against Intolerance’ (January 22
nd
, 
2016 ) can be found at 
<http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/regmeet/mar16/e1attach.pdf> (University of 
California, 2016).  
Meanwhile, liberal Zionist Peter Beinart points out that despite claims in the Wall 
Street Journal (Yudolf and Waltzer, 2016) and by TruthRevolt (2015) about Vassar College 
(the latter rates Vassar 10
th
 in the top 10 ‘worst anti-Semitic campuses in the U.S.’ ) the BDS 
campaigns there are led by ‘a group of left-wing activists, several of whom are Jewish. One 
of the most prominent BDS student union activists sits on the board of Vassar’s Jewish 
Student Union’. (‘When the fight over BDS is a Jewish civil war: It’s not anti-Semitism that 
makes pro-Israel Jewish students at Vassar feel uncomfortable, it’s anti-Zionism, sometimes 
championed by fellow Jews’) (Beinart, 2016).  
Other examples of heated interchange over antisemitism and antizionism have 
occurred in the course of the American Anthropological Association’s ‘vote on the boycott of 
Israeli academic institutions from April 15 to May 31 [2016] by electronic ballot’ 
<https://anthroboycott.wordpress.com/> (Anthroboycott, 2017) not to mention targeting of 
antizionist faculty, including Norman Finkelstein (Cohen, 2007) although Finkelstein would 
later call time on BDS (Smith, 2015) and also Palestinian-American scholar Steven Salaita, 
who brought a law suit against the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (‘Salaita v. 
Kennedy et al’) (Center for Constitutional Rights, 2015) on the withdrawal of the offer of 
tenure. 
Palestine Legal (2015) published a 124-page report on this phenomenon, ‘The 
Palestine Exception to Free Speech: A movement under attack in the U.S.’ and Jewish 
Voice for Peace also issued its own report ‘Stifling Dissent’ (Jewish Voice for Peace, 2015). 
Ali Abunimah, founder of the website Electronic Intifada, dedicates Chapter 6 of The Battle 
for Justice in Palestine (2014, pp. 169-225) to ‘The War on Campus’, alleging that since 
antisemitism is low nowadays in the U.S., the David Project has focused its campus 
advocacy on ‘anti-Israelism’, including recommending witch hunts against academics such 
as the harassment of Columbia University’s Professor Joseph Massad. 
55 Ernst Zündel was deported from Canada where he had lived without naturalisation for 
40 years, to stand trial and sentencing for Volksverhetzung (hate speech) in his native 
Germany. His trial is discussed at length in Robert A. Kahn’s Holocaust Denial and the 
Law: A comparative study (Kahn, 2004), together with a comparison of the legal systems of 
Canada, U.S., France, Germany and the U.K. that produced differing legislation and 
outcomes for controversial Holocaust denials. ‘When the Germans deny the Holocaust, 
they reawaken doubts that the nation has placed its Nazi past behind it. When the French 
deny the Holocaust, they revive a debate between those who collaborated and those who 
resisted the Nazi occupation. … In the United States and Canada, the impetus for 
prosecutions comes from the large Jewish communities (and Holocaust survivors) who 
reside there’ (Kahn, 2004, p. 2). 
56
On the Underground Archive of the Warsaw Ghetto, also known as the Oyneg Shabes or 
Ringelblum Archive (after the Sabbath day on which contributors met in secret, and after the 
historian Emmanuel Ringelblum who coordinated the documentation) the Jewish Historical 
Institute in Warsaw, Poland, records in 2014 that ‘Until today, the third part of the Archive [on 
the Jewish Underground], which was to be hidden on 19 April 1943, the night before the 
outbreak of the uprising in the ghetto, in the brushmaking workshop near the 34 
Świętojerska St. (today, the Chinese embassy grounds), was not found. … From the end of 
the 20th century until the beginning of the 21st century work has been carried on on the 
preservation and digitization of the documents of the Archive. In the years 2001 –2003, a 
new inventory of the collection was put together. The Ringelblum Archive for over 60 years 
has been used by historians and yet still the lion’s share of it is little known and requires 
detailed study. Only a full edition of documents from the Oneg Shabbat collections started in 
the years 1997 – 2000 and, after a break, continued since 2011, opens new opportunities for 
Holocaust researchers’ (Blogged at the website of the Jewish Historical Institute, 
http://www.jhi.pl/en/blog/2014-10-08-ringelblum-archive). However, in an April 22
nd
 2009 
article in Ha’aretz, Jack Khoury (2004) reports that staff at Kibbutz Lohamei Hageta'ot’s 
Ghetto Fighters Museum (Beit Lohamei Haghetaot) in northern Israel believe that they hold 
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and have decoded the third archive, ‘Simcha Stein, the museum's director, said researchers 
had long been unable to decipher the handwriting in which the so-called Berman Collection 
[digitalized at <http://infocenters.co.il/gfh/list.asp>] which was an elaborate code. After 
painstaking research, however, they now believe that the long-searched for third part of the 
Ringelblum Archive is not hidden in Warsaw, but has actually been in their possession for 
nearly two decades. “Today, after Sisyphean investigation, we believe it is highly likely that 
this is indeed the third part of the Warsaw Ghetto archive,” Stein said. … One of the most 
important documents is the diary of an unidentified girl who hid in a bunker with members of 
the Resistance. It documents the last six days of the uprising, until virtually the moment 
German troops burst into her hiding place.’ 
57
 For the latter, the German foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future (Stiftung 
Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft <http://www.stiftung-evz.de/eng/home.html> was 
established only in 2000. 
58
 See, for example, the Claims Conference on Jewish Material Issues 
<http://www.claimscon.org/what-we-do/negotiations/open-issues/> 
59
 ‘Holocaust Reparations: Germany to Pay 772 Million Euros to Survivors’ (Spiegel Online, 
2013). The Times of Israel’s David Rising also reports on November 16
th
, 2012 that 
‘Germany increases reparations for Holocaust survivors: In a ceremony at Berlin’s Jewish 
Museum, finance minister announces help for a rapidly aging, often poverty-stricken 
population’ (Rising, 2012). Rising cites a comment by former US ambassador to the EU and 
Claims Conference special negotiator Stuart Eizenstat that he was ‘was very much taken by 
the degree to which [the Germans] had come to terms with World War II … It’s a very sharp 
contrast to what Japan has done in recognizing their responsibilities… it’s quite striking,”’ 
and notes in the same article that: 
Germany has paid—primarily to Jewish survivors—some $89 billion in 
compensation overall for Nazi crimes since the agreement was signed in 1952.  
In one change to the treaty that Germany agreed to earlier this year, the 
country will provide compensation payments to a new category of Nazi victims—
some 80,000 Jews who fled ahead of the advancing German army and mobile killing 
squads and eventually resettled in the former Soviet Union. 
They became eligible Nov. 1 for one-time payments of $3,253. The 
amendment also formalizes an increase in pensions for Holocaust survivors living in 
formerly communist eastern Europe to the same as those living elsewhere — $382 
per month — from the $255 to $331 they had been receiving.’ 
60
 Reported by Dan Bilefsky in The New York Times, ‘France to Pay Holocaust Survivors 
Over Deportations’ (Bilefsky, 2014); see also Mémorial de la Shoah (n.d.) ‘Compensation 
and restitution for Holocaust victims in France’.  
 
Notes for Chapter Four  
 
1
 The researcher comes from a feminist peace education background that prefers multiple 
theoretical perspectives rather than a single, hierarchical framework. With the reservation 
that all theory is evolutionary, mutable, and contestable, the project has therefore rooted 
itself in a number of literatures: sociological collective trauma literature, psychological trauma 
literature, social/political psychology (the two fields frequently overlap) and peace 
psychology (which often overlaps with social/political psychology), aiming to identify 
possibilities when applied to intractable conflicts, for which present peacebuilding literature 
offers no answer. In addition, approaches from critical discourse analysis will be referred to 
for analysis of national discourse. 
2
 See, for example, articles linked to by the NPO, the Foundation for the Benefit of Holocaust 
 Victims in Israel (founded in 1994) <http://www.k-shoa.org/?CategoryID=660> (‘New Report 
 paints grim picture of Israel’s Holocaust survivors’ [Sobelman, 2015]; ‘Dichter: Foundation for 
 Holocaust survivors needs private donors’ [Ziri, 2013]; ‘Report: Israel has only five years left 
 for a nationwide push to aid Holocaust survivors’ by Lidar Grave-Lazi [2014]; in 2012, the 
 Foundation was unable to disperse aid, according to a YNet article [Efraim, 2012] ‘Foundation 
 suspends Holocaust survivors' benefits’). 
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3 Comments Anshel Pfeffer on the nomenclature, ‘Most of us usually abbreviate it to “Yom 
Hashoah” (“Holocaust Day”), but the “Bravery” was added for two reasons. The 27th of 
Nisan was already “Bravery Remembrance Day” for the Jewish “Yishuv” in British Mandatory 
Palestine, commemorating the Jews murdered between 1936 and 1939 in the Arab Revolt. 
Choosing the same day to commemorate the Jews murdered in the Holocaust fused the 
memories of martyrdom together, and helped create the narrative of continuation: “meshoah 
letkuma” – from Holocaust to redemption or rebirth.’ However, it is not really those Jews who 
died in the Arab Revolts that are summoned to life on 27
th
 Nisan (‘Tune out the politicians on 
this Holocaust Remembrance Day’, [Pfeffer, 2017]). 
4
 The White House added to the political controversy surrounding the de-exceptionalization 
of this day as remembrance of the Jewish Holocaust by this year declining to specify Jewish 
victims, as Ben Jacobs noted The Guardian (Jacobs, 2017) and Matthew Rosza commented 
in Salon.com, 2017). 
5
 The triumphalist, Olympics opening-ceremony style 2018 official celebrations for Yom 
Ha’atzmut can be viewed at https://youtu.be/aHQLCV6xiOo (Ka’an Chadashot [Here is 
news] 2018). 
6
 ‘Netanyahu glares at U.N. for 45 seconds after berating its silence on Iran threat to Israel’ 
(Washington Free Beacon, 2015); for the full text of PM Netanyahu’s address to the UN 
General Assembly, see Jerusalem Post Staff ( 2015).  
7 ‘
Mufti meets Hitler clip’ <https://youtu.be/7E54Vd0h9BQ> (Santi, 2016); ‘Adolf Hitler 
meeting with Grand Mufti of Jerusalem’ <https://youtu.be/OIovLAJ6D9M> (TheMrwolf79, 
2012); ‘The Grand Mufti and Hitler’ <https://youtu.be/LhplTdwhCeU> (Pirovano, 2014). 
8
 Historian Yehuda Bauer (‘An Open Letter to Daniel Barenboim’) argues that the notion that 
Israel’s establishment owes itself directly to the Holocaust is ‘fallacious’ since the foundation 
of the state was a historical process, ‘In the decades before 1947-48, the Zionist movement 
laid the ground for a Jewish political entity in the Land of Israel. It sought to settle large 
numbers of Jews there — mainly from Eastern Europe, where they faced persecution and 
were barred from immigrating elsewhere’. In fact, argues Bauer, if the Holocaust had truly 
been responsible for the state of Israel, there would not have been much of a state to 
establish. It is ‘the fact of that entity’s establishment, despite the odds, that must be 
explained. The historical formula, contradicting [Daniel Barenboim’s] argument, is more 
Holocaust, less Israel; less Holocaust, more Israel.’ Nor, according to Bauer, was the state 
established on the back of European guilt for its role in the Holocaust: 
The belief that world leaders regretted what happened is a Jewish myth. The 
archives from 1945-48 are open. Britain opposed a Jewish state. So did the U.S. 
State Department, which in March 1948, after the partition plan was approved in 
November 1947, proposed the establishment of an Anglo-American protectorate that 
would continue the policy of the 1939 British White Paper policy. Its main provision 
was to hand the country, after 10 years, to the Arab population. The Holocaust and 
the Jews’ fate in the war were irrelevant. (Bauer, 2017) 
As for the Nakba, it was rather the ‘result of a struggle between two peoples over a small 
piece of real estate’ than an outcome of the Holocaust, argues Bauer—a perception contra 
to that held by the majority of Palestinians today, who directly blame European anti-Semitism 
for their own displacement.  
 
 
 
 
Notes for Chapter Five 
 
1
 ‘The Israeli authorities prevented the internally displaced persons from returning to their 
homes, and appropriated their land and property under various laws, most importantly the 
Emergency Regulations (Absentees’ Property) - 1948, and the Absentees’ Property Law – 
1950’ notes Areej Sabbagh-Khoury (2011, p. 41). 
2
 See <http://www.deiryassin.org/pictures.html>, ‘A view from Yad Vashem’: ‘It is unfortunate 
that so few Palestinians visit Yad Vashem. Understandably, many argue that they were not 
involved in the Holocaust and resent hearing again about Jews as victims of Nazis when the 
whole world has so long failed to recognize Palestinians as victims of Zionists. Many also 
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believe that the Holocaust was (mis)used as a justification or rationalization for the creation 
of the state of Israel and for the conquest and confiscation of their homes and villages. 
Nevertheless, it is unfortunate because from Yad Vashem, looking north, is a spectacular 
panoramic view of Deir Yassin. The Holocaust museum is beautiful and the message "never 
to forget man's inhumanity to man" is timeless. The children's museum is particularly heart 
wrenching; in a dark room filled with candles and mirrors the names of Jewish children who 
perished in the Holocaust are read along with their places of birth. Even the most callous 
person is brought to tears. Upon exiting this portion of the museum a visitor is facing north 
and looking directly at Deir Yassin. There are no markers, no plaques, no memorials, and no 
mention from any tour guide. But for those who know what they are looking at, the irony is 
breath-taking.’ (Deir Yassin Remembered, n.d.) 
3
 According to Salman Abu-Sitta in The Palestine Nakba 1948 ‘A note on the number of 
refugees’ (http://www.plands.org/en/books-reports/books/the-palestinian-nakba-1948/a-note-
on-the-number-of-the-refugees), ‘Using UNRWA records as a guide, the refugees from 
‘extra’ villages is 16% or 130,806, giving a total of 935,000 for the 1948 refugees 
[researcher’s emphasis] (Abu-Sitta, 2000). 
 To test the accuracy of this figure, let us compare the result with studies by J. Abu-
Lughod. She made a careful analysis of British figures and concluded that the refugee 
population is in the range of 770,000 and 780,000. But her figures include the 1931 figure of 
66,000 for Beer Sheba. Curiously this figure has remained static at 66,000 for most studies. 
If we use the corrected figure of 90,507 in this list as the net refugee population for Beer 
Sheba, we get 804,000 which is close to our figure. Adding ‘extra’ villages, we get 935,000. 
Let us now compare this result with other estimates, quoted by Morris, p. 297. The 
Israeli estimate is 520,000, which is incredibly low and cannot be substantiated. It is given in 
order to avoid “hordes of claimants” as “(We) are eventually obliged to accept the return of 
the refugees”. According to Morris, the Israeli Foreign Ministry admitted that “the real number 
was close to 800,000”. 
The Conciliation Commission on Palestine estimated the number to be 766,000 and 
the British Foreign Office between 600,000-760,000. A figure which is still widely quoted is 
750,000. This figure is an approximation of the figure of 726,000, often found in documents. 
This figure is patently incorrect. It is based on UN Conciliation Commission document 
(A/AC.25/Com.Tech/7/Add.1) of 1 April 1949, entitled: Appendix B: “Non-Jewish (sic) 
Population within the Boundaries held by IDF”. This document gives the figure of 726,800, 
but it suffers from two basic defects: (1) it quotes the official Village Statistics of April 1945, 
i.e. it is 4 years behind, and (2) it quotes for Beer Sheba the ever-decreasing number of 
53,550. It has therefore to be adjusted for these defects. When so adjusted, it will come to 
875,000 and, with the ‘extra’ villages, to about one million. 
According to Morris, Arab spokesmen at the time spoke of 900,000 to one million 
refugees, which was considered by the Israelis as a wild exaggeration. Although the Arab 
figure does not appear to be based on a rigorous analysis, it turns out to be, after all, not off 
the mark. 
Further analysis of UNRWA records reveal very interesting results about the 
dispersion of the refugees upon their expulsion. The village population moved en masse to 
their place of refuge. They first hovered around their village, then moved to the next safe 
village. Finally they settled in one of the five UNRWA areas. Tracing the movement of the 
refugees, it was found that fully 72% of all refugees moved to one UNRWA area, and only 
20% moved to two areas. Just 8% are dispersed in more than 2 areas. This indicates the 
monolithic structure of the Palestinian society based on the village unit. This phenomenon is 
also remarkable given the wars of 1967, 1970 and 1982. As to be expected, refugee 
movement was largely confined to a particular area grouping as follows: (West Bank and 
Jordan), (West Bank and Gaza) and (Syria and Lebanon). More than two thirds of the 
refugees can be found in one of these groups.’ 
Thus in spite of ravages of war and interminable suffering, the Palestinian refugees 
remain monolithic and traceable to a large degree.’ 
4
 For a discussion of the number of IDPs within Israel and why their numbers may have been 
neglected, see ‘The Internally Displaced Palestinians in Israel’ by Areej Sabbagh-Khoury in 
Al-Majdal, Palestinian Citizens of Israel: Defying the Ongoing Nakba, Issue 51, Winter 2012 
(Sabbagh-Khoury, 2012).  
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5
 Israeli Apartheid Week <http://apartheidweek.org/> is celebrated across university 
campuses worldwide annually; in 2018 it was celebrated between February 19th and April 
17
th
.  
6
 Sari Hanafi, however, chooses to refer to this as ‘spacio-cide’ referring to the 
‘dispossession, occupation and destruction of Palestinian living space and what I call spacio-
cide’ (Hanafi, 2009.) 
7
 This socially constructed silence emanates from three factors, according to Winter; firstly, 
there is ‘liturgical silence’, which is ‘always part of the framing of public understandings of 
war and violence, since these touch on the sacred, and on eternal themes of loss, mourning, 
sacrifice and redemption’ (Winter, 2010, p. 4). Then there is ‘political’ or ‘strategic silence’ 
that may be selected ‘to suspend or truncate open conflict over the meaning and/or 
justification of violence, either domestic or trans-national. The hope here is that the passage 
of time can lower the temperature of disputes about these events, or even heal the wounds 
they cause’ (Winter, 2010, p.5). Finally, there is ‘essentialist silence’, which ‘arises from 
considerations of privilege … Only those who have been there, so this argument goes, can 
claim the authority of direct experience required to speak about these matters’ (Winter, 2010, 
p. 6). 
8
 Retorts Daniel Blatman of Morris’s approach, ‘Benny Morris still believes that the role of the 
historian is no more than to tell his readers what he found in an official archive and in 
documents issued by some government organization or other. Had the study of the 
Holocaust, for example, continued to be based on a similar approach – as indeed was the 
case in German historiography in the 1970s – we would know almost nothing about the 
Jews’ lives and their efforts to survive during the years of their great tragedy, as we now 
know thanks to the many testimonies from the survivors themselves.’ (Blatman, 2017).  
9
 It is not the goal of this study to take on an account of Palestinian resistance; Yezid 
Sayigh’s mighty 1997 work, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian 
National Movement, 1920-1993, does that, however, in great depth. For those Palestinians 
engaged in resistance, it resulted in the ‘transformation of the Palestinian image, from a poor 
refugee to a revolutionary hero .... Palestinians in the refugee camps spoke about their 
rebirth as normal human beings after the rise of the resistance in Lebanon… Exile was 
identified with loss and lack of identity. It was also a lack of dignity, where the Palestinian 
had no control over his life. Identity was connected and bound to the territory of Palestine. 
As a result, regaining identity had to be coupled with resistance and struggle’ (Jamal, 2003).  
10
 See WowWire (2011):‘Dr. Rosemary Sayigh is an anthropologist and oral historian. Since 
1953 she has been based in Beirut, Lebanon. She is the author of numerous publications on 
Palestinian history and Palestinian women, including: Palestinian: From Peasants to 
Revolutionaries (Zed Books, 2008), “Women’s Nakba Stories: Between Living and Knowing” 
in Ahmad Sa’di and Lila Abu-Lughod eds. Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of 
Memory (Columbia University Press, 2007), “Product and producer of Palestinian history: 
stereotypes of “self” in camp women’s life stories” in Journal of Middle East Women’s 
Studies (2007), “Remembering Mothers, Forming daughters: Palestinian Women’s 
Narratives in Refugee Camps in Lebanon” in Ronit Lentin and Nahla Abdo (ed.) Dissemi-
Nation: Narrating Palestinian/ Israeli Gendered Auto/Biographies of Dis-Location. Oxford and 
New York: Berghahn Books 2002, Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in 
Lebanon (Zed Books, 1994), “Encounters with Palestinian Women under Occupation” in 
Journal of Palestine Studies (1998), “Femmes Palestiniennes: une histoire en quete 
d’historiens” in Revue d’Etudes Palestiniennes (1987), “Researching Gender in a Palestinian 
Camp: Political, Theoretical and Methodological Issues” in Deniz Kandiyoti (ed.) Gendering 
the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives. London: I.B. Tauris 1996.’ 
11
 See, for example, ‘Outlawing the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement - Legal 
background’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015) and Barak Ravid’s ‘Israel outlaws 
Islamic Movement’s Northern Branch’ (Ravid, 2015).  
12
 ‘In the beginning, in April 1945, the Holocaust was not the “Holocaust”’ writes Jeffrey 
Alexander (Alexander, 2004a, p. 196), describing the slow trickle of information about the 
atrocities in Nazi-occupied Europe, and the lack of identification with the victims on the part 
of Americans. 
13
 Areej Sabbagh-Khoury and Nadim. M. Rouhana write, ‘Research on the social and 
political history of the Palestinians in Israel did not address important historical stages in 
their individual and collective experience. These include, for instance, the critical stage of 
social and political formation that followed the start of the Nakba and the period of military 
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rule (i.e., the stage in which the Palestinians were transformed from a majority into a minority 
in their own homeland, and from its owners into strangers in it). This stage had a central 
effect on the configuration of their social identity and social structure, the formation of their 
political organizations, and the formulation of their political discourse during that period–as 
well as on laying the foundation for their future political consciousness. Furthermore, 
Palestinians did not write their own social or political history during the period of military rule 
that Israel imposed on them until 1966–the critical period in which the Palestinians lost 
connection with their people and the Arab nation and environment. In this period, Israel also 
imposed strict means of control in order to dispossess them of their resources, and to tighten 
political domination, obstruct nationalist political organization, impose intellectual hegemony, 
and instil fear of the security establishment’. (Sabbagh-Khoury and Rouhana, 2011, p. 10). 
Sorek notes that the emergency regulations also led to the killing of ‘between 2,700 
and 5,000 Palestinians’, mostly trying to return home from their land after curfew, including 
the massacre of Kafr Qasim (October 29, 1956) (Sorek, 2015, loc. 955). Forty-nine men, 
women and children were killed in the latter atrocity, as Adel Manna discusses (Manna, 
2011, p. 76). 
14
 IPCRI, the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, has issued three reports: 
‘Analysis and Evaluation of the new Palestinian Curriculum: Reviewing Palestinian textbooks 
and tolerance education program’ (Report 1, March 2003; Report 2, June 2004 for Grades 4 
& 9; Report 3, July 2006 for Grades 5 & 6). The reports are viewable at 
<https://issuu.com/ipcri/docs/analysis_and_evaluation_of_the_new_>, 
<https://issuu.com/ipcri/docs/analysis_and_evaluation_of_the_new__435079b984ac19> and 
<http://www.ipcri.org/index.php/publications/research-and-information/125-analysis-and-
evaluation-of-the-new-palestinian-curriculum-report-ii-2005> respectively. 
Impact-se ‘a research, policy and advocacy organization that monitors and analyzes 
education. It employs international standards on peace and tolerance as derived from 
UNESCO declarations and resolutions to determine compliance and to advocate for change 
when necessary’ (formerly the Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace – CMIP) regularly 
releases reports on the textbooks and educational materials of the Occupied Palestinian 
territories <http://www.impact-se.org/reports/palestinian-territories/palestinian-authority/> and 
Gaza <http://www.impact-se.org/reports/palestinian-territories/hamas/> , while also studying 
the representation of Palestinians in Israeli textbooks <http://www.impact-
se.org/reports/israel/> .However, many of the reports between 2000-2010 are authored by 
Arnon Groiss, who studied the representation of Jews, Israel, and the ‘other’ also in 
textbooks in Egypt, Iran Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tunisia. Groiss’s position as a proponent of 
Israeli hasbara (a Hebrew term that basically translates to ‘public relations’ or ‘propaganda’) 
made clear in articles such as, ‘De-legitimization of Israel in Palestinian Authority 
schoolbooks’, published in 2012 in Israel Affairs, 18(3), 455-484, DOI: 
10.1080/13537121.2012.689524; and ‘Teaching “The Right of Return” in UNRWA Schools’ 
(n.d.) (available at 
http://israelbehindthenews.com/library/pdfs/RightofReturninUNRWASchools.pdf ). In 
contrast, Nurit Peled-Elhanan (2012) has studied negative representations of Palestinians in 
the Israeli curriculum (Palestine in Israeli School Books: Ideology and Propaganda in 
Education, London and New York: I B Tauris); Ruth Firer and Sami Adwan co-wrote an 
earlier study in 2004, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in History and Civics Textbooks of Both 
Nations (Hanover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung) while Sami Adwan later took part (2012) 
in the writing of Side by Side: Parallel Histories of Israel-Palestine (with Dan Bar-On and 
Eyal Naveh, Peace Research Institute in the Middle East and New York: The New Press) in 
a remarkable attempt at a textbook representation of both Palestinian and Israeli historical 
narratives in tandem. 
15
 According to the right-wing NGO Monitor <https://www.ngo-monitor.org/ngos/zochrot/> 
Zochrot funders include Christian Aid, Jewish Voice for Peace and Oxfam.  
16
 According to its website, ‘Zochrot and other Israeli NGOs have been fairly successful over 
the past few years in raising the Nakba to the awareness of the broad Jewish public. The 
term ‘Nakba’ has become part and parcel of current Israeli discourse; nevertheless, its mere 
presence still does not mean broad acknowledgement of and accountability for the 
destruction of hundreds of villages and resulting hundreds of thousands of Palestinian 
refugees in the 1948 War.’ (‘Our vision’, <http://zochrot.org/en/content/17> (Zochrot, 2014). 
17
 Al Jazeera in Arabic began broadcasting in 1996. 
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18
 The concept initially emerged through social media, according to a report by Maram 
Humaid (Humaid, 2018) ‘We want to return to our lands without bloodshed or bombs’: ‘Abu 
Artema then posted a message on his Facebook page asking people whether they would be 
interested in a peaceful border protest. The majority of responses applauded the idea, which 
quickly gained traction and received the backing of Palestinian political parties in the Strip, 
including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah and leftist parties.’  
19
 One report quotes Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh as saying that the Great March of Return 
will transform into a general intifada and will continue beyond May 15
th
 ‘The series of weekly 
violent Palestinian protests known as the March of Return will not end on … Nakba Day, but 
will continue through Ramadan, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh said this week. Attending a 
meeting of religious clerics ahead of the month-long fast of Ramadan, which commences 
May 16, Haniyeh said the protests would not end, as originally planned, as they have 
“strategic goals.” He did not lay out any specific goals. … Haniyeh added furthermore that 
the protests would no longer be isolated to the Gaza border and would spread throughout 
Judea and Samaria.’ (Hamas: March of Return to Continue Through Ramadan, Spread to 
West Bank.’ [JLBWC Staff, 2018]) The article draws on data from the Meir Amit Intelligence 
and Terrorism Information Center (<http://www.terrorism-info.org.il>) (IDF Spokesperson’s 
Office, 2018) but the comment about indefinite continuance of the Great March of Return 
can be verified on Hamas’ homepage, ‘He [Haniyeh] confirmed that the peaceful protests 
would continue after the Nakba Day on May 15 until Palestinians regain their fundamental 
rights and return to their homelands’ (‘Hamas: Palestinians' right to return to homeland is 
inalienable’, 28th April, 2018, <http://hamas.ps/en/post/1286/hamas-palestinians-right-to-
return-to-homeland-is-inalienable>. ) Finally, OCHA (on May 18
th
 2018) suggests that the 
demonstrations are set to run until Naksa Day, June 5
th
 
(<https://www.ochaopt.org/content/56-palestinians-reported-injured-during-demonstrations-
gaza-first-friday-ramadan>) but as we now know, there appears to be no end date in sight. 
20
 B’tselem executive director Hagai El-Ad wrote to UN Secretary General António Guterres 
sharing the names of the victims (publicized in this campaign) and condemning ‘the 35 
Palestinians killed and 1,500 injured by live ammunition … the predictable outcome of the 
manifestly illegal rules of engagement implemented during the demonstrations, of ordering 
soldiers to use lethal gunfire against unarmed demonstrators who pose no mortal danger. 
These orders are unlawful under both international law and Israeli law. Responsibility for 
these fatal outcomes rests with the policy makers and – above all – with Israel’s prime 
minister, defense minister and chief of staff.’ El-Ad called for the UN to ‘do all in its power – 
and its responsibility – in order to protect Palestinian lives and uphold international norms.’ 
<https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/publication/20180426_GazaKillings_B%27Tsel
emLetter_eng> (El-Ad, 2018). 
As a result, according Israel Hayom, Israel’s ‘national service program suspend[ed] the 
organization's eligibility for volunteers, saying campaign violated the law’. (Altman and Israel 
Hayom Staff, 2018; ‘Rights group B'Tselem loses volunteers after calling for IDF 
insubordination’.  
21
 The post appears on May 3
rd
, 2018 at 
https://www.facebook.com/gershon.baskin/posts/10160275190200366 
22
 The message on Israeli peace activist Gershon Baskin’s Facebook page is: 
Gaza sends messages of peace to Israelis 
We want freedom 
We want peace 
We want to live in safety 
We want to lift the siege 
We want justice and democracy 
We want to live equally 
We want to live in dignity 
The right to travel and travel 
Right to treatment 
Right to education 
The post appears on May 4
th
, 2018 at: 
<https://www.facebook.com/gershon.baskin/posts/10160279975250366> 
23 The post appears on May 5th, 2018 at: 
<https://www.facebook.com/gershon.baskin/posts/10160281225100366> 
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One of the commentators, Rachel Ben-Shitrit, attempted to translate the clip (from Arabic to 
Hebrew): 
‘I'll try to translate. 
The first woman to speak: the message is a message of peace. 
We came here to the border and flew 150 pigeons to send a message to the world and to 
Israel. We are teenagers with no connection to a political party, sending a message of peace 
and love. We don’t want wars, we don’t want people to be killed, we don’t want blood. We 
want to go back to our country through justice. 
The second woman: the pigeons represent peace, and so we want to send a message to the 
other side via these pigeons that people in Gaza are a democratic people, seeking freedom 
and peace. We want to live in freedom like the rest of the Arab nations. 
- sorry for my inaccuracies, my Arabic is not fluent. But I tried as well as I could.’ 
[Researcher’s translation, from Hebrew to English.] 
Notes for Chapter Six 
 
1
 For the 2002 text of the API, see 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/28/israel7> (The Guardian, 2002) or the 
official English translation at <http://www.centerpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Arab-
Peace-Initiative-Official-Translation.pdf> (S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace, 
2013, citing Muasher, 2008). 
2
 See 
<https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/C758572B78D1CD0085256BCF0077E51A> 
United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/194 (III)11 December 1948 (United Nations 
General Assembly, 1948).  
‘11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace 
with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, 
and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to 
return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international 
law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities 
responsible;  
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and 
economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of 
compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations 
Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and 
agencies of the United Nations.’. 
3
 Comments Teitelbaum, ‘The Lebanese continued to present problems with respect to the 
refugee issue. They did not accept that Resolution 194 offered the possibility of 
compensation, and were determined to have a specific paragraph against Palestinian 
resettlement (in Arabic, tawtin) in Lebanon’ (2009, p. 12). 
4
 On this, Podeh (2007) observes, ‘First, [the API] was not directed at the Israeli government. 
Based on their hard-line and aggressive image of Sharon, the Saudis assessed that he 
would immediately reject it; the Initiative was aimed at the peace camp in Israel, with the 
hope that it would either exert political pressure on the government to accept it or would 
trigger a change in government. Second, the Saudis hoped that the UN Security Council 
would endorse the Initiative. Such a step would enable the replacement of UN Resolution 
242, which was perceived as inappropriate and too pro-Israel, since it did not relate to 
Palestinian rights and did not specify the withdrawal of Israel from all the territories. 
 
Notes for Chapter Seven 
 
1
 Nets-Zehngut (2016, pp. 49-50) categorizes the forms neatly as ‘popular memory, defined 
as representations of the past held by society members, best manifested directly in public 
opinion surveys … official memory—the representations of the past adopted by the formal 
institutions of the group. … cultural memory—the way the society views its past via, inter 
alia, newspaper articles, memorials, monuments, films and buildings’. 
 
 
